Military

(1) Village. A village has 3,000 inhabitants or less. A brigade AO (area of operations) can include many villages. As a normal part of brigade operations, the brigade units bypass, move through, defend from, and attack objectives within villages.

(2) Town. A town has 3,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, but is not part of a major urban complex. Operations in such areas normally involve brigades or divisions. As part of division operations, brigades bypass, move through, defend in, or attack enemy forces within towns.

(3) City. A city has 100,000 to 1 million inhabitants.

(4) Metropolis. A metropolis has between 1 and 10 million inhabitants.

(5) Megalopolis. A megalopolis has over 10 million inhabitants.

(1) City Core. The city core is its downtown or central business district-the heart of the city. This area is relatively small and compact. It contains a large percentage of the city's shops, offices, and public institutions as well as its highest density of multistory buildings and subterranean areas. Today, typical city cores consist of buildings that vary greatly in height. Also, most cities have developed their core zones more than their core periphery zones. Thus, city cores usually differ greatly from their peripheries. The two most common construction patterns used in city core zones are:

(2) Core Periphery. The core periphery is located at the edges of the city core. Its streets vary from 12 to 20 meters wide and have continuous fronts of brick or concrete buildings. In small towns, the buildings range between two and three stories high. In large cities, they range from five to ten stories. The two most common construction patterns used in core periphery zones are the same as those described for the city core: dense random construction and close orderly block construction.

(3) Dispersed Residential Area. In Europe, this type area normally occurs next to close-orderly block areas. It has row houses or single-family dwellings with yards, gardens, trees, and fences. Streets normally form rectangular or curving patterns.

(4) High-Rise Area. Typical of modern construction in larger cities and towns, this type area consists of multistoried apartments, separated open areas, and single-story buildings. Wide streets form rectangular patterns. These areas are often located right next to industrial or transportation areas. Sometimes they intersperse with close-orderly block areas.

(5) Industrial-Transportation Area. These areas generally occur along major rail and highway routes in urban complexes. Some older complexes exist within dense randomly constructed or close-orderly block areas. New construction normally consists of low, flat-roofed factory and warehouse buildings. Throughout the Orient, adjacent high-rise areas provide worker housing. The platoon must identify all transportation facilities in these areas, because all of them, especially rail yards, pose significant obstacles to military movement.

(6) Permanent or Fixed Fortifications. These include any of several different types of fortifications, including such isolated forts as the Hue Citadel (Viet Nam) and the German fortifications around Metz. They can also include fortified lines such as the Siegfried and Maginot Lines. Though most are in Western Europe, many are also in the Balkans, the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and South America. Most such fortifications in the United States were built for coastal defense. Permanent fortifications are made of earth, wood, rock, brick, concrete, steel-reinforced concrete, or any combination of these. Some of the latest variants are built underground using heavy tank or warship armor; their armament includes major caliber and other weapons; they have internal communications, service facilities, and NBC overpressure systems.

(7) Shantytowns. Shantytowns seldom follow any of the previously described urban patterns. They occur in many different zones in urban areas. Many underdeveloped countries have small towns and villages, but few large cities. Shantytown structures are made of materials ranging from cardboard to concrete block. People in arid regions build with adobe, which consists of earthenware bricks, sometimes reinforced with straw. Even larger cities can have shantytowns around their perimeters.

(1) Urban Airspace. Airspace offers a rapid avenue of approach into an urban area. Obstacles such as rubble, vehicles, or constructed barriers do not affect aviation assets. However, pilots must avoid power lines, towers, sign poles, and billboards. To ensure improved flight planning, reconnaissance elements can locate, identify, and report these obstacles.

(2) Supersurface. The term "supersurface" refers only to the top, roof, or apex of a structure. These areas can provide cover and concealment, limit or enhance observation and fields of fire, and, depending on the situation, can enhance, restrict, canalize, or block movement. Historically, most movement within the urban environment has been on the surface or between supersurfaces (from rooftop to rooftop). Supersurface areas can provide excellent concealed positions for snipers, automatic weapons, light and medium antitank weapons, and man-portable air defense systems. In many cases, they enable top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored vehicles (their decks) and unsuspecting aircraft (their underbellies).

(3) Intrasurface. The term "intrasurface" refers to the floors within the structural framework, that is, all areas between ground level (surface) and the structure's permanent roof or apex (supersurface). It includes all interior surfaces. Historically, the most numerous and most intense combat engagements occur in this intrasurface area, which is a diverse and complex combat environment. The intrasurface of a building greatly limits reconnaissance and surveillance but, at the same time, enhances cover and concealment. Some intrasurface areas have mobility corridors within and between structures at upper levels. These corridors can conceal snipers, automatic weapons, light and medium antitank weapons, and man-portable, air-defense systems. In many cases, intrasurfaces allow top-down attacks against the weakest points of armored vehicles (their decks) and unsuspecting aircraft (their underbellies).

(4) Surface. This includes all ground-, street-, and water-level surfaces. Streets and open areas provide a rapid approach for ground movement in urban terrain. Buildings canalize units that try to move along the streets. This leaves the unit little room to move. Conversely, the enemy can observe and engage forces that move across large open areas such as parks, athletic fields, and parking areas.

(5) Subsurface. This includes all underwater and subterranean areas such as subways, sewers, public utility systems, and cellars. Dismounted elements can move through subsurface areas. Both attacker and defender can use subterranean routes to outflank or turn the opposition, or to infiltrate, ambush, counterattack, and sustain operations. Some urban subsurface systems are hard to find, but can still play an important role in the outcome of operations.

(1) Air Power. Air power offers little help to Infantry units fighting from buildings, because an adept enemy "hugs" the opposition to deny them use of overwhelming firepower.

(2) Training and Equipment. The training and equipment used against a mobile, armored threat might work poorly in urban operations.

(1) Radio. Structures and a high concentration of electrical power lines normally degrade radio communications in urban areas. The construction materials in many buildings prevent radio waves from passing through them. Units often have too few radios to communicate with subordinate elements as they enter buildings and move through urban canyons and defiles.

(2) Visual Signals. The platoon can use visual signals, which are often ineffective due to the screening effects of buildings, walls, and other vertical structures. Leaders must plan, widely disseminate, and ensure understanding by all assigned, attached, or OPCON units.

(3) Sound Signals. Increased noise makes the effective use of sound signals difficult. Also, verbal signals may communicate the location and intent of the unit to the enemy.

(4) Messengers. Messengers are slow and susceptible to enemy fire when moving between buildings or crossing streets.

(5) Wire. Wire is the best way to control the defense of an urban area. Given sufficient assets, it offers an alternative means of communications during offensive operations. Its weakness is its vulnerability to damage from falling or flying debris, exploding munitions, and moving vehicles.

(1) Accidents. More casualties result from shattered glass, falling debris, rubble, ricochets, urban fires, and falls from heights than from actual combat engagements.

(2) Situational Awareness. Difficulty in maintaining situational awareness also increases casualties, because leaders find preventing fratricide more difficult if they do not know the locations of other friendly personnel.

(3) Psychological Illnesses. Stress naturally contributes to the number of accidents, fratricide incidents, and illnesses. Stress can also trigger other, latent psychological problems.

(4) Physical Illnesses or Environmental Hazards. Nonbattle injuries result from illnesses, environmental hazards, unsanitary conditions, contaminated water, toxic industrial materials, and so forth.

(1) Threat forces can use the local population to support their deception plan. Guerrillas, terrorists, paramilitary, and even conventional soldiers might take on the appearance of the local population, even to the extent of growing facial hair, if needed.

(2) Threat forces will try to take advantage of the US's sense of moral responsibility by trying to burden the Army's logistical and force-protection resources with responsibility for the civil population. To do this, they could herd refugees into friendly-controlled sectors, steal from US-paid local nationals, and hide themselves among civilians during offensive operations.

(3) The civil population can also provide intelligence to threat forces. Local hires serving among US soldiers, civilians with access to base camp perimeters, and refugees moving through friendly-controlled sectors could provide information about friendly dispositions, readiness, and intent. In addition, threat special-purpose forces and hostile intelligence-service assets try to move among well-placed civilian groups.

(1) Portable video cameras, Internet, commercial radios, and cellular telephones are all venues where threat forces can tell their story. They can stage and broadcast fictitious American "atrocities" and send e-mail to groups sympathetic to friendly forces. In either case, the purpose is to undermine the resolve-and therefore also the actual support-of supporting friendly forces. Internet web sites provide easy worldwide dissemination of threat propaganda and misinformation. Threat hackers could try to gain access to US sites in order to manipulate information to their own advantage.

(2) The threat can use the news media skillfully. For example, insurgent campaigns need not succeed tactically or militarily. To gain domestic and world support, they need only make the opposition's campaign seem unpalatable. The media coverage of the Tet Offensive of 1968 affected the will of both the American people and their political leadership. Although the battle for Hue was a tactical victory for the US, the North Vietnamese clearly achieved strategic success by searing the American consciousness with the high costs of urban warfare.

(1) Telephones. Telephone exchanges provide simple and reliable communications that anyone can secure easily using off-the-shelf technologies.

(2) Sewage and Flood Facilities. The threat can use sewage treatment plants and flood-control machinery to implement weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or to render sections of the urban area uninhabitable.

(3) Broadcast Media. Media stations significantly improve the information operations position of the controlling force.

(4) Power Plants. Power generation and transmission sites provide means to control significant aspects of civilian society over a large area.

(1) Upper floors and roofs make excellent observation points and battle positions whose height might exceed the height to which many weapons can elevate. Engagements from upper floors strike armored vehicles in some of their most vulnerable locations-their top deck(s), hatches, and, in some cases, in their gunner's stations.

(2) Basements provide firing points below the level that many weapons can depress. They too allow fire at armored vehicles' weak belly armor.

(3) Sewers and subways provide covered and concealed access throughout the area of operations.

(1) Safe Havens. Areas that could serve as safe haven for threat forces. Examples include hospitals, police stations, embassies, and any other nominally friendly facilities that could harbor threat elements.

(2) Hazardous Areas. Hazardous areas such as construction sites, dangerous intersections, bridges, and areas of criminal activity.

(3) Key or Critical Areas. Key or critical areas, including but not limited to bridges, parks, industrial complexes, and airports.

(1) The scouts add graphic control measures and identify sites of tactical and operations significance (Figure 9-5). The platoon leader uses the accumulated information to develop a detailed urban operations sketch (Figure 9-6). He must ensure that the platoon's sketches are consistent with those used at higher levels. In addition, he can develop more than one type of operational overlay, depending on the information collected. Example overlays (Figures 9-7 through 9-9) show terrain conditions, likely threat positions, and subterranean infrastructure.

(2) The platoon leader distributes the sketches and overlays both within the unit and to higher and adjacent elements. Because individual reconnaissance squads might have to execute operations on their own, the platoon leader must ensure that every soldier understands the sketches, the overlays, and the reference system used. As the platoon conducts operations in the urban area, it confirms the accuracy of the sketches and overlays, adding and adjusting details as needed.

(1) He can form two R&S teams from each squad. He can form a two-soldier team and a three-soldier team (Figure 9-10).

(2) He can include a platoon radio operator and eight two-soldier teams under the squad leader (Figure 9-11).

(1) Avoids silhouetting himself in doors and windows.

(2) Avoids moving alone; moves with at least one other soldier for security.

(3) Tries to stay 12 to 18 inches away from walls when moving. Rubbing against walls could alert an enemy on the other side of the wall. Also, ricochet rounds tend to travel parallel to a wall.

(4) Avoids stepping into puddles of water or any other substances that could leave tracks. Carries several plastic grocery bags with him. If he must walk through such a substance, he can cover his boots with the bags, then remove the bags as soon as he clears the obstacle. This prevents him from tracking the substance elsewhere.

(1) For example, the point soldier, or the first soldier in the order of movement, observes street level to his front, generally from 12 o'clock to 1 o'clock. The Number Two soldier observes to the front and across the street (1 o'clock to 2 o'clock), both at street level and upper stories. The squad leader observes the upper stories to his front (his 12 o'clock). He also observes the same side of the street the squad observes. The Number Three soldier observes across the street (from 2 o'clock to 4 o'clock), from street level up. The Number Four soldier provides rear security for the squad. He observes from 4 o'clock to 6 o'clock, street level and upper stories (Figure 9-12).

(2) Moving from building to building or between buildings poses a risk. The enemy can easily detect a squad, which makes a large target for enemy fire. When moving from the corner of one building to the corner of another building, the squad should cross the open area as two separate groups (Figures 9-13 through 9-17).

(3) Moving from the side of one building across the street to the side of another building, not at a corner, presents a similar problem. The squad uses the same technique of movement, and it uses the building as cover. In moving adjacent to a building, squad members should keep a distance of 3 to 5 meters between themselves (Figure 9-18).

(1) Serpentine Formation. The five-soldier reconnaissance squad uses the serpentine technique when moving in narrow hallways. The Number One soldier provides security to the front. His sector of security includes the far end of the hall and any doorways near the end. The Number Two and Number Three soldiers observe the left and right sides of the Number One soldier. Their sectors of security include any nearby doorways on either side of the hall. They cover the Number One soldier's flanks. The squad leader moves behind the Number Two and Number Three soldiers and centers on them so he can observe and control the squad. The Number Four soldier provides rear security, observing the hallway behind the squad.

(2) Rolling "T" Formation. The squad uses the rolling "T" technique when moving in wide hallways. The Number One and Number Two soldiers move abreast, observing the opposite side of the hallway from their position. The Number Three soldier observes the far end of the hallway from a position behind the Number One and Number Two soldiers, observing between them. The squad leader moves behind the Number Three soldier so that he can observe and control the squad. Again, the Number Four soldier provides rear security.

(3) Modified Trail Formation. The squad uses the modified trail formation when contact with the enemy is possible and speed is not important. The squad moves along the hallway in a staggered trail formation. Number One and Number Two soldiers observe the length of the hallway on their respective sides. The squad leader follows, controlling movement. The Number Three and Number Four soldiers position themselves behind the squad leader and stagger their positions as well. They both observe to the rear and along their respective sides (Figure 9-23). When using this movement technique, soldiers should leave enough separation between them to execute the "break contact" drill. No more than two personnel should be in short stretches of hallway (less than 50 feet between intersections) (Figure 9-24).

(1) The squad leader designates two or three soldiers to clear the stairs.

(2) The squad maintains 360-degree/three-dimensional security near the stairs.

(3) The squad leader then directs the clearing team to locate, mark, bypass, or clear any obstacles or booby traps that may be blocking access to the stairs.

(4) The clearing team moves up (or down) the stairways using either the two- or three-soldier "flow" technique, which provides for overwatching up and down the stairs during movement. The three-man variation works best (Figure 9-27).

(1) If the element makes contact at close range (15 meters or less) and cannot find cover, the Number One and Number Two soldiers engage the enemy at once with rapid semiautomatic fire. At the same time, they assault the threat until they neutralize it (Figure 9-28). Other members of the squad (the Number Three soldier and the squad leader) should stay prepared to engage any targets that present themselves. However, they should not fire past the Number One and Number Two soldiers. The Number Four soldier seeks cover and provides rear security.

(2) If the reconnaissance platoon makes contact at a range greater than 15 meters, and if it can find no immediate way out, then the Number One soldier starts engaging the enemy with rapid semiautomatic fire. It withdraws to the rear, and the Number Two and Number Three soldiers assume kneeling positions. The Number Two soldier engages the enemy with rapid semiautomatic fire as well. The squad leader shifts to one side of the hall and assumes a kneeling position, ready to provide covering fire as his squad withdraws. The Number Four soldier (facing to the rear) moves to the nearest hallway intersection or doorway that offers cover (Figure 9-29). He ensures the area is secure. Once the Number One soldier clears the Number Three soldier's field of fire, the Number Three soldier begins to engage the enemy with rapid semiautomatic fire (Figure 9-30). After moving to a position forward of the Number Four soldier, the Number One soldier provides security along the rearward hallway.

(3) Then the Number Four soldier turns around to support the squad's withdrawal. Once the Number Three soldier begins providing suppressive fire, the Number Two soldier begins to withdraw in the same manner as the Number One soldier (Figure 9-31).

(4) As the Number Two soldier passes the squad leader, the squad leader begins to provide suppressive fire; the Number Three soldier prepares to withdraw, as did the Number Two soldier (Figure 9-32).

(5) After the Number Three soldier has moved, the squad leader moves into the center of the hallway, allowing the Number Four soldier to engage any threat as the squad leader withdraws (Figure 9-33).

(6) When the squad leader moves out of contact with the enemy, the squad is ready to move (Figure 9-34).

(1) Outside the Area. An OP on the periphery can serve as a prelude to an offensive operation into the urban area. It could also play a defensive role well forward of the battalion's urban defensive positions. Either way, the platoon uses the same techniques to establish and operate the OP in UO that they would use in open terrain.

(2) Inside the Area. Selecting and occupying an OP inside the confines of the urban area proves very difficult. To do it, the reconnaissance leader must have detailed maps of the city. This includes maps of subterranean facilities, maps with street names, and maps of all key and critical structures. Aerial photographs help in determining size, height and, possibly, structural composition of buildings in the AO. Pictures need to show clearly the AO's boundaries, suspected enemy locations, and routes of movement that the OP must observe.

(1) Observation. Roadways and open areas clearly define, but structures limit, the fields of observation. Surrounding rooftops, windows, and doorways become distractions requiring constant observation. Sectors of adjacent OPs should overlap. The effects of smoke from military obscurants and burning buildings can degrade what appeared to be an excellent vantage point. The platoon must provide all-round security, because the enemy can fire from many directions, and because the platoon must counter the enemy's attempts to infiltrate.

(2) Cover and Concealment. Urban terrain readily provides cover and concealment for both maneuvering and static elements. However, the defender has a decisive advantage. A maneuvering attacker normally exposes his presence when moving through the area.

(3) Covered and or Concealed Routes to the Observation Post. The element should move along avenues of approach inside buildings, whenever they can. The enemy is less likely to detect personnel moving inside buildings than those moving through the streets. Reconnaissance elements must remember the enemy will see them on standard avenues of approach. When possible, they should try to use subterranean routes.

(4) Specific Positions Inside the Area. Leaders should position OPs in masonry buildings that offer long-range fields of observation and all-round views. The observer has an advantage because he does not have to move. However, the leader should avoid locating OPs—

(5) Multiple Positions. Due to the restricted fields of observation in urban terrain, teams should identify and prepare alternate positions within their assigned sectors. A single position might not afford adequate observation without increasing the risk of detection, whereas two carefully placed positions might. Alternate positions must maintain mutual support with adjacent OPs.

(1) Determine if using subterranean avenues of approach or occupying subterranean areas will help the platoon accomplish its mission.

(2) Analyze the subterranean mission and evaluate the impact of subterranean operations on the soldiers. Before submitting soldiers to subterranean combat, think it through first. Remember that it places extremely high physical and psychological demands on soldiers.

(3) Plan for redundant communications (messengers, wire, radios).

(4) Plan for additional weapons and ammunition that may be required for subterranean operations (shotguns, pistols, distraction devices, early warning, and so forth).

(1) Movement. Subterranean routes enable the reconnaissance element to infiltrate the objective area undetected. Depending upon the size and experience of the threat forces, movement along the subterranean avenue of approach could be unimpeded. However, a large, well-trained opposing force will try to control subterranean facilities. Once the reconnaissance element reaches the objective area, they must deploy multiple R&S teams aboveground and into buildings to conduct the area reconnaissance.

(2) Initial Reconnaissance. The use of subterranean passages allows the reconnaissance element to conduct an initial infiltration into the urban area virtually undetected. Without prior intelligence of possible enemy positions, reconnaissance elements using subterranean routes can identify critical locations, structures, movement routes, and enemy positions. Curbside storm drains make excellent observation ports when conducting a route or zone reconnaissance, or when tasked to observe an essential intersection or roadway.

(1) Exploit Weaknesses. The reconnaissance platoon can also assist the commander in concentrating sufficient combat power at decisive points within the city. Historical experience indicates that, when an attacker wins despite inferior manpower and firepower, the defender has most likely violated one or more principles of war. Reconnaissance elements in support of an urban attack should always be alert to the possibility that the defender has not positioned his forces correctly or exhibits some other weaknesses or shortcomings.

(2) Neutralize Key Facilities. The commander may be able to capitalize on such a weakness or shortcoming, or he may be able to create one. As an example, intelligence sources, including the reconnaissance platoon, have determined that the defending force relies on the local telephone exchange and military FM communications for command and control. The commander probes this weakness by directing his reconnaissance to identify key communications nodes. Once identified, the commander can disrupt enemy C2 by destroying the telephone system and jamming FM communications. He can also eliminate other types of commercial broadcasting systems, such as TV and radio, to deny the enemy a backup means of communications. The friendly commander then exploits this situation by massing combat power against isolated threat forces to seize key areas.

(1) Traditionally, indirect artillery and mortar fire has been a significant factor in successful urban operations. Fire support has proved to be the primary means by which the commander can interdict enemy supply operations, as well as prevent the reinforcement and evacuation of enemy troops. In such instances, the commander plans and places indirect fires on routes leading to and from the city rather than in the urban area itself.

(2) In support of his indirect-fire plan, the commander uses the reconnaissance platoon in various ways. Among others, he uses them to accurately direct fires onto enemy positions. He relies on them to provide "ground truth" information, which can help him prevent the problems associated with indiscriminate or inaccurate fires. These problems could of course include fratricide, civilian casualties, and serious collateral damage. Reconnaissance elements prove especially valuable in preventing fratricide by helping to ensure that the commander knows at all times the accurate locations of friendly and enemy forces in the urban area.

(1) The figure shows the buildings numbered consecutively in a counterclockwise manner.

(2) The platoon leader labels building apertures consecutively, using rows and columns. He designates all apertures relative to the direction of assault. In the example, the lower left-hand window on the direction-of-assault side of OBJ 4 is labeled "OBJ 4, WHITE, window A1." (See Appendix G, FM 34-130 for more information about building shapes and structural labeling.)

(3) The reconnaissance element can use this same technique when producing area maps and objective sketches for the battalion. A detailed map consisting of streets, alleys, roadways, and buildings, each one individually labeled, along with additional structural sketches would greatly enhance missions planning.