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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The development and refinement of materiel, technology, and tactics by both North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Warsaw Pact forces continue to change the complexion of the modern battlefield. Threat forces have a greater ability to locate and destroy an enemy force than ever before. Advances in technology continue to create new families of weapons, communications, and surveillance devices. Technology has produced weapons that are more accurate and more lethal at longer ranges. Additionally, developments in automotive research have led to vast improvements in the mobility of maneuver units.

1-1. PURPOSE

1. Future combat will be characterized by highly mobile formations that have tremendous firepower and shock effect. This is most evident in the Warsaw Pact forces where the armies are made up of motorized, mechanized, and armored forces. These forces are designed to overwhelm and overrun enemy forces on the battlefield.

2. Antiarmor units equipped with the TOW weapon system provide the infantry and mechanized battalion with unprecedented tank-killing power. Its mobility, long range, and capability to engage the enemy during limited visibility enhances the infantry battalion's capability to defeat the Threat.

3. Antiarmor units are organized under the H-edition and L-edition TOE. (See Appendix A.) Listed below are the antiarmor units this manual covers.
   (1) Antiarmor platoon in infantry and mechanized battalions organized under the H-edition TOE.

   (2) Antiarmor company in infantry and mechanized battalions organized under the L-edition TOE.

   (3) Antiarmor battalion (separate) in the National Guard. Employment of the separate antiarmor battalion is discussed in Chapter 5.

1 - 2. THE AIRLAND BATTLEFIELD

1. In any situation where the battle is dominated by armor formations, success will largely depend on the proper use and maintenance of the combined arms team. The backbone of any armor formation is the tank, yet the tank cannot survive on the modern battlefield without a balanced and coordinated effort of infantry, antiarmor systems, artillery, air defense, engineers, and close air support (CAS).

2. The concepts and fundamentals of AirLand Battle apply to antiarmor units in much the same manner as they do to maneuver units. Like tanks, antiarmor systems do not operate alone on the battlefield. They operate in conjunction with infantry, armor, and other elements of the combined arms team. Long-range antiarmor fires of antiarmor units make them a key asset in destroying the integrity of the enemy's combined arms team.

3. The key to employment of a unit's antiarmor assets is mass. When terrain and fields of fire allow, the TOW platoons should be controlled by one person in the battalion. This person is responsible for planning and directing antiarmor fires in concert with the battalion commander's scheme of maneuver. This means that task-organizing the TOW systems out to the line companies will no longer be the norm. By massing his TOW platoons, the commander does not need to employ his tanks as the principal antiarmor platform. Employing antiarmor systems in areas once covered by tanks releases more tanks to cover areas where their speed and shock effect is maximized. Using antiarmor systems in bases of fire frees more tanks to maneuver.

4. In the offense, antiarmor systems give the maneuver commander a tremendous increase in the capability to overwatch his forces and to conduct an attack. Antiarmor fires also allow the commander to engage and destroy enemy tanks before committing his maneuver forces to the battle.

5. In the defense, integration of antiarmor fires with engineer countermobility efforts, artillery, and other direct-fire weapons, greatly increases the chances for success against a larger enemy force. The long range of antiarmor units allows the maneuver commander to engage and destroy enemy vehicles early in the battle. As the enemy closes with friendly maneuver units, displacement and repositioning of antiarmor units allows continuous antitank fires throughout the depth of the battlefield.

This also allows antiarmor units to support a counterattack to regain the initiative.

1-3. CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS

1. All antiarmor units have common capabilities that must be understood and considered to realize their full combat potential. The TOW 2 weapon system provides direct fires against armor or other hard targets out to 3,750 meters. This extended range enables the TOW to engage armor beyond the enemy's capability to return effective, direct cannon fire. These fires can be delivered with great accuracy in daylight, at night and during other conditions of limited visibility (smoke, haze, and fog). The wheeled or tracked TOW 2 system is fully mobile and can be concealed easily. In the dismounted mode, it can be transported in Army utility helicopters. Antiarmor units equipped with improved TOW vehicles (ITVs) in mechanized battalions have armor protection and mobility equivalent to the mechanized infantry companies.

2. Antiarmor units also have limitations. The ones with the most impact are the austere combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) capabilities organic to separate antiarmor battalions and antiarmor companies (see Chapter 5). Commanders employing wheeled vehicle-mounted antiarmor units must consider their lack of protection against direct and indirect fires. Careful positioning in depth and rapid relocation can improve their survivability. Both tracked and wheeled vehicle-mounted antiarmor elements must be positioned so that accompanying infantry provides them security against ground attack, especially in restricted terrain and during reduced visibility. Though accurate, TOW rate of fire is relatively slow due to tracking and reload time. This, coupled with its launch signature, increases the antiarmor squad's vulnerability, especially wheeled vehicle-mounted, when it engages within the enemy's direct-fire range. This vulnerability is reduced when antiarmor elements reposition frequently and integrate their fires with the fires of tanks and other antitank weapons, and with indirect fires to complicate the enemy's target acquisition task.

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