Military

(1) To join forces for the encirclement of an enemy force.

(2) To join a force that has broken out of an encirclement with a friendly force.

(3) To join an attacking force with another force that has conducted an air assault or airborne assault into the enemy's rear.

(4) When converging friendly maneuver forces meet.

(1) The headquarters directing the linkup establishes control measures, such as linkup points and alternate linkup points, linkup rally points, axes of advance, boundaries between converging forces, restrictive fire lines, coordinated fire lines, and other measures to control maneuver and fires (Figure 7-1).

(2) The headquarters directing the linkup operation must also establish the command relationships and responsibilities of the forces involved.

(1) Command and control. Normally, the passing unit tactical CP collocates with the tactical CP of the stationary unit. The time and event of any changes in responsibility must be coordinated between unit commanders and remain within the higher commander's intent.

(2) Movement. Priorities for use of routes and control of movement times must be set. The passing unit uses multiple routes through the passed units and avoids the use of assembly areas. The passing unit coordinates with the stationary unit to obtain current information on obstacle emplacement. If the tactical plan requires a wide passage lane, coordination for opening lanes must be linked to actions at the contact and passage points.

(3) Control measures. Control measures are essential to coordination and to enhance C2 during the passage.

(4) Battle handover. The responsibility for control of the zone or sector passes from one force to another at passage establishes the BHL. The subordinate commanders coordinate the exact location and conditions for the transfer of responsibility at the BHL. The stationary forces must be prepared to conduct operations in support of the passing force should the enemy attack or interfere with the passage.

(5) Planning passage of lines. In planning passage of lines, air defense is absolutely essential. Whether passing forward or to the rear, the moving unit is forced to move slower and often in some type of column formation during the passage. As a result, air defense must be coordinated with the stationary unit. In most cases, the air defense unit deployed with the stationary supported force is able to protect the passing force, allowing the passing force's supporting air defense assets to move with them. However, if the passing force requires static air defense coverage, the terrain is the handover line. The higher headquarters directing the coordinated with the supported stationary force.

(6) Fire support. Integrate fire support of both the stationary and passing units. There must be clear agreement on who has authority to call for and to clear fires during the passage of lines. Normally, this is the stationary unit.

(7) Reconnaissance. Thoroughly reconnoiter all routes used (to, through, and beyond the area of passage).

(8) Liaison. Liaison involves the exchange of information to include the following:

• Time to pass.

• Tactical and communications plans to include signal operation instructions (SOI).

• Deception plan.

• Day and night recognition signals.

• Designation and types of units to pass.

• Control measures.

• Mission and scheme of maneuver.

• Fire support plan to include available fire support assets and their locations.

• Enemy situation and their capabilities of interfering with the passage.

• Reaction forces.

• Day and night locations of friendly units.

• Maintenance support.

• Medical evacuation support.

• Observation posts and patrol routes.

• CS and CSS assets available, their ability to support the passing unit, and their location.

• Terrain information.

(9) Engineers. Engineers exchange information on obstacles, terrain, demolitions, and enemy defenses.

(10) Air defense. In planning a passage of lines, air defense is essential. Whether passing forward or to the rear, the moving unit is forced to move slower and often in some type of column formation during the passage. As a result, air defense must be coordinated with the stationary unit. In most cases, the air defense unit deployed with the stationary supported force is able to protect the passing force, allowing the passing force's supporting air defense assets to move with the unit. However, if the passing force requires static air defense coverage, the terrain must be coordinated with the supported stationary force.

(1) Exchange of plans and liaison personnel. The tactical CPs are collocated to assist in the relief. The outgoing brigade leaves liaison personnel with the incoming brigade until the incoming brigade becomes familiar with the situation.

(2) Sequence of relief. The relief in place is conducted in stages--either rear to front, or front to rear. If front to rear, reserves are relieved first, followed by relief of forward elements. The relief is conduct from front to rear when minimum forces are employed on the FLOT. When determining the sequence of relief, both commanders should consider the following:

• The subsequent mission of the brigade conducting the relief.

• The strength and combat efficiency of the brigade in the forward defensive area.

• The ability of the enemy to detect and react against the relief.

• The need to vary the pattern of the relief.

• The size and type of elements involved in the relief.

(3) Battle handover. The time or circumstances when the incoming commander assumes responsibility for the area must be clearly established. During the relief, the outgoing commander retains responsibility for the area and mission. He exercises operational control over all subordinate elements of the incoming brigade that have completed their portion of the relief. Responsibility passes to the incoming commander when all the battalions in the forward defense area have been relieved and adequate communications have been established.

(4) Reconnaissance. Leaders at the lowest level must reconnoiter potential assembly areas, routes, and positions. Reconnaissance should include an inspection of terrain to the front, defensive installations, relief routes, assembly areas, weapon positions, and CSS installations.

(5) Security. Both brigades must make every effort to prevent the enemy from learning that a relief is taking place. Some measures that assist in maintaining security of the operations are as follows:

• Conduct the relief at night or during reduced visibility.

• Enforce operations security.

• Conduct an aerial reconnaissance (incoming brigade) in outgoing brigade aircraft.

• Maintain normal patterns of activity.

• Conduct the relief on the command frequency of the outgoing brigade.

• Limit the size of reconnaissance and advance parties.

• Execute an integrated tactical cover and deception plan (both incoming and outgoing brigades), if assets are available.

(6) Movement control. The incoming and outgoing brigades make (arrangements for their control while moving into and out of the area. If terrain allows, relieving and relieved brigades are assigned separate routes and assembly are as to reduce congestion and concentration of forces. Assembly areas allow for quick coordination and preparation before executing subsequent missions. They should be vacated as soon as possible. Coordination should include the following:

• Routes and priorities for their use.

• Responsibility for traffic control.

• Location of assembly areas.

• Guides for incoming units.

• Common use of transportation.

• Control measures.

(7) Air defense artillery. Air defense protection must be planned for the forces during the phases of the relief in place. Normally, ADA units of the outgoing unit remain in position to provide ADA coverage until relieved. Relief operations most often occur during limited visibility, complicating the operation in terms of time and ease.

(8) Fire support. The method of relieving fire support units must be clearly established. Normally, fire support units of the outgoing brigade remain in position until the units in the forward defense have been relieved. Target lists and fire plans are exchanged at all echelons. Incoming brigade organic FSEs may elect not to take over the firing positions of outgoing units. In this case, the incoming FSEs move into position by platoons or sections. The FSEs may relieve or replace by squad or section to avoid congestion.

(9) Engineers. Engineer units exchange target folders, status of obstacles, emplacement of hasty and scatterable minefield, and reports of enemy minefield emplacements.

(10) Combat Service Support. The CSS relief is just as complicated as the tactical relief but usually occurs before. This allows the relieved brigade's FSB a chance to establish operations in preparation for the relieved brigade's recovery. The rear CPs and FSBs of each brigade collocate. Also, separate routes are planned for the relieving and relieved units to avoid two-way traffic. Some supplies are transferred to the relieving FSB such as Classes I, IV, and V.

(11) Intelligence. All information and intelligence are transferred from the outgoing brigade to the incoming brigade concerning the enemy and area of operations. When the incoming brigade requires more information it should be requested, collected, and issued by the outgoing brigade before the handover of responsibilities.

(12) Equipment. The outgoing and incoming brigades may sometimes transfer equipment or crew-served weapon systems.

(1) Reestablish a chain of command. Fragmented units are reorganized, and a clear chain of command is established. Personnel not essential to CS and CSS are organized for combat operations or provided to battalions as replacements.

(2) Establish a viable defense. The command quickly establishes all-round defense; assigns sectors, battle positions, or strongpoints; and institutes an aggressive patrolling plan.

(3) Establish a reserve. A reserve must be constituted and positioned to take advantage of interior lines. Consider establishing more than one reserve.

(4) Establish security. Security elements are positioned as far forward as possible to provide early warning. Vigorous patrolling is initiated immediately. Local security is established throughout the force, and passive security measures must be enforced.

(5) Organize fire support. All indirect-fire assets in the encirclement are reorganized and brought under centralized control of the FSCOORD. Artillery and mortars are distributed throughout the pocket to limit their vulnerability to counterfire. The available fire support from outside the encirclement is coordinated by the FSCOORD. The FSCOORD plans fires for the defense and subsequent breakout.

(6) Reorganize logistics. An early assessment is made of the logistics posture of the encircled command. All CSS is put under the centralized control of the senior logistician or designated individual. He rations key supplies, authorizes cannibalization, identifies equipment to be destroyed, and develops a casualty evacuation and stay-behind plan.

(7) Maintain morale. Commanders and leaders at all levels maintain the confidence of soldiers by resolute action and a positive attitude. They keep soldiers informed to suppress rumors.

(8) Improve mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Based on the commander's estimate of the situation, some assets may be tasked to create obstacles and lay minefield to deny enemy penetration. Other assets may continue to improve the survivability of the force. Survivability is important due to the units vulnerability to accurate artillery and air strikes.

(9) Organize air defense. The air defense assets must be organized to provide cover for the encircled area. The static nature and known perimeter makes the unit a lucrative air target. If possible, air defense units maintain contact with the main force to receive early warning reports.

(1) Deceive the enemy as to time and place of attack. If it is not possible to break out immediately, the commander tries to deceive the enemy by concealing his preparations. He makes it appear as if the force is taking a resolute stand and waiting for relief. Dummy radio traffic that is intended for monitoring by the enemy or the use of landlines that might be tapped are good means of conveying false information. The direction for the breakout should not be the obvious route toward friendly lines unless there is no other way.

(2) Identify and exploit gaps or weaknesses. Early in the encirclement, reconnaissance should locate gaps or weaknesses in the encircling force. Although a breakout attack through a gap or weakness may be a less direct route or may be over less favorable terrain it is often preferred because it would avoid enemy strength and increase the chance for surprise.

(3) Exploit darkness and limited visibility. The cover of darkness, fog, or severe weather conditions favors the breakout because the target acquisition capability of the enemy's weapons are normally less effective in these conditions. However, waiting for darkness or limited visibility may give the enemy time to consolidate his defense.

(4) Concentrate fire support. Supporting fires are concentrated at the breakout point. Risks are taken on other parts of the perimeter. Once the breakout is achieved, priority of fires may be shifted to the rear guard.

(5) Protect air defense assets. Air defense assets are assigned elements to accompany and protect them throughout the operation. The switch from an area to the unit's defense occurs at the same time with the start of operations. If this requires repositioning, ADA assets should link up early with their assigned unit.

(6) Organize the forces. The forces for breakout are organized into five distinct tactical groups: the rupture force, the follow-and-support force, the main body with the CS and CSS elements, the rear guard, and the diversion force (Figure 7-6).

(7) Concentrate combat power at the breakout point. Every effort is made to produce overwhelming combat power and to generate momentum at the breakout point. The rear guard must be prepared to fight a vigorous delaying action on the perimeter so that no portion of the force is cut off. Supporting fires are concentrated at the breakout point. Once the breakout is achieved, priority of fires may be shifted to the rear guard action. However, the momentum of the breakout attack is maintained or the force is more vulnerable to destruction than it was before the breakout attempt.

(8) Coordinate with supporting attacks. The breakout attack may be assisted with a supporting attack by a relief force that diverts enemy attention and assets from the breakout effort. The breakout attempt should be timed to occur just after the enemy reacts to the relief force attack.

(1) Using all available assets to cross the most soldiers and equipment in the least time.

(2) Using either a narrow or broad front based on the factors of METT-T. A narrow front allows for a massing of forces if a breakthrough is achieved. A broad front permits a rapid crossing for the entire force and reduces vulnerability.

(3) Using a deception plan that effectively supports the timing of the crossing.

(4) Using air defense units to protect the crossing sites from enemy air attack.

(5) Using extensive reconnaissance to collect information about the enemy and the water obstacle.

(6) Deploying engineer/crossing assets well forward to expedite the crossing.

(7) Using artillery to suppress enemy positions that have observation and fields of fire over the crossing sites. Smoke missions should be fired to add to the obscuration of friendly forces. Additional fire support considerations include the following:

• Make fires immediately available to the crossing forces.

• Assign priority of fires to assault forces.

• Use all available targeting assets to develop targets in the bridgehead area. Consider a direct link between tactical air assets and supporting artillery.

(1) Hasty. A hasty river crossing is part of an ongoing operation, normally an attack. The brigade uses existing bridges, and organic or available assets to cross immediately. Although termed hasty, rehearsed SOPs and detailed coordination ensures that fire support and crossing means are available on arrival at the water obstacle. A hasty crossing is preferable over a deliberate crossing, because it does not stop the momentum. A hasty river crossing is characterized by the following:

• Speed, surprise, and minimum loss of momentum.

• Decentralized operations with organic, existing, or expedient resources.

• Weak (or no) enemy defenses on both banks.

• A river is not a severe obstacle and so crossing does not require expensive planning or preparation.

• Minimum concentration of forces.

• Quick continuation of the attack.

(2) Deliberate. A deliberate river crossing (Figure 7-7) involves loss of momentum. It usually occurs when a hasty crossing fails or is not feasible. Crossing of brigade assets will require bridging support assets from corps. A deliberate river crossing is characterized by the following:

• Detailed planning and centralized control.

• Deliberate pause to prepare, to acquire additional bridging and rafting equipment, and to concentrate combat power.

• A need to clear enemy forces from the exit bank.

• Detailed reconnaissance.

(3) Crossing phases. Offensive deliberate river crossings are divided into four phases. The phases are established to facilitate planning, while in execution the phases overlap without pause. Planning should be conducted in reverse order to facilitate the continuation of the attack.

• The advance to the river.

• Assault across the river.

• Advance from the exit bank.

• Secure the bridgehead.

(1) Retrograde river crossings are characterized by detailed planning and centralized control. They have three phases--delay, crossing, and defense.

(2) Retrograde crossings differ from offensive crossings in that both banks are under friendly control. Existing bridges or other crossing sites may be intact and available to speed the crossing of the retrograde force. Command and control is organized the same as for offensive crossings.

(1) Level I. These are threats that can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures. Examples of what a Level I threat may involve are:

• Enemy controlled agent activities.

• Sabotage by enemy sympathizers.

• Terrorism.

(2) Level II. These are threats that are beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. They can be defeated by response forces, normally military police with supporting fires. Examples of what a Level II threat may involve are:

• Diversionary and sabotage operations conducted by unconventional forces.

• Raids, ambushes, and reconnaissance operations conducted by combat units.

• Special missions or unconventional warfare missions.

(3) Level III. These are threats that require the command decision to commit a combined arms tactical combat force. Examples of what a Level III threat may involve are:

• Heliborne operations.

• Airborne operations.

• Amphibious operations.

• Ground force operations.

• Infiltration operations.

(1) A combat force conducts an airborne operation to seize and defend key terrain in support of the main attack (Figure 7-9).

(2) A combat force conducts an air assault operation to block a repositioning enemy or to counterattack while the main attack assaults its objective (Figure 7-10).

(3) A combat force conducts an air assault operation to conduct a spoiling attack (Figure 7-11).

(4) A combat force conducts an air assault to block an escaping enemy after a successful attack.

(5) A combat force infiltrates to attack a defending enemy from a different direction than the main attack (Figure 7-12).

(6) A combat force infiltrates to breach and mark an obstacle for the main attack.

(1) Intelligence. Situation, event, and decision support templates must encompass the area of operations. While the S3 is overall responsible for the DST, the S2's input is critical. Terrain analysis, particularly cover and concealment, is critical to the survivability of the inserted force.

(2) Maneuver. The inserted force must be tailored to be light and flexible, yet lethal enough to accomplish the mission. The plan must identify the decisive purpose for the operation and have branches and sequels in case of unforeseen developments. Integration and synchronization of combat, CS, and CSS assets is critical to mission accomplishment and unit survival. The criteria for aborting the mission must be clear and understandable. Plans must be made for follow-on missions upon completion of the current operation, such as linkups with friendly forces, extractions to tactical assembly areas, breaking contact, and moving to an assault position. As a minimum, the plan must incorporate the following:

• Stealthful insertion of the force.

• Measures to prevent detection of the force.

• Surprise.

• Synchronized action with the main effort.

• Achievement of the decisive purpose IAW the commander's intent.

• Follow-on mission; linkup, air extraction, exfiltration, and so forth.

(3) Fires. Fires should be planned throughout the operation. Depending upon the distance and the factors of METT-T, mortars may be the only indirect fire support available to the force. The cross-FLOT force may have to rely on Army aviation naval gunfire, and tactical aircraft for fire support. Coordination measures should be used to control indirect and direct fires, and a SEAD program is necessary if insertion is by aircraft. Consider airdrop or air assault of artillery.

(4) Air defense. Stinger man-portable air defense system (MANPADS) should be used for insertion force air defense as well as passive air defense and combined arms air defense.

(5) Mobility/survivability. Plans should be made for breaching obstacles for an attack and preparing obstacles for defense (if applicable). Survivability depends on the availability and positioning of materials and equipment.

(6) Combat service support. There must be a resupply plan for a unit that must remain undetected before executing the mission and coordination of air movement and resupply, including MEDEVAC procedures.

(7) Battle command. Graphic control measures that illustrate the maneuver of the cross-FLOT force and main attack must be planned. Consideration must be given to the communication plan, fratricide prevention measures, battle tracking of both forces, and flexible C2 facilities (tactical CP).

(1) Local air superiority is vital during airland operations, and enemy air defense must be suppressed or avoided.

(2) Deployment and initial resupply depend on availability and type of aircraft.

(3) In situations where the brigade is expected to engage in combat upon landing, the units should be task-organized and loaded accordingly.

(1) Ground tactical plan. The ground tactical plan provides the scheme of maneuver and organization for units making the initial assault. This plan assigns missions and objectives, and it includes the airhead line and the assault objectives, which are selected concurrently; the security zone and the R&S forces; the boundaries; and the assault task organizations.

(2) Landing plan. This plan joins the air movement plan and the ground tactical plan. The landing plan sequences the time and place of delivery of troops and equipment into the objective area. The size and location of LZs and LAPES zones are basic considerations in preparing the landing plan.

(3) Air movement plan. This plan covers the time from loading until the aircraft lands at the objective. The plan is the product of Army/Air Force coordination with the air lift commander responsible for execution of the air movement phase. The two key elements of the air movement plan are the air movement table and the flight route diagram. The unit should adhere to the principles of cross loading and tactical integrity.

(4) Marshaling plan. This plan includes the preparations required to load equipment and personnel aboard aircraft. Key elements of this plan are the movement to the marshaling area, mission briefings, administrative and logistic requirements, movement to the departure airfields, and aircraft loading.

(1) Airfield layout. The exact layout of an airfield is situational. The best use must be made of existing facilities, such as roads and open areas, to reduce the time and construction effort. Consideration should be given to layouts that facilitate future expansion and provide the best deployment and flexibility. While the air facility is being improved, it becomes vulnerable to enemy destruction. Therefore, airlanding facilities must be highly dispersed and less complex so they do not present high-value targets to the enemy.

(2) Airfield operations. The airfield commander constructs (if required) and establishes the assault airfield, marks routes and assembly areas, positions his AACG personnel, and opens communications.

(3) Traffic control. As aircraft arrive and off-load, the CCT directs vehicles and personnel to a traffic control point.

(4) Arrival airfield control group. The AACG personnel at the traffic control point receive a copy of the manifest, verify loads, and provide guides for vehicles and personnel. The guides personally lead vehicles and personnel to assembly/dispersal/holding areas.

(5) Cover and concealment. All personnel cover and conceal their positions and wait for the arrival of their unit guides.

(6) Convoys. As other elements arrive, convoys of vehicles are formed and sent forward under the control of a unit representative.

(7) Helicopter assembly points. Helicopters and aviation personnel are moved to separate helicopter assembly points; reassembly begins immediately.

(1) The ground force commander is responsible for the construction repair, and maintenance of airland facilities in the airhead. The airlift commander furnishes the ground force commander with requirements in order of priority. The ground force commander determines priorities after joint consideration of the ground force and airlift requirements. After engineer effort is committed for support of airlift facilities, these facilities must adhere to established priorities insofar as personnel and resources permit. Any deviation should be coordinated with the airlift commander for the respective airlanding zone.

(2) The control of all air traffic (letdown, traffic pattern, landing, taxi, and takeoff of aircraft) at Air Force-operated airhead airfields is a responsibility of the Air Force commander. The movement of ground vehicles at these locations is closely regulated by their air traffic controllers.

(3) The ground force commander is responsible for the unloading, reloading, and tying down of Army cargo with technical assistance from the Air Force. The ground force commander is also responsible for the documenting and manifesting of Army cargo, which is reloaded in the airhead.