Military

(1) The brigade commander's guidance determines the specific role that fire support plays in the brigade scheme of maneuver. The FSCOORD plans fires and allocates fire support assets and priorities as the brigade commander outlines the scheme of maneuver. The FSCOORD must know when and where the commander wants fire support. In addition, he must understand what the commander wants in the way of effects, duration, and timing. He must understand the commander's target priorities. The FSCOORD must understand how all fire support assets (FA, mortars, CAS, NGF, and AHs) are integrated.

(2) The depth and complexity of the fire support plan depend upon the time available to produce it. At brigade level, it could be the result of both the formal and informal fire planning processes. However, the key to a successful fire support plan is simplicity.

(1) Fire support coordination. The brigade FSCOORD is the commander of the DS FA battalion that supports the brigade. He is the brigade commander's primary adviser on fire support matters. He maintains a working relationship with the brigade commander and the brigade S3 through the planning and execution phases of an operation. The FSCOORD must know the maneuver operation so he can anticipate missions and changes to the tactical situation. He ensures the fire support system--

• Is synchronized with maneuver.

• Supports the brigade commander's battle plan.

• Can sustain fire support.

(2) Maneuver commander. The maneuver commander and his FSCOORD plan the battle together. They examine the contribution of fire support to the battle plan concurrently with maneuver considerations, which increases the chances of using all available fires. This planning follows the decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting method. Decisions made during the target methodology process include--

• Attack guidance.

• Target selection standards.

• High-payoff targets.

• Intelligence collection means.

• Fire support execution responsibilities.

In some cases, fire support considerations influence the scheme of maneuver. If there are insufficient maneuver assets to make the mission viable, fire support can accomplish a portion of the mission without commitment of large troop concentrations. The brigade commander and his FSCOORD plan fire support as follows:

(3) Fire support plan execution. Execution of the fire support plan is a combined arms responsibility. The success of the fire support plan depends on how well it is understood by subordinate commanders and FSOs. The brigade fire support execution matrix provides subordinate commanders and FSOs a summary of the plan, which connects the execution of fire support to specific events and assigns specific responsibility for that execution. Detailed fire support rehearsals, in conjunction with maneuver rehearsals, are critical for successful execution. The fire support execution matrix (Table 8-2) is a stand-alone document, which permits the fire support team to execute the commander's plan.

(1) Counterair operations. The CA operations are to gain control of the airspace environment. The following are specific CA operations:

(2) Close air support. CAS is air action against hostile targets that are close to friendly forces. Therefore, CAS requires detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces.

(3) Air interdiction. Air interdiction missions are designed to delay, neutralize, or destroy an enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces. Air interdictions are attacks against land force targets that have a near-term effect on the scheme of maneuver of friendly forces, but they are not in close proximity to friendly forces. Therefore, detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces is not required.

(4) Reconnaissance. Air reconnaissance provides air and ground commanders with responsive photographic and electronic information on the enemy locations and actions. It also assesses the effectiveness of friendly air and ground activities. The brigade S2 requests air reconnaissance in support of his intelligence collection process.

(5) Airlift. Airlift moves personnel, equipment, and supplies by air within a theater of operation.

(1) Preplanned CAS missions are those that can be anticipated sufficiently in advance to permit detailed mission planning, coordinating, and munition tailoring tasked in the air tasking order. The brigade S3 air, FSO, and ALO determine target suitability and potential airspace conflicts, and they incorporate the CAS mission into the brigade's fire support plan. The brigade S3 air combines the requests with those from maneuver battalions. He eliminates duplication, assigns priorities, and forwards the consolidated request to the division G3 air. Preplanned air requests go through Army channels.

(2) Immediate CAS missions are provided to meet specific requests that arise during the course of battle and that, by their nature, cannot be preplanned. Also, fighter/attack aircraft performing other air missions could be diverted to CAS missions to meet the immediate demands of battle. The brigade FSE monitors all immediate air support requests from subordinates on the ALO's radios (Air Force air request net). The brigade can cancel or amend a request or a fire support means. Immediate air requests go through Air Force channels.

(1) The JAAT can operate with FA, ADA, Army aviation, and ground maneuver units of brigade or battalion size. It can also operate independently in an area some distance from the ground maneuver units. Because of their mobility differential over ground maneuver units, attack helicopters are often the first to join the battle. During offensive operations, when the brigade commander determines that his maneuver forces need increased combat assets to attack a lucrative target array, he requests attack helicopters and CAS aircraft. During defensive operations, the JAAT is most often used to reinforce committed ground maneuver units. The ground maneuver commander has overall responsibility for planning, coordinating, and employing the JAAT. The brigade commander, S3, FSCOORD, ALO, ADO, air battle captain, aviation brigade liaison officer, and FAC must coordinate the scheme of maneuver, CAS, air defense, and fire support plan to the greatest extent possible. The S3 should designate an officer under his control as the coordinator for JAAT, either the assistant S3 or the FSO preferably.

(2) The ground commander must plan for the joint suppression of enemy air defense through the use of direct and indirect fires. The JAAT assets can be used to degrade and suppress enemy ADA, but this is the least desirable method.

(3) Designation of specific engagement areas, coordination of supporting fires, designation of enemy and friendly locations, and the other specifics of directing the JAAT are performed by the commander through the aviation brigade liaison officer.

(4) The FSE of the ground maneuver unit controlling the overall operation usually plans artillery fire support for the JAAT. Planning a JAAT requires detailed coordination among the brigade commander with the S3, FSCOORD, ALO, and ATKHB commander working together to ensure that adequate supporting fires are planned. Fire support plans should be kept simple so that the air battle captain and FAC can be rapidly briefed. Since the briefing is normally by radio, the interpretation of data can be difficult.

(5) The controlling of fires into the engagement area is conducted by the air battle captain from the ATKHB. The two basic methods for employing a JAAT are sectored and combined attacks.

(6) Some key considerations in the employment of the JAAT are as follows:

(1) Air defense suppression sorties and EW missions may be flown to enhance the survivability of tactical aircraft. It is essential that brigade units give priority to the suppression of enemy surface-to-air defense systems when supported by tactical aircraft.

(2) The maneuver commander's area of responsibility extends from the FLOT to the limits of observed fire. The weapons control status should be "weapons tight" at a minimum for fixed-wing aircraft during SEAD/JSEAD operations to reduce the possibility of loss due to friendly ADA fire.

(1) Attack helicopters. Regardless of the overall operation being conducted by the brigade, the ATKHB conducts its portion of that operation through offensive task. Because there are no single solutions for attack helicopter operations in the offense or defense, the brigade commander assesses the factors of METT-T. The assessment influences the mission that are assigned to the ATKHB. With the ATKHB commander's assistance, the brigade commander determines where the ATKHB is to be used. From the brigade commander's mission and intent, the ATKHB commander determines how the battalion is to be employed.

(2) Observation helicopters. The OHs participate in a multitude of missions such as field artillery observation, armed reconnaissance, and target designation for attack helicopters and CAS aircraft.

(3) Utility helicopters. The UHs have a variety of roles to perform. Air assault, air movement, and equipment transportation are the primary missions of the UHs. The UHs may also be used for command and control, emergency aeromedical evacuation, and search and rescue.

(4) Cargo helicopters. The cargo helicopters provide rapid movement of equipment and materiel. They are available in the aviation brigade of the air assault division or at corps level.

(5) Special electronic mission aircraft (quick fix). The SEMA performs EW and aerial surveillance missions; they are habitually placed under OPCON of the division MI battalion.

(1) Forward area air defense. Light infantry, airborne, and air assault divisions contain a FAAD battery with Avengers, MANPADS (Stingers), and AD sensors (LSDIS/GBS) as organic FAAD weapons systems. Due to the limited number of these systems, they are often employed to specific locations to provide area air defense cover. A thorough air IPB must be conducted to determine the most likely enemy air avenues of approach. Once determines, FAAD assets may be positioned on these air corridors. Operations at night or during limited visibility are restricted by the gunner's ability to identify the target. Avengers and Stingers can also be used in point defense of a critical asset. Battalions normally receive a mix of Avenger and MANPADS units (based on METT-T) to support their operations. Avengers are the only night, all weather capable FAAD system.

(2) High-to-medium-altitude air defense. The HIMAD category includes the Patriot and Hawk. These systems are usually deployed throughout the theater to defend theater/corps high-priority assets against hostile aircraft. They provide incidental ADA protection to the brigade if it is located within the effective range of the weapons system. (See FMs 44-16 and 44-100 for more information on ADA employment.)

(1) Mobility. Engineer support to offensive operations includes obstacle breaching, such as in-stride, deliberate, assault, and covert breaching. (See FM 90-13-1 for more details on breaching operations.) In some situations, support will include construction of combat trails through areas where routes do not exist. Mobility in defensive operations includes counterattack routes cleared of obstacles; construction of combat trails, lanes, and gaps through obstacles for supply and passage of security elements; and reduction of enemy fires and sabotage.

(2) Countermobility. The intent of countermobility operations is to decrease the enemy's ability to maneuver, mass, and reinforce and to increase his vulnerability to fires. Tactical obstacles are used to disrupt, turn, fix, or block the enemy.

(3) Survivability. Survivability includes all the aspects of protecting personnel, weapons, and supplies. It includes construction of fortifications, protective obstacles, and strongpoints; and camouflage and deception measures. Engineers construct fighting positions for crew-served weapon systems and combat vehicles. They also construct survivability positions for artillery, mortars, air defense, command and control elements, aviation, and critical logistics assets. Engineer assets and time are seldom sufficient to complete all requirements; therefore, they work on high priority survivability requirements established by the commander. Soldiers and crews must prepare their own positions whenever possible. Protective obstacles are a critical part of survivability. They prevent the enemy from attacking or assaulting from areas close to or within a static defensive position. In restrictive terrain protective obstacles may act like tactical obstacles and attack the enemy's ability to maneuver. Protective obstacles are emplaced by the maneuver force, with or without the assistance of engineers.

(4) Sustainment engineering. Sustaining combat operations requires extensive engineer support. Critical tasks, which are beyond the abilities of divisional engineers and require augmentation from corps, include the following:

• Maintaining and improving LOCs.

• Constructing and repairing support facilities.

• Erecting tactical bridges.

(5) Topographic engineering. Terrain teams at division can provide terrain visualization and analysis products so the commander can develop plans to make the best use of the terrain.

(1) The FASCAM can provide a rapid and responsive obstacle emplacement capability to the brigade. The brigade S3 and brigade engineer plan and coordinate use of FASCAM assets regardless of the means of delivery. Each system has different characteristics in terms of patterns, self-destruct times, and responsiveness that must be considered in the planning process. Long self-destruct mines are those that self-destruct in more than 24 hours. Short self-destruct mines are those that self-destruct in less than 24 hours. All scatterable mines have a similar life cycle, though specific times vary based on SD time and dispensing system.

(2) Accurate, timely, uniform reporting and disseminating of scatterable minefield emplacement information are imperative. Fluid, fast-moving tactical situations require that complete information on scatterable mine employment be disseminated rapidly to all units that could be affected.

(3) The corps commander is the approving authority for the employment of all scatterable mines in the corps area. He usually delegates this authority to the division commander. The division commander often retains the authority for emplacement of long self-destruct mines at his level but often delegates approval authority for short self-destruct mines to the brigade commander. When the division commander does delegate approval for long self-destruct mines to the brigade commander, it is for a specific period or for a certain operation. The brigade commander can further delegate short self-destruct mine employment authority down to battalion commanders with the concurrence of the division commander. Any delegation of authority to employ scatterable mines must be specifically stated in the applicable OPORD; otherwise, the authority is automatically withheld.

(4) During planning, consider the affect of large safety zones around all scatterable minefields, particularly to artillery-delivered (ADAM/RAAM). The safety zone sizes shown for the ADAM/RAAM in Table 8-4 are worst case examples. The FSO provides the actual sizes required around each aiming point based on the artillery data. After the mission is fired, a scatterable mine warning message is disseminated. The actual location of the scatterable mines will be based on the location of the artillery tubes from the impact zone and whether the angle of fire was high or low. The actual location of mines from a mission to fire a 400 by 400 meters minefield with one aim point is shown in Figure 8-1.

(1) The brigade can be reinforced with SIGINT/EN assets, additional KUMINT assets, an enhanced communication package, and a deployable intelligence support element. Each asset provides the brigade commander a unique capability to answer the PIRs. The assets allow the commander to quickly and accurately identify and target the enemy, close, deep and rear.

(2) The DS company commander employs the assets based on the brigade commander's intent, the brigade concept of operation and BOS synchronization matrix. When tasked, the DS company commander ensures that the maneuver main effort is weighted with IEW support at the critical time and place on the battlefield. The DS company commander ensures the assets are effectively employed to provide the brigade commander the intelligence needed to plan and execute operations.

(1) Command and control. The DS company commander receives the mission from the brigade OPORD and the collection plan. He is the principle advisor to the brigade commander on IEW asset capability. When available, the DS company commander participates in the brigade's tactical decision-making process. He is the asset manager for all IEW assets in DS to the brigade and deconflicts terrain issues with the brigade S3 for GS or other reinforcing MI assets operating in the brigade AO. The DS company CP is normally collocated with the brigade TOC.

(2) Analytical control team. The analytical control team provides the brigade commander with an automated window to the "big picture." The team is the link between the brigade S2 and the division's ACE. Using all source analysis system workstation, the team can push and pull intelligence between the databases of the brigade and the ACE. The analytical control team provides the brigade and division commanders with a common understanding of the battlefield. The team receives templates and other intelligence products by way of data link with the ACE. The analytical control team supports the technical and intelligence reporting of reinforcing EW assets. During OOTW, when reinforced with a communications package, normally TROJAN SPIRIT, the team allows split-based operations.

(3) Remotely monitored battlefield sensor system. The REMBASS is a measurement and signature intelligence collector and is ideally suited to OOTW and force protection missions. In conventional conflicts, REMBASS's role is normally one of economy of force. By providing remote surveillance out to 15 km, REMBASS allows soldiers and other assets to concentrate at more critical areas. The REMBASS can classify a target, provide location, number, direction, and rate of movement and time of activation. Found only in light, airborne, and air assault infantry units, REMBASS can be used throughout the depth of the battlefield. The brigade's one REMBASS team normally operates in DS and reports to and is tasked by the S2.

(4) Signals intelligence and electronic warfare. The DS company has no organic SIGINT/EW collection, DF, or electronic attack assets. On a conventional battlefield where the brigade is fighting as part of a division, the MI battalion deploys its GS MI company in the division's area of operations. The GS MI company sends collected intelligence down to each of the brigades.

(5) Human intelligence. The DS company's HUMINT assets consist of interrogators and counterintelligence agents. These assets are best employed as a HUMINT team of at least one interrogator and one CI agent. Each brigade can form two to three teams. During the early stages of conventional battles, these teams are deployed well forward with the lead battalions. The teams provide on-site screening and combat interrogation of EPWs and other detainees. As the battle progresses, the teams move back to the brigade EPW cage. In OOTW, HUMINT teams are ideally suited to providing force protection. They can identify rear area threats/targets and recommend countermeasures. The teams are also an excellent collector of intelligence provided through liaison with host nation police or security agencies. Interrogators provide limited translation support to the brigade. The HUMINT teams are most often kept in DS and report to the analytical control team. The analytical control team performs initial analysis and reports the results to the S2 and ACE.

(6) Ground surveillance radar. The GSR is part of the DS company and normally attached to the brigade. The company's GSR section has three teams. When attached, the teams respond directly to the tasking and report to the S2. The GSR teams can be further attached to battalions and report to the battalion S2. If necessary, a GSR team can be attached to the lead company and report to the company commander. In light brigades, GSA teams use the PPS-15. The PPS-15 can detect and locate personnel out to 1,500 meters and vehicles out to 3,000 meters.

(7) Unmanned aerial vehicle remote video terminal downlink. The unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) remote video terminal downlink is manned by the imagery processing section and allows the command to "see" over the next hill. The UAV missions are tasked and prioritized at division. Brigades do not normally control the UAV, but they do receive the UAV imagery near-real-time with the remote video terminal. In unique circumstances where a UAV is in DS of a brigade, the brigade S3, S2, and DS company commander must be actively involved in A2C2.

(1) Retransmission operations. In fast-paced linear offensive operations, providing secure FM retransmission operations for the brigade command net is an important function of the retransmission teams. For example, C Company of the division signal battalion provides retransmission capability for the division command net. The signal officer determines the optimal location of the team and ensures the location is reported to the S2, S3, FSO, and other appropriate staff officers to ensure force protection and prevent fratricide.

(2) Wire operations. The section provides installation, operation, maintenance, and retrieval of any wirelines (MSE or WD-1) to adjacent or external elements requiring point-to-point wire communications with the brigade CP or MSE wireline access into the SEN switchboard located with the brigade CP. This support is required if the adjacent element does not possess its own wire and wireline installers (3IU or 3IL) to run their own lines. Wire support from within the signal section could also include running WD-1 wire to a local commercial terminal such as a magneto drop. The 3IUs installers in the signal section run the hot loop for perimeter security communications for the brigade CP site.

(3) Maintenance. The 3l-series MOS soldiers' training and responsibility in the area of maintenance are limited. Communications maintenance has shifted to the 29-series CMF whose personnel are only found in the forward support battalion or main support battalion. If the MTOE designates a 3lU soldier's position as repair or maintenance slot, because of the soldier's limited maintenance training, his duties will be limited to basic multimeter PSM-45 and PRM-34 troubleshooting. This troubleshooting isolates faults and determines what equipment should be sent to the support battalion for internal repair or replacement.

(4) Communications security, cryptovariable, and signal operation instructions support. Depending on whether the maneuver brigade has its own COMSEC account or is a hand-receipt holder under the division COMSEC office of record, the signal section assumes all COMSEC/SOI duties for the brigade. These duties include receipt of record keeping, and initial safeguarding and issuance of all communications security, electronic cryptovariables, and SOIs. The fill devices for COMSEC cryptovariables and for non-COMSEC frequency hopsets, which are controlled cryptovariable items (MX 18290, KYK-13, KYK-15), are normally owned by the respective users' sections. However, the signal section must control the receipt, issuance, and destruction of the electronic variables stored by the users who own the fill devices.

(5) Advanced troubleshooting/user training support. The subject matter expert level troubleshooting of all communications systems is a critical support mission that requires the signal leader's time and attention, particularly during tactical operations. Periodic or on-going training of nonsignal MOS personnel by instructor-quality signal soldiers is another key support mission provided by the signal section.

(1) The brigade signal officer coordinates through the signal battalion S3 at the system control center (SCC) with the signal company commander whose unit is tasked to support their maneuver brigade. This unit could be any of the two or three area signal companies (usually A, B or D company) in the division signal battalion. The unit tasked may change from one operation to another, or a habitual relationship with one signal company or one SEN/LOS team may develop. The SEN/LOS team provides local wireline (DNVT) switchboard capability (through the SEN) and network-wide wireline (DNVT) access through the SEN and LOS transmission link back to a node center.

(2) The MSE cellular (radio) access is provided to AN/VRC-97 (MSRT) users through radio access units that are geographically placed throughout the corps and division areas by the SCC. This placement provides overlapping continuous cellular coverage to all MSRT users independent of their location or unit of assignment. The only action required by the maneuver brigade signal officer with respect to MSRT support is to have the proper "M" and "U" key loaded into the storage device for issue to users and have a written copy of the division's frequency plan if manual loading of that plan becomes necessary. The maneuver brigade signal officer must also advise the ADSO or signal battalion S3 of any changes in the CP location at least two to four hours before breakdown of the equipment for displacement. This ensures the system control center has time to plan for connectivity from the LOS into the node center.

(1) The brigade employs two categories of smoke: hasty and deliberate. Hasty smoke is employed for short-term requirements with a minimum of planning. It can be delivered by all smoke assets, but it is normally delivered by artillery, mortars, and smoke pots. Deliberate smoke is characterized by integrated planning. It is used over extended periods to cover friendly activities throughout an entire operation. Although it is normally employed to conceal friendly units, it can also be used to blind enemy units. Deliberate smoke is normally produced by mechanical generators and smoke pots. Either type of smoke can be used to deceive the enemy.

(2) Smoke has the following general applications on the battlefield:

(3) Smoke planning is a part of the overall tactical plan. Each echelon of command plans for employment of smoke to support its operations. The brigade S3 has primary staff responsibility, but he has the advice and support of the FSO, S2, S4, chemical officer, and staff weather personnel. (Smoke operations are described in FM 3-50.)

(1) Conduct route reconnaissance operations to and within the brigade area. Continually monitor the condition of MSRs; and identify restricting terrain effects of weather on routes, damage to routes, NBC contamination and the presence of the enemy. Identify alternate MSRs, when required. Report all observations, maintain surveillance, and develop the enemy situation.

(2) Enforce the command's highway regulation plan and traffic circulation plan to keep MSRs free for resupply operations. To expedite traffic on MSRs, use the following measures: TCPs, roadblocks, checkpoints, holding areas, defiles at critical points, and temporary route signs. Gather information on friendly and enemy activity by use of mobile teams.

(3) Operate straggler control points and coordinate return of stragglers to parent units.

(4) Control the movement of refugees whose actions could hinder the commander's operations.

(5) Collect, report, and disseminate information and intelligence during the normal course of all MP missions. Provide soldiers, units, and other road users locations of supply points and medical facilities; information about MSRs, critical points, contaminated areas, holding areas; and the locations of units and facilities.

(1) Conduct area reconnaissance and surveillance operations to gain information to guard against unexpected enemy attacks in the rear area.

(2) Provide security for designated personnel, unit convoys, critical facilities such as conventional/special ammunition pipelines, railways, deep water ports, and MSR critical points.

(3) Respond to bases/base clusters under attack when the rear area threat exceeds their ability to defend themselves.

(4) Conduct area damage control operations to reduce the level of damage or lessen effects of hostile actions or natural and man-made disasters. This helps restore combat operations and support.

(5) A platoon DS relationship is seldom interrupted, but sometimes (as in a division-size river-crossing operation) an operation requires all platoons in an MP company to function as a unit. Sometimes the PM must place the platoons in a GS role.

(6) Conduct other rear operations.