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Military

Appendix H

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

The activities that comprise operations other than war range from operations that already are planned contingency missions; for example, noncombatant evacuation operations and raids, to activities such as peace enforcement and peacekeeping whose TTP may require some modification to some units' current mission-essential task list. Operations other than war are normally joint and combined in nature. The Army role is identified in JCS Publication 3.07, FM 100-20, FM 100-23, FM 100-19, and FM 7-98.

Section I
OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS

The principles of command and staff planning during war apply in operations other than war. However, operations other than war place greater emphasis on the political, economic, social, and psychological elements of power. This requires constant planning to include some unique areas.

H-1. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

This paragraph provides factors unique to operations other than war that must be considered in the planning process. The need for force protection must have priority in all operations other than war operations.

a. Command Relationship. Infantry brigades enter into operations other than war as part of a larger force (for example, division, JTF, or UN missions). Nonmilitary US agencies, specifically the ambassador, will usually have the lead in setting the overall parameters of the operation. Command relationships among US Army forces, between other US services, and between coalition and US forces could continue to develop as the operations unfold.

b. Mission Analysis. The same procedures for mission analysis outlined in Chapter 3 apply in operations other than war. Commanders must use tasks rather than operations in their mission statements, and the purposes of supporting efforts must be tied to the main effort.

c. Intelligence. Intelligence forms the foundation for the commander's decisions. However, processing and dissemination of information must be accelerated since much of it may be perishable. Data broadcast should be to the lowest level that can use the intelligence. Operations in unfamiliar environments require nontraditional, low-level, "police-type" intelligence to support the command. There will probably be a very undeveloped doctrinal threat data base. In such an environment, HUMINT is potentially the most important and productive source of intelligence. FM 34-130 contains excellent IPB considerations for operations other than war.

d. Legal Restrictions. Unusual legal issues may arise because of the unique nature of operations other than war. Operations other than war may be authorized by the UN, a regional organization, or the national command authority. Regardless of who has authorized the operations, international law and US domestic laws and policy apply. For example, the laws of war, fiscal law and policy, and restrictions on the use of riot-control agents apply to US forces participating in the operations. The commander must solicit the advice of the SJA.

e. Operation in a Foreign Environment. The brigade commander must consider the differences in language, customs, practices, and religions when operating in a foreign environment. Training to learn the customs and courtesies is also beneficial. The brigade can obtain interpreters through host nation support, or attached civil affairs and PSYOP personnel. The PSYOP and civil affairs personnel can also conduct cultural training and provide area studies. SOF can provide limited PSYOP and civil affairs support.

f. Decentralized Operations. Operations other than war are often small-scale, decentralized operations over extended distances. Subordinate commanders must be allowed maximum flexibility in the execution of their missions. However, they should be given specific responsibilities and understand the commander's intent. Commanders must remember to achieve mass, concentration, and objective, and must not become so decentralized as to piecemeal their efforts.

g. Rules of Engagement. The ROE are directives that explain the circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate and or continue combat engagement with hostile forces. The ROE reflect the requirements of the law of war, operational concerns, and political considerations when military force shifts from peace to conflict or war, and back to the peace phase of an operation. These requirements are the primary means the commander uses to convey legal, political, diplomatic, and military guidance to the military force in peacetime for handling the crisis. There is close cooperation between tactical and legal channels when formulating ROE. The tacticians, usually represented by the S3, first decide what the desired intent of the ROE is. Then the SJA will put that intent in legal terms. Generally in wartime, the commander, through ROE, permits a wider use of military force. However, ROE restrict the use of military force to the achievement of the political objectives. In all operations, the commander is legally responsible for the care and treatment of civilians and property within the area of operations until transfer to a proper government. The ROE assist the commander in fulfilling these responsibilities. They vary in different conflicts and often change during the respective phases from combat or crisis through peace-building or nation-assistance. Even during a single phase and operation the rules are amended at the different levels of command, which may result in confusion. Also, rules that apply to a certain operation may not apply to another. The ROE must be based on METT-T to include any restrictions that fall between the established peacetime ROE and those ROE associated with hostilities (wartime). The ROE must be consistent with training and equipment capabilities. For example, "shoot to wound" is not an effective instruction unless soldiers have been trained in this skill. When necessary, command guidance can clarify ROE. While the rules must be tailored to the occasion, they should observe that nothing in such rules negates a commander's obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action in unit self-defense. Also, the rules should concisely establish guidance for the search and seizure of inhabitants, the authority of local security patrols, the control of black market operations, and surrender of hostile personnel.

(1) Request channels for rules of engagement. Commanders at all levels need to know the request channels for ROE as well as the procedures to obtain approval for recommended changes to the ROE. Because ROE are developed with political considerations in mind, they normally come from JCS-level decisions. However, changes to the ROE may result from immediate tactical emergencies at the local levels. Therefore, the commander should have access to request and obtain changes to the ROE. Changes in ROE are requested through the operational chain of command and must be approved by the proper authority. Situations requiring an immediate change to the ROE could include introduction of combat forces from a hostile nation; attacks by sophisticated weapon systems including NBC; or incidents resulting in loss of life. These situations should be war-gamed and request channels exercised.

(2) Rules of engagement intent. ROE should be established for, disseminated down to, and understood by individual soldiers, but the ROE cannot cover every situation. Soldiers at all levels must understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly despite any military disadvantage that may occur. The commander responsible for ROE formulation should consider including an intent portion that describes the desired end-state of the operation as well as conflict-termination considerations. This assists commanders and leaders at all levels in situations not clearly addressed in an OPORD.

h. Force Protection. Commanders must always consider the aspects of force protection and how they relate to the ROE. Some considerations are as follows:

(1) Coordinate for security forces. If the host nation secures the outside perimeter, US personnel must secure the inside perimeter.

(2) Avoid becoming a lucrative target.

(3) Include security in each plan, SOP, OPORD, and movement order.

(4) Develop specific security programs such as threat awareness and OPSEC.

(5) Restrict access of unassigned personnel to the unit's location.

(6) Constantly portray an image of professionalism and readiness.

(7) Consider force protection throughout the range of military operations; base the degree of security established on a continuous threat assessment.

i. Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence. Brigades do not normally perform the function of a joint task force headquarters. If a JTF has not been established for the operation, a command and control element from the division performs the role of the JTF to integrate the other services. This role allows the brigade to focus on the control of its battalions.

(1) Command and support relationships. The ambassador to the country is responsible for US operations, both civilian and military, except military forces under the command of a regional CINC. He heads a country team that interfaces with civilian and military agencies. The term "country team" describes in-country interdepartmental coordination among the members of the US diplomatic mission. Examples are as follows:

  • Economic officer.

  • Director of USAID.

  • Commercial Attache.

  • Agriculture Attache.

  • USIA.

  • Chief, Security Assistance Office (SAO, MAAG, MILG, and so forth).

(a) The US area military commander is not a member of the diplomatic mission. The JTF interfaces with the senior military defense representative on the country team. If no JTF has been established, division or brigade headquarters may be responsible for interface with the country team and host nation.

(b) Command and control headquarters may be unilateral or established with the host nation. An interagency headquarters of civilian and military forces also include police, paramilitary, security, and even other US agencies. The headquarters must coordinate operations with civilian agencies to ensure no conflict of political and military objectives. The increased need for liaison with both military and civilian organization is evident.

(c) Civil affairs and PSYOP initiatives in and out of country are coordinated with the Agency for International Development and the US Information Service through the JTF. The brigade conducts detailed coordination to ensure the purpose of current PSYOP and civil affairs efforts is understood. It may influence the planning, preparation, and execution of operations.

(d) If a conventional force follows an SOF during a deployment, it should request a liaison before arrival in the operational area. Conventional forces coordinate with SOF through the JTF. If a JTF has not been created, the unit contacts the SOF through the security assistance office. (See Chapter 8 for linkup procedures.)

(2) Communications. Communications abilities are augmented to affect long-range communications and proper liaisons. Equipment compatibility, crypto use, information sharing, and security measures are considered when working with SOF, joint forces, and multinational forces.

(3) Intelligence consideration. The brigade uses the IPB to portray the intelligence estimate for the commander. Population status, ethnicity, and socio-economic factors take an increasing importance. Threat doctrinal information may be scarce. HUMINT is a major focus, and the intelligence effort must be continuous. (See FM 34-130, for more information on IPB for operations other than war.)

(a) Organizations. Organization sources include all host country military and civilian intelligence systems as well as US intelligence sources.

(b) Collection. Tactical collection includes all sources. Technological capabilities may not provide significant advantage in some environments. An intelligence database may or may not apply or be available to the tactical commander. The focus of the IPB and the main source of intelligence is often HUMINT; every soldier must be a collector.

(c) Restrictions. Internal and external restrictions may exist on the dissemination of information. Gathering information on and within another country in conditions other than war has political sensitivity; how information was gathered is always protected.

(d) Emphasis. The intelligence effort must have continued emphasis. Before force commitment, the brigade must effectively collect, process, and focus intelligence to support all planning, training, and operational requirements. During execution, intelligence determines the proper course of action.

H-2. PRINCIPLES

Brigades may participate in operations other than war independently or as part of a larger and usually joint force. The tenet of versatility requires brigades to be able to adjust rapidly to these diverse requirements. The principles of operations other than war provide guidance for how the brigade should conduct itself in all operations other than war situations. The principles are perseverance, objective, unity of effort, security, restraint and legitimacy.

a. Perseverance. FM 100-5 states that operations other than war "the underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or decisive resolution." This presents a challenge when received in conjunction with the principle of objective. Perseverance has not been traditionally a part of the American way of war and both the US public and military have grown accustomed to quick victory with minimal casualties. Such conditions may be difficult to achieve in operations other than war, and brigade commanders must be sensitive to this reality. The US is more likely to persevere in actions not involving direct military intervention.

b. Objective. Under the principle of objective, FM 100-5 advises "direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective." However, the perseverance principle says decisive resolution in operations other than war will be difficult. To address this situation, the commander must articulate a clear end state for the operation. The end state may require continued refinement during the operation. The end state for operation Restore Hope was "an environment in which the UN and NGOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the Somalia relief efforts." Conditions must also be established to meet the end state. An example of these conditions drawn from Restore Hope is the four no's: no bandits, no checkpoints, no technical weapons, and no visible weapons.

(1) The brigade commander faces the difficult and important task of translating objective guidance into tangible, tactical tasks. For example, during the 1992 riots in Los Angeles, JTF-LA was to "conduct civil disturbance operations to restore order in the greater Los Angeles area." This statement identifies the operation and the purpose, but not the task. Subordinate commanders must take such guidance and analyze it to produce the tactical tasks such as "retain intersection X, " "clear zone Y," and "secure route Z."

(2) The brigade must be alert to mission creep and keep a close handle on its resources and requirements to help maintain focus. A mission matrix is one tool that is used to help accomplish this.

c. Unity of effort. Note that this is not the familiar "unity of command" from the principles of war. In operations other than war, the emphasis is on cooperation rather than command. Joint, multinational, NGO, and interagency personnel will be involved The demand for liaison is tremendous. In many operations other than war situations, the infantry brigade will not be the main effort. Different personnel in the operation, especially relief agencies, may have different agendas. It is important to find out who has authority in the AO, whether it is religious, civic, business, military, political, or other basis, and work through and with them.

d. Security. The nonhostile intent of friendly forces involved in operations other than war does not mean that the enemy or noncomplying forces share that same intent. This danger is compounded by intelligence difficulties. There are no doctrinal threat templates for operations other than war to compare with those in FM 100-2 Soviet manuals. As R. James Woolsey said, "Yes, we have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of." This is compounded by the lack of HUMINT collection assets available in a HUMINT intensive environment. These conditions make the IFB process all the more important.

e. Restraint. Sometimes at odds with the need for security is the principle of restraint. Almost all operations other than war activities will be conducted IAW some rules of engagement. Soldiers will have to accomplish their mission without using maximum force. Predeployment training in the form of what if scenarios and ROE dilemmas is essential.

(1) Table H-1 is an extract of ROE dilemmas adapted for the 1992 Los Angeles riots. The dilemmas will vary for each ROE.

(2) Another restraint consideration might be arming status. The appropriate arming status should be a function of the threat and soldier experience, training, and discipline. See Table H-2, for the arming order levels that were used in the Los Angeles riots.

f. Legitimacy. Build and sustain the willing acceptance by the international community, the US public, and the indigenous populace of the right of the sponsoring authority to take action. Loss of acceptance by any one of the above groups limits or jeopardizes the effectiveness of the operations.

(1) Legitimacy is first developed through the diplomatic process in the source of authority and development of a mandate. Military force and military operations do not establish legitimacy, they support it. They support it through the composition of the force, ROE, and restraint.

(2) The composition of the force must support the mandate and be politically acceptable to the international community while being able to complete the mission and protect the force. The composition of the force must support the stated goals of the sponsoring authority. Perception that the forces employed exceed the limits of the mandate lessens legitimacy with the international community, the US public, and the indigenous populace. Capability and acceptability are not constants but wary based on the threat, the intensity of operations, the missions to be performed, and changing international perceptions.

(3) Minimal use of violence and strict adherence to the mandate are the two fundamentals of building and maintaining legitimacy. Misplaced or wrongful use of force could require that an element be withdrawn from the effort. While commanders must protect their soldiers, only the minimal essential force required is acceptable in operations other than war. Respect, in word and action, for the people, both as individuals and as a culture, does much to legitimize the operations other than war forces. In situations where local cultures differ from one or more elements of the force, the achievement of respect may entail a significant troop education effort.

(4) Another major concern is the efforts to establish legitimacy by way of dealing with the media. The presence of the media on the battlefield is a reality that must be dealt with. The following is a sample guidance list of do's and don'ts for dealing with the media:

  • You do not have to talk to the media if you do not wish to.

  • Always protect classified information. Do not guess or speculate on things you don't know about. Anything you say can be in enemy hands within minutes.

  • Members of the media will be credentialed and escorted by a military or DOD civilian escort.

  • Discuss only matter in which you have direct knowledge. If you don't know say, "I don't know."

  • Do not discuss political or foreign policy matters.

  • Do not discuss operational capabilities, exact numbers or troop strengths, numbers/types of casualties, types of weapon systems, or future plans. Use the term "approximate" or light, moderate or heavy.

  • Do not answer "what if" questions or render opinions.

  • Never lie to the news media.

  • Everything you say is "on the record, " never answer "off the record" questions. Simply say I can't tell you off the record, however, I can tell you... !

  • Ignore the reporter's camera and talk to the interviewer.

  • Be brief/concise; use simple language, not jargon. Avoid acronyms.

  • Take your time; think--questions need not be answered instantly.

  • Answer only one question at a time.

  • Do not provide the enemy with propaganda material by grumbling and thoughtless complaining.

  • If you accidentally say something classified, tell the reporter and ask him not to use it. Report the incident to higher. Do not confiscate any material or equipment from the media.

  • Do not attempt to cover embarrassing events under a cloak of security classification.

  • Maintain a professional attitude during interviews; remain in control even when the media seems aggressive or questions seem silly. Reasoned responses will help you stay in control of the interview.

  • Do not allow yourself to be badgered or harassed.

  • Be polite but firm in dealing with the press.

  • Do not schedule or participate in an interview when it would interfere with your mission. However, do not use unit missions as an excuse to avoid the media or interview.

  • Use the media opportunity to tell your unit and Army story.

Section II
ACTIVITIES

FM 100-5 addresses operations other than war and categorizes them into 13 activities. The boundaries between these activities are not always well defined nor are they meant to be exhaustive. The following is a general discussion of the common activities.

H-3. NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS

Noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted to evacuate US citizens whose lives care in danger. These operations may also include evacuating natives of the host nation and third country aliens friendly to the US. This type of operation involves swift insertion and temporary occupation of an objective followed by a planned withdrawal. Leaders use only the amount of force required for protection of the evacuees and for self-defense.

a. The key in planning is to determine whether the evacuation takes place in a benign environment, involves facing the threat of violent opposition, or will, in fact, be a combat operation. The NEOs are conducted in three types of environments:

(1) Permissive. In permissive environment, there is no apparent physical threat to evacuees. The host government will not oppose their orderly departure or US military assistance. Military assistance is normally limited to medical, logistics, military police, and transportation. Security forces are tailored to what is required to protect military property personnel. Depending on the political situation in the HN, the JTF commander may elect to have a reaction force on standby to respond rapidly if the environment becomes less permissive.

(2) Uncertain. In an uncertain environment, the degree of danger is uncertain. The host government may or may not be in control but cannot ensure the safety of US citizens. Because of the uncertainty, the JTF commander may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with additional security units. The need for a reaction force comes more important. Forced entry may be required. In this environment, the JTF commander will probably elect to issue weapons and ammunition to evacuation force personnel. The ROE must be disseminated early enough to ensure troops are trained, and they must be strictly enforced to avoid escalation of hostilities.

(3) Hostile. In a hostile environment, host government or other forces are expected to oppose evacuation and US military assistance. The JTF commander may elect to deploy a sizable security element with the evacuation force. He may position a large reaction force, either with the evacuation force or at an ISB. Forced entry may be required. The ROE must be strictly enforced.

b. The brigade objectives are limited to those tactically needed to provide a suitable avenue of evacuation. Care of civilians and maintenance of order in and around the evacuation site are prime responsibilities. Because of the sensitive nature of the mission, political concerns and constraints apply. The military NEO role consists of five phases:

PHASE I: Predeployment. The military NEO role begins with the brigade being notified and ends with the deployment phase.

PHASE II: Deployment. During this phase, the brigade moves to the intermediate staging base (ISB) or directly to the host nation.

PHASE III: Evacuation. During this phase, the evacuation force establishes an evacuation site, coordinates with US Embassy personnel, escorts US citizens to designated assembly areas and the evacuation site, processes the evacuees, and transports them to the safe haven. Commanders should anticipate evacuating more personnel than estimated by the US Embassy.

PHASE IV: Safe Haven Operations. During this phase, planners may wish to collocate the safe haven with the ISB, since they both must be at the nearest protected site to the host nation. Two other possibilities are involved during this phase. The first is that the host nation asks the US forces to leave the safe haven, since the political situation makes its presence undesirable. Therefore, the processing of evacuees is turned over to the US Embassy officials from the safe haven country. The State Department personnel have the responsibility for this phase rather than the military, since they screen all evacuees before they enter the US. The second possibility is that the military transports the evacuees directly to the US. The screening then takes place on US soil and the military cannot participate.

PHASE V: Withdrawal. During this phase, the evacuation force recovers all equipment, retrieves rear detachments, and moves back to its home base. If the operation is smooth, this phase is short and simple. If US citizens or the military must remain in either the host nation, ISB, or the safe haven after the US Embassy closes, the joint task force commander is responsible for the safety and security of both US forces and evacuees.

H-4. SUPPORT TO DOMESTIC CIVIL AUTHORITY

Domestic support operations are covered in detail in FM 100-19. Support to US civil authority includes those activities provided by military forces in support of federal and state officials under and limited by the Posse Comitatus Act and other laws and regulations. Congress and the courts view requirements for military support in civilian domestic affairs as situation-specific. These requirements restrict military support to situations that involve disaster assistance, civil disorder, threats to federal property, and some other emergencies. Congress defines drug trafficking, illegal immigration, and customs violations as threats to national security that warrant military support. Military involvement either as a primary or a supporting agency, is depicted in Table H-3.

a. Disaster Assistance. Disaster assistance provides emergency aid to civilians and helps restore vital public activities and facilities. The brigade becomes a rapidly deployed manpower base in response to these crises. Military assistance includes:

  • Medical supplies, equipment, and emergency medical treatment.

  • Food, water, and shelter.

  • Rescue and fire fighting services.

  • Police protection.

  • Route clearance and traffic control.

  • Prevention of panic.

  • Communications.

  • Restoration of facilities.

  • Enforcement of curfews.

b. Civil Disorders. The mission of the brigade forces during civil disorders is to assist local authorities in restoring and maintaining law and order. The brigade can do the following:

  • Present a show of force.

  • Establish road or area blocks.

  • Disperse crowds.

  • Release riot control agents.

  • Patrol.

  • Serve as security forces or reserves.

H-5. PEACE ENFORCEMENT

Peace enforcement operations possess unique characteristics that make them distinct from war and unique in operations other than war. (See Figure H-1.)

a. Peace enforcement is a form of combat, armed intervention, or the physical threat of armed intervention. It is pursuant to international license, authorizing the coercive use of military power to compel compliance with international sanctions or resolutions. The purpose of peace enforcement is to maintain or restore peace under conditions broadly defined by the international community.

b. Army forces may be employed under these circumstances to separate hostile factions or belligerent parties forcibly. Such operations involve a high probability of combat, involving combat multipliers from PSYOPS and civil affairs to mechanized infantry and armored forces.

c. Other peace enforcement operations may include the following:

  • Enforcement of sanctions.

  • Protection of the human rights of minorities.

  • Protection of humanitarian relief efforts.

  • Guarantee or limitation of freedom of movement (ground, air, sea).

  • Restoration of territorial integrity.

d. The US may participate in peace operations under the auspices of an international organization such as the UN, in cooperation with other countries, or unilaterally.

e. Peace enforcement forces create the conditions for peace. The forces cannot solve the underlying problems that cause peaceful relations to dissolve. Inserting the forces to stop combat is the essential first step in setting the conditions for peace, but military operations cannot be the basis of a lasting peace. Settlement, not victory, is the goal of all peace enforcement operations. The measure of success is always political, not military.

f. Conflict, violence, disorder, and possibly chaos, rather than peace, describe the environment surrounding enforcement operations. Moreover, one or more of the belligerent parties to the conflict prefers it that way.

g. The consent of one or both belligerent parties to peace enforcement may not exist. Peace enforcement operations are likely to disregard state sovereignty, especially if the mission takes place on the soil of the combatant who opposes peace and has not invited the peace enforcers into its territory.

h. Methods of coercion may be the rule rather than the exception for peace enforcement forces and operations. Such coercion involves activities or objectives that make the political embrace of peace more attractive than continuance of the conflict.

i. Peace enforcement forces may fight their way into the conflict area and use force to separate the combatants physically. Under these conditions, they should consider certain factors. First, the peace enforcement force usually retains the right to use the appropriate force first. However, the threat of overwhelming forces, while not proportional to the requirement for protecting the peace enforcement units, may be the best means of coercing the belligerent parties into separating. Commanders must not allow a gradual escalation of force to be perceived by the belligerent parties as a weakness. The area of operations is normally characterized by some density of civilians. This situation poses special considerations for threat identification collateral damage, civilian casualties, and displaced civilians.

j. If the threat of force fails, the peace enforcement force may have to engage in offensive actions. However, commanders must be aware that inappropriate use of force could worsen the overall situation. Such use of force may involve inflicting and suffering casualties, possibly undercutting international and US domestic support and the legitimacy of the force in the eyes of the populace and others in the area of operations.

k. The peace enforcement force is not well-suited to transition to a peacekeeping force. Because of its previous use of force, it would not be considered neutral by both of the belligerent parties.

l. Modern arms and the training to use them are readily available to most of the world's political belligerents. Therefore, US forces must be prepared to deal with a determined, well-armed, and well-trained foe.

m. In accordance with the principle of objective, the commander focuses on an end state. This end state is abroad description of what the legitimizing authority wants the theater to look like following the application of the various elements of power. These elements include political, economic, informational, and military. An example of a possible end state is as follows:

  • Lines of communication secured.

  • All combatants separated.

  • A cease fire implemented.

  • A UN peacekeeping force in place.

  • International humanitarian relief operations ongoing.

n. As seen in Figure H-1, peace enforcement operations follow a natural sequence or phasing that can be used as an execution framework for staff planning: introduction of forces, establishment of the lodgement of the conditions for the exit of peace enforcement forces, and the relief by peacekeeping forces and redeployment. The following discussion assumes that the national command authority decision to deploy peace enforcement forces and interagency force tailoring have taken place.

(1) Introduce forces into the area of operations.

(a) Preparation of the area of operations by SOFs. The SOFs prepare the AO through normal SOF activities designed to gain intelligence updates on key and local personalities and facilities. The SOFs make contact with local agencies and friendly authorities. The PYOPS effort must begin early in the operation. The SOFs establish surveillance over the planned points of entry. The SOFs might also conduct operations to prevent the synchronized defense or counterattack by threat forces in the vicinity of the point of entry. Finally, the SOFs provide up-to-the-minute weather and intelligence before the leading forces enter.

(b) Entry. The tactical environment within the AO dictates the nature of the initial entry of forces. The objective is normally an airfield and or port facilities. An unopposed entry is preferred and should be attempted through diplomatic coordination with host nation authorities. However, the initial-entry forces may have to conduct a forced entry to gain a lodgement for the entry of follow-on forces. In either case, ROE and other characteristics of peace enforcement operations influence the conduct of the operation.

(2) Establish the lodgement. Once force leaders have secured the entry point, actions to establish the lodgement include security patrolling; fundamental force protection measures, the establishment of command, control, and communications facilities; logistics build-up; and the posting of checkpoints and roadblocks to control entry into the lodgement area. This posting of checkpoints and roadblocks may include the link up with and the relief of SOF elements posted at key choke points, allowing them to prepare the AO for the expansion of operations. Finally, installation security measures are established (for example, the establishment of perimeters and the posting of guards). The technique of base clustering logistics, command and control, and maneuver elements are considered as a means of force protection, concentration, and flexibility. The use of this technique is measured against the risk of enemy targeting. The establishment of the lodgement is executed as a normal combat operation under the constraint of the ROE.

(3) Expand the lodgement. In addition to security patrolling, reconnaissance patrolling begins the effort to expand the lodgement. Commanders and leaders need to orient themselves and their so soldiers to the area through contact with local authorities and the populace. Staffs continue to update their information on the area and revise their assessments for operational requirements. Combat, CS, and CSS elements continue to arrive, increasing combat power and improving logistics facilities and other required infrastructure.

(4) Establish conditions to stop hostilities.

(a) Separate the belligerent parties. The first step in stopping hostilities is the separation of belligerent parties. This may involve combat operations that range from show-of-force to movements-to-contact or limited objective attacks to seize key terrain. The intent of ground commanders is to separate belligerents and affect their withdrawal from the designated buffer or demilitarized zone. The boundaries of this zone must be easy to recognize.

(b) Support mediation and negotiation efforts. All military operations work toward supporting the political efforts at mediation. These efforts involve monitoring the activities that both sides undertake "in good faith" to ensure that good faith is maintained. The military may find itself involved in mediation and negotiation efforts, and the following is a checklist to help guide in the effort:

  • Highlight arms of agreement.

  • Summarize points of disagreement.

  • Hear arguments without interruption.

  • Tackle easy issues first.

  • Use two interpreters if you are concerned that one interpreter may give inaccurate translation.

  • Consider having a subordinate conduct initial sessions so that any faux paus can later be corrected by a senior official.

  • Have a signal made up so that an assistant can call you away for a phone call or bring in refreshments if a break is needed.

(c) Support civil affairs operations. Military personnel can expect to become involved in civil affairs operations. Soldiers are an integral part of the coordination of civil affairs activities. They are also used to take part in civil affairs projects to promote good will.

(d) Report progress. As the belligerent parties disengage, through coercion or combat, the peace enforcement unit assumes the tactical positions of the displaced forces. The commander considers informing all parties of the unit's progress. Though this violates OPSEC, it does preclude unintentional engagements and lessens the risk of fratricide.

(e) Establish buffer and demilitarized zones. As the belligerent parties withdraw, the buffer or demilitarized zone begin to take shape. A buffer zone is defined as the space controlled by the peace operations force, which gives the desired assurance that the specified parameters and the degree of risk are not exceeded. The specified parameters are determined by METT-T; ROE; range of the belligerent parties direct, indirect weapons systems; and the commander's intent. In contrast to buffer zones, DMZs are not normally occupied by third party presence but are patrolled by observer teams or surveyed from OPs. The DMZs are created to neutralize certain areas from military occupation and activity. In general, these are areas that are claimed by both sides, and the control by one could constitute a direct threat to the other.

(f) Maintain separation of the belligerent parties. With the establishment of a buffer or demilitarized zone, certain missions are conducted to maintain the separation of the belligerents. (Consideration should be given to conducting nonpermissive noncombatant evacuation operations.)

(5) Establish conditions for the exit of forces. Once belligerent parties separate, operations are conducted to keep them apart. Security operations, such as screening, combat and reconnaissance patrolling, cordon and search, search and attack, and establishment of checkpoints and roadblocks to control movement into and within the buffer zone are normally conducted to maintain the separation of belligerent parties. Peace enforcement forces may not be able to exit the area until the mission has been accomplished. This involves formalizing the cessation of hostilities. At the local level, this may include public ceremonies mirroring national or regional ceremonies or agreements to end hostilities. The agreement of both belligerent parties to remain separated is the goal.

(6) Relief by peacekeeping forces/redeployment. Peace enforcement forces plan to exit the area when the agreements and buffer zones are formalized and should not attempt to transition to peacekeeping roles. The handover of operations and facilities occur much like a relief in place operation. The establishment of liaison, linguistic assistance, the sequencing of incoming and outgoing forces (combat, combat support, and service support), and the coordination of logistics and equipment left in place are of prime important. Given this framework, commanders and staffs can begin to plan and prepare for peace enforcement operations.

H-6. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF

Disaster relief operations provide emergency assistance to victims of natural or man-made disasters. Brigade elements involved in disaster relief operations have various tasks; they include refugee assistance, food programs, medical care, and other civilian welfare programs. Army CS and CSS units are key players in these operations, but combat arms units provide the added support. If the operation is conducted inn hostile area the unit involved may have a force protection or security mission. The operation is discontinued when the host country gains enough control to continue on its own; it is reduced activity by activity. This process is accomplished by phases until call military units have departed. The military provides the logistic support to move supplies to remote areas, extract or evacuate victims, provide emergency communications, and conduct direct medical support operations.

H-7. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

A peacekeeping force facilitates a negotiated truce and political settlement of disputes by assuring each side that the other is not taking advantage of the terms to its own benefit. The peacekeeping force differs from internal security in that the force does not act in support of a government. The peacekeeping force remains entirely neutral. Once the force loses its reputation for impartiality, the usefulness of the force is destroyed. The following conditions must be present in order for peacekeeping operations (PKOs) to work well:

  • Consent of the belligerents.

  • The political recognition of the PKO by most if not all of the international community.

  • A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.

  • Sufficient freedom of movement for the force, or observers, to carry out their responsibilities.

  • An effective, command, control, and communications (C3) system.

  • Well-trained, balanced, impartial, noncoercive forces.

  • An effective and responsive all-source intelligence capability.

a. Political Factors. Political factors influence the tactical execution of PKOs. Specifically, the political process mandates ROE, freedom of movement and area of operations. Often, political restrictions limit the military commander in the conduct of the mission. The tactical commander complies with instructions and informs the chain of command of the tactical implications of a political decision. Political and military leaders must understand each other's perceptions and problems. The peacekeeping mission operates with a mandate that describes the scope of operations for the mission. The sponsoring bodies usually consist of several countries. Although these countries are supposed to be impartial, each may have its own idea of what the peacekeeping force should do. Also, the agreement frames the mandate for the peacekeeping force in such a way that it gives advantage to no side. For these reasons, the agreement is imprecise and susceptible to different interpretations by the belligerent parties and all countries contributing to the force as well.

b. Guidelines. To plan a PKO, the planner considers political factors, force structure, command and control, reinforcement/rotation, maintenance and supply of equipment, emergency withdrawal plans, weapons policy and ROE, public affairs policy, morale and welfare support, the use of technology, and force protection.

(1) The difficulties of joining a multinational force in a hostile environment, in unfamiliar territory, and with restrictions on one's freedom of action are overcome if commanders study the history and lessons of previous PKOs. They can anticipate the kinds of problems that may occur in a new operation. Force mandates, which lay down the principles governing the conduct of operations, vary to meet the circumstances peculiar to each operation. A number of guidelines apply to the conduct of a peacekeeping force in all situations:

(a) All members must be fully briefed on the political and military situation, the customs and religions of the people, and be kept up-to-date as the situation changes. Every effort must be made to know the people and to understand their problems with the aim of achieving a reputation for sympathy and impartiality.

(b) Peacekeeping personnel maintain a high profile, and consequently, their lives are continually at risk. Commanders need to maintain a confident presence with due provision for the safety of their troops. An officer should be present when a detachment is likely to face a difficult situation.

(c) All units must enforce the policy on ROE and the action to be taken with regard to infringements and violations of agreements. In operations where units have used different standards in executing the ROE, there has been trouble with the parties to the dispute and constant friction as well as recrimination between the national contingents of the peacekeeping force.

(2) In peacekeeping, small incidents have serious political results. Trivial events can increase rapidly into major crises and calls for emergency meetings of the security council. Although there are great advantages in dealing with problems at the lowest possible level, senior commanders and force headquarters must follow the smallest incident with interest. They may also have to intervene at an earlier stage than is customary in normal military operations.

(3) Centralized control ensures a uniformity of reaction to incidents and may prevent sudden action by inexperienced peacekeepers. However, no superior commander can foresee every eventuality or predict how incidents may develop. The commander allows a measure of initiative to junior leaders within the general framework of force policy directives and SOPs.

(4) Subordinates ensure their superiors are informed of situations as they develop. They suggest possible courses of action in enough time for their leaders to evaluate them and give directions. If a subordinate anticipates a serious crisis in time, a superior commander, even the force commander, goes to the scene and takes charge. However, there are occasions when an incident develops so fast that the subordinate must immediately decide the most sensible course of action. The subordinate must report what he has done and the reasons for his actions as quickly as possible.

c. Technology. Technology assists substantially in the conduct of PKOs. The missions can involve extended distances or restrictions that can be reduced by technology. Useful systems are as follows:

  • Intelligence fusion systems.

  • Effective countermine equipment.

  • Effective night vision equipment.

  • Communications systems.

  • Surveillance systems.

  • Lightweight body armor.

  • Accurate ground maps.

  • Modular tactical force protection equipment.

Early in the planning process, commanders give consideration to the use of such technology as sensors to provide better surveillance or perform other key peacekeeping roles. For example, the Sinai field mission successfully incorporated a wide range of sensors to continuously monitor key terrain.

d. Peacekeeping Tasks. Each PKO is unique; however, a PKO may be one of the following or a combination thereof: withdrawal and disengagement, cease fire, prisoner-of-war exchange, or demilitarization and demobilization. Accomplishment of PKOs often includes obscure situations; the peacekeeping force may have to deaf with extreme tension without becoming involved. Tasks normally assigned to a peacekeeping force can be listed under the following headings: supervise a truce or cease-fire agreement or contribute to the maintenance of law and order and a return to normal conditions. To accomplish these tasks, leaders may need to establish and deploy military peacekeeping units and observer groups in a demilitarized zone or a buffer zone between the opposing forces. This enables a force to do the following:

  • Exercise control and surveillance of an area or boundary and demarcation line between the opposing parties.

  • Prevent infiltration or a confrontation between the opposing forces.

  • Direct local negotiations between the parties concerned.

(1) The tasks may also involve a survey of the opposing forces' military and paramilitary units to ensure the following:

(a) Permitted units are not increased above the strength stated by the parties involved.

(b) Existing fortifications are not reinforced or enlarged.

(c) Arms and supplies are not increased from those agreed upon.

(d) Armistice demarcation line or buffer zone are not overflown by aircraft from the opposing sides.

(2) The methods used to accomplish a mission may include the following:

  • Observing.

  • Patrolling.

  • Traffic controlling.

  • Surveying of sensitive areas.

  • Preventing or dispersing prohibited demonstrations.

  • Checking on transportation of goods.

  • Searching for missing persons.

  • Negotiating with local authorities.

  • Providing logistic support to isolated ethnic groups.

  • Gathering information.

  • Clearing mines.

  • Marking forward limits of each side's military forces.

  • Receiving the remains of KIAs.

H-8. SHOW OF FORCE

Forces deployed abroad lend credibility to a nation's promises and commitments; these operations are meant to reassure a friend or ally. They influence other nations by displaying a viable military force. These operations also influence other government or political-military organizations to respect US interests. Operations develop by deploying forces forward, using aircraft and ship visits, and by introducing forces as a show of force. The presence of a credible military force highlight policy interests and commitment; the force must be able to conduct a combat operation if the psychological effect proves insufficient for the purpose.

a. Deployment of strategic or rapid deployment forces provide show of force either in response to certain threats or as part of a routine exercise. The following elements are important for planning:

  • Timeliness.

  • Location.

  • Tasks.

  • Force composition and size.

  • Means of entry and withdrawal.

  • Purpose.

  • Duration.

  • Sustainment.

b. As with all operations other than war, the political nature of the operation prevails, mainly in the use of military forces. Since the object is not the use of force, legal and political constraints may apply. The operation is coordinated with the related country teams. Forces must understand the objectives; they must have the will to complete the operation without a clear military success. Before commitment, the chain of command ensures that the force understands the purpose, ROE, and inherent risks of the operation.

c. The first element vital to a show of force is the forward deployment or basing of forces. Also, the availability of required logistics and infrastructure is crucial. The force must be sustainable, which requires the following:

  • Host nation support.

  • Appropriate mobility assets.

  • Sufficient liaison.

  • Accurate intelligence.

  • Clear lines of command and control.

  • Adequate communications ability.

  • Ready and responsive forces.

H-9. SUPPORT TO INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

Support to insurgency or counterinsurgency includes all assistance the US can provide to help a friendly nation or group to combat or prosecute an insurgency.

a. When US armed forces are directed to assist, they provide equipment, training, and services to the insurgent force. An infantry brigade would probably not be committed to support an insurgency, but if it is, the brigade could perform a variety of combat and related tasks.

b. The US support to counterinsurgency rests on the IDAD concept. This concept uses all the leadership, organizational, and material resources available to the host government. If the host nation requests support and US interests are involved the US National Command Authority directs the US Army to participate. This assistance includes economic, political, and military assets. Brigade operations include civil affairs, population, and resources control; psychological operations; intelligence; tactical operations; and training assistance. Intelligence, PSYOP, and EAD/EAC signal assets; civil affairs teams; and medical, engineer, supply, transportation and maintenance units may be required to enhance these capabilities.

c. The brigade's most common combat role in counterinsurgency is executing counterguerrilla missions, such as search and attack operations. Usually, the brigade operates as part of a JTF or division. (See FM 90-8 for more information on counterguerrilla operations.)

H-10. COMBATTING TERRORISM

Combatting terrorism includes actions taken to protect installations, units, and individuals from the threat of terrorism. Antiterrorism focuses on defensive measures. Counterterrorism encompasses a full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. In operations other than war, antiterrorism countermeasures are a continuous requirement. The measures taken depend on the threat; they are included in al the categories of operations other than war. (See JP 3-07.2 for more information.)

H-11. RAIDS

In operations other than war, raids include the rescue of US or friendly foreign nationals, and the location, identification, and recovery of sensitive equipment. They also support political and diplomatic measures. These attacks are made for purposes other than gaining or holding terrain. Such operations are deliberate responses or quick reactions; they are either direct or indirect in nature. Raids aid cooperation; they create situations that let friendly nations seize and maintain the political initiative.

a. Raids can succeed if performed by organizations skilled in basic warfighting techniques. Such a force (rangers, special forces, or light infantry) acts alone or with special operations elements or allied forces. Elements are inserted by ship or aircraft. They strike strategic objectives, targets of high psychological profile, time-sensitive targets, or key personnel and bases.

b. Successful raids are characterized by the following:

  • A start time and location not known by the enemy.

  • Covert planning rehearsal, and deployment.

  • Swift, violent, precise, and audacious actions that focus full combat power at the decisive time and place.

  • Use of all available combat power assets.

  • Precise timing.

  • Swift disengagement when the mission is complete.

  • Planned and swift withdrawal that includes deception plans.

c. Raids are normally conducted in five phases.

PHASE I: The force inserts into the objective area.

PHASE II: The objective area is scaled off from outside enemy support or reinforcement to include enemy air.

PHASE III: All available combat firepower is used to overcome the enemy force at or near the objective by surprise and violent attack.

PHASE IV: The mission is accomplished quickly before any surviving enemy can recover or be reinforced.

PHASE V: The force withdrawals from the objective area and is extracted.

H-12. SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG OPERATIONS

The armed services may be involved in many actions taken to disrupt, interdict, or destroy illicit drugs and the infrastructure (personnel, materiel, and distribution system) of illicit drug entities. Such action is always in conjunction with another governmental agency. Some of these agencies are the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, and the Drug Enforcement Administration. Military support to drug interdiction operations can include mobile training teams, offshore training, advisory personnel, logistic support (materiel, maintenance, resupply, and transportation), communications, and intelligence support. Using special aircraft, ships, and personnel, military forces help the US Coast Guard and other US law enforcement agencies track and interdict illegal drug shipments. As directed by the NCA, US military forces also help foreign governments to stop the processing of illicit drugs. Military training activities often adapt to support both combat readiness and the US counterdrug effort.

H-13. ARMS CONTROL, SECURITY ASSISTANCE, AND NATION ASSISTANCE

The infantry brigades have minimal involvement with the three remaining activities. There may be some short-term, high-impact involvement working with the allied nation's military under nation assistance. Arms control and security assistance activities may require temporary assignment of the brigade's senior leadership to support these missions.

Section III
LOGISTIC SUPPORT

This section provides general guidelines that apply to all categories of operations other than war. Logistic support in operations other than war involves providing material and supplies to US and host nation combat forces. It can also involve developing logistic systems, infrastructure, and procedures for the host nation, and training host nation logistic personnel. In operations other than war, logistic elements often precede other military forces into the area of operation, or they may be the only forces deployed. Logistic systems supporting either US or host nation forces must operate within the environmental, legal, and political constraints governing US involvement. Therefore, such systems must be flexible to tailor support to the situation.

H-14. PRINCIPLES OF SUPPORT

The principles of support apply in all political-military environments. The logistician must apply and adapt these principles to the operations other than war environment, which presents unique challenges. The following are characteristics of logistic systems in operations other than war:

  • Greatest economy of resources.

  • Flexible task force composition.

  • Ability to operate in any theater or country.

  • Routine use of host nation support to include local services, supplies, facilities, and transportation. It must not be used so extensively that it causes dislocation in domestic supplies, industries, services, or prices.

  • Best use of existing fixed facilities such as lines of communication, ports, and airfields.

  • Best handling of supplies.

  • Greatest reliance on CONUS supply activities or, when appropriate, existing regional support bases.

  • Provisions for self-protection and passive protection measures for logistic units.

  • Routine use of both strategic and theater airlift until surface transportation can accommodate the deployment.

  • Elimination of duplicate facilities and of overlapping functions.

  • Short-duration conflicts (less than 90 days) should be supported by carefully tailored, preplanned resupply packages.

H-15. PLANNING

Planning for support of operations other than war is a continuous process. Although OPSEC may limit access to plans in the early stages, inclusion of the logistician at the outset during mission planning and force development is vital to the success of any operation. Once the concept of operation is determined, detailed logistics planning can proceed. Supporting plans should be as detailed as planning time permits. However, since operations other than war requirements arise with little warning and may occur in any theater of operation, leaders should be familiar with operations other than war and their characteristics.

H-16. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS

Once units are deployed, the wide dispersal of forces, the need to protect all bases and installations, the need to provide security for ground and air movement, and the problems of acquiring local resources can hinder logistic support in operations other than war. Due to these concerns, logistic facilities and stock levels should be kept low to reduce security requirements; this action lowers the risk of supplies being taken by an opposing force. While local resources should be used to the fullest, such use should not adversely affect the local security forces or population.

H-17. TAILORING OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The structure of most logistic organizations allows brigade to be tailored to the assigned mission and situation. This flexibility enables logistic organizations to meet the wide range of deployment situations in operations other than war. The conventional echelons of logistic functions are often not responsive enough to sustain operations other than war force in an austere area of the world. Direct contact by units in the area of operations with the wholesale logistic community is vital for responsive support to remote areas. Therefore, procedures must be established early on how to accomplish such direct contact. Simplicity allows the required flexibility for effective support under demanding and adverse conditions. Logistics support must be tailored to the force mixture and conditions of METT-T.

a. Normally, light battalions are attached to a heavy brigade and heavy battalions are OPCON to a light brigade. In operations other than war, the meaning of OPCON might include the OPCON unit bringing extended support assets on deployment. As the situation develops, the unit could become attached, and the support assets may be under the control of the higher headquarters.

b. The light brigade focuses on replacing parts, but the heavy unit focuses on repairing equipment.

c. Light units can use transportation assets of the heavy force.

Section IV
TRAINING

Training and preparation for operations other than war should not detract from a unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat. The foremost requirement for success in operations other than war is the successful application of warfighting skills. Operations other than war are not new missions and should not be treated as separate tasks for adding to a unit's METL. However, units selected for these duties do require time to train and prepare. The amount of training required, and when the training is given, depends on the specific operations other than war mission. Most facets of normal military operations and training apply to operations other than war, especially personal discipline. Operations other than war require an adjustment of attitude and approach. To accomplish operations other than war, individuals and units need training in various skills and techniques before deployment to change the focus from combat-warriors to soldiers who may only use force in self-defense. The urgent need to deploy forces often precludes a complete and long training program. However, with prior training, a training program can assist the commanders in preparing for these missions.

H-18. UNIT TRAINING

Time required to train units for operations other than war varies according to the mission and unit. To be effective, the unit must tailor its entire training methodology toward the tasks required. Many of the combat METL are directly applicable, with slight modification, to operations other than war. The execution of certain tasks is adjusted to account for ROE and other considerations. Table H-4 lists the tasks and the skills that are required for specific operations other than war activity.

H-19. LEADER DEVELOPMENT AND INDIVIDUAL TRAINING

Good leadership is important at every level--from the unit commander to the junior leader.

a. Leader Development. Leader development is most important in achieving success. Operations other than war require skill, imagination, flexibility, adaptability, and patience. Emphasis during training must be to develop these skills.

b. Individual Training. Individual training for operations other than war duties should emphasize the personal characteristics of patience, professionalism, impartiality, and inquisitiveness. These characteristics have unique meaning in an operations other than war environment.

(1) Patience. Except for the infrequent serious incident, nothing happens quickly. An attempt to hasten the pace in negotiations may prejudice the outcome. This is true, not only at the higher levels, but also at the lower levels where local difficulties are often resolved by company grade officers and senior NCOs.

(2) Professionalism. The credibility of a force involved in operations other than war is damaged by unprofessional activities during off-duty status, which in turn, affects its relationship with the parties in the conflict. All members of the force must be knowledgeable and trained in all aspects of the mission.

(3) Impartiality. A force must guard against unequal treatment and avoid controversial, off-the-record remarks that can reach unintended audiences. These comments can lead to a demand for the offender's removal and, if reflecting a prejudice, to pressure for the withdrawal of the entire national contingent.

(4) Inquisitiveness. The normal routine of daily life should become so familiar that soldiers notice even small events that could be of importance if matched with information from other observers. All personnel involved in operations other than war must receive training on the customs of the local population and coalition partners.

H-20. COMMON MILITARY SKILLS

Many of the skills that enable a unit to accomplish its primary mission apply in operations other than war. Training to enhance these skills should be a part of the predeployment training program. This training program should at least include the following common military skills: intelligence; observation and reporting; communications; patrolling; navigation; explosive ordnance safety precautions; locating, identifying, and marking mines; and NBC defense; convoy procedures and sustainment operations.

a. Intelligence. An important aspect of training for the mission of operations other than war is to understand that the force is a potential target of foreign intelligence and terrorist activities.

b. Observation and Reporting. Observing and reporting are the primary functions of a force involved specifically with peacekeeping. Individuals must be familiar with the standard reporting formats that include the following reports: situation, shooting, overflight, and aircraft sighting. Personnel should learn to recognize the aircraft, vessels, vehicles, dress, and equipment of all sides.

(1) Learning to function in an OP is essential. Small units must learn the typical layout of an OP and checkpoint as well as the general daily duty routine at an OP. A unit can live and work at an OP for days at a time, isolated from its parent organization.

(2) Training should emphasize security and patrolling, and the ROE that apply to operations. ROE applications are trained using the dilemma and vignette methods. Individuals who staff the checkpoints that stride major roads must be taught to slow and observe traffic without stopping it. This procedure allows them to observe and report traffic passing from one zone to another.

(3) Vehicles and personnel entering and exiting installations are stopped and searched for contraband and explosives. Personnel must learn not only how to search but also how to search courteously without undue force.

H-21. SUSTAINMENT TRAINING

Once deployed, the force can continue its mission training. If time permits, the force can also train in items that require recurring emphasis such as common task training. Training can be restricted by an agreement between the parties in the conflict. However, once the force is firmed, a schedule can be established that enables the force to train on METL requirements regularly.

a. Unit commanders plan to conduct unit training so that it can conduct its primary mission when not actively involved in operations other than war.

b. For a multinational or multilingual force to operate effectively, it must periodically train together. Although the commander and subordinate officers, regardless of nationality, must reconnoiter likely crisis points with discretion, they should perform training where it is unlikely to alarm the local population and the parties in the conflict.

H-22. POSTOPERATIONS TRAINING

Operations other than war require a major change in orientation for military personnel. Before operations other than war, training transitioned the combat-ready individual to one constrained in most actions. At the conclusion of operations other than war, certain actions are necessary to orient the soldier to the unit's wartime METL. Commanders must allocate sufficient resources and time for training in order to achieve collective and individual standards required to meet the unit's primary warfighting mission.

Unit commanders must allow time and resources after operations other than war for refresher training. The refresher training develops skills and abilities that have been affected by the nature of operations other than war. A training program must hone skills necessary to return the unit to a combat-ready status.



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