Appendix E
LIGHT/MECHANIZED/SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES OPERATIONS
Employing light brigades with mechanized and special operations units is a combat multiplier. Light/mechanized operations effectively use the light brigade's ability to operate in restrictive terrain, such as urban areas, forests, and mountains. This increases their survivability while using the mobility and firepower of mechanized units. The light/mechanized force should be mutually supporting based on the commander's concept of employment to ensure the assets of both forces are integrated and synchronized. The SOF provides the commander the capability to receive time-sensitive intelligence. The SOF teams can also assist the brigade in the conduct of combat missions. This appendix discusses the light brigade commander's considerations in planning and executing tactical operations with mechanized and special operations forces.
Section I
CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPLOYMENT
The purpose of employing light/mechanized/SOF units together is to capitalize on the unique characteristics of each while offsetting the limitations of the other. To accomplish this, commanders must understand the capabilities and limitations of each force. They must be able to apply light/mechanized/SOF operations units to the principles of war and synchronize all combat, CS, and CSS units.
E-1. CAPABILITIES/LIMITATIONS
The employment of a mixed force must be based on sound METT-T analysis. By increasing capabilities and reducing limitations, commanders can effectively integrate light/mechanized/SOF units. A listing of capabilities for mechanized and SOF units along with considerations for reducing limitations is as follows:
a. Mechanized Force Capabilities. Mechanized forces--
- Conduct sustained combat operations in all environments.
- Accomplish rapid movement and deep penetrations.
- Exploit success and pursue a defeated enemy as part of a larger formation.
- Conduct security operations (advance, flank, and rear guard) for a larger force.
- Conduct defensive operations or delay in sector over large areas.
- Conduct offensive operations.
- Conduct operations with light and special operations forces.
- Conduct operations other then war activities in the environments of peace, conflict, and war.
- Deploy personnel task organized to the brigade onto pre-positioned equipment and be ready for combat at C + 15 days.
b. Mechanized Force Limitations. The mechanized force limitations and the techniques used to reduce these limitations are as follows:
(1) Mechanized forces are mainly dependent on radio communications. This makes mechanized forces vulnerable to EW reconnaissance. Understanding of the commander's intent, doctrine, drills, and control measures for the operations ensures that execution plans are less disrupted when radio communications break down from jamming or inoperable systems.
(2) They have restricted mobility in jungles, dense forests, steep and rugged terrain, built-up areas, and water obstacles. This can be reduced by reconnaissance and security of routes through restrictive areas. Combining dismounted forces to protect the mechanized force at close ranges and to assist in identification of targets also reduces the effects of this terrain.
(3) They have a high consumption rate of supply items, especially Classes III, V, and IX. Anticipation of these supply needs, integration of supply assets into the BSA at the best times, and extensive use of LOGPACs can reduce this burden.
(4) They are vulnerable to antiarmor weapons and mines. Proper integration of dismounted infantry, use of artillery, terrain driving, and extensive reconnaissance to locate and target enemy antiarmor positions and minefield reduces this vulnerability.
(5) Tank elements have difficulty defending positions against enemy infantry. Employment of mechanized forces on mechanized avenues of approach combined with counterreconnaissance, deception, and the defending or dismounted approaches by infantry forces reduces this vulnerability.
(6) Mechanized forces are not able to conduct long duration or continuous dismounted infantry operations. The commander must determine when to commit dismount elements to the fight.
(7) Mechanized forces require a secure ground line of communication. Follow-and-support elements securing convoys for support units and integrating support assets in the march (coupled with breaks in the patterns of support) reduce the demand for a totally secure LOC.
c. Special Operations Forces Capabilities. The SOF can--
(1) Infiltrate and exfiltrate specified operational areas by air, land, or sea.
(2) Conduct operations in remote areas and nonpermissive environments for extended time with little external direction and support.
(3) Develop, organize, equip, train advise, and direct indigenous military and paramilitary.
(4) Train, advise, and assist US and allied forces.
(5) Conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.
(6) Conduct direct-action operations that include raids, ambushes, sniping, emplacing of mines and other munitions, or providing terminal guidance for precision-guided missions.
(7) Conduct rescue and recovery operations.
d. Special Operations Forces Limitations. Special operations forces--
(1) Depend on the resources of the Theater Army to support and sustain operations.
(2) Cannot conduct conventional combined armed operations on a unilateral basis. Their abilities are limited to advising or directing indigenous military forces conducting this type of operation.
(3) Do not have organic combined arms capability. They habitually require the support or attachment of other combat, CS, and CSS assets.
(4) Cannot provide security for operational bases without severely degrading operational and support capabilities.
E-2. ORGANIZATION OF MECHANIZED FORCE UNITS
A mechanized battalion is the most likely mechanized unit to be OPCON to an infantry brigade. The organization of an armor battalion, mechanized infantry battalion, infantry battalion (Bradley), and infantry battalion (M113) is as follows:
a. Tank Battalion (M1A1). The organization, structure and personnel of a tank battalion (M1A1) TOE 17375L000 is contained in Figure E-1.
b. Mechanized Infantry Battalion (M2). The organization, structure, and personnel of an infantry battalion (M2) TOE 07245L000 is contained in Figure E-2.
E-3. ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
Typical SOF organizations include the joint operations task force, a special forces operation base, a forward operational base, an advanced operational base, a special forces operational detachment "A", a ranger regiment, a special operations aviation task force, a psychological operation task force, and a civil affairs task force. (See FMs 100-25 and 31-20 for detailed information.)
E-4. LIGHT/MECHANIZED PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
The effective employment of a force with both light and mechanized elements requires detailed planning. Mutual planning, development of orders, rehearsals, and coordination between respective commanders and staffs must take place to capitalize on advantages and to address concerns. Critical areas in the planning process include the command and support relationship, the composition of the CS and CSS support, and the effective use of terrain. A common SOP or understanding of each unit's SOP is essential to the synchronization of all combat, CS, and CSS units. Specific planning considerations include the following:
a. Intelligence. Detailed intelligence is critical to the success of light-mechanized integration. The intelligence requirements for each force must be understood and integrated into the IPB process. Mechanized forces orient on unit concentrations, tank and antitank locations, counterattack routes, armor obstacles, engagement areas, artillery and air defense assets. The PIRs and the decision support templates of both forces need to be combined, compared, and explained to both staffs in detail. Reconnaissance and surveillance plans should be jointly developed. The mechanized force uses its long-range observation devices to conduct reconnaissance.
b. Maneuver. Either the light or mechanized force can fix the enemy. The maneuver force then attacks. In both cases, the mechanized force requires the advantage of maneuverable terrain.
(1) The mechanized force is best suited to open and mixed terrain. Mobility and organic firepower make it easier for mechanized and armored forces to disperse and rapidly concentrate at the decisive point on the battlefield.
(2) The operational tempo differences between light and mechanized units must always be a consideration, including the scheduling of rehearsals. It may dictate an early rehearsal time to allow both forces to take part.
(3) Both unit's direct and indirect fires should mutually support each other. The mechanized battalion can use its long-range direct fires to provide suppression and overwatch fires for the light brigade. The light brigade should plan to use the long-range antiarmor fires of the mechanized force. In mechanized-light operations, differences in equipment may dictate different techniques in marking TRPs.
c. Fire Support. The mechanized force must recognize that dismounted infantry operations focus on stealth, which could preclude preparation and other preliminary fires. The available fire support for each force must be integrated into the fire plan. Planners must be familiar with the organization, capabilities, and limitations of all forces involved. A liaison team should be used during the planning and preparation phases to facilitate the synchronization of fire support. Restrictive fire control measures must be jointly developed and understood by everyone.
d. Air Defense. Direct special attention to ADA resupply requirements. Centralized planning is required to orchestrate ADA support of light-mechanized organizations. The ADA units can be consolidated to provide denser coverage around the most critical targets. Mechanized forces provide excellent coverage and capability in air defense. Mechanized forces can carry the resupply of missiles.
e. Mobility/Survivability. Develop obstacle belts that support the commander's scheme of maneuver. Consider using light infantry to clear choke points and obstacles for the mechanized force. Consider the weapons' range disparities and their affect on prepared obstacles, and the use of terrain during battle handover to a mechanized force. The priorities of mobility and survivability may be different for each force. The light force must be prepared to take full advantage of mechanized force engineer assets. When light forces breach obstacles for mechanized forces, make sure the breach is large enough for the widest vehicle in the operation.
f. Combat Service Support. The CSS requires an understanding of the current, ongoing, and forecasted needs of both forces.
(1) The brigade must be able to identify where CSS support needs to be focused throughout the operation Commanders need to know where and how the support can be obtained. Mechanized forces are dependent upon their parent unit for CSS. Success in any operation depends on how well these requirements are satisfied. Special ground and air lines of communication must be developed to ensure the needs of each unit are met in a timely manner. The requirements inherent in both an attached and operational control relationship must be clearly understood.
(2) Commanders must be able to establish normal, ad hoc, surge, and cross-leveling to support the overall support requirements. The light brigade can coordinate the use of transportation assets of the mechanized force. The light brigade emphasizes replacing parts, but the mechanized unit emphasizes repair. This requires continuous attention throughout the duration of the operation. The mechanized force performs maintenance continuously. The light commander must understand this requirement and provide an opportunity for such maintenance. Also, mechanized forces can provide the light force with water, resupply, and casualty evacuation as they move through the AO.
g. Command and Control. The directing headquarters defines the authority and responsibility within the light-mechanized force by designating command relationships. A light brigade attached to a armor/mechanized division or a armored/mechanized force under OPCON to a light brigade is the preferred method of operation in most situations. Liaison officers must be exchanged between the light and mechanized force. The planning process is jointly conducted, and the development of orders and overlays is coordinated. Briefbacks are required at brigade level of combat, CS, and CSS units to ensure timing, synchronization, and understanding of intent. Standard operational terms and symbols must be W4 and codes, recognition signals, and SOIs are exchanged. The directing headquarters may need to set up a retransmission site to compensate for the shorter range of the light brigade's communications equipment.
h. Nuclear, Biological, Chemical. The light brigade is more limited in its decontamination capabilities than the mechanized force. The mobility of the light brigade is affected by the need for soldiers to carry protective clothing in addition to their standard load. The use of mechanized unit vehicles should be planned for assisting in transporting NBC equipment. A mechanized battalion has expedient devices and water haul capabilities that can be used to offset light force shortfalls.
E-5. SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS
Infantry leaders at all levels must be aware of certain safety concerns when operating with armored vehicles. Leader awareness and involvement are important if the infantry brigade has had little training with armored vehicles. All personnel in the brigade must be aware of these considerations and remain alert during light/mechanized operations to prevent casualties.
a. The armored crew's observation is focused on the enemy or potential enemy locations and not on avoiding soldiers nearby. The infantry soldier is responsible for being alert and maintaining a safe position in relation to the vehicle.
b. The high-velocity, armored-piercing, discarding-sabot round fired by tanks and the 25-mm gun on the M2/M3 present a safety problem due to the discarded sabot that falls to the ground shortly after leaving the muzzle. The danger area extends at an angle of about 10 degrees below the muzzle level, out to at least 100 meters and about 17 degrees left and right of the muzzle. Infantry soldiers in this area require overhead cover and protection (a berm or tree) from the rear.
c. The exhaust from the M1 tank may be in excess of 1700 degrees. Soldiers following behind the tank must position themselves off to the side of the exhaust grill or at safe distance if directly behind the grill.
d. The WP smoke used by BFVs is a potential hazard to dismounted soldiers.
e. Infantry soldiers can ride on top of the armored vehicles. (FM 7-8 discusses the specifics for rigging a vehicle and carrying soldiers on top.) The main concern is the vulnerability of the exposed soldiers to any weapon that the enemy may direct against the vehicle. Infantry soldiers should ride on top of the vehicles when the risk of enemy contact is low and the need for speed is great.
E-6. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
The following are planning considerations for requesting direct support of SOF and linkup procedures.
a. Commanders can request direct support of SOF from the unified command's SOCOM. The SOCOM forms a joint special operations task force, as required.
b. During the planning phase, an SOF liaison officer is assigned to the brigade along with all communications assets necessary for immediate communications with SOF assets at JSOF headquarters and at the objective area. The SOI and signal plan must standardize not only frequencies and call signs, but address visual signals as well as daylight and night operations.
(1) A SOCCE links up with the brigade through the SOF liaison officer.
(2) The SOCCE coordinates with the S2/S3 sections and both elements provide the current situation, commander's intent, and future operations of their respective forces (within OPSEC limits).
(3) The SOCCE provides SOF locations through personal coordination, overlays, and other friendly order of battle data to the FSE and brigade operation section.
(4) The SOCCE requests appropriate restrictive fire support coordination measures and provides time windows when these measures are to be effective. The SOCCE must also ensure that FSE dissemination of these measures does not result in OPSEC violations.
Section II
LIGHT-MECHANIZED CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
Light-mechanized operations give the commander an additional range of options, providing him greater flexibility. Using the estimate process, the brigade commander must determine the task organization, the appropriate command or support relationship, the tasks to be accomplished, and the concept of CSS. Light-mechanized forces are employed to conduct missions in which the mechanized or light force is given the main effort. Exactly how the commander determines the main effort depends on METT-T. This includes the size and type of force; the support structure available; the duration of the operation, as well as expected future operations; the type of threat, which element is most effective on the terrain; and possibly which force has been in the area the longest. Light-mechanized organizations can be used to conduct all the operations that either a mechanized or light force can conduct. This section discusses the missions and roles that mechanized and light forces can conduct in mechanized-light or light-mechanized operations.
E-7. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The fundamentals, principles, and concepts discussed in Chapter 4 still apply in light-mechanized offensive operations. However, there are many different ways that light and mechanized forces may operate; these are some of the fundamental methods for conducting light-mechanized offensive operations.
a. The mechanized force attacks by fire, then moves forward rapidly and joins the light forces for the assault. In this method, the mechanized force vehicles suppress the objective from hull defilade positions after the light infantry has moved into an assault position. When the light infantry masks the vehicle fires, or on a prearranged signal, the mechanized force moves rapidly forward and joins the infantry in the final assault.
(1) This method should only be used with tanks in the assault. Other armored vehicles should only assault with the infantry when the AT threat is low. When unable to assault with the infantry, the armored vehicles can be used to isolate the objective area, and once the objective is secured, they support the consolidation of the objective. During the assault, the tanks and infantry may move together, or the tanks may move slightly ahead of the infantry.
(2) This method is used when the enemy has prepared obstacles on the mounted avenues of approach. In this case, the infantry must breach the obstacles and clear a lane for the tanks to get to the objective. Time is needed for careful coordination and preparation of a detailed supporting fire plan. Advantages of this method are that the tanks are exposed to enemy fire for a shorter period, because the tanks can move forward at their own speed, and the infantry is not endangered by enemy fire directed at the friendly tanks. This method may also provide the infantry the best chance to approach the objective undetected.
b. When light and mechanized forces advance together, the infantry and vehicles move at the same speed. The vehicles may advance rapidly for short distances, stop, provide overwatch, then move forward again when the infantry comes abreast. Tanks are best suited for assaulting under fire. The mechanized infantry vehicles may be used in this manner, but the threat of AT fires must be small. If an antitank threat exists, infantry usually leads with the vehicles following as close as needed to provide fire support.
(1) This method may be used when the enemy situation is vague; when the objective is large and consists of both open and restrictive terrain; or when visibility, fields of fire, and mechanized force movements are restricted. These conditions exist in fog, towns, woods, and at night. The vehicles provide immediate close-in direct fires, and the infantry protects the vehicles from individual antitank measures.
(2) When the primary enemy threat is small-arms fire, the infantry may follow closely behind the tanks to gain protection from frontal fires. From this location, they can protect the flanks and rear of the tanks from hand-held AT weapons.
(3) In operations that require long and fast moves, the light and mechanized forces may advance together with the infantry riding on the armored vehicles until contact with the enemy is gained. This provides speed, but results in increased exposure of infantry soldiers to enemy fire, particularly to air burst munitions. It also interferes with the operation of the mechanized force vehicles.
c. Mechanized force vehicles attack by fire while the infantry assaults the objective. In this method, vehicles fire from hull defilade positions until the fires are masked by the infantry. This method is generally the most effective method for mechanized infantry vehicles. It may also be used with tanks when antitank weapons/obstacles prohibit them from moving to the objective.
(1) This method may also incorporate a feint to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main attack. In this case, the mechanized force supporting attack by fire is timed to divert the enemy's attention from the light force's assault. Their fires may also cover the sound of the infantry approach/breach. Close coordination between the mechanized and light force commanders is essential to ensure effective fire control is maintained.
(2) Another variation of this method may be used when the terrain or the enemy disposition limits the mechanized forces' ability to support the infantry assault by fire. In this case, the mechanized force may be tasked to suppress/fix adjacent enemy positions or accomplish other tasks that isolate the objective area.
d. Mechanized and light forces converge on the objective from different directions. In this method, mechanized force vehicles and light infantry advance by different routes and assault onto the objective at the same time. Usually, the infantry elements must move out and close on their assault position under cover of darkness and poor weather so that both forces can assault onto the objective at the same time. This synchronization provides surprise, increases fire effect and increases shock action.
(1) When using tanks, mechanized and light forces use this method effectively. Mechanized infantry vehicles are less suitable but may be needed to clear obstacles. Favorable conditions are open, or partly open, terrain free from mines and other tank obstacles, and effective neutralization of enemy antitank weapons by supporting fires and smoke. However, neutralization is needed only during the brief period required for the tanks to move from their line of departure to the near edge of the objective.
(2) This method requires coordination between mechanized and light forces to provide effective fire control between the two forces on the objective. When conditions do not permit a rapid advance by the armored vehicles, infantry should accompany them to provide protection.
E-8. OFFENSIVE MISSIONS/ROLES
In the conduct of offensive operations, the fire power, mobility and shock effect of the mechanized force is integrated with the dispersed and synchronized attacks of the light forces. (Tables E-1 and E-2, give a listing of missions and roles that mechanized and light forces conduct in mechanized-light or light-mechanized offensive operations)
E-9. EXPLOITATION
Exploitation in battle follows success, taking full advantage of the enemy's disorganization to drive deep to the enemy's rear and complete his destruction and defeat. The mechanized force is usually the commander's most capable exploitation force. A tank-heavy force operating as a team may exploit a local success following the defeat of an enemy force or the capture of an enemy position. This operation is directed at destroying all enemy personnel and installations nearby. A common combination is the mechanized force battalion reinforced by an attached infantry company, engineers, and other supporting units. The infantry may be transported in armored vehicles or trucks, or they may ride on the tanks. Riding on tanks may be the most desirable method since it reduces road space, decreases supply problems, and keeps the members of the team together. The infantry leaders ride with the corresponding tank unit commanders.
E-10. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Light-mechanized forces are well-suited to conduct defensive operations. The mechanized force provides a concentration of antiarmor weapons and the capability to rapidly counterattack by fire or maneuver. The light force can occupy strongpoints, conduct spoiling attacks, and conduct stay-behind or hide-force operations. The fundamentals, principles, and concepts discussed in Chapter 5 still apply in light-mechanized defensive operations. The following techniques are for conducting light-mechanized defensive operations:
a. The force defends along the FEBA with the light force used as a flank unit or a covering force, or positioned in depth. The mechanized force keeps its freedom of maneuver. The light force emplaces its force to best use restrictive terrain. Contact points between light and mechanized units should be in restrictive terrain to protect the light brigade.
b. The mechanized unit is used as a covering force forward of a light brigade defense. In its role, the covering force masks the location of the light brigade. Battle handover to the light brigade requires careful planning. Of special concern is the relative scarcity of the light brigade's direct-fire overwatch weapons supporting from inside the battle handover line. A method is to OPCON some mechanized forces antiarmor assets to the light infantry. Mechanized units must assume a greater role in overmatching themselves as they pass through the positions of the light brigade.
c. The mechanized force assumes positions in depth behind the light brigade's defense. The light brigade's forward deployment shapes the battlefield for decisive action by the mechanized forces. The light brigade denies the enemy the use of restrictive terrain while leaving an avenue of approach into the engagement area of the mechanized unit. If the enemy penetrates the light brigade, the mechanized unit counterattacks to destroy or block the enemy until additional units can be repositioned to destroy him. The light brigade supports the counterattack by identifying the location of the enemy's main effort, slowing his advance, and destroying his C2 and CS elements. To achieve surprise on the enemy's flank, the light brigade can guide the counterattacking force through restrictive terrain.
d. A light brigade may defend to hold terrain while the mechanized brigade maneuvers to destroy the enemy from the flanks or rear.
e. The light brigade occupies a strongpoint with additional assets. The enemy is forced into the engagement area of mechanized units.
f. The light brigade occupies hide positions well forward of the FEBA. As the enemy passes, the light forces attack the enemy's C2, CS, or CSS elements. The mechanized force defends against enemy maneuver forces.
E-11. DEFENSIVE MISSIONS/ROLES
Tables E-3 and E-4 contain listings of missions and roles that mechanized and light forces conduct in mechanized-light or light-mechanized defensive operations.
E-12. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS
Retrograde operations include delays, withdrawals, and retirements. The purpose of a delaying action is trade space for time. The purpose of the withdrawal is to free a unit for other missions. Mechanized forces are employed against hostile elements and their avenue of approach that threaten the success of the operation. Light forces must use additional transportation assets to include helicopters to move to subsequent positions.
a. Basic movement techniques are those of maneuver and bounding overwatch in reverse. Mechanized units with small, light-force units mounted in combination with infantry reconnaissance platoons and antitank elements move to subsequent delay positions under the cover of mutually supporting fires.
b. Mechanized forces are used to cover a withdrawal. When possible, the withdrawal is conducted under limited visibility.
c. All mechanized-force attacks for delaying purposes must have limited objectives, and they must be supported by artillery and all units in the covering force.
E-13. RETROGRADE MISSIONS/ROLES
Tables E-5 and E-6 contain listings of missions and roles that mechanized and light forces conduct in mechanized-light or light-mechanized retrograde operations.
Section III
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT
During combat operations, SOF elements can conduct special reconnaissance missions to provide operational and tactical intelligence support to the brigade. Under the control of SOF headquarters, special forces, rangers, and special operations aviation can conduct combat operations against high-value targets. The brigade may support SOF in the conduct of combat operations.
E-14. EMPLOYMENT
The following are considerations by battle operating system for the employment of SOF during combat operations.
(1) Special reconnaissance teams allow the commander to conduct HUMINT collection in denied areas at the operational and strategic levels. It is time-sensitive information and provides the commander the ability to monitor or disrupt the enemy commander's scheme of maneuver.
(2) Civil affairs assets can provide timely intelligence to the commander through interviews and conversations with refugees.
b. Maneuver.
(1) The SOF and ranger units, under the command and control of SOF headquarters, can conduct direct-action missions against high-value targets such as critical C3 nodes.
(2) The audiovisual PSYOP teams can aid the tactical commanders deception plan
(3) The SOF assists in civil-military operations by training and advising host nation military forces.
c. Fire Support.
(1) Special reconnaissance or direct-action teams can conduct terminal guidance operations using laser-target designators or beacons for high-performance aircraft against high-value targets.
(2) Special reconnaissance or direct-action teams can provide nonattributable target acquisition and adjustment of deep fires in the deep battle area.
(3) Psychological operations elements provide nonlethal fire support to the conventional force by--
(a) Conducting information programs that undermine the enemy commander's morale and confidence.
(b) Conducting information programs that serve as an emotional and mental detriment to the enemy soldiers' morale.
(c) Conducting information programs that undermine the enemy's political and social programs or institutions in a denied area.
(d) Conducting information programs that define US foreign policy/objectives to friendly personnel.
(e) Conducting information programs that reinforce host nation economic and social programs.
(f) Interfacing SOCCE with fire control elements to prevent fratricide of SOF elements that are operating in the infantry brigade's area of influence.
(g) Conducting training to improve host nation fire support assets.
d. Mobility, Countermobility, Survivability.
(1) Successful special reconnaissance or direct-action missions contribute to the survivability of conventional forces.
(2) Escape and evasion nets are established that can assist in the recovery of downed USAF pilots.
(3) Special forces A Team can assist in civil-military operations by training and supervising host nation forces in vertical and horizontal construction methods or projects.
e. Air Defense Artillery.
(1) Counterair operations are conducted at enemy airfields or against enemy ADA sites (ADA MANPADS and sniper weapons respectively).
(2) The SOF trains host nation ADA.
(3) Air defense participates in JSEAD operations by monitoring and reporting enemy airfields, air bases, forward operating base, and FACs for destruction. Then FAAD C3I system supports this activity.
f. Combat Service Support.
(1) The SOF trains host nation CSS.
(2) The SOF assists in identifying host nation facilities.
(3) The SOF assists in coordinating host nation CSS support.
(4) The civil affairs elements assist in implementing population resource control measures.
(5) The civil affairs teams strengthen the existing host nation technocratic infrastructure.
(6) The civil affairs teams reinforce host nation credibility and capability through CMO activities (medical, dental, engineer).
(7) The CSS assists in refugee control operations.
g. Command, Control, Communications.
(1) The special forces teams can remain under the command and control of a SOF headquarters (JSOTF, SFOB, FOB, or AOB) and through the establishment of liaison element (SOCCE). They may provide time-sensitive information directly to a brigade headquarters.
(2) The special forces teams can remain under the command and control of a SOF headquarters and report all information through the JSOTF to the JTF for further dissemination (the least-efficient method).
(3) The special forces teams may be placed in GS or DS to a brigade headquarters. In this method a special forces liaison element (SOCCE) is collocated with the supported brigade for interface between the teams and the conventional headquarters. This aids the flow of timely intelligence to the conventional headquarters while the teams remain responsive to the SOF headquarters.
(4) The special forces teams may be placed OPCON to the ground maneuver commander in whose area of operation the teams are working. If the teams are in denied territory, an SF liaison element (SOCCE) is collocated with the unit receiving OPCON to aid communications.
E-15. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES INTERFACE
Because of the decentralized nature of SOF operations, it is probable that any unit (even down to a squad) may work with SOF. The missions are usually coordinated at brigade; however, there may be times when SOF personnel coordinate directly with a subordinate unit within the brigade. The key to the success of such operations is to decentralize decision-making requirements to ensure a quick response to the situation.
a. The brigade commander must make sure the units under his control understand this requirement. Knowing the commander's intent enables the subordinates to use their initiative and ensure a quick response, thus avoiding a need for approval that may result in a lost opportunity.
b. Likely missions of working with SOF for a unit subordinate to the brigade include:
- Provide a reaction force.
- Reinforce SOF direct-action or special reconnaissance missions.
- Conduct a linkup/relief in place.
- Isolate areas or objectives.
- Augment/support civil affairs and PSYOP personnel.
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