Military

(1) This may include nothing more than providing additional instructions, establishing more restrictive control measures, or directing a specific use for one of his organic assets, such as positioning one of the grenadiers to block enemy movement up a ravine to prevent the enemy from flanking the platoon's battle position.

(2) Or in an unusual situation, the CO may detail exactly how the platoon leader will employ his entire platoon, clearly state the limits for using his initiative, and collocate himself or the XO with this platoon. This should be only a short-term solution; leaders must be trained to meet their responsibilities.

(1) The commander is responsible for everythingthe company does or fails to do. This includes the tactical employment, training, administration, personnel management, and sustainment of his company. He must know the capabilities of his men and supporting weapons and how to tactically employ them. He must also know the capabilities of the enemy.

(2) The CO exercises command through his subordinate leaders.

(3) The CO employs his company to support the accomplishment of the battalion and brigade missions. He requests additional support from battalion when required.

(1) The XO is second in command. His primary role is to help the commander fight the company. He ensures the tactical reports from the platoons are forwarded to the battalion tactical operations center. The XO may locate where he can maintain communications with the company commander and the battalion TOC. He may require additional soldiers to provide security and provide a CONOPS capability (see Section IV). The XO assumes command of the company as required.

(2) Before the battle the XO (with the lSG) plans and supervises the company CSS. They make sure precombat inspections are complete. He plans and coordinates logistical support with agencies outside the company while the 1SG does the same internally. He prepares or assists in the preparation of paragraph 4 of the OPORD. He may also assist the CO in planning the mission.

(3) The XO coordinates with higher, adjacent, and supporting units. He may aid in control of a phase of the battle, such as passage of lines, bridging a gap, breaching an obstacle, or assumption of control of a platoon attached on the move.

(4) The XO may be assigned tactical missions, such as the following:

(1) He is the senior NCO and normally the most experienced soldier in the company. He is the commander's primary tactical advisor and expert on individual and NCO skills. He assists the commander in planning, coordinating, and supervising all activities that support the unit mission. He operates where the commander directs or where his duties require him.

(2) His specific duties include the following:

(1) The FSO helps plan, coordinate, and execute the company's fire support. During planning, he develops a fire support plan based on the CO's concept and guidance. He coordinates the fire support plan with the battalion FSO.

(2) During the planning, the FSO also--

• Advises the CO of the capabilities and current status of all available fire support assets.
• Assists the CO in developing the OPORD to ensure full integration of fires into the commander's concept
• Designates targets and fire control measures and determines method of engagement and responsibility for firing the targets.
• Determines the specific tasks and instructions required to conduct and control the fire plan.
• Briefs the fire support plan as part of the company OPORD and coordinates with platoon FOs to ensure they understand their responsibilities.
• Integrates platoon targets into the company target overlay and target worksheet. Passes these products to the battalion FSE.

(3) During the battle, the FSO normally locates with the CO. This allows greater flexibility in conducting or adjusting the fire support plan. At times, the FSO may locate away from the CO to more effectively control supporting fires. The FSO informs the CO of key information received on his radio net.

(4) The FSO must understand infantry tactics. This not only provides better fires integration, but if the CO becomes a casualty, the FSO may need to assume control of the operation until the XO is able to.

(5) The FSO may coordinate CAS or NGF, or employ and control the company mortar section.

(6) The FSO ensures the indirect fire plan is part of each company rehearsal.

(1) He supervises operation, maintenance, and installation of organic wire and FM communications. This includes sending and receiving routine traffic and making required communication checks.

(2) He supervises the company CP to include relaying information, monitoring the tactical situation, establishing the CP security plan and radio watch schedule, and informing the commander and subordinate units of significant events.

(3) He performs limited troubleshooting of organic communication equipment and provides the link between the company and the battalion for maintenance of communications equipment.

(4) He is responsible for supervising all aspects of COMSEC equipment, to include requesting, receipting, training, maintaining, securing, and employing this equipment and materials.

(5) He advises the CO in planning and employing the communication systems. Based on the CO's guidance, he prepares or assists in preparation of paragraph 5 of the OPORD.

(1) The RATELO is responsible for operating and performing maintenance on his assigned radio to include preparation for special operations (waterborne, cold weather, airborne, or air assault).

(2) He encodes and decodes messages and makes field expedient antennas.

(3) The RATELO must understand the company mission. In the event the commander becomes a casualty, the RATELO may be the only man on the radio for a time. At these times, he may request and adjust artillery, and request medical evacuation or resupply.

(4) The RATELOs may assist in the preparation of the OPORD by copying the overlays and building sand tables.

(1) The supply sergeant requests, receives, issues, stores, maintains, and turns in supplies and equipment for the company. He coordinates requirements with the 1SG and the battalion S4.

(2) When positioned in the battalion field trains, the supply sergeant is supervised by the HHC commander or the support platoon leader. He uses the battalion administrative and logistical radio network to communicate with the company.

(3) He may also control the vehicle and driver when one is provided to the company.

(4) He monitors the tactical situation and anticipates logistical requirements. Chapter 8 has a more detailed discussion of the CSS requirements.

(1) He assists and advises the company commander in planning NBC operations. He conducts and supervises the NBC training within the company (NBC decontamination and equipment maintenance and operation).

(2) He operates forward with the company CP and assists the communications sergeant with CP operations and security.

(3) His specific duties include the following:

• Provide the commander with unit operational exposure guidance.
• Process and disseminate information on enemy and friendly NBC attacks.
• Monitor and supervise decontamination operations.
• Make recommendations to commander on decon and smoke support.
• Requisition NBC specific items of equipment and supply.

(1) He performs organizational maintenance on the company's small arms. He evacuates weapons to the DS maintenance unit. Normally, he assists the supply sergeant in the BSA.

(2) He may operate forward with the company CP to support continuous CP operations.

(1) He is responsible for employing the antiarmor section.

(2) He must be prepared to execute the following tasks with his section.

(1) He is responsible for employing the mortar section.

(2) He ensures effective mortar support for the company. He also assists the CO in planning the employment of the mortar section, coordinates with the company FSO/FIST, and controls the section during tactical operations.

(1) In static positions (assembly areas, battle positions, and so forth), a stationary CP location may be designated by the CO. This allows wire communications to be established with battalion and the units of the company, field expedient antennas to be set up, and fighting positions to be dug. It also provides a designated spot to which messengers can report. The CP should be off natural lines of drift and key terrain features. It must be well camouflaged from ground and air observation. Local security is provided, either by its relation to the rifle platoons, by collocating with the company reserve element, or by its own personnel. When the CO leaves the CP, the XO or the 1SG normally assume control.

(2) When moving, the CO designates where the CP will move (Chapter 3). At times, he may locate away from the CP. For example, to control the company's movement better, he may move with the lead platoon; or in the attack, he may locate with the main effort. In these situations, he may designate a part of the CP (his RATELOs or the FSO) to move with him.

(1) Once an upcoming mission is identified, actions to begin preparing the unit are conducted. The CO conducts an initial METT-T analysis to determine the requirements for his warning order.

(2) With the information available, the commander sets his time schedule by identifying the actions that must be done (time-critical tasks) to prepare his unit for the operation. These preparatory actions are identified by a preliminary consideration of the information on the mission, enemy, terrain, and own troops. An initial reconnaissance (may be a map reconnaissance) is conducted to allow the leader to more fully understand the time requirements for the mission. He then develops his time schedule by starting at "mission time" and working backward to the time it is now (reverse planning). The mission time is normally the most critical time in the operation.

(3) The commander must ensure that all subordinate echelons have sufficient time for their own planning needs. A general rule of thumb for leaders at all levels is to use no more than one-third of the available time for planning and issuance of the OPORD. This will leave the rest of the available time for subordinate leaders to use for their planning and preparation. This is a tentative time schedule, which may require adjustment as the TLP process continues.

• 0600, execute mission.
• 0530, finalize/adjust the plan, based on the leader's reconnaissance.
• 0400, establish ORP; begin leader's reconnaissance.
• 0200, begin movement.
• 2100, conduct platoon inspections.
• 1900, hold rehearsals.
• 1800, eat meals (tray packs).
• 1745, hold briefbacks (SLs to PL).
• 1630, issue platoon OPORD.
• 1500, hold briefbacks (PLs to CO).
• 1330, issue company OPORD.
• 1045, conduct reconnaissance.
• 1030, update company warning order, if required.
• 1000, recieve battalion OPORD.
• 0900, recieve battalion warning order, issue company warning order.

(1) Prepare the plate. The CO determines--

• What are his information requirements?
• What are his security requirements? (The higher headquarters may also assign R&S responsibilities to the company.)
• What are the priorities for these requirements?
• What assets are available to meet these requirements? (The CO may request support from higher, adjacent, and supporting units.)
• How much time is available to collect the information or establish security?
• What is most critical (and thus the focus) for his personal reconnaissance?
• To whom will he assign tasks to meet the R&S needs?

(2) Issue the plan. The CO provides additional instructions to supplement the assigned tasks to his subordinates. The amount of detail depends on the specific situation. A leader's reconnaissance that has several subordinate units involved requires more specific instructions. These may include the following:

• A specific tasking for selected soldiers from subordinate units, such a s the Ist Platoon's RATELO.
• A specific time schedule for the reconnaissance (report, inspection, departure, and return times).
• Specified routes and formations.
• Special equipment required.
• Likely contingency plans.
• Fire support coordination.
• Withdrawal plan from the reconnaissance site.
• Link up with the company.

(3) Select the technique. The leader's reconnaissance is crucial to every operation. An effective leader reconnaissance provides the required information without being detected by the enemy. The risk of detection and the effect that this loss of surprise will have on the mission must be weighed against the benefit of collecting the information. Generally, the closer the reconnaissance element is to the objective, the greater the risk of detection. The two primary techniques for conducting the leader's reconnaissance are:

(4) Conduct the reconnaissance. The leader's reconnaissance should be conducted as any reconnaissance patrol; only essential personnel should take part. The smaller this element is, the less likely the enemy will detect them. This should include a leader from each of the key elements. Additional tasks during the reconnaissance may include:

• Testing communications if authorized.
• Making final coordination on precise timings, signals, weapons/personnel locations, and sub-unit responsibilities.
• Establishing security/surveillance on the objective area.

(1) Inspect. During pre-combat inspections, check--

• Weapons and ammunition.
• Uniforms and equipment.
• Mission-essential equipment.
• Soldiers' knowledge and understanding of the mission and their specific responsibilities.
• Communications.
• Rations and water.
• Camouflage.

(2) Rehearse. Rehearsals are always conducted. They are essential to ensure complete coordination and subordinate understanding. The warning order should provide subordinate leaders sufficient detail for them to schedule and conduct rehearsals of drills/SOPs before receiving the company OPORD. Rehearsals conducted after the OPORD can then focus on mission specific tasks. Rehearsals are conducted as any other training exercise except the training area should be as much like the objective area as possible, including the same light and weather conditions. Mock-ups of the objective should be used for these practices. Rehearsals include holding soldier and leader briefbacks of individual tasks and using sand tables or sketches to talk through the execution of the plan. These are followed by walk-through exercises and then full-speed, blank-fire or live-fire rehearsals. The CO should establish the priority for rehearsals based on the available time. The priority of rehearsals, as COA development, flows from the decisive point of the operation. For example, actions on the objective, battle drills for maneuver, actions on enemy contact, special teams, movement techniques, and others as required. Security must be maintained during the rehearsal.

(3) Briefback. Subordinates should briefback the commander right after the OPORD to ensure they understand their instructions. Briefbacks of the subordinates' plans should also be conducted. These briefbacks maybe given collectively at a meeting of the orders group. Such a technique allows exchange of information, coordination among units, and rapid distribution of changes to the initial plan.

(4) Coordinate. The commander visits his subordinates and adjacent units to discuss their plans. The CO ensures that all necessary preparations are being made. These may include coordination of fire support and engineer activities, maintenance, resupply, movement, and other required actions.

(1) Radio. This is probably the most common means of communications. Radios are well suited for use when the company is on the move or in an attack. Different units often have different types of radios, but the basic company command net remains about the same (Figure 2-2). The CO normally has two radios--one for the battalion command net and the other for the company command net. He may operate from his vehicle (if assigned), which is equipped with two vehicular-mounted radios. He normally has a speech security device for secure communications on the battalion command net. The XO and platoon leaders have a radio for communications with the CO. Although most infantry companies have a radio available for the XO (three in the company headquarters), the lack of a RATELO and the limitations of the radio often limit the ability of the XO to maintain communications with higher and adjacent units. When planning radio communication, the CO considers several factors.

(2) Wire. Wire is more secure than radio. Wire usually provides better communications because it is less subject to interference from weather, terrain, and man-made obstacles. It is not subject to enemy electronic warfare actions, such as jamming and direction finding. It is, however, subject to breakage by direct and indirect fire and ground traffic.

(3) Visual signals. The company commander may use visual signals to send prearranged messages quickly and to identify friendly units. They include arm-and-hand signals, flags, panels, lights, weapon fires (both direct and indirect) and pyrotechnics. He may use visual signals to identify friendly positions for aircraft. Visual signals, however, may be seen by the enemy or be misunderstood by friendly units.

(4) Sound. The company commander may use, whistles, sirens, gongs, shots, and explosive de-vices for sound communications. These can attract attention, transmit prearranged messages, and spread alarms. Sound signals are usually good for short distances only. Their range and reliability may be further reduced by battle noise. Sound signals must be simple to avoid misunderstandings. Meanings for sound signals should be stated in the unit SOP and SOI.

(5) Messenger. Aside from personal contact, messengers are the most secure and reliable communications means. Messengers should always be available at the company CP. They are ideal for transmitting lengthy written messages. Their speed depends on their mode of travel, the tactical situation, and terrain. They are vulnerable, however, to enemy action in forward areas, and they lack sender-to-receiver contact. Hard copy messages are preferred over oral messages. If oral messages are sent, have the messenger repeat the message to ensure he understood. At times, the platoons may be tasked to provide a messenger to the company CP.

(1) Recognition. The first thing an operator must do when his radio receives interference is to find the cause. He should not immediately assume jamming. Some jamming is similar to other types of radio interference. To help identify the problem, the operator should remove the antenna. If the interference decreases with the antenna removed, then its cause is external and may be jamming. If the interference does not decrease, the problem is in the radio.

(2) Continued Operation. An operator must continue normal radio operation once jamming has been identified so that the enemy will not know that his jamming is working. The rule is: During jamming, continue operating unless ordered by the net control station to shut down or to change frequencies. An operator being jammed should never mention over nonsecure radio that he is being jammed. If the company cannot continue to operate on the jammed net and also continue the mission, they should switch to the antijamming frequency and continue the mission.

(1) In addition to these specified tasks, other requirements may become apparent as the OPORD is analyzed. These are called implied tasks; they are not routine or SOP-type requirements. Nor are they requirements inherent to other assigned tasks or to military operations. Routine or SOP tasks depend on the specific unit, but generally the following type tasks would be considered routine:

• Provide security during movement.
• Conduct resupply operations.
• Coordinate with adjacent units.

(2) If the company was assigned a mission to seize an enemy position for some purpose, some examples of inherent tasks might be as follows:

• Task-organize the unit to accomplish the mission.
• Conduct reconnaissance to locate enemy weak points.
• Isolate the area at the point of attack.

(3) In some cases or for some units, tasks that should be routine, inherent, or SOP may not be. In this case, the CO (understanding the training and limitations of his unit) would identify that task as an implied task. It is not important to classify the tasks. What is important is to identify all the requirements (tasks) that the unit must complete to accomplish its mission. Once the CO identifies these tasks, he then ensures that his plan includes all of them.

(1) If the mission analysis began as the result of a short FRAGO or a significant change to the situation, the company's mission may not be clearly stated. In this case, the commander must determine his mission essential task. He does this by reviewing the battalion commander's concept and determining what his companies role is for the decisive action. What must his unit achieve to support the battalion's mission accomplishment? The relationship of his unit to the battalion's main effort may also clarify his mission essential task. If his company is the main effort, there should be a direct relationship between his purpose and the battalion's purpose. If the CO reviews each of his assigned tasks by this process, it should be clear which task is essential to the success of the battalion commander's concept.

(2) Time is continuously analyzed during the operation. Once the CO has conducted his mission analysis, he has a better understanding of the time requirements for his unit. If a time schedule was issued prior to conducting the detailed mission analysis, it may need to be updated now.

(3) The restated mission statement becomes the focus for the remainder of the estimate process. This is a clear, concise statement of the essential task(s) to be accomplished by the company and the purpose to be achieved. The mission statement will normally state WHO (the company), WHAT (the task), NMEN (the critical time), WUERE (usually a grid coordinate), and WHY (the purpose the company must achieve). It also becomes paragraph 2 of the company OPORD. The other specified and implied tasks and limitations are included in the plan where required. Some examples of restated missions follow:

• (WHO) "A Company attacks (WHEN) 09050OZ Dec 92 (WHAT) to seize HILL 482 (WHERE) vicinity NB 457271 (OBJ BLUE) (WHY) to enable the battalion's main effort to destroy enemy command bunker and reserve platoon."
• (WHO) "C Company defends (WHEN) NLT 28153OZ Oct 97 (WHAT) to destroy enemy forces from (WHERE) AB163456 to AB163486 to AB123486 to AB123456 to (WHY) prevent enemy forces from enveloping 1-66 infantry (L) from the south."

(1) Assumptions are used in the absence of facts. They are based on the facts that he has developed, his knowledge of the enemy's doctrine, and also his experience from fighting this enemy. An example of a valid assumption might be: The enemy has prepared antipersonnel minefields on the dismounted avenues of approach into his position. Possible minefield locations can then be deduced based on the enemy's doctrine and the CO's knowledge of his tactics. During this analysis, assumptions are treated as facts to allow the CO to deduce the impact they may have on his unit. The CO reduces the number of assumptions by conducting reconnaissance to gather the required facts.

(2) The CO also analyzes the facts to determine how they impact on his mission, on his unit, and on the enemy. For example: The CO's terrain analysis identifies a creek that is an obstacle to mounted movement. The CO analyzes this fact to deduce the impact it may have on the operation. If he is defending, he must determine how the creek will affect the enemy's movement. It may only be an obstacle to wheeled vehicles and not to tracked ones. Are there choke points along the obstacle which would allow him to concentrate combat power against the enemy? How will the obstacle affect friendly units? Is vehicle resupply and casualty evacuation possible forward of the creek or will he have to use soldiers to move supplies and casualties? How can this obstacle assist in the accomplishment of his mission? The quality of these deductions will determine the effectiveness of the courses of action developed later in Step 2. Figure 2-4 shows this analysis process for Step 2.

(3) Throughout Step 2, the CO identifies potentially decisive points where he can generate superior combat power in relation to the enemy. These points may result from his terrain analysis (locations on the ground which provide an advantage or put the enemy at a disadvantage), from the enemy analysis (an identified enemy weakness that can be exploited), or possibly from the time analysis (a time when the combat potential of the enemy force is degraded). Ideally, a decisive point will be identified where an enemy weakness is positioned at a time and a location that allows the company to generate overwhelming combat power. These points are potentially decisive because the effects of the company's combat potential, when applied there, should lead to accomplishing the mission.

(1) Obstacles. Identify the existing and reinforcing obstacles and hindering terrain that will affect mobility. All terrain is evaluated and coded as either NO-GO, SLOW-GO, or GO. When time permits, a combined obstacle overlay is developed to graphically depict the mobility capability of the terrain. Figure 2-5 shows an example of a combined obstacle overlay.

• NO-GO terrain is impractical for the type of force being considered to move through it. NO-GO terrain does not always mean that units cannot pass through that terrain, but only that the speed of movement will be substantially reduced unless considerable effort is expended to enhance mobility. (Example: nonfordable stream and slopes of greater than 45 degrees for mounted movement.) With mounted forces, this would mean substantial engineer support.
• SLOW-GO terrain hinders ground movement to a lesser degree than NO-GO terrain. Little effort is needed to enhance mobility. (Example: sparsely vegetated forests and fordable streams.)
• GO terrain is fairly open terrain that presents no problem to ground movement.

(2) Avenues of approach. Avenues of approach are developed next and identified one level down. These are areas through which a unit can maneuver. Normally, they are thought of in terms of mounted movement, but they can be applied to dismounted movement as well. Both mounted and dismounted avenues of approach must be identified. When selecting them, the commander uses tactical judgement with respect to the type unit to be used. They traverse GO terrain, bypass NO-GO terrain, and occasionally pass through or over SLOW-GO terrain. They are considered for both the enemy and friendly units. As such, a doctrinal width guideline for a platoon is 250 meters, a company is 500 meters, and a battalion is 1,500 meters. Aerial and subterranean avenues must also be considered.

(3) Key Terrain. Key terrain is any location or area that the seizure, retention, or control of affords a marked advantage to either combatant. Using the map and information already gathered, look for key terrain that dominates avenues of approach or the objective area. Next, look foe decisive terrain that if held or controlled will have an extraordinary impact on the mission. The retention or seizure of decisive terrain is necessary for accomplishment of the mission. During the wargame process, other terrain may be identified as potentially key or decisive, based on likely changes in the situation. By this analysis, the commander should get a good feel for potential positions for friendly and enemy units and weapon systems. These locations are important during the development of COAS.

(4) Observation and fields of fire. Determine locations that provide the best observation and fields of rare along the approaches, near the objective, or on key terrain. Determine the potential of friendly or enemy forces to overmatch or support (with direct fire) the movement of their forces, and to observe movement along the avenue of approach and place fire on it from various positions on the terrain. The analysis of fields of fire is mainly concerned with the ability to cover the terrain with direct fire. Positions with good observation for the FIST personnel are also identified. Look at the capability of direct fire weapons from likely or known positions. Reconnaissance from the enemy's viewpoint is most effective when conducting a defensive analysis. Determine where fires may be concentrated.

(5) Cover and concealment. The analysis of cover and concealment is often inseparable from the fields of fires and observation. Weapon positions must have both to be effective and to be survivable. Infantry units are capable of improving poor cover and concealment by digging in and camouflaging their positions. When moving, the terrain is used to provide cover and concealment.

(1) Terrain. The terrain is most affected by rain, snow, or freezing temperatures. GO terrain may become NO-GO terrain after a heavy rain because it will no longer support vehicle movement. Freezing this same terrain may revert it to GO terrain if it will now support vehicles. The frozen ground may prevent digging fighting positions.

(2) Equipment. The temperature and humidity can change the amount of maintenance required to keep equipment operating. Batteries may not last as long. The soldiers' clothing and boots wear out faster under some conditions.

(3) Soldiers. The spirit and morale of the soldiers are affected by the conditions they fight in. In winter zones, more energy and resources maybe spent on just surviving the elements than fighting the enemy. Nonbattle casualties may outnumber the battle casualties.

(1) "The enemy will continue to defend with one platoon in a deliberate defense vicinity of HILL 482 oriented to the north and west. Two squads and two MGs are oriented north overlooking a mounted avenue of approach. One squad and one MG is oriented west against a dismounted approach. The platoon CP is on the topographical crest of Hill 482. There are between 20 and 30 personnel in this position. A minefield is located NW of the position at the bottom of the hill. A suspected minefield is west of the position. The confirmed OP is rotated every 8 hours. Security patrols (5 to 7 men) operate north and west of the position at random intervals. An OP is positioned vicinity of HILL 524. Suspected OP locations are at the trail intersection NW of the platoon and on the trail SW of the platoon. We can expect the enemy platoon to retain its position to prevent its enemy platoon to retain its position to prevent its parent company from being enveloped from the NW. I forced to withdraw, he will most likely move to the SE where there are supporting fires from the parent company. This company could reinforce the platoon position with up to 20 men in 20 minutes. Figure 2-6 is a situational template of this enemy position.

(2) "The enemy will attack NLT 120800 Dec 87 to seize the high ground vicinity HILL 464 with two MRC (+) conducting the main attack in prebattle formation along avenue of C, and one MRC (+) in the second echelon. The CRP and FSE will arrive first and attempt to locate gaps in our defenses. At PL YANKEE, the MRB main body will assume attack formation with tanks leading and will attempt to seize their objective mounted. Specific objectives for the lead MRCs will most likely be the intersection at GL123456 and HILL 464. Artillery concentrations will be fired on HILL 464 as he crosses PL YANKEE. Smoke will be used to screen his left flank. Although he has the capability to employ chemical weapons, this is not likely. After seizing these objectives, the enemy will continue to attack to seize objectives along to battalion rear boundary. I expect BTR and BMP recon vehicles in our sector within 24 hours."

(1) Determine decisive points and times to focus combat power.

(2) Determine the results that must be achieved at the decisive points to accomplish the mission.

(3) Determine the purposes to be achieved by the main and supporting efforts. (The supporting purposes must be clearly linked to the main effort's assigned purpose).

(4) Determine the essential tasks for subordinate units (main and supporting efforts) that achieve these purposes.

(5) Task-organize squads to accomplish each mission that has been determined. (The loss of cohesion when moving a squad to another platoon is critical. Normally, platoons do not cross-attach squads.)

(6) Assign C² headquarters. (The platoon headquarters, section leaders, XO, 1SG, and other company leaders are used as required.)

(7) Complete a generic task organization by assigning all organic or attached units.

(8) Establish control measures that clarify and support the accomplishment of the platoon's assigned mission. (This may also include critical timings for key events.)

(9) Prepare a COA statement and sketch.

(10) Repeat this process for additional courses of action. (Other COAs may begin with a different potential decisive point, or they may concentrate combat power at the same one using different tasks, purposes, positions, and so forth.)

(1) Where can risk be taken to enable weighting the main effort? What is the likelihood of this action being overwhelmingly decisive?

(2) What assets are needed for immediate subordinates to achieve their specific tasks and purposes? Ensure the main effort is resourced first. If insufficient resources remain to ensure the supporting efforts' missions are attainable, change the tasks or modify the purpose. Do not take resources from the main effort to reduce risk in less important areas.

(3) Ensure mutual support is achieved. This may be done by the physical positioning of units and weapons in relation to each other, or it may be achieved by the clear linkage of purposes in subordinate's mission statements. Often, during decentralized operations, mutual support between the main and supporting efforts is solely dependent on a clear linkage of purposes in the unit's missions.

(4) What freedom of action do subordinates have? Use control measures (axis, DOA, assault positions, objectives, BPs, sectors, engagement areas...) to synchronize subordinate actions without stifling initiative.

(1) Offensive course of action.

• COMPANY MISSION STATEMENT: A Co/2-66 IN(L) attacks at 190600 OCT 89, to seize high ground vicinity N-B 459270 (OBJ DOG) to prevent the enemy from disrupting 3-66 IN's (BDE Main Effort) attack.
• COA STATEMENT: The company crosses the LD at 0600 along direction of attack Blue and occupies the ORP. After the leader's reconnaissance, one platoon (2 infantry squads, 2 Dragons, and the 60-mm mortars) occupy a support position vicinity hill 455 to suppress enemy positions to support the company's seizure of OBJ DOG. The antiarmor section (4 Dragons) follows the supporting PLT to checkpoint 1, then it establishes ambush positions vicinity road junction at NB459260 to isolate OBJ DOG. The remaining two platoons (3squads each) occupy the assault position. The lead platoon seizes the western enemy squad position (OBJ TOOL) to allow the trail platoon to pass through and seize the decisive terrain. The trail platoon (company main effort) remains in the assault position. On-order, it moves through the lead platoon, seizes the high ground vicinity NB459270 (OBJ BOX) to disrupt the enemy's command and control and to dominate the remaining squad positions. Then it destroys any enemy remaining in these positions to the south and east to prevent the enemy from disrupting 3-66 IN's attack. The 1SG with one infantry squad will follow and support the main effort by resupplying ammunition and evacuating casualties.

(2) Defensive course of action.

• MISSION STATEMENT: C Co/2-67 IN(L) is prepared NLT 281700 AUG 93 to destroy enemy forces from GL375651 to GL389650 to GL394660 to GL 373665 to prevent the envelopment of A Co (BN Main Effort).
• COA STATEMENT: The company defends with two PLTs forward in sector and 1 PLT in a depth BP. The PLT ( 2 squads) forward in the north destroys enemy forces to prevent enemy bypass of the main effort PLT. The PLT (3 squads, 2 Dragons) in sector to the south destroys enemy forces to prevent an organized company attack against the Co main effort. The main effort PLT (3 squads, 2 TOWS) retains Hill 657 (vic. GL 378659) to prevent the envelopment of Co A (BN Main Effort) from the south. The antiarmor section (1 squad, 4 Dragons) establishes ambush positions at the road junction (vic GL 377653) to destroy enemy vehicles to prevent a concentration of combat power against the main effort PLT. The Co mortars locate vic GL 377664. The antiarmor section initiates fires when the enemy combat reconnaissance patrol reaches the intersection.

(1) The box. This method is used to focus the war-game process on a specific area of the battlefield. This may be the objective area, an engagement area, or some other critical area where the decisive action will take place. The leader uses the same action-reaction-counteraction method already discussed, but he limits himself to the actions within the box. The size of the box is determined by the situation, but it should include the units and actions that impact on the decisive action. When time is limited, this technique ensures that the war-game process considers the decisive action, but the disadvantage is that other critical actions/events may not be considered.

(2) The bell. The leader using the belt technique, divides the COA into sections in depth and then war-games each of these belts in sequence. The offensive COA war-game example used the belt technique initially. The COA was divided into the following phases:

• Movement from the AA into the ATTACK POSITION.
• Movement from the LD to the ORP.
• Actions in the ORP.
• Deployment prior to the assault.
• The assault.
• Consolidation.

Each of these phases was war-gamed in sequence. In the example, once the war game reached the assault phase, the box technique was used to war-game the decisive action in detail. This technique may also be used to war-game a defensive COA.

(3) The avenue of approach. It is most often used to war-game a defensive COA when there are several avenues of approach that must be considered. The leader war-games the selected COA against the enemy's most probable COA by focusing the process on one avenue of approach at a time.

(1) Offensive COA war game. This is a war game of the COA presented in paragraph 2-19g(1).

(2) Defensive course of action war game. This is a war game for the COA presented in paragraph 2-19g(2).

(1) Examples of advantages include:

• Uses the most covered and concealed routes.
• Allows extra time for the leader's reconnaissance.
• Supports the reduction of the soldier's loads.
• Provides an excellent chance of surprise.
• Limits the risk on the secondary approach.

(2) Examples of disadvantages include:

• High risk of detection by the enemy's OP.
• Mortar ammunition requirements increase the soldier's loads.
• Time constraint requires daylight movement.
• Does not attack the enemies weakest point.

(1) Mission-specific factors. These are generated from the requirements for a specific mission. They are often determined by the critical events identified during the war-game process. They may also result from the advantages and disadvantages for each COA. Examples include:

• Casualty evacuation.
• Soldier's load.
• Effectiveness in accomplishing the mission.
• Time usage.

(2) General factors. These are for the employment of infantry in all operations. They include the Principles of War, the imperatives of AirLand Battle, the risk involved, the characteristics of the offense or defense, and other such doctrinal guidelines. Although these apply in every tactical operation, certain ones are more important to the mission at hand. The CO determines which these are and then lists them as significant factors for this mission. Examples include:

• Security.
• Simplicity.
• Surprise.
• Exploitation of enemy weaknesses.
• Risk.
• Disruption of the enemyattack.
• Concentration at the decisive point.
• Use of limited visibility.
• Employment of key weapons.

(2) There are several ways to use this matrix. The simplest way is to give a + to the COA which best supports each factor. All other COAs would receive a -. Another way is to rank order each COA for each factor. The best COA for each factor receives a I., next best a 2, and the COA that supports the factor the least would receive a 3. The COA with the lowest sum supports the significant factors best.

(1) Maneuver. The maneuver paragraph should be focused on the decisive action. It may, however, describe the maneuver throughout the operation. At company level, a maneuver paragraph that assigns the missions to each platoon/section and identifies the main effort normally requires no additional clarification. When additional information is required to clarify the concept, the CO may insert this information in the concept of the operation paragraph. Information such as movement formations and techniques, or the order of movement, should only be included if it clarifies the concept. Normally, the coordinating instructions paragraph is the appropriate location for this type of information.

(2) Fires. This paragraph describes bow the CO intends for the fires to support his maneuver. The company FSO may prepare this paragraph based on the CO's guidance. This paragraph normally states the purpose to be achieved by the fires, the priority of fires for the company, and the allocation of any priority targets. A target list or overlay maybe referenced here. Specific taskings for the company mortars should only be stated here if they clarify the concept of the operation.

(3) Engineering. Often, especially in defensive operations, this paragraph is required to clarify the CO's concept for preparing obstacles, mines and fortifications. When the company is supported by engineer equipment or units, the CO would state his guidance for employing these assets here. He may do this by stating the priority of effort (survivability, countermobility, and mobility) and the priority of support for his subordinates (3d PLT, lst PLT, AA section, 2d PLT, mortar section, and the CP).

(1) The tasks from the mission analysis may require only one subordinate unit to complete them. In this case, the CO decides which unit should do this task and assigns it. Examples of these tasks are listed.

• Provide one squad to carry ammunition for the battalion mortar platoon.
• Establish an OP at NB233876 NLT 231000.

Others may require two or more subordinate units or even the entire company to comply with them. In this case, the CO would list these tasks or limitations in the coordinating instructions.

(2) Most of these requirements result from the war game of the COA. They include--

• How to synchronize the operation.
• How to secure the company throughout the operation.
• How to concentrate the combat potential at decisive points.
• How to manage the soldier's load.
• How to degrade the enemy's combat potential.

To accomplish each of these requirements, the CO assigns specific taskings to each of his units. He also assigns specific limitations to certain subordinates. These may be listed here or noted on the company operations overlay/concept sketch.

(1) Locations for the BN main CP, and the command group.

(2) Critical communication requirements, such as radio listening silence in effect forward of the LD.

(3) Signals for specific events or actions. The company concept will have similar requirements for the company commander to include. These may include:

• The locations for the CO or CP, and the XO.
• Adjustments to the unit SOP, such as a change to the succession of command or the standard PZ markings.
• Emergency/visual signals for critical actions.
• Signal information.