Rear operations are actions, including area damage control, taken by all units, singly or in a concerted effort, to secure and sustain the force, neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear area, and ensure freedom of action in deep and close operations. Since the primary role of the MSB is sustainment, nearly all MSB activities involve rear operations. The rest of this manual deals primarily with the details of the sustainment function. This appendix addresses the other rear operations functions.
The objectives of rear operations are to-
- Secure the rear areas and facilities.
- Prevent or minimize enemy interference with command, control, and communications.
- Prevent or minimize disruption of combat support and combat service support forward.
- Provide unimpeded movement of friendly units throughout the rear area.
- Provide continuous, unimpeded support to deep, close, and rear operations.
- Find, fix, and destroy enemy incursions in the rear area.
- Provide area damage control before, during, and after an attack or incident.
The keys to rear operations are sound planning, early warning, continuous OPSEC, and the rapid deployment of sufficient forces and resources to counter the threat. Rear operations is a command responsibility. The division commander will ensure battle planning includes consideration for deep, close, and rear operations. Rear operations will be part of the division's overall operations, mission analysis, threat assessment, IPB, resource allocation, and base assessment process.
The principle of economy of force means the MSB must defend itself against attempts to disrupt their operations. It must be able to minimize destruction, to reinforce its units, and, if necessary, to gain time until response forces arrive. As discussed below, units will form base defense perimeters to defend against the threat. When enemy forces exceed base and base cluster defense capabilities, response forces will provide the initial force to close with and to destroy the enemy. If an enemy incursion exceeds the capability of response forces, tactical combat forces must be assigned to neutralize the threat.
Responsiveness is a key to defeating enemy incursions in the rear area. This involves the immediate reaction and rapid deployment of sufficient combat power and area damage control resources to destroy the enemy and to minimize damage. Responsiveness is achieved through-
- Effective command relationships and command supervision.
- Reliable communications.
- Accurate intelligence.
- Centralized planning and decentralized execution.
- Organic mobility of response force.
- Training and rehearsals.
- Prior assessment of the capabilities of bases and facilities to withstand enemy attack. This assessment is based on their degree of exposure and their importance to the division's ability to sustain operations. This mission-essential vulnerability analysis assists the commander in allocating resources to protect personnel, supplies, and facilities in consonance with their importance to the mission.
Four activities must be conducted as part of rear operations: sustainment, movements, terrain management, and security. The mission of the division rear CP is to integrate these functions to support the commander's concept and facilitate current and future operations. In this regard, it works closely with the DISCOM commander and staff, who have primary responsibility for logistics operations. Area damage control is a responsibility of commanders at all levels. It crosses the four major functional areas. For clarity, ADC will be addressed separately.
Typically, the DISCOM commander is designated by the ADC-S as a base cluster commander. His base cluster will normally include the MSB. The DISCOM command net serves as the primary FM link between the DISCOM headquarters and the MSB. Multichannel (VHF) links are established between the DISCOM and MSB.
The sustainment efforts of the division are made possible through movement. Required supplies and personnel replacements must be moved from the sustainment base at corps and EAC into the division rear and forward to support the main battle. Casualties and damaged equipment must be evacuated from the forward area for prompt treatment or repair and returned. Movements take place between the forward brigade areas, the division rear, the corps rear area, and laterally within the division rear.
The planning and coordinating of logistics movements within the division rear is the responsibility of the CSS cell of the rear CP in coordination with the DISCOM movements control officer and the military airlift command air liaison officer. As discussed in Chapter 9, the MCO in conjunction with the DTO and MSB coordinates the movement of supplies and materiel from the DSA to the BSAs and return. He also coordinates CSS movements between the corps rear and the DSA, or, in the case of throughput, directly to the BSAs.
To control movements in the division rear, the rear CP may designate a movements control FM net, require units such as the MSB TMT company to report convoy start and end times by VHF, or rely on information from MP traffic control points or patrols. The rear CP must be able to stop or shift traffic between routes, gather information on enemy and route conditions, and respond to requests for help from convoys encountering enemy activity.
Logistics traffic will be a high priority interdiction target for threat aircraft, artillery, and unconventional warfare elements. In the offense, bypassed enemy forces will attempt to get supplies by force. Single vehicles, especially ones moving fuel and ammunition, will be ambushed by unconventional forces.
After assessing threat capabilities and intentions, the rear operations commander may dedicate escorts to critical convoys such as those moving fuel and ammunition. Escort possibilities include ground escorts of MPs, combat engineers, or tactical forces; aerial escorts; or ADA systems such as Vulcans and Stingers. When resources are scarce, dedicated escorts may not be practical or possible. In such cases, response forces, air defense, or fire support assets may be positioned along the MSR to provide general support. The MSB staff must coordinate convoy security with the MCO AND TMT company.
The DISCOM commander moves MSB units to provide responsive support to the division and to provide security for MSB units. Forward moves during an offensive operation and rearward moves during a defense or retrograde must be made to maintain appropriate distances from the FLOT and from supported units. As stated in Chapter 1, vehicles should be able to get from the DSA to each BSA in two hours or less. In addition, MSB elements that stay in place for long periods of time do so at great risk. Movement is a key component of MSB security. MSB elements must be prepared to move every one to three days.
The first step in DSA movement is to determine the new location, what units will occupy it, and whether all units will move together. An advance party of representatives from the moving units, including MSB elements, should be sent first to conduct security and NBC sweeps of the new site and establish initial communications among units.
The advance party performs the following tasks:
- Conduct security sweep of new site to ensure area is free of enemy forces.
- Conduct NBC surveys to ensure area is free of contamination.
- Establish LPs, OPs, and dismount points.
- Establish communications with old location and notify command of results of sweeps.
- Facilitate arrival of quartering party.
The quartering party consists of representatives of each unit and subelement. It prepares the new DSA for arrival of the main body. It must have enough assets to perform the following tasks:
- Increase security by manning key points along the perimeter.
- Establish communications with parent and higher headquarters.
- Select locations for unit vehicles, work sites, and tentage.
- Establish land-line communications among the BCOC, unit CPs, dismount points, LP/OPs, and other critical sites.
- Select individual and crew-served weapon fighting positions.
- Position personnel to guide arriving units to the main body from the RP to preselected locations.
- Position chemical alarms.
The main body begins the move as coordinated by the DISCOM S2/S3 and the division rear CP. The serials should be planned to move by echelon. An entire MSB element's mission capability should never be included in a single serial. However, individual elements should not be too fragmented due to austerity of communications assets. The first serial or serials should include elements of critical support points. These include MSB assets for classes III, V, and IX; critical maintenance; and medical treatment.
Movement by echelon is required to provide continuous support. Personnel at the old site continue to provide support until lead elements of the MSB establish support points at the new BSA. Echeloning support requires careful planning and thorough coordination. Customers in the division rear and supported FSBs must know where the new DSA is and when to expect support operations to begin at that site. Supply personnel at the old site issue supplies from the reserve stocks already at the old DSA to reduce the stocks to be moved. The DMMC must coordinate in advance with the COSCOM MMC to have replenishment stocks shipped to the new site when supply assets there are ready to receive them. Planners may also have to arrange to stockpile supplies at the BSA supporting the main tactical effort before moving the DSA. This may eliminate breaks in support when transportation assets are being used to move DSA elements.
When possible, elements of the main body close during hours of darkness. The quartering party meets them and guides them to the positions. Work then follows the priorities set by the commander in the movement and occupation order. Establishment of hasty defenses normally has priority over the logistics mission. The following is a suggested sequence of tasks for the main body:
- Finalize communications among units.
- Erect work areas.
- Camouflage vehicles and installations.
- Position crew-served weapons.
- Prepare primary fighting positions.
- Clear fields of fire and prepare range cards.
- Emplace wire, mines, and other obstacles and cover them by fire.
- Select composition of and position for reaction force.
- Select and prepare alternate and supplementary positions.
- Finalize base defense plan depicting base layout, sectors, fields of fire of crew-served weapons, obstacle and fire support plans.
- Implement reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
- Emplace sensors and early-warning devices.
- Prepare protective positions adjacent to work areas.
- Prepare and rehearse reaction force.
- Submit base defense, obstacle, and proposed fire support plans to BCOC.
- Coordinate with adjacent bases.
- Plan deceptive measures.
MSB planners should also plan for hasty moves. These would only be conducted when the battalion is in danger of destruction or has been seriously compromised by enemy reconnaissance. The objective of such moves is preservation of essential personnel, supplies, and equipment. As much as possible, procedures should be covered in SOPs to minimize the time required for planning once the move is required. Plans must be coordinated with the DISCOM headquarters and the division rear CP.
The MSB, like other CSS units, has terrain requirements. It must be positioned adjacent to established air, road, rail, and often, water lines of communication to facilitate mission accomplishment. Its positioning must, among other things, simplify the receipt of supplies and materiel from higher echelons, the movement of these supplies forward, and evacuation, repair, and return of damaged equipment. Terrain also affects mission effectiveness. Any MSB maintenance unit located in a builtup area with adequate power, hardstand, and civilian resources can repair materiel more efficiently than it could if located in a forest with soft soil. DISCOM mission considerations must be integrated with security and movements considerations when making terrain decisions.
As discussed in Chapter 1, locations of MSB elements in the DSA will vary depending on METT-T. For example, the medical company should not be colocated with other units which may be prime targets of enemy attacks. Transportation and engineer units are poor choices for colocation since mission-requirements will mandate large portions of these units being away from the base for extended periods. This results in a weakened base defense capability. MSB elements selected for colocation in bases must complement each other's strengths and weaknesses. Other guidelines to follow for locations of elements include the following:
- Balance the advantages of dispersion (reduced destruction from a single enemy strike) with the disadvantages (C3 constraints). In general, though specific situations may dictate otherwise, the DSA can be expected to occupy an area approximately 7 to 10 kilometers in diameter. Assets must be dispersed, yet, the MSB elements must be close enough and located on defensible terrain to defend against ground attack.
- Make supply points accessible to both customers and transportation assets replenishing the supply points.
- Keep class III points away from other supplies to prevent contamination. They should also be located at least 100 feet from water sources.
- Position GRREG and salvage points near the MSR so they are accessible to units and to maximize backhaul missions of vehicles used for resupply.
- Locate the class I point near the water point whenever water sources allow.
- Locate medical facilities away from likely target areas (ATP, class III point, bridges, road junctions) but near evacuation routes and an open area for landing air ambulances.
- Locate maintenance sites so they are accessible to customers and evacuation vehicles.
- Position units with heaviest firepower along the most threatening avenues of approach.
Security operations enable the MSB to perform its foremost rear operations function-sustainment. MSB commanders are responsible for the security of their units. They must ensure that their units have the knowledge and training required to be proficient in basic tactical skills.
To enhance sustainment operations, MSB elements are often grouped together. Typically, all DISCOM elements in the DSA form a base cluster under the DISCOM commander, though the rear operations commander is ultimately responsible for the composition of bases and base clusters in the division rear. Factors discussed under the terrain management must also be considered when grouping bases. In addition, units selected for colocation complement each other. A mix of weapon systems, adequate planning and supervisory personnel, and varied communications assets are required to form a viable base.
Though the division rear CP coordinates rear operations in the division, the DISCOM must be intimately involved in the IPB process. Also, the DISCOM must be involved in IPB because of the value of information in sustainment planning and because the MSB commander and other CSS commanders are responsible for the security of their units.
The concept of OCOKA is used to analyze terrain. OCOKA refers to observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. The DISCOM commander relies heavily on the rear CP for terrain analysis and passes information to the MSB. The division is supported by a DS terrain team which provides information to the G2 for IPB.
Line of sight is required in the DSA for radios, ground and air observers' vision, air defense target acquisition, and fields of fire for MSB direct fire weapons.
Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. Cover is protection from effects of fire. The MSB elements must "dig-in" to the degree possible using organic and available engineer assets. The MSB must determine what possibilities the terrain offers to both the friendly and enemy forces. This analysis is vital to MSB units in view of the limited weapons available and numerous personnel and items of equipment in the area. In built-up areas, MSB elements are likely to occupy buildings to maximize cover and concealment. Buildings significantly reduce heat signature. However, planners must consider the road net available for sustainment and security operations.
Obstacles are natural and man-made features that stop, impede, or divert movement. MSB planners must be familiar with all existing obstacles and the effects of removing, overcoming or bypassing them. Weather effects on trafficability also act as obstacles.
Any feature that provides a tactical advantage is key terrain. Whether a particular feature is key or not varies with the tactical situation. However, features which may be key terrain features include bridges, fording sites, high ground, choke points, and road junctures.
Avenues of approach are ground and air routes by which a force may reach an objective or key feature. Considerations for avenues of approach in the rear are their capabilities to support movement and to allow rapid enemy movement into the rear area.
Weather affects mobility and the functioning of virtually all items of equipment, as well as the performance of personnel. Terrain and weather are considered concurrently. Again, DISCOM planners depend on the rear CP to pass weather analysis information from the division weather team. The five aspects of weather that affect planning are temperature and humidity, precipitation, wind, clouds, and visibility.
Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the enemy forces. It considers threat organization, tactical doctrine, equipment, and support systems. The DISCOM passes any information it has on the threat to the rear CP to assist in its evaluation. Truckers from the TMT company and customers coming into support points are valuable sources of information.
Once the threat evaluation is complete, this information is integrated with weather and terrain factors to determine how the threat is likely to operate in the rear area. Relevant information developed by the rear CP is passed to the DISCOM. Base clusters must ensure that all base commanders understand the different threat levels and the associated actions. The ROC must also be aware that DISCOM units are neither staffed nor equipped to continue support operations at normal levels while responding to increased levels of threat. Support will be degraded. How much it is degraded depends on the threat level.
Level I threats are those which can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures. They normally involve the activities of agents, saboteurs, and terrorists.
Level II threats are those beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. They can, however, be defeated by response forces, normally MPs with supporting fires. They normally involve-
- Diversionary and sabotage operations by unconventional forces.
- Raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations by small combat units.
- Special or unconventional wartime missions.
A tactical combat force is required to defeat a Level III threat. Level III threats normally involve-
- Heliborne operations.
- Airborne operations.
- Amphibious operations.
- Penetration by enemy forces from the main battle area.
- Ground force deliberate operations (for ex-ample, operational maneuver groups with linkup of smaller airborne and assault units).
- Infiltration operations.
A base is a geographically small, defensible area with a contiguous perimeter and established access controls. For MSB units, the DISCOM commander determines the position of the base. Elements of the MSB are grouped into bases to enhance their own defense as well as to jointly support combat forces. Frequently, a MSB company will constitute a base. Normally, the base commander is the senior unit commander when more than one unit is in the base. Selection of the base commander should take into consideration not only rank, but also branch and experience. The medical company commander may not command a base or cluster with nonmedical units.
The base commander is responsible for preparing the base defense plan and coordinating with its appropriate base cluster operations center, typically operated by the DISCOM S2/3. The base commander will establish a base defense operations center to operate 24 hours a day. The BDOC is normally formed from the staff of the base commander. If the units occupying the base are less than battalion-sized, the base commander will draw personnel and equipment from his own and tenant units to form a functional BDOC. The base commander will train all personnel in basic defense techniques to establish a viable perimeter. The commander will develop a reaction force. This force is designed for internal security and reinforcement of the base. Each base must be capable of defending itself against a Level I threat and delaying a Level II threat until the base cluster reaction force arrives. If a base is faced with a Level III threat, it must take action to prevent critical supplies and equipment from falling into enemy hands, defend itself as long as possible, and avoid capture.
Whenever possible, the base should be situated and configured to take advantage of natural and man-made terrain features. The area to be defended may vary from high ground with good observation and fields of fire to a highly congested area with buildings or vegetation obscuring observation and limiting fields of fire. Both the support mission and security considerations are involved in the positioning decision. In addition to terrain factors discussed above, considerations include the following:
- Dispersion.
- Cover and concealment.
- Internal accessibility.
- Proximity to supported units.
- Security and defense capabilities.
- Communications.
The final selection of a site includes a thorough ground reconnaissance of the site chosen by map reconnaissance. Tentative locations of base elements are determined and marked. Sketches of the area are prepared. The BDOC develops the traffic circulation plan, OPs and LPs, motor parks, and the base defense plan. Sketches also show the locations and directions of fire for any crew-served weapons. Weapon systems in the DSA or BSA for repair should be integrated into the defense plan whenever possible.
Base clusters contain several bases grouped together to enhance security and mission accomplishment. A base cluster normally does not have a defined perimeter or established access points. Base clusters rely on mutual support among bases for protection. Mutual support may be achieved through interlocking fires, integrated patrol and surveillance plans, or use of reaction forces. A base cluster reaction force also aids in mutual support. The base cluster commander must designate the personnel in the reaction force and ensure they have sufficient weapons, mobility, and communications. They must be trained to react quickly and appropriately.
The DISCOM commander is normally the base cluster commander for MSB units in the DSA. The base cluster commander establishes a base cluster operations center with assets primarily from the S2/S3 section. The BCOC provides the command and control to plan, coordinate, and supervise base cluster operations. It positions units assigned to the cluster into bases and designates the base commanders. The base cluster commander is responsible for integrating base defense plans into a base cluster defense plans.
An effective base defense system must accomplish the following four tasks:
MSB personnel must be trained in defense principles and techniques. Training must include use of organic weapons, communications procedures, emplacement and monitoring of ground sensors, preparation of defensive positions, fire support coordination, and NBC defense measures.
All MSB personnel have a part in base defense operations. They may require refresher training in the following areas:
- Preparation of individual fighting positions.
- Camouflage, cover, and concealment.
- Patrolling and operation of roadblocks and checkpoints.
- Limited visibility operations.
- Cross-training on individual and crew-served weapons and supporting equipment available in the unit.
- Marksmanship, especially night firing, and the preparation of range cards.
- LP and OP operations with emphasis on security, sound and light discipline, and reporting procedures.
- Emplacement and maintenance of special observation and detection devices such as sensors, flares, and remotely employed sensors.
- Cross-training in all communications equipment available in the unit.
- Obstacle construction and mine and boobytrap employment.
- Use of rally points.
- Use of individual and crew-served weapons in an air defense role.
- Operations security.
- Identification of threat vehicles and equipment.
- Spot reports using SALUTE format.
- Fire support requests, coordination, and adjustment.
- Target engagement and designation techniques.
- Identification, marking, and neutralization of minefields.
Unit training focuses on rehearsal of base defense plans, continuation of the support mission under limited attack, and full occupation of defensive positions. The DISCOM may ask the rear CP for training support from combat units for tactical training and from MI units for OPSEC training.
Rehearsals should include manning of defensive positions, commitment of reaction forces, coordination of supporting fires, coordination with adjacent bases, and integration of external support by MPs and the tactical combat force. BDOC and BCOC exercises should also be used to train leaders to exercise fire support coordination, to test communications, and to exercise required coordination among bases, base clusters, and the rear CP. Rehearsals should be conducted at day and night and in various weather conditions.
The division commander provides guidance to planners on requirements to support the AirLand Battle, including area damage control. The ROC is responsible for ADC plans to provide necessary support. Planners in the G4 shop and DISCOM ensure logistics and medical support is available to support the division. The DISCOM S2/S3 coordinates directly with the rear CP to ensure that mutual support of the commander's base assessment is within the ADC capabilities reported to the rear CP in the base cluster defense plans. When ADC assets are available, the rear CP must provide each base with external support necessary to overcome an attack and return to its primary mission.
Effective planning, setting specific responsibilities, and use of all available assets to conduct ADC are necessary to restore operations and provide continuous support. ADC assets will be limited. In emergencies, assets will likely have to be diverted from other missions. In most cases, bases will have to use local assets to deal with the situation.
MSB base commanders will identify assets available for ADC. Assets will include medical evacuation and treatment elements as well as equipment evacuation and repair, critical supply, and EOD assets. Commanders will identify critical support points, to include points that are the sole local sources of supplies. They will also assess the base and base cluster capabilities to conduct ADC operations. ADC plans must be included in BDOC and BCOC defense plans.
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