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Rear operations are actions taken by all units to secure and sustain the force. These actions are taken singly or in a concerted effort. They include those actions necessary to neutralize or defeat enemy operations in the rear area. They also ensure freedom of action in deep and close operations and include area damage control.

The division commander is responsible for rear operations within his boundaries. Within the maneuver brigade area, the brigade commander is responsible for rear operations, as discussed in FM 71-3. Threat activity may exceed the capability of a forward brigade's assets. When this happens, the division commander may assume responsibility for defeating a Level III threat in the brigade rear area by restructuring the brigade area.

The objectives of rear operations are to --

• Secure the rear areas and facilities.
  

• Prevent or minimize enemy interference with command, control, and communications.
  

• Prevent or minimize disruption of combat support and CSS forward.
  

• Provide unimpeded movement of friendly units throughout the rear area.
  

• Provide continuous, unimpeded support to deep, close, and rear operations.
  

• Find, fix, and destroy enemy incursions in the rear area.
  

• Provide area damage control before, during, and after an attack or incident.
  

The key considerations to rear operations are sound planning, early warning, continuous OPSEC, and the rapid deployment of sufficient forces and resources to counter the threat. Rear operations is a command responsibility. The division commander ensures battle planning includes consideration for deep, close, and rear operations. Rear operations are a vital part of the division's overall operations. They are part of the mission analysis, the threat assessment, and IPB. They are also part of resource allocation, and the base assessment process.

The principle of economy of force means DISCOM units must defend themselves against attempts to disrupt their operations. They must be able to minimize destruction and to reinforce their units. DISCOM units must also be able to gain time until response forces arrive. As discussed below, units form base defense perimeters to defend against the threat. If enemy forces exceed base and base cluster defense capabilities, response forces are used. These forces will provide the initial force to close with and to destroy the enemy. If an enemy incursion exceeds the capability of response forces, tactical combat forces must be committed to neutralize the threat.

Responsiveness is a key to defeating enemy incursions in the rear area. Responsiveness requires the immediate reaction and rapid deployment of sufficient combat power and area damage control resources. These two forces destroy the enemy and ensure minimal damage to the area. Responsiveness is achieved through --

• Effective command relationships and supervision.
  

• Reliable communications.
  

• Accurate intelligence.
  

• Centralized planning and decentralized execution.
  

• Organic mobility of response force.
  

• Training and rehearsals.
  

• Prior assessment of the capabilities of bases and facilities to withstand enemy attack. This assessment is based on a unit's degree of exposure and that unit's importance to the division's ability to sustain operations. This mission-essential vulnerability analysis assists the DISCOM commander. With this analysis, the commander is able to allocate resources to protect personnel, supplies, and facilities in consonance with their importance to the mission.
  

Four activities must be conducted as part of rear operations: sustainment, movement, terrain management, and security. The mission of the rear CP is to integrate these functions to support the DISCOM commander's concept and facilitate current and future operations. Area damage control is a responsibility of commanders at all levels. It crosses the four major functional areas. For clarity, ADC will be addressed separately.

The rear CP consists of three cells: headquarters, operations, and CSS. The ADC-S in the headquarters cell is the rear operations commander in the division. The operations cell plans and controls terrain management, security, and ADC in the division rear. It also synchronizes all rear operations activities. The CSS cell is responsible for sustainment planning. In this regard, it works closely with the DISCOM commander and staff. It is the DISCOM commander and staff who have primary responsibility for logistics operations.

As discussed in Chapter 2, the DISCOM commander commands and controls the MSB, the FSBs, and the aircraft maintenance company. In addition, corps logistics units located in the DSA are controlled tactically by the DISCOM commander. Typically, the DISCOM commander is designated by the ADC-S as a base cluster commander. His base cluster will normally include units located in the DSA. Corps logistics units, such as ammunition supply points, may be located at isolated locations within the division rear. They either operate as separate bases or are assigned to a base cluster by the ADC-S. The FSB commander is normally the base cluster commander for units in the BSA.

The sustainment efforts of the division are made possible through movement. Required supplies and personnel replacements must move from the sustainment base at corps and EAC into the division rear. From the division rear, these assets need to move forward to support the main battle. Casualties and damaged equipment must be evacuated from the forward area for prompt treatment or repair and returned. Movements take place among the forward brigade areas, the division rear, and the corps rear area. Movement also takes place laterally within the division.

Tactical movements are the responsibility of the G3. The G3 is assisted in this task primarily by the DTO and the PMO. He is also assisted by such special staff officers as the division AFSCOORD, engineer, air defense, and signal officers. The G3 representatives in the operations cell of the rear CP assist the division G3 primarily by resolving conflicts between tactical and nontactical movements, normally giving priority to tactical convoys. They may also assist the G3 in coordinating corps-level tactical movements throughout the division.

The planning coordinating and execution of logistics movements within the division rear is the responsibility of the CSS cell in coordination with the DISCOM MCO and the military airlift command air liaison officer. The MCO in conjunction with the DTO coordinates the movement of supplies and materiel from the DSA to the BSAs and return. He also coordinates CSS movements between the corps rear and the DSA, or, in the case of throughput, directly to the BSAs. The operations cell assists in obtaining combat support resources for CSS convoys moving within the division rear. These resources would include the engineer, NBC, smoke and flame, reconnaissance and chemical decontamination support, MP support, and fire support.

As discussed in Chapter 9, the DTO is responsible for developing and implementing the division traffic control plan for both tactical and nontactical movements. He is assisted by the DISCOM MCO and rear CP operations cell. The DTO reserves routes for tactical movements, identifies primary and alternate main supply routes, and institutes traffic control measures. These actions are all performed through the guidance received from the G3. Traffic control measures may include restricting certain types of movements to specified routes during specified times. Traffic control may also require designating certain routes as one-way or two-way traffic lanes.

Traffic control also requires coordinating the establishment of permanent or temporary traffic control points. If centralized control is to be implemented, the DTO may require both units and the MCO to re-quest movement clearances. He may also institute a movement credit system. This system would control movements exceeding a certain number of vehicles emanating from a base or base cluster. It would also control those vehicles entering the division rear from the brigade or corps sectors.

To control movements in the division rear, the rear CP may designate a movements control FM net, require units to report convoy start and end times by VHF, or rely on information from MP traffic control points or patrols. The rear CP must be able to stop or shift traffic between routes. It must be able to gather information on enemy and route conditions. It must also be able to respond to requests for help from convoys encountering enemy activity.

Logistics traffic is a high priority interdiction target for threat aircraft, artillery, and unconventional warfare elements. In the offense, bypassed enemy forces will attempt to get supplies by force. Single vehicles, especially ones moving fuel and ammunition, will be ambushed by unconventional forces.

After assessing threat capabilities and intentions, the rear operations commander may decide to assign escorts to critical convoys such as those moving fuel and ammunition. Escort possibilities include ground escorts of MPs, combat engineers, or tactical forces. Also considered are aerial escorts or ADA systems such as Vulcans and Stingers. When resources are scarce, dedicated escorts may not be practical or possible. In such cases, response forces, air defense, or fire support assets may be positioned along the MSR to provide general support.

The first step in DSA movement is to determine the new location. The next consideration centers on what units will occupy the area and how these units will move in echelons. An advance party of representatives from the moving units will be sent to the new location. The advance party is deployed early to become familiar with the new site and to conduct security and NBC sweeps of the area. Once the area is secure, the advance party establishes initial communications among units. The advance party performs the following tasks:

• Establish LPs, OPs, and dismount points.
  

• Conduct security sweeps of new site to ensure area is free of enemy forces.
  

• Conduct NBC surveys to ensure area is free of contamination.
  

• Establish communications with the main body of the unit and notify command of results of sweeps.
  

• Facilitate arrival of quartering party.
  

• Increase security by manning key points along the perimeter.
  

• Establish communications with parent and higher headquarters.
  

• Select locations for unit vehicles, work sites, and tentage.
  

• Establish land-lime communications among the BCOC, unit CPs, dismount points, LP/OPs, and other critical sites.
  

• Select individual and crew-served weapon fighting positions.
  

• Position personnel to guide arriving units from the RP to preselected locations.
  

• Position chemical alarms.
  

When the main body closes, ideally during hours of darkness, the quartering party meets and guides it to the positions. Work then follows the priorities set by the commander in the movement and occupation order. Establishment of hasty defenses normally has priority over the logistics mission. The following is a suggested sequence of tasks for the main body:

• Finalize communications among units.
  

• Erect work areas.
  

• Camouflage vehicles and installations.
  

• Position crew-served weapons.
  

• Prepare primary fighting positions.
  

• Clear fields of fire and prepare range cards.
  

• Emplace wire, mines, and other obstacles and cover them by fire.

• Site FPFs and select TRPs.
  

• Select composition of and position for reaction force.
  

• Select and prepare alternate and supplementary positions.
  

• Finalize base defense plan. The plan should depict base layout, sectors, and the fields of fire of crew-served weapons. It should also contain obstacle and fire support plans.
  

• Implement reconnaissance and surveillance plan.
  

• Emplace sensors and early-warning devices.
  

• Prepare protective positions adjacent to work areas.
  

• Prepare and rehearse reaction force.
  

• Submit base defense, obstacle, and proposed fire support plans to BCOC. For independent bases, the same information is submitted to the division rear CP.
  

• Coordinate with adjacent bases.
  

• Plan deceptive measures.
  

DISCOM units have unique terrain requirements. They must be positioned adjacent to established LOC in order to facilitate their mission accomplishment. Air strips, primary and secondary road nets, rail heads, and often, established water sources are key considerations in the positioning of DISCOM units. Their positioning must simplify the receipt of supplies and materiel from higher echelons and their movement forward to the main battle area. Defined routes for the forward movement of supplies also allow for the evacuation, repair, and return of damaged equipment to the support areas. Terrain also affects mission effectiveness. Support operations located in built-up areas with adequate power, hardstands, and civilian resources operate more efficiently than those located in a field site. The DISCOM S2/S3 is aware of the unique terrain requirements of the DISCOM. The S2/S3 works with the CSS planners and terrain managers in the rear CP to ensure that the terrain needs of DISCOM and corps CSS units are known. DISCOM mission considerations must be integrated with security and movements considerations when making terrain decisions.

Locations of DISCOM elements vary depending on METT-T. Specific positioning considerations for MSB and FSB elements are discussed in FM 63-21 and FM 63-20 respectively. General guidelines include the following:

• Positioning the DISCOM CP near the center of the DSA for C2 and security reasons.
  

• Balancing the advantages of dispersion with the disadvantage of constrained C3. In general the DSA can be expected to occupy an area approximately 7 to 10 kilometers in diameter. The BSA can be expected to occupy an area approximately 4 to 7 kilometers in diameter.
  

• Making supply points accessible to both customers and transportation assets replenishing the supply points.
  

• Keeping Class III points away from other supplies to prevent contamination. They should also be located at least 100 feet from water sources.
  

• Locating ATPs at least 180 meters from other supplies and 620 meters from the nearest inhabited tent.
  

• Positioning GRREG and salvage points near the MSR, possibly in the vicinity of the ATP. This maximizes the backhaul missions of vehicles used for ammunition supply.
  

• Locating the Class I points near the water point whenever water sources allow.
  

• Locating medical facilities away from likely targeted areas. Examples of targeted areas would be ATPs, Class III points, bridges, or road junctions. However, medical facilities should be near evacuation routes and open areas that can be used for landing air ambulances.
  

• Locating maintenance sites so they are accessible to customers and evacuation vehicles.
  

• Positioning units with heaviest firepower along the most threatening avenues of approach.
  

Security operations enable the DISCOM to perform its foremost rear operations function-sustainment. DISCOM commanders are responsible for the security of their units. They must ensure that their units have the knowledge and training required to be proficient in basic tactical skills.

To enhance sustainment operations, DISCOM elements are often grouped together. Elements may be grouped into bases and base clusters for mutual support. The ROC is ultimately responsible for the composition of bases and base clusters in the division rear. Factors discussed under terrain management apply here. In addition, the ROC must ensure units selected for collocation complement each other. A mix of weapon systems, planning and supervisory personnel, and varied communications assets are required to form a viable base.

The DISCOM S2/S3 and MSB S2/S3 sections coordinate with the rear CP on grouping of DISCOM units in the division rear. In the maneuver brigade area, the FSB commander is responsible for BSA security. Through his S2/S3, he coordinates with the brigade rear CP for planning security operations.

Certain bases or base clusters are designated as critical by the CSS and operations cells of the rear CP. This is done in coordination with the DISCOM staff. These critical bases may contain a majority of a class of supply or service. An example of a critical base might be a nuclear or chemical ammunition storage site. Other examples might be ammunition or fuel storage sites. All command and control headquarters are considered critical as are critical communications nodes. In addition to its criticality, each base is assessed for its vulnerability. Vulnerability is based on the base's location, composition, and relative target value. Since forces cannot be strong everywhere, resources must be used to protect the most critical and vulnerable assets first.

Though the division rear CP coordinates rear operations in the division, the DISCOM must be intimately involved in the IPB process. As discussed in FM 63-20, the FSB, as the rear operations center in the BSA, employs IPB techniques covered in FM 34-130, Appendix G. The DISCOM headquarters must also be involved in IPB. This is necessary because of the value of information in sustainment planning and because commanders are responsible for the security of their units.

The concept of OCOKA is used to analyze terrain. OCOKA refers to observation and fields of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach. The DISCOM commander relies heavily on the rear CP for terrain analysis. The division is supported by a direct support terrain team which provides information to the G2 for IPB.

Line of sight is required in the DSA and BSA for radios, ground and air observers' vision, air defense target acquisition, and fields of fire for DISCOM direct fire weapons.

Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. Cover is protection from effects of fire. The DISCOM must determine what possibilities the terrain offers to both friendly and enemy forces. This analysis is vital to DISCOM units in view of the limited weapons available and numerous personnel and items of equipment in the area. In built-up areas, DISCOM elements are likely to occupy buildings to maximize cover and concealment. Buildings significantly reduce heat signature. However, planners must consider the road net available for sustainment and security operations. Large area smoke hazes can provide concealment or contribute to deception operations. These measures are effective for periods of increased vulnerability. Periods of vulnerability would involve air attacks or unit moves.

Obstacles are natural and man-made features that stop, impede, or divert movement. DISCOM planners must be familiar with all existing obstacles and the effects of removing, overcoming, or bypassing them. Weather effects on trafficability also act as obstacles.

Any feature that provides a tactical advantage is key terrain. The tactical situation determines if a particular feature is key or not. However, key terrain features may include bridges, fording sites, high ground, choke points, and road junctures.

Avenues of approach are ground and air routes by which a force may reach an obstacle or key feature. Considerations for avenues of approach in the rear are their capabilities to support movement to allow rapid enemy movement into the rear.

Weather affects mobility and the functioning of virtually all items of equipment, as well as the performance of personnel. Terrain and weather are considered concurrently. Again, DISCOM planners depend on the rear CP to pass weather analysis information from the division weather team. There are various aspects of weather that affect CSS planning. These aspects are temperature and humidity, precipitation, wind, clouds and visibility.

Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the enemy forces. It considers threat organization, tactical doctrine, equipment, and support systems. The DISCOM passes any information it has on the threat to the rear CP to assist in its evaluation. Truckers from the TMT company and customers coming into support points are valuable sources of information.

Once the threat evaluation is complete, this in-formation is integrated with weather and terrain factors. This determines how the threat is likely to operate in our rear area. Relevant information developed by the rear CP is passed to the DISCOM. Base clusters must ensure that all base commanders understand the different threat levels and the associated actions. The ROC must also be aware that DISCOM units are neither staffed nor equipped to continue support operations at normal levels while responding to increases in threat activity. Support will be degraded. How much support is degraded is dependent upon responses to threat activity.

Level I threats are those which can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures. They normally involve the activities of agents, saboteurs, and terrorists.

Level II threats are those beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. This threat can, however, be defeated by response forces, typically MPs with supporting fires. This threat normally involves sabotage, raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations. These operations are normally conducted by special purpose or unconventional forces and tactical reconnaissance units.

A tactical combat force is required to defeat a Level III threat. Level III threats normally involve --

• Heliborne operations.
  

• Airborne operations.
  

• Penetration by enemy forces from the main battle area.
  

• Ground force deliberate operations (for example, operational maneuver groups with linkup of smaller airborne and assault units).
  

• Infiltration operations.
  

A base is a unit or multiunit position with a definite perimeter. For DISCOM units, the DISCOM commander determines the position of the base in conjunction with the division rear CP. Frequently, a DISCOM company constitutes a base. Normally, the base commander is the senior unit commander when more than one unit is in the base. Selection of the base commander should take into consideration not only rank, but also branch and experience. The medical company commander may not command a base or cluster with nonmedical units.

The base commander is responsible for planning the base defense plan and coordinating with its appropriate base cluster operations center. The base commander establishes a base defense operations center to operate 24 hours a day. The BDOC is normally formed from the staff of the base commander. If the units occupying the base are less than battalion-sized, the base commander draws personnel and equipment from his own and tenant units to form a functional BDOC. The base commander trains all personnel in basic defense techniques to establish a viable perimeter. The commander develops a reaction force. This force is designed for internal security and reinforcement of the base. Each base must be capable of defending itself against a Level I threat and delaying a Level II threat until the base cluster reaction force arrives. Additional response forces external to the base and base cluster may be requested to repel a Level II threat. The designated echelon commander determines Level II response forces based on the operational situation, METT-T, and IPB. If a base is faced with a Level III threat, it must take action to prevent critical supplies and equipment from falling into enemy hands. It must be prepared to defend itself as long as possible and avoid capture.

Whenever possible, the base should be situated and configured to take advantage of natural and man-made terrain features. The area to be defended may vary from high ground with good observation and fields of fire to a highly congested area with buildings or vegetation obscuring observation and limiting fields of fire. Both the support mission and security considerations are invoked in the positioning decision. In addition to terrain factors discussed above, considerations include the following:

• Dispersion.
  

• Cover and concealment.
  

• Internal accessibility,
  

• Proximity to supported units.
  

• Security and defense capabilities.
  

• Communications.
  

Base clusters contain several bases grouped together to enhance security and mission accomplishment. A base cluster normally does not have a defined perimeter or established access points. Base clusters rely on mutual support among bases for protection. Mutual support is achieved through interlocking fires, integrated patrol and surveillance plans, and use of reaction forces. A base cluster reaction force also aids in mutual support. The base cluster commander must designate the personnel in the reaction force and ensure they have sufficient weapons, mobility, and communications. They must be trained to react quickly and appropriately.

The DISCOM commander is normally the base cluster commander for units in the DSA. The AMCO normally falls in with the defense plan of the aviation brigade. (FSB units in the BSA are part of the base cluster commanded by the FSB commander, as discussed in FM 63-20.) The base cluster commander establishes a base cluster operations center with assets primarily from the S2/S3 section. The BCOC provides the command and control to plan, coordinate, and supervise base cluster operations. It interfaces with the rear CP on terrain management, movements requirements, and security operations. The BCOC positions units assigned to the cluster into bases and designates the base commanders. The rear CP assigns division and nondivision units in the division rear to base clusters or independent bases. The base cluster commander is responsible for integrating base defense plans into abase cluster defense plan.

An effective base defense system must accomplish the following four tasks:

• Security of the base. The base and base cluster commanders must establish the necessary defensive measures to ensure the security of their units. Each commander must apply METT-T analysis to determine requirements.
  

• Detection. Detection is the early warning of enemy infiltration attempts. Detection devices include day and night observation devices as well as communications, intelligence, radar, and sensor equipment. Chemical and radiological monitoring must also be used. Warning systems and procedures must be established and understood by all personnel. If an attack is unlikely, few people are involved in defensive operations. However, personnel will always man LPs, OPS, and access points. If a threat is probable, defensive requirements will disrupt support operations. Alarms should be used to notify all personnel of alert postures. Warning devices include sirens, pyrotechnic and horns. The MPs are the base and base cluster commander's link for detection, early warning, and deployment against enemy attacks in the rear. Information gathered by MP elements dispersed throughout the rear area helps apprise commanders of enemy activity near bases. When the ROC determines the need, MPs respond to bases under attack. (See FM 19-1.)
  

• Delay. The defense system must be able to hinder the threat's progress to permit defense forces to react. Obstacles covered by direct or indirect fires slow or canalize movement. The ROC can, with G3 approval, authorize mine emplacement in the division rear. However, he must ensure a proposed minefield is coordinated with adjacent, higher, and subordinate units. He must also ensure limitations to friendly maneuver units are minimized and all requirements for reporting, marking, and recording are met.
  

• Destruction. DISCOM units should place machine guns and lightweight antiarmor weapons to cover obstacles and avenues of approaches. Grenade launchers mounted on vehicles are effective fire suppression systems that can be quickly dispatched to threatened areas. Weapons base's capability, the base may not be able to in the DSA and BSA for repair should be prevent breach of the perimeter. Evacuation of integrated into the defense plan if the firing critical units should be preplanned and rehearsed systems are operational. If the threat exceeds the for emergencies.
  

The division commander provides guidance to planners on requirements to support the AirLand Battle, including area damage control. The ROC is responsible for ADC plans to provide necessary support. Planners in the G4 shop and DISCOM ensure logistics and medical support is available to support the division. The DISCOM S2/S3 coordinates directly with the rear CP to ensure that mutual support of the commander's base assessment is within the ADC capabilities reported to the rear CP in the base cluster defense plans. When ADC assets are available, the rear CP must provide each base with external support necessary to overcome an attack and return to its primary mission.

Effective planning, setting of specific responsibilities, and use of all available assets to conduct ADC are necessary to restore operations and provide continuous support. ADC assets are limited. In emergencies, assets likely have to be diverted from other missions. In most cases, bases have to use local assets to deal with the situation.

DISCOM base and base cluster commanders identify assets available for ADC. Assets include medical evacuation and repair, critical supply, and EOD assets. Commanders identify critical support points, to include points that are the sole local sources of supplies. They also assess the base and base cluster capabilities to conduct ADC operations. ADC plans must be included in BDOC and BCOC defense plans.

The rear CP, with DISCOM assistance, reviews base cluster defense plans to ensure ADC plans are adequate and compatible. It also identifies host-nation support available and performs the required coordination to implement plans. The DISCOM S2/S3 helps the rear CP identify emergency food, clothing, water, and fuel sources and available distribution assets.