Military

Like all other Army forces, the support battalion performs IPB. The support battalion interest is two-fold. First, the support battalion knows the importance of valuable information in support planning. Second, commanders are responsible for the security of their units. Intelligence information is also essential for battlefield deception operations. Essentials of IPB are briefly discussed. Detailed information on IPB is in FM 34-130.

The support battalion and subordinate commanders know what possibilities the terrain offers to both friendly and enemy forces. This analysis is vital to support battalion units in view of the limited weapons available and numerous personnel and equipment in the area. The support battalion commander relies heavily on the brigade rear CP for passing information on terrain analysis from the brigade main CP.

The support battalion S2 personnel use OCOKA to analyze terrain. OCOKA refers to observation and field of fire, concealment and cover, obstacles, key terrain, and avenue of approach.

Radios, ground and air observers' vision, and air defense target acquisition require line of sight. Brigade direct fire weapons fields of fire also require LOS.

Concealment is protection from air and ground observation. Cover is protection from effects of fire. In built-up areas, brigade elements are likely to occupy buildings to maximize cover and concealment. Buildings significantly reduce heat signature. However, planners also consider soundness of buildings and the surrounding road net for support and security operations.

Obstacles are natural and man-made features that stop, impede, or divert movement. To ensure freedom of movement for friendly forces in the rear, support battalion planners know all existing obstacles and the effects of removing, overcoming or bypassing them. Weather effects on trafficability also act as obstacles.

Any feature providing a tactical advantage is key terrain. Whether a particular feature is key or not varies with the tactical situation. However, commanders consider the following as possible key terrain: bridges, fording sites, high ground choke points, and road junctions.

Avenues of approach are ground and air routes by which a force may reach an objective or key feature. Considerations for avenues of approach in the area are their capabilities to support movement and to allow rapid enemy movement into the rear.

Weather affects mobility and the functioning of virtually all items of equipment, as well as the performance of personnel. Planners consider terrain and weather concurrently. Again, support battalion planners depend on the brigade rear CP to pass weather analysis information from the brigade weather section. The five aspects of weather affecting planning are temperature and humidity, precipitation, wind, clouds, and visibility.

Very high temperatures cause heat injuries and increased engine wear and failure. Very low temperatures increase cold weather injuries, damage to engines and cooling systems, lubrication problems, and fuel requirements. Cooler temperatures and humidity cause fog.

Precipitation affects mobility, visibility, and effectiveness of personnel and equipment. It also affects the quality of some stored material. Snow, even in small amounts, reduces the effectiveness of mines. Support battalion planners consider precipitation of more than 0.1 inch per hour or 2 inches in 12 hours critical. Six inches of snow accumulation or drifts higher than 2 feet have severe effects on mobility.

Wind usually favors the upwind force by blowing dust, smoke, sand, rain, or snow on the downwind force. It affects employment of NBC munitions, smoke, and conventional weapons.

Clouds affect air operations. This includes logistics air missions, and also our own close air support, as well as the enemy's ability to conduct airborne or air assault operations.

Though poor visibility limits employment of airborne forces, agents and special purpose force operations often rely on it to reduce the effectiveness of rear area security. Poor visibility hinders control and reduces effectiveness of reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition.

Detailed information on the threat is in FMs 100-2-1, 100-2-2, and 100-2-3. Threat evaluation is a detailed study of the enemy forces. It considers threat organization, tactical doctrine, equipment, and support systems. The support battalion interest for security purposes is in rear area threat evaluation. In coordination with the brigade rear CP, the support battalion S2/S3 prepares a doctrinal template to reflect the enemy's air assault, airborne, operational maneuver group, and special purpose force employment doctrine. An unconventional warfare situation map and population status overlay depict other rear area threats such as insurgents, guerrillas, terrorists, agents, and potential civil unrest. The situation map shows probable operating areas, headquarters, encampments, and movement routes for unconventional forces. The rear area population status overlay shows areas with a high potential for civil unrest or concentrations of enemy sympathizers. The overlay also shows the locations where psychological operations are effective.

The support battalion passes any information it has on the threat to the brigade rear CP to assist in its evaluation. Sources of information include local authorities, local civilians, and displaced civilians. The support battalions uses information and any other elements moving into the area. Intelligence analysts integrate the threat evaluation with weather and terrain factors to determine how the threat is likely to operate in the rear area and pass relevant information to the support battalion.

The support battalion commander uses this information to identify specific areas of interest. These may include --

• Landing and drop zones.

• Key road junctions.

• Forest paths.

• Small groups of individuals attempting to move through or evade detection in the BSA.

• Guerrilla and insurgency sites.

• Terrorist operating areas.

A number of factors determine the elements located in the BSA. The support battalion commander and staff coordinate with the brigade S4 to determine who is in the BSA. The BSA is that portion of the brigade rear area occupied by the support battalion CP and organic, attached, or supporting units. The location of the BSA and the support battalion is contingent on the tactical situation and the location of the COSCOM CSS installations. The location is also contingent on the MSR, terrain in the AO, and security considerations. The brigade S3 approves the location of the BSA with advice from the S4 and support battalion commander.

The BSA is made up of a combination of small logistics point and unit bases. The BSA may not be one large contiguous area. It could be several smaller areas interspersed across the rear. During tactical operations, the BSA is under the tactical control of the support battalion commander.

In the ACR, the RSS commander locates the RSA in the security area or in the regimental rear area. He may also locate the RSA in a brigade rear area or in a division area based on METT-T. In any case, the commander locates the RSA approximately 25 kilometers behind the FLOT. This distance is beyond the range of threat can-non artillery. The RSA is under the tactical control of the support squadron commander.

The list below is a representative example of brigade elements that could be expected to locate in the BSA:

• Support battalion CP.

• Brigade rear CP.

• S&T company CP.

• Class I point.

• Water point.

• Class III point.

• Class II, III (packaged) IV and VII point.

• Ammunition transfer point.

• Salvage collection point,

• Mortuary affairs collection point.

• Maintenance company CP.

• Maintenance shops.

• Class IX point.

• Medical company CP.

• Medical clearing station

• Class VIII point.

• Smoke platoon.

• Decontamination platoon.

• Reconnaissance squad.

• Military police platoon (-).

• EPW collection point.

• Military intelligence company (-).

• ADA battery (-).(ACR only)

• Engineer company (-).

• Field artillery battalion field trains. (HSB and SIB/TDB)

• Maneuver battalion task force/cavalry squadron trains.

• ACR aviation elements.

• Signal team.

Some of the BSA tenants are always located in the BSA. Examples of these tenants are the brigade rear CP and the support battalion company headquarters. Others move in and out of the BSA depending on METT-T. The maneuver battalion task force field trains are not always located in the BSA. In some cases, trains are not echeloned. In other cases, field trains locate closer to the battalion troops than to the support battalion elements. In such cases, it is not feasible to integrate them into the BSA security plan. At other times, terrain features make such integration impractical. In short, although the field trains normally locate in the BSA, they are not there when support or tactical considerations make another location more favorable.

In all cases, the composition of BSA elements does not remain static. The support battalion tracks and controls changes. To accomplish this, all ground units entering the brigade area send a representative to report to the brigade rear CP and support battalion CP. Together, they coordinate movement routes and positioning for units locating in the BSA. They also coordinate communications, support requirements and procedures, and security responsibilities and arrangements. Guards at points of entry into the BSA direct representatives of entering units to the rear CP/support battalion CP location. Also, base commanders notify the BCOC of all LOGPAC arrivals and departures. Movement of displaced civilians and local civilians is also controlled.

Changes are also constantly taking place within the elements. MSTs in the UMCPs vary in composition. Medical evacuation elements constantly move in and out of the BSA. Supply elements continue their resupply efforts. Personnel available for defense actions are extremely limited within certain bases. Base commanders keep the BCOC informed of their situations.

Locations of elements within the BSA vary depending on METT-T. The support battalion commander, in coordination with the brigade S3 and S4, determines the new locations. They also order the movement of support battalion elements in the BSA. Some general guidelines they consider include--

• Position the brigade rear CP/support battalion CP near the center of the BSA for C2 and security reasons.

• Position field trains forward in the BSA near routes between supply points and combat trains.

• Ensure field trains and other bases locate their CPs near the rear of their bases, closer to the BCOC, to enhance communications and protection of C2 facilities.

• Balance the advantages of dispersion (reduced destruction from a single enemy strike) with the disadvantages (C3 constraints and extended perimeter). In general, the BSA occupies an area 4 to 7 kilometers in diameter, though METT-T may dictate otherwise.

• Make supply points accessible to both customers and resupply vehicles and helicopters.

• Keep Class III points away from other supplies to prevent contamination. They should also be located at least 100 feet from water sources.

• Locate the ATP at least 180 meters from other supplies and 620 meters from the nearest inhabited tent.

• Position mortuary affairs and salvage points near the MSR possibly near the ATP to maximize back-haul missions of vehicles used for ammunition supply.

• Locate the Class I point near the water point whenever water sources allow.

• Locate the clearing station away from likely target areas (ATP Class III point, bridges, road junctions) but near evacuation routes and an open area for landing air ambulances.

• Ensure maintenance shops, along with parking and equipment holding sites are on firm ground.

• Position the ATP adjacent to the maintenance company site to allow the maintenance company, which has the most self-defense assets in the support battalion, to provide protection for the austerely staffed ATP.

• Position the ATP near the rear of the BSA and near but off the MSR. Then large numbers of corps trailers bringing ammunition into the area do not clog up the MSR within the BSA. The ATP requires sufficient area to perform transload operations without interfering with BSA traffic.

• Position units with heaviest firepower, such as the maintenance company, along the most threatening avenues of approach.

• Ensure the limited defensive capabilities (M-16/9mm only) of the medical unit is considered in its placement within bases or base clusters.

The support battalion commander integrates the base defense plans into abase cluster defense plan. This requires development of a rear operations communications system and coordination with field artillery, engineer, ADA, and MP elements and RAS elements of the ACR.

As a base cluster commander, the support battalion commander assigns a defensive position and a sector to each base. He gives bases on likely avenues of enemy approach a smaller sector. He also ensures each base's sector of fire overlaps the adjacent base's sector. He does this by checking sector sketches provided by bases. When interlocking fires are not possible between bases, he plans other defensive measures. He covers gaps by planning for fires, obstacles, patrols, OPs, and sensors. He coordinates this planning carefully with each base to avoid troops engaging friendly forces. The commander uses HSS personnel only on perimeter defense of their assigned medical facility.

HSS personnel do not provide perimeter defense of nonmedical units.

Development of the defense plan requires that the BCOC knows who is in the BSA, what weapons and night vision devices it has, and what its ammunition status is. The fire support plan is fully coordinated to ensure that required support is available. The plan integrates mortars of units in reserve as well as available helicopters.

The BCOC keeps a sketch of the defensive plan. It shows base sectors of fire, locations of mines and obstacles, planned indirect fire coverage, OPS, patrol routes, and positions of automatic and antiarmor weapons. These weapons include those in the BSA for repair. If the firing system is operable, the defense scheme includes these weapons, and mechanics work on them in their fighting positions. Whenever possible, units occupy the same location within the BSA relative to other units every time the BSA moves. They build a habitual relationship with the units on all sides of them. This expedites coordination of sectors of fire. Since night vision devices are likely to be scarce, the overall security plan includes an illumination plan. Details on sector defense planning are in FM 19-4.

The base cluster commander plans for a reaction force from assets in the cluster. He calls this force when a base's defenses cannot defeat the threat and combat forces are not immediately available. As a minimum, the reaction force consists of personnel, vehicles, machine guns, grenade launchers, rifles, and FM radios. It is well rehearsed and reacts precisely and immediately. It plans and practices rally point operations and other detailed procedures in advance, such as lanes of movement to various points on the perimeter. The support battalion commander submits copies of the base cluster defense plan to the brigade S3. He also proposes obstacles and indirect fire support plans to the brigade S3 for review and approval.

The BCOC ensures that all base commanders understand the different threat levels and the associated actions. The brigade staff is also aware the support battalion is neither staffed nor equipped to continue support operations at normal levels while responding to increased levels of threat. Support is degraded. How much it is degraded depends on the level of the threat.

Level I threats are defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures. They normally involve the activities of agents, saboteurs, and terrorists. Typical actions the base cluster commander requires in such situations include manning OPs fully and increasing guards. The base cluster commander requires spot-checking vehicles and tightening base security. He also alerts defensive perimeter personnel and increases protection of key facilities.

Level II threats are those beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. Response forces can defeat Level II threats. They normally involve --

• Diversionary and sabotage operations by unconventional forces.

• Raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations by small combat units.

• Special or unconventional wartime missions.

A tactical combat force is required to defeat a Level III threat. Level III threats normally involve --

• Heliborne operations.

• Airborne operations.

• Amphibious operations.

• Penetration by enemy forces from the main battle area.

• Ground force deliberate operations (for example, operational maneuver groups with linkup of smaller airborne and assault units).

• Infiltration operations.

The BCOC determines the level of threat and issues prearranged alerts to all bases. The BCOC also determines the probability of an air attack and issues air defense warnings.

The BCOC develops save plan procedures in advance. If the support battalion is under imminent danger from a Level lI or III threat, the BCOC calls for a save plan of key BSA assets. The BCOC identifies key elements in advance. It prepares to move to a predesignated site with minimum notice. Key elements likely include C2, ATP, Class III, emergency medical treatment, and austere maintenance elements. Personnel perform emergency destruction of equipment and supplies (excluding Class VIII) to avoid enemy capture. Priority items for destruction include COMSEC items, fuel ,ammunition, vehicles, communications equipment and weapons.

The BCOC also identifies primary and secondary entry points into the BSA. It designates preplanned landing zones for brigade reaction forces to use when required., The BCOC conducts regular (preferably daily) meetings. with base representatives to update the defensive plan.

The base cluster commander organizes elements in the BSA into bases for self-defense. Normally, each company and field trains in the BSA constitutes a base. The base cluster commander organizes miscellaneous small teams into bases. The base commander prepares the base defense plan and coordinates with the base cluster commander. The base commander trains all personnel in basic defensive techniques to establish a viable perimeter. The base commander develops a reaction force for internal security and reinforcement of the base. Each base defends itself against a Level I threat and delays a Level II threat until a reaction force arrives. The base may face a Level III threat. If so, it takes action to prevent critical supplies and equipment from falling into enemy hands. It also defends itself as long as possible and avoids capture.

Base commanders are responsible for the following:

• Coordinating with bases on each side to plan mutually supporting fires and to avoid troops engaging each other. If a problem exists, the base commander notifies the base cluster commander.

• Ensuring each individual is assigned a fighting position. As much as possible, positions provide overhead cover. Positions also allow for interlocking sectors of fire.

• Ensuring proper individual fighting positions are prepared. Soldiers use all available cover. Positions provide frontal protection from direct fire while allowing fire to the front and oblique. Protection from indirect fire requires a depression or hole at least 1 1/2 feet thick with overhead cover. Details on fighting positions are in FM 5-103.

• Deploying crew-served weapons in fighting positions with primary and secondary sectors of fire. Instructions for preparing positions for each type of crew-served weapon are also in FM 5-103. Base commanders submit a sector sketch to the base cluster commander. The sector sketch details the location and range of all crew-served weapons and M203s.

• Identifying target reference points to direct fire against approaching ground or air enemy forces.

• Deploying all weapon-carrying vehicles on the base perimeter. This includes vehicles in the BSA for repair.

• Ensuring vehicles are properly positioned, Natural cover and concealment are used as much as possible.

• Setting up OPs and LPs. OPs provide a good view of the sector, which ideally overlaps with the adjacent OP sectors. Both the OPs and routes to them provide cover and concealment. They are not in positions that attract attention (such as isolated groups of trees) or on the very peaks of hills where positions are silhouetted. Further guidance on OPs is in FMs 19-4 and 17-98.

• Establishing patrols.

• Enforcing noise and light discipline.

• Ensuring camouflage is used properly. Guidance is in FM 5-20.

• Planning and establishing hasty obstacles.

• Ensuring soldiers know alert signals and proper responses to artillery and air attacks.

Whenever possible, natural berms, deep-cut protective positions, natural terrain concealment, and camouflage nets protect fuel tanks. Personnel protect Class I, II, and IV items in deep-cut trenches if time allows. Construction of trenches for these items is a low priority. Traffic control includes measures to conceal movement at, to, and from supply points. At water points, personnel control spills to avoid standing pools of water which reflect light.

In the base shop area, personnel prepare individual positions near billeting areas and on the periphery of work stations. They construct simple cut-and-cover or other expedient shelters next to key shop facilities for quick protection from artillery and air attacks. Whenever possible, they integrate weapon systems on vehicles in the BSA shop for repair in the base defense plan.

Medical personnel require shelters with adequate overhead cover so treatment can continue during hostilities. While a direct attack on HSS assets is not likely, the commander cannot rule out this action. More realistically, enemy actions, disrupt HSS operations by interdicting evacuation routes, destroying bridges, and sabotaging supplies. Also, the enemy may damage or destroy HSS units and other assets because of their proximity to other rear area facilities targeted for destruction. Dispersion of HSS assets, within the limits of the tactical situation, becomes a vital consideration. In the event of an attack, HSS personnel dispatch treatment and evacuation assets to the damaged area.

Defense plans do not require medical units to fire on enemy troops unless it is the result of direct attack upon medical units. Medical units do not fire to support adjacent units unless the enemy directly threatens medical units. Under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, medical unit personnel do not man the perimeter defense of nonmedical units. These non-medical units include unit trains or logistics areas. To require such action causes the loss of protected status. See FM 8-10 for additional information.

The elements of rear operations that have the most impact on transportation units are the assembly and movement of reserves and the relocation of units. Deployment routes offer concealment from observation. Supply personnel disperse supply storage areas and move them frequently. Strict traffic regulation and control are essential.

Dispersion of vehicles is also essential. There is enough dispersion between vehicles and facilities to offer protection against loss resulting from hostile ground action including mortar and artillery fire and against hostile air attack. When authorized personnel construct roadblocks and place antivehicular and antitank mines on likely avenues of approach. They camouflage trucks and facilities with natural vegetation or lightweight screening systems. Personnel conceal vehicle tracks going into the area and make vehicle tracks going into unoccupied areas to deceive the enemy. As transportation commitments increase, the personnel to man the perimeter decrease. A good candidate for the transportation company reaction force is the maintenance section. They habitually work together and typically remain in the base.

Training in defense principles and techniques is critical to the survival of BSA elements. Training includes use of organic weapons, communications procedures and emplacement and monitoring of ground sensors. Training also includes preparation of defensive positions, fire support coordination and NBC defense measures.

All personnel have a part in base defense operations. They likely require refresher training in the following areas:

• Preparation of individual fighting positions.

• Camouflage, cover, and concealment.

• Patrolling and operating roadblocks and check-points.

• Limited visibility operations.

• Cross-training on individual and crew-served weapons and supporting equipment available in the unit .

• Marksmanship, especially night firing, and the preparation of range cards.

• LP and OP operations with emphasis on security, sound and light discipline, and reporting procedures.

• Emplacement and maintenance of special observation and detection devices such as sensors, flares, and remotely employed sensors.

• Cross-training in all communications equipment available in the unit.

• Obstacle construction and mine and booby trap employment.

• Use of rally points.

• Use of individual and crew-served weapons in an air defense role.

• OPSEC.

• Identification of threat vehicles and equipment.

• Spot reports using SALUTE format.

• Fire support requests, coordination, and adjustment.

• Target engagement and designation techniques.

• Identification, marking, and neutralization of mine. fields.

Unit training focuses on rehearsal of base defense plans and continuation of the support mission under limited attack. It also focuses on full occupation of defensive positions.Rehearsals are crucial. Training center experience shows that units which rehearse defense plans greatly increase their ability to survive BSA attacks. The support battalion asks the brigade headquarters for support from combat units for tactical training.The support battalion asks the MI company for OPSEC training.

Rehearsals include manning of defensive positions, commitment of reaction forces , and coordination of supporting fires. Rehearsals also include coordination with adjacent bases and integration of external support by MPs and the tactical combat force. BDOC and BCOC exercises also train leaders to exercise fire support coordination and to test communications. They train leaders to exercise required coordination among bases, base clusters, and the brigade rear CP. Trainers conduct rehearsals during day and night and in various weather conditions.

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Effective planning, setting of specific responsibilities, and use of all available assets to conduct ADC are necessary to restore operations and provide continuous support. Planners in the brigade S4 section and support battalion ensure logistics and HSS are available to support the brigade. When ADC assets are available, the support battalion/brigade rear CP provides each base with external support necessary to overcome an attack and return to its primary mission.

Effective damage control is decentralized and executed at the lowest level. BSA base commanders review and identify all assets available within the base. They also assess the base's capability to conduct ADC operations. Assets include medical evacuation and treatment elements. Assets also include equipment evacuation and repair, critical supply, and EOD assets. BSA base commanders and the support battalion commander identify critical support points. They include points that are the sole local sources of supplies. They examine innovative ideas and initiatives to minimize damage. They coordinate with host-nation assets, MPs, and engineer units through the brigade rear CP. The commandeers include ADC plans in the BDOC and BCOC defense plans. The support battalion S2/S3 helps the brigade rear CP identify emergency food, clothing, water, and fuel sources, and available distribution assets.

In accordance with the ADC guidelines, bases in the BSA complete the following tasks before an incident occurs:

• Designate specific individuals and units to perform ADC operations.

• Attempt to disperse and harden units and facilities to minimize damage; when practical, use existing structures.

• Establish priorities within the area of operations. Identify those critical facilities requiring protection and logically prioritize the responsibilities based on the commander's directives. Report critical facilities not provided necessary ADC support immediately.

• Prepare, coordinate, and rehearse ADC plans and SOPs.

• Organize, equip, and train personnel and units for ADC operations.

• Designate alternate operational sites or alert areas. Report facilities or supply points that are sole source facilities.

• Conduct an immediate assessment of the damage and report to the BCOC. Simultaneously, initiate actions to isolate the danger areas and to prevent extension or continuation of the damage. (Fighting fires, stopping gas leaks, and minimizing flooding are examples.)

• Where feasible, prevent fires by bunkering and isolating flammable and explosives. Fight existing fires with stored water or identified water sources. Extensive fire-fighting is primarily a unit responsibility with support from engineer fire-fighter teams where available. However, due to the extended distances involved and the current technology that produces widespread devastation, alternate means may have to be used. Local fire-fighting capabilities such as HNS or the acquisition of commercial material to support ad hoc fire-fighting teams may be necessary.

• Perform self-, buddy-, and first aid for casualties, and transport casualties. If possible, medical personnel and vehicles evacuate patients. However, the timely transportation of casualties is important. The situation may require the use of nonmedical vehicles for mass casualties. If possible, medical personnel accompany those patients being transported in nonmedical vehicles to provide en route patient care.

• Coordinate with the MPs to provide traffic control. This ensures fire-fighting equipment gains access to the area and ambulances and evacuation vehicles clear the area. MPs notify the brigade command post of blocked routes and divert traffic as necessary. The MPs also provide refugee control, straggler control, and some local security when required.

• Coordinate with the engineers to support critical facilities. Engineers construct fortifications and barriers and clear debris and rubble in support of the base ADC mission.

• Coordinate EOD support to area damage control operations with the EODCT. One EODCG with four subordinate EOD detachments is allocated to each separately deployed brigade.

• Coordinate for decontamination support. The contaminated units evacuate along specific routes (not the MSR) assigned by the MCO to the appointed decontamination sites. The MPs provide route control.
  
  
  

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