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Source Notes

These are the sources used, quoted, or paraphrased in this publication. They are listed by page number. Where material appears in a paragraph, both page and paragraph number are listed. Boldface indicates the titles of historical vignettes.



"How one understands command and control depends on the perspective.": paraphrased from Thomas P. Coakley, Command and Control for War and Peace (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press: GPO, 1992) (hereafter cited as Coakley), 9-15.


The Battle Of Arbela (331 BC): based on Anthony Livesey, Great Commanders and Their Battles (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 8-19; and Simon Goodenough, Tactical Genius in Battle, ed. Len Deighton (London: Phaidon, 1979), 67-70.

Chapter 1— Command and Control


"War is the realm of uncertainty;.": Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1976; reprint, First Princeton Paperback, 1989) (hereafter cited as Clausewitz), 101.


pars. 1-55-1-60. The discussion of the challenges of land-force and land-combat operations is based on GEN Paul F. Gorman, as quoted and discussed in Kenneth Allard, Command, Control, and the Common Defense, rev. ed. (Washington, DC: National Defense Univ. Press: GPO, 1996), 158-188.


Figure 1-4. Adapted from Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control (Washington, DC: GPO, 04 Oct. 1996) (hereafter cited as MDCP 6), 81.


"no plan.extends.": Helmuth von Moltke, Moltke's Military Works, vol. 4, War Lessons, Part I, "Operative Preparations for Battle" (Berlin: Mittler, 1911), quoted in Hans Delbrück, History of the Art of War within the Framework of Political History, vol. 4, The Modern Era, trans. by Walter J. Renfroe, Jr. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 425.


Command and Control at Chancellorsville: based on Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996) (hereafter cited as Sears); James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988); and Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, vol. 2, Fredericksburg to Meridian (New York: Random House, 1963) (hereafter cited as Foote).


"I not only expected victory,.": as quoted in Foote, 262.


"My plans are perfect,.": as quoted in Foote, 262. See also Sears, 120.

Chapter 2— Command


"The criterion by which a commander.": Field Service Regulations: Operations (Washington, DC: GPO: 22 May 1941; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1992), 24.


"To command is to do more.": Roger H. Nye, The Challenge of Command: Reading for Military Excellence (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1986), 28.


par. 2-17: "the quick recognition of a truth.": Clausewitz, 102.


par. 2-22: "As each man's strength gives out.": Clausewitz,104.


"There will be neither time nor opportunity.": as quoted in Thomas B. Buell, Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980), 521.


"I suppose dozens of operation orders.": William Slim, Defeat Into Victory (London: Cassell, 1956; reprint New York: David McKay, 1961), (hereafter cited as Slim) 210-211.


"It is my design if.": Ulysses S. Grant, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, vol. 10, January 1-May 31, 1864, ed. John Y. Simon (Carbindale, IL: Southern Illinois Univ. Press, 1982) (hereafter cited as Papers), 251-252.


"That we are now all to act.": Papers, 253-254 note.


"Next to a battle lost.": as quoted in The Greenhill Dictionary of Military Quotations, ed. Peter G. Tsouras, (Mechanicsville, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000) (hereafter cited as Tsouras), 51.


"A commander has.": Harold G. Moore and Joseph Galloway, We Were Soldiers Once.and Young (New York: Random House, 1992), 113.


Calculated Risk or Military Gamble? Operation HAWTHORNE, Dak To, Vietnam: based on John M. Carland, Combat Operations: Stemming the Tide, May 1965 to October 1966, The United States Army in Vietnam, CMH Pub 91-5 (Washington DC: Center of Military History, US Army: GPO, 2000), 277-287.


Resolve: Mustafa Kemal at Gallipoli: based on George W.Gawrych, "The Rock of Gallipoli," in Studies in Battle Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995), 87-96.


Obstinacy: Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf: based on Scott Stephenson, "Old Fritz Stumbles: Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf, 1759," in Studies in Battle Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995), 13-20.


Establishing and Using Commander's Intent: VII Corps and the Ruhr Encirclement: based on William M. Connor, "Establishing Command Intent, A Case Study: The Encirclement of the Ruhr, March 1945," in The Human In Command: Exploring The Modern Military Experience, ed. Carol McCann and Ross Pigeau (Toronto, Canada: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Press, 2000), 93-110.

Chapter 3— Control


"The test of control.": The Infantry Journal. Infantry in Battle, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal, 1939; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1981), 169.


"Many.reports in war are contradictory.": Clausewitz, 117.


"Everything in war is simple ..": Clausewitz, 119, 121.


Crosstalk in the Desert: VII Corps in the Gulf War: based on TRADOC Pam 525-100-1, Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM (Fort Monroe, VA: HQ, TRADOC, 1992) (hereafter cited as TRADOC Pam 525-100-1), 28.


"...avoid taking 'firm control' or a 'tight rein'.." paraphrased from Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii, by Richard E Simpkin and John Erickson (London: Brassey's Defence, 1987), 150.


Control in Command and Control: Austerlitz: based on David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (New York, Macmillan Co., 1966), 402-432.

Chapter 4— The Role of the Commander


"When he looked at a map, Zhukov .": A. Chakovskly, The Blockade, quoted in D.A. Ivanov et al., Fundamentals Of Tactical Command And Control: A Soviet View, (Moscow:Voenizdat, 1977); trans. US Air Force, Soviet Military Thought, no. 18 (Washington, DC: GPO, no date), 203.


".one of the most difficult things.": Adolph von Schell, Battle Leadership (Fort Benning, GA: Benning Herald, 1933; reprint, Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1999), 55.


"Morale is a state of mind.": Slim, 182.


"Judgment comes from experience.": Simon Bolivar Buckner, as quoted by Omar N. Bradley, "Leadership: An Address to the US Army War College, 07 Oct. 71," Parameters 1 (3) (1972): 8.


"Benteen. Come on.": as quoted in John S. Gray, Custer's Last Campaign: Mitch Boyer and the Little Bighorn Reconstructed (Lincoln: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1991), 281.


"More than 50 percent of battle command in VII Corps was nonelectric.": as quoted in TRADOC Pam 525-100-1, 34.


"There is no alternative.": as quoted in Martin van Creveld, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1985), 199.


"Magnificent, But Not War": Misunderstood Orders and the Charge of the Light Brigade: based on John Sweetman, Balaclava, 1854: The Charge of the Light Brigade (London: Osprey, 1990); and Cecil Woodham-Smith, The Reason Why (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).


"General Meade was an officer of merit with drawbacks.": Ulysses S. Grant, Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters, 1839-1865, vol. 2, Personal Memoirs, ed. William S. Mc Feely and Mary Drake McFeely (New York: Library of America, 1990), 770. [Online] Available


"Like the great artist the general.": J.F.C. Fuller, Generalship: Its Diseases and their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing, 1936; reprint, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1987), 87.


"No man is more valiant than Yessoutai.": as quoted in Rashid ad-Din, Sbornik Letopisei (Collected Chronicles), vol. I/2 (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosizdat, 1952), trans. O.I. Smirnova, 261-262, as quoted in Harold Lamb, Genghis Khan: The Emperor of All Men (New York: Robert McBride, 1927; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1956), 46.


"He [Napoleon] fell from the height of greatness.": Antoine Henri de Jomini, Treatise on Grand Mililtary Operations, trans. S.B. Holabird (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1865), as quoted in UK Army Doctrinal Publication 2, Command (London: Chief of General Staff, Apr. 1995), 2-14.


"One of the most valuable qualities of a commander.": William Slim, Unofficial History (New York: David McKay, 1962), 156.


"[Rommel] commanding from the front.": David Fraser, Knight's Cross: A Life of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, 1st US edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 161.


Forward Command: LTG Eichelberger at Buna: based on Thomas M. Huber,"Eichelberger at Buna: A Study in Battle Command," in Studies in Battle Command (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College: GPO, 1995), 123-128.

Chapter 5— The Command and Control System


"I will only invite your attention to.": George C. Marshall, "Development in Tactics," undated lecture, US Army Infantry School (1928-1933), in The Papers of George Catlett Marshall: vol. 1, The Soldierly Spirit, December 1880-June 1939 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981), ed. Larry Bland and Sharon R. Ritenour, 334-335.

Chapter 6— Exercising Command and Control


"The great end.": paraphrased from Robert D. Heinl Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1966), 1.


"Only in very rare cases can an army.": F.W. von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War, 1st American ed., trans. H. Betzler; ed. by L.C.F. Turner (Norman, OK: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 94.


"If I always appeared prepared.": as quoted in Tsouras, 363.


pars. 6-77-6-130: The doctrine for decisionmaking during execution is based on, among other sources, Dennis K. Leedom, et al., Final Report: Cognitive Engineering of the Human-Computer Interface for ABCS (Andover, MA: Dynamics Research Corporation, 1998); and Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

Appendix A— The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) Cycle


par. A-7. based on Robert L. Bateman III, "Avoiding Information Overload," Military Review 77 (4) (1998): 54-55.

Appendix B— Information


The cognitive hierarchy and discussion of it are based on MCDP 6, 66-71; JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: GPO, 30 May 1995), I-3-I-4; and Jeffrey R. Cooper, "The Coherent Battlefield-Removing the 'Fog of War'" (unpublished paper: SRS Technologies, Jun. 1993), as cited in MCDP 6, 143.


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