Contingency Operations
Since the [Point Salines] runway was surrounded by construction equipment, bringing in engineer equipment from Fort Bragg was unnecessary. Equipment operators with the first- deployed engineer platoons quickly began using the captured equipment, which included Russian dump trucks and Komatzu bulldozers. As more operators, mechanics and combat engineers arrived, more captured equipment was put into operation.
"Operation Urgent
Fury"
LTC Lawrence L. Izzo
The Engineer, Winter 1983-84
Contingency operations (CONOPs) under conditions
short of war are politically sensitive military activities normally
characterize by the short-term, rapid projection or the employment
of forces. This chapter addresses the following types:
- Disaster-relief operations.
- Support to counterdrug operations.
- Security assistance surges.
- Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
- Rescue and recovery operations.
- Shows of force and demonstrations.
- Operations to restore order.
- Strikes and raids.
The consistent feature of CONOPs is an effort
focused on a specific problem (usually in a crisis) and guided
at the national level by the crisis action system. This system
has six phases and is designed for time-sensitive, joint military
planning, Joint Publication (Jnt Pub) 5-02.4
contains details on the crisis action system.
CONOPs under conditions short of war frequently
take place far from established military bases of operation. These
operations may require temporary development of long lines of
communication (LOC) in a hostile environment. They are often undertaken
to avoid a crisis or to manage crisis situations requiring the
use of military assets to enforce or support diplomatic and informational
initiatives. These conditions distinguish CONOPs under conditions
short of war from wartime CONOPs, which are often conducted for
purely military objectives.
CONOPs may require a wide variety of engineer
support. Specific operational requirements may limit participation
to a small number of engineers. In other cases, engineer involvement
on a large scale may be necessary. The type of operation determines
requirements for combat- or construction-related engineering skills.
These skills may be needed simultaneously or sequentially. Large
areas of the world where CONOPs may occur are not yet covered
by scale maps. The Defense Mapping Agency or Army topographic
engineers may provide special quick-response photomaps from satellite
imagery, aerial photography, and so forth. Existing host-nation
(HN) maps may also be revised or enlarged to meet specific mission
requirements. During CONOPs, engineers may work with civilian
agencies, such as the Red Cross. Engineers may support combat
forces during joint or combined operations. Engineer command and
support relationships vary considerably, depending on the circumstances
of each specific operation. Logistical support for engineers also
varies. Support procedures will be outlined in applicable operation
orders (OPORDs).
Disaster-relief operations provide emergency
assistance to victims of natural or man-made disasters abroad.
These operations are responses to requests for immediate help
and rehabilitation from foreign governments or international agencies.
Disaster relief may include refugee assistance, food programs,
medical treatment and care, or other civilian welfare programs.
While this section specifically addresses disaster relief, the
same principals apply when assisting refugees resulting from other
situations such as political turmoil. Army Regulation (AR) 500-60
provides additional information for disaster-relief operations.
In a low intensity conflict (LIC) environment,
disasters can worsen already unstable situations. When properly
executed, United States (US) participation in disaster-relief
and refugee assistance can have significant, positive effects.
The military can provide logistical support to move supplies to
remote areas. They can locate and extract or evacuate victims as
needed and provide emergency communications or conduct direct
medical-support operations.
Military elements involved in disaster-relief
operations may have a variety of missions. Military personnel
assess the damage caused by the disaster and the HN's ability
to deal with it. The military executes assistance programs developed
by the Department of State or the US Agency for International
Development (USAID). Army combat support and combat service support
units play a major role in these operations. If needed, combat
arms units can provide additional support.
Command and control during disaster-relief operations
vary from situation to situation. A command structure may be established
for US forces participating in these operations. In some cases,
units may work directly for the US country team. Disaster-relief
operations are generally joint in nature. Because of the quick
response time necessary in disaster-relief operations, it is essential
to establish liaison, communication, and operating procedures
rapidly. Coordination with HN and international agencies is always
essential.
Logistical support from an HN or nearby country
may be provided for disaster-relief operations. A nation that experiences
a disaster severe enough to request external support may have
difficulty providing for its people. The nation may also be unable
to support relief personnel from the US and other nations. Logistical
support for disaster-relief operations often flows through LOCs
stretching from the US.
Engineers may become involved in disaster-relief
operations as individuals, teams, or complete units. Individuals
may provide technical assistance to HNs in the areas of damage
assessment or engineer work estimation. Teams may provide specialized
support such as well drilling, power supply and distribution,
or utilities repair or reconstruction. Units may perform these
missions:
- Support for search and rescue operations.
- Clearance of rubbled areas.
- Opening of roadways for emergency and medical traffic.
- Restoration of critical facilities, services, and utilities.
- Provision of emergency topographic engineering support.
- Engineer environmental studies.
- Construction of roads.
- Provision of water facilities and distribution.
- Provision of sanitation facilities.
- Construction of displaced-persons camps.
The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)
can support disaster-relief efforts by providing expertise through
its engineer districts and divisions. Support can include damage
survey and assessment teams, contracting support, and technical
advice. The US Army Engineering and Housing Support Center (USAEHSC),
a field operating agency of USACE, can provide prime power teams
and equipment to provide temporary electrical power to key locations
and to help restore electrical services. (See Chapter 2
for more information.) Planners must resolve funding issues with
USACE early in the disaster-relief response process.
Engineer units supporting disaster-relief operations
must take adequate tools and equipment to support all potential
missions. For example, a unit deploying to an earthquake disaster
area should take all squad and platoon tool kits. The unit should
also take specialized tool kits, such as carpenter's, pipe fitter's,
and electrician's tool kits. Pioneer-type tools are used to clear
rubble, open air holes, assist in entering structures, and so
forth. When conducting search operations, specialized tool kits
are used to turn off water systems, turn off or seal gas leaks,
disconnect electrical systems, and temporarily buttress damaged
structures. Construction equipment is used to clear emergency
routes, remove rubble, and demolish unsafe structures. When searching
partially collapsed structures, cutting torches are needed to
cut reinforcing bars. In the same manner, units deploying to a
flood disaster area need to consider the mission types they may
face based on initial reconnaissance reports. If displaced-persons
camps are to be constructed, heavy horizontal and vertical engineer
equipment assets will be required. Planners must also design units'
support packages (fuel, water, communications assets, maintenance
support, and so forth) to facilitate the success of their operation.
When conducting disaster-relief operations, it
is critical to maintain personnel accountability. Leaders must
keep track of subordinates at all times. Close supervision and
personnel training is necessary to prevent the perception of looting.
During a crisis situation, a soldier may become separated from
his unit and be trapped in a hazardous area. Unit leaders must
develop a system to track the location of their soldiers at all
times (to include during rest or sleep breaks).
When conducting disaster-relief operations overseas,
failure to obtain proper funding sources and authorizations may
become a "show stopper" for engineer operations. Immediate
efforts must be made to identify find sources and authorizations
to procure materials and issue construction contracts.
Another critical factor in disaster-relief and/or
refugee operations is to observe ethnic and cultural mores in
types of construction and operations. Failure to construct facilities
(for example occidental versus oriental style latrines) according
to local values may result in unused facilities and/or poor relationships
with the local populace.
SUPPORT TO COUNTERDRUG
OPERATIONS
Military support to counterdrug operations reduces,
as much as possible, the supply of illicit substances available
in the US. Military efforts support national drug control strategies
and provide an integrated program of counterdrug actions. Military
counterdrug efforts always complement, rather than replace, the
efforts of other US agencies, the states, and/or cooperating foreign
governments. The commitment of military resources is always consistent
with US national values and legal framework. The primary legal
restraint on military involvement in counterdrug activities is
the Posse Comitatus Act. It prohibits military enforcement of
civil statutes except in cases and circumstances expressly authorized
by the Constitution or Act of Congress.
Military counterdrug support must be a balanced
effort to stop the flow of drugs in each phase of the supply cycle:
at the source, while in transit, and during distribution. HNs
that are source or transit countries receive direct financial
and technical assistance. The US government provides operational
assistance to HN forces to attack drug-production facilities.
The US collaborates with HN law enforcement agencies and armed
forces to prevent the export of illegal drugs from those countries.
Within the US, military forces can provide support to federal,
state, and local agencies (within the restrictions of the Posse
Comitatus Act) to locate narcotics sources. An example is locating
marijuana plants on public lands.
Military support to efforts to stem the flow
of drugs will always be conducted in coordination with federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies. Military support for
interdiction includes two operational areas. The first is interdicting
drugs in air, sea, and land traffic lanes. The second is detecting,
monitoring, and seizing drugs at the nation's borders and ports
of entry. Within the US, the military provides support for domestic
counterdrug operations to attack the flow of drugs by several
methods:
- Military planning and training assistance for domestic law enforcement agencies.
- Equipment loans and transfers.
- Use of military facilities.
- Enhanced roles for the National Guard.
Engineer-specific missions supporting counterdrug
operations include--
- Constructing target ranges for law enforcement personnel.
- Constructing temporary operational bases. Facilities may include helipads, fuel storage facilities, maintenance facilities, and billets.
- Producing photomaps of areas where counterdrug operations will take place.
- Constructing or upgrading access roads for drug interdiction patrols.
- Clearing fields of observation for counterdrug teams.
- Locating infiltration tunnels.
- Supporting efforts to encourage farmers to develop alternative crops to those that support the drug trade.
- Rehabilitating existing drug-law enforcement agency (DLEA)-owned buildings to accommodate counterdrug operations or activities, such as an evidence processing facility or operations center.
- Any other mission that is within the capability of military engineer troop units and is also within the legal framework of DOD support to DLEAs.
Army National Guard units have also supported
local law enforcement agencies by demolishing buildings used to
distribute drugs in the inner city.
During counterdrug operations, engineers must
be sensitive to the legal aspects of support to civilian authorities
and abide by the Posse Comitatus Act. They must also be aware
of the capabilities of the threat. Many narcotics traffickers
are well-equipped and heavily armed. The fact that counterdrug
operations are a peacetime activity must not lull leaders into
a false sense of security. Military support to civil authorities
in counterdrug operations capitalizes on inherent capabilities
of the US military.
The US may accelerate security assistance when
a friendly or allied nation faces a threat of imminent harm. Activities
are frequently focused on providing logistic support. This includes
the provision of additional weapons systems, equipment, and supplies.
However, support may include the full range of assistance to include
training and financial support. Engineers may aid these surges
through mobile training teams (MTTs) designed to transfer skills
or to assist in fielding engineer equipment.
NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION
OPERATIONS
NEOs relocate threatened civilian noncombatants
from locations in a foreign land or an HN. These operations normally
involve US citizens whose lives are in danger. NEOs may also include
selected HN and third-country personnel, based on the current
situation or previously arranged agreements. AR 525-12
outlines responsibilities, policies, and procedures for planning
and conducting NEOs.
Military, political, or other emergencies in
any country may require evacuation of designated personnel as
the situation deteriorates. The Department of State initiates
requests for military assistance and obtains necessary clearances
from other governments. These clearances can include basing and
overflight authorizations and the use of facilities essential
to performing the evacuation.
A NEO in a LIC environment usually involves the
swift insertion of a force; the temporary occupation of an objective;
and a planned, rapid withdrawal. Only the degree of force required
for self-defense and the protection of the evacuees is used. Ideally,
there should be little or no opposition to an evacuation. In reality,
this may not always be the case. A number of factors impact on
the specific manner in which forces conduct a NEO. These include
the--
- Required speed of the evacuation.
- Potential for violence (threat level).
- Number of individuals to be evacuated.
- Dispersion of individuals to be evacuated.
- Status of ground LOC.
The speed at which an evacuation must be conducted
will depend on how rapidly the situation in an HN deteriorates.
If intelligence assets provide early warning of the need for an
evacuation and the political decision is made to initiate an evacuation,
a gradual withdrawal is possible. If destabilization occurs quickly
or if a political decision is made to provide an in-country presence
as long as possible, a rapid evacuation may be needed. Ideally,
dependents and nonessential personnel will have already departed
at the direction of the US ambassador before the start of a NEO.
The potential for violence during a NEO depends
on the strength of local forces opposing the HN's government.
The ability of that government's police, paramilitary, and military
forces to maintain order is also key. US forces conducting a NEO
may enter a situation where there is little threat from opposing
forces and the HN is able to effectively shield US forces from
contact with the threat. Sometimes forces opposing the HN may
actively attempt to disrupt the evacuation, but the HN is still
able to support the NEO. US forces may also conduct a NEO under
conditions of strong and heavily armed opposition, with the HN's
forces unable to provide any support. In a worst-case scenario,
the "hint" nation's forces may actually be part of the
threat. In each of these situations, accurate intelligence and
detailed planning is essential to ensure a successful operation.
The US evacuation-force commander must always be prepared to defend
the evacuation effort and provide protection for his forces.
Planning for force protection during NEOs requires
detailed analysis of the threat level. Military planners must
assess the strength of forces opposing the HN's government and
the HN's ability to maintain law and order. Rules of engagement
(ROE) must be developed for the operation. They must be understood
by all members of the force conducting the operation. Generally,
NEOs are conducted during politically sensitive and potentially
unstable situations. Local conditions may change rapidly. Commanders
should remember that NEOs can quickly turn into peacekeeping operations
and plan for these contingencies. All participants in the operation
must understand the environment they will enter.
Engineers providing support for a NEO generally
operate as part of a joint force. Engineer units may be part of
the force actually conducting the operation. In other cases, they
may provide support in another country by constructing temporary
support facilities for either US forces or the evacuees. Engineer
units may also provide topographic products and data tailored
to the operation.
Engineers directly participating in the evacuation
may perform a variety of tasks, depending on the situation. In
a high-threat environment, engineers may perform combat-related
engineering tasks. They may construct protective structures for
both US forces and evacuees, if necessary. Airfields designated
for use in evacuation operations could become damaged-- engineers
must be prepared to repair them in case the HN cannot or will
not. Engineers may clear landing zones if helicopters will be
used either to consolidate evacuees from outlying areas or to
move them to waiting ships or other secure areas. If evacuees
must be transported on the ground due to a lack of aviation assets
or an air defense threat, engineers may be involved in route reconnaissance
and mobility-type operations. Field Manuals (FMs) 5-100,
5-101, 5-103,
5-105, and 100-20
and other related doctrinal manuals provide information relating
to engineering tasks.
Facility construction may be required to support
a NEO. Evacuees may move to another country temporarily before
returning to the US. US forces may require a staging area near
the country where the NEO will be conducted. If existing facilities
are inadequate or not available, engineers may construct a temporary
base. The Department of State conducts necessary coordination
to obtain clearance to construct and maintain these facilities
(early identification of funding sources and authorizations is
essential). FMs 5-104, 5-116,
5-166, 31-82,
and 100-20 and Technical Manuals (TMs) 5-301-1,
5-301-2, 5-301-3,
5-301-4, 5-302-1,
5-302-2, 5-302-3,
5-302-4, 5-302-5,
5-303, and 5-304
provide doctrine relating to facility construction.
RESCUE-AND-RECOVERY OPERATIONS
Rescue-and-recovery operations are sophisticated
actions requiring precise execution, especially when conducted
in hostile countries. These operations may be clandestine or overt.
They may include the rescue of US personnel or friendly foreign
nationals or the location, identification, and recovery of sensitive
equipment or items critical to US national security.
Hostile forces can oppose rescue-and-recovery
operations. However, these operations may remain unopposed if
potentially hostile forces are unaware of them or unable or unwilling
to interfere. Stealth, surprise, speed, and the threat of overwhelming
US force are some of the means available to overcome opposition.
Rescue-and-recovery operations require timely intelligence, including
current topographic information. They also require detailed planning,
deception, swift execution, and extraordinary security measures.
These operations usually involve highly trained special units,
but they may also receive support from general purpose forces.
The threat level during rescue and recovery varies
depending on the circumstances of the specific operation. Rapid
execution of the mission, as well as tight security before and
during the operation, will minimize risk. ROE will be established
before the operation begins. These rules must be clearly stated
and understood by all participants.
During rescue-and-recovery operations, engineer
units may provide support to combined arms teams or joint task
forces (JTFs). Engineers may provide route reconnaissance, mobility-
type operations, construction of helicopter landing zones, and
so forth. In these situations, FMs 100-5,
and 5-100 and related manuals
provide supporting doctrine.
Engineer units may also become involved in constructing
staging areas for rescue-and- recovery operations. These areas
may include billeting, administrative, and logistical support
facilities. The extent of these facilities depends on the projected
duration of their occupation. Construction of staging areas may
include mock-ups of buildings, airfields, ports, and so forth
to support rehearsals by units participating in the operation.
SHOWS OF FORCE AND DEMONSTRATIONS
US forces deployed abroad lend credibility to
US promises and commitments. Shows of force increase the regional
influence of the US and demonstrate its resolve to use military
force as an element of national power. In addition, the National
Command Authorities (NCA) give orders for shows of force or demonstrations
to bolster and reassure friends and allies. These operations can
influence another government or political-military organization
to respect US interests or to enforce international law. These
are some examples:
- Forward deployment of military forces.
- Combined training exercises.
- Aircraft and ship visits.
- Introduction or buildup of military forces in a region.
The objective of shows of force and demonstrations
must be well-defined and clearly understood. To be effective,
the force tasked with the mission must be demonstrably mission-capable
and sustainable. The specific requirements for sustainment include
adequate command, control, and communications (C3);
intelligence support; interdepartmental and international liaison;
and ready and responsive forces. Logistical support for these
operations should be based on the possibility that the mission
may require the actual use of force.
Political concerns dominate shows of force and
demonstrations. Military forces conduct these operations with
delicate legal and political constraints. The political will to
employ actual force, should a demonstration of it fail, is vital
to the success of these operations. Actual combat is not the goal
of the operation, but it is a possible outcome. Soldiers involved
in these operations must enter them physically and mentally prepared
to conduct combat operations. The force coordinates its operations
with the country team (or teams, if more than one country is involved).
Before commitment, the chain of command must ensure that the members
of the force understand the national purpose, ROE, and inherent
risks of the operation.
Engineer support to shows of force and demonstrations
will normally be conducted in the context of support for a joint
or combined force. FMs 5-100,
5-101, 5-102,
5-103 and related manuals provide
applicable doctrine for these operations. If a show of force or
demonstration continues for a protracted period of time (particularly
if it is conducted in an undeveloped area), base-camp, logistical-facility,
and LOG construction will become necessary. Under these conditions,
manuals such as FMs 5-104, 5-105,
and 31-82 and TMs 5-301-1,
5-301-2, 5-301-3,
5-301-4, 5-302-1,
5-302-2, 5-302-3,
5-302-4, 5-302-5,
5-303, and 5-304
outline engineer activities required to support the force.
The US conducts operations to restore order when
it is in the national interest to stop a violent conflict in a
country or region and to force a return to political and diplomatic
methods. (Operations to restore order were previously called "peacemaking.")
The US typically undertakes these operations at the request of
appropriate national authorities in a foreign nation or to protect
US citizens as part of an international, multilateral, or unilateral
operation. The long-range goals of an operation to restore order
are often unclear. Therefore, these operations are best terminated
by prompt withdrawal after a settlement is reached or by rapid
transition to a peacekeeping operation (PKO) (see Chapter 6).
The political complexities of operations to restore
order require that the available force be sufficient to achieve
US objectives and that its use be applied with discretion. ROE
tend to be restrictive because the purpose of the force is to
maintain law and order. Political considerations may influence
force size and composition. The force commander must prepare himself
to deal with external pressures not normally associated with military
operations. He may have to adjust his operations to reconcile
the conflicting demands of political considerations, mission accomplishment,
and force protection.
The threat level during an operation to restore
order depends on the political and military situation within the
area of operations. If one or more of the belligerents in the
area oppose the presence of US forces, their capabilities must
be considered in the threat assessment. The capabilities of the
party that requested US involvement, if one exists, must also
be considered. The threat assessment must be continuously updated.
It will assist the commander in establishing appropriate steps
to ensure adequate force protection.
Engineers involved in operations to restore order
support combat operations and perform sustainment and topographic
engineering missions. Engineers also support efforts to develop
a logistical support base elsewhere in the region, if one is required.
Initial force deployment in support of operations to restore order
may be conducted by airdrop, airland interdiction, or amphibious
operations. To support the buildup of combat forces and permit
the flow of logistical support, engineer units may construct new
airfields or repair damage to existing ones. Once a forward operating
base has been established, expansion of the lodgment area involves
engineer support. This may involve constructing protective structures,
hardening key facilities, and other activities based on the situation.
The duration of the operation, the amount of resistance met by
US forces, and the availability of existing facilities will dictate
the actual amount and type of engineer support required in the
area of operation. FMs 5-100,
5-101, 5-102,
5-103 and related manuals provide
applicable doctrine for combat operations. FM 5-104
and related manuals provide guidance relating to sustainment engineering.
FM 5-105 provides information
on topographic support.
If operations to restore order are conducted
in a remote area, it may be necessary to establish a logistical
support base or staging area outside the area of operations but
still within the region. The Department of State conducts the
coordination required to obtain clearance to construct and maintain
these facilities. When engineer units support base development,
FMs 5-104 and 31-82,
TMs 5-301-1, 5-301-2,
5-301-3, 5-301-4,
5-302-1, 5-302-2,
5-302-3, 5-302-4,
5-302-5, 5-303,
5-304, and other related manuals
outline engineer activities required to support the force.
The US executes strikes and raids for specific
purposes other than gaining or holding terrain. Strikes and raids
can support rescue or recovery operations or destroy or seize
equipment or facilities that demonstrably threaten national collective
security interests. Strikes and raids can also support counterdrug
operations by destroying narcotics production or transshipment
facilities or supporting HN activities in this arena. Strikes
and raids are the most conventional CONOPs under conditions short
of war. The principles of combat operations apply directly (see
FMs 5-100, and 100-5
and related manuals). The combatant commander normally plans and
executes them.
Before a strike or raid, engineers may construct
rehearsal sites for the forces involved in the operation. Topographic
engineers may produce large-scale photomaps or graphics to help
guide forces to their objectives. Those engineers actually participating
in the mission may require refresher training in specialized skills,
depending on the specifics of the operation. These skills may
include air assault techniques, military operations on urbanized
terrain (MOUT), or reorganization as infantry. During strike or
raid operations, engineers may be called upon to perform unique
missions, in addition to traditional engineer tasks. These missions
could include--
- Emplacing and manning roadblocks.
- Moving or disposing of captured equipment.
- Using captured equipment to perform missions.
In some cases, the US may assist with reconstruction
in an area where a strike or raid has been conducted. USACE, through
an engineer district, can provide teams to assist with damage
assessment and contracting for cleanup and repair work. US engineer
troop units, if located in the region, may assist by clearing
rubble; opening roadways for emergency and medical traffic; and
restoring critical facilities, services, and utilities. If USACE
teams or engineer troop units are used, they must deploy rapidly
to the area to restore key facilities and limit suffering by the
local populace.
In many CONOPs, an Army corps plans and conducts
Army operations as part of a joint or combined force commanded
by a Commander in Chief (CINC) (combatant commander) or joint
force commander. Sometimes, the corps commander will serve as
both Army force (ARFOR) and land component commander in the joint
operation. The corps may contribute to a contingency JTF headquarters
for campaigns involving all services. A corps that is the largest
land force in a theater of operations will often translate strategic
goals into tactical objectives. If the corps functions as the
nucleus of a JTF headquarters, it is responsible for developing
a campaign plan or outline.
To achieve quick, decisive results in CONOPs,
the corps must be prepared to deploy and employ its forces simultaneously.
In a large operation, while the majority of the force is deploying
into the area of operations, lead echelons must lead the way by
seizing (if necessary) and securing arrival points for the remaining
force. Corps CONOPs will be phased. Phases should begin with planning
and preparation and end with contingency force redeployment. However,
some phases may not occur at all. The following phases provide
the general structure for a CONOPs; they can be adjusted to fit
each contingency:
- Predeployment/crisis action.
- Deployment/initial combat operations.
- Force buildup/combat operations.
- Decisive combat operations.
- Redeployment.
For additional information relating to corps contingency planning, see FM 100-15.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
