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Chapter 1

The Strategic Environment

National Strategy Goals--Throughout our history, our national security strategy has pursued broad, consistent goals. We have always sought to protect the safety of our nation, its citizens, and its way of life. We have also worked to advance the welfare of our people by contributing to an international environment of peace, freedom, and progress in which our democracy--and other free nations--can flourish.

National Security Strategy of the United States
The President of the United States
March 1990

Military operations short of war are of increasing importance to the United States (US). These are operations conducted in peacetime or during conflict. Nearly all armed conflicts of the past 40 years have occurred in the Third World. These are the diverse, developing countries primarily situated in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean Sea. During this 40-year period, all conflicts in which the US has been involved (directly or indirectly) have occurred in this region. Continuing changes in the world geopolitical scene have increased the chance that future US military operations will fall within the arena of operations short of war.

THE OPERATIONAL CONTINUUM

Each nation has various means by which it can achieve its national goals. These include the political, economic, informational, and military elements of national power. The political element of power consists of moral and political example, alliance relationships, public diplomacy, and diplomatic mediation. Methods by which a nation employs its economic power include economic incentives and sanctions, developmental assistance, and financial aid. The informational element includes cooperation in the areas of science and technology, participation in international organizations, and provision of information. Military strength and security assistance to other nations are two facets of the military element. In most situations, a nation exercises all four elements of national power to varying degrees. For example, US participation in an alliance such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) uses all four elements to achieve national aims. In describing environments in which US military forces may conduct operations, it is vital to understand the interaction of these elements.

The operational continuum is the range of environments in which the US military conducts operations. The continuum consists of three general states: peacetime, conflict, and war. The state of war is a violent environment in which the national survival of a belligerent is at stake. In war, military force contributes directly to the achievement of strategic aims. It seeks to create conditions that make it possible to achieve the desired strategic end state. The political, economic, and informational elements of national power support the military effort to establish these conditions.

In the less violent environments of the operational continuum, US forces operate under conditions of peace or conflict. "Short of war" is a collective term for these states of the environment. A key concept relating to these states is low intensity conflict (LIC). This is a political-military confrontation between contending states or groups below conventional war and above the routine, peaceful competition among states. LIC often involves protracted struggles of competing principles and ideologies. It ranges from subversion to the use of armed force. LIC is waged by a combination of means, employing political, economic, informational, and military elements. Low intensity conflicts are often localized. They generally occur in the Third World but have regional and global security implications. In LIC, the contribution of military force to the US strategic aim is indirect. Military operations support nonmilitary actions that create conditions under which strategic aim can be realized. Frequently, these actions aid friendly governments or resistance groups.

The key difference between a LIC environment and war is the way the elements of national power are employed. In war, the US directly employs the military element to establish conditions that enable the nation to achieve its strategic aims. The other elements of national power support the military element. In a LIC environment, the US directly employs the political, economic, and informational elements to establish conditions that help secure US strategic aims. Ideally, the military element directly supports the other elements. An example is a show of force designed to express US support for a host nation's (HN's) government. This is not a hostile act, but it shows US resolve and supports political initiatives. Sometimes the direct use of military force maybe necessary, but this is not the preferred approach to achieving national goals.

It is essential to understand that the "low intensity" description within the term LIC is a US perspective. LIC involves threats that are usually subtle and indirect and that occur over an extended period of time but which also have serious implications for US national security interests. From the perspective of the government of a country where a "low intensity" conflict is occurring, the intensity may be very high. The conflict may threaten the country's existence. To US military personnel involved in an operation in a LIC environment, the perceived level of intensity from the national perspective is unimportant. To those individuals the environment is one of conflict.

Within an area of operations, more than one environment may exist at the same time. For example, within a country where US forces are operating, there maybe both a limited war and a LIC environment. Within a unified Commander in Chiefs (CINC's) area of responsibility, environments may range from peacetime to war simultaneously. Commanders must be aware of the specific environment in which they are operating. The environment affects such planning considerations as force protection, rules of engagement (ROE), and interaction with the local populace.

Escalation of conflict between states of the continuum may occur, but it is not inevitable. For example, LIC does not necessarily lead to war. The objective of operations within LIC, in fact, should be to resolve conflict on terms favorable to US interests without resorting to war. On the other hand, war does not always resolve all aspects of contention between nations. A war may evolve into some form of LIC. Military forces must be prepared to adjust their operations as these transitions occur.

THE ARMY IN PEACETIME

Under peacetime conditions, the political, economic, and informational elements of the US are the primary mechanisms for achieving national goals. Those who direct the agencies that administer these elements take the lead in establishing policies and programs that support the country's objectives. The military assets of the US serve two purposes in a peacetime environment.

During peacetime, the primary mission of the military element is to deter conflict and war. A trained and ready force reduces the chance that operations in more hostile environments will occur, Two conditions must be met for the US armed forces to accomplish this mission. First, the forces must be perceived as being capable of responding to any threat or contingency that arises. This capability is linked to the levels of manning and training, the material status, and the deployability of the forces. Second, the international community must perceive that the US government will apply the military element. These two conditions equate to deterrence.

During peacetime, the secondary mission of the military element is to support political, economic, and informational efforts to achieve US goals. Military operations in this environment provide an indirect application of the military element of power, compared with the direct application of the military element in the environment of war. Activities by armed forces under peacetime conditions must be closely coordinated with the agencies responsible for directing the use of the other elements of power. This is necessary to ensure unity of effort toward achieving US goals and a consistent approach by all US agencies in dealing with members of the international community.

A great percentage of military operations conducted in the pursuit of peace will occur outside the US. These operations will generally be conducted to support another US government agency's programs. Often the goal of these programs will be to promote stability within a nation or region of the world. In this context, stability is not a status quo but orderly progress for national or regional development.

Within the military establishment, engineer forces are particularly well suited to conduct operations in this environment. The capabilities, flexibility, and generally nonthreatening nature of military engineer units readily support the types of programs that are established during peacetime to achieve US national goals. Some activities in which military engineers may be involved include staff assistance visits, personnel exchanges, civic action projects, and unit deployments for training. Military engineer units may conduct these operations independently; they may be augmented by combat, combat support, combat service support, or United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) (civilian or military) assets; or they maybe part of a combined or joint force.

Although most military peacetime operations occur outside the US, there are several noteworthy exceptions of particular interest to Army engineers. These are disaster preparedness and relief operations, military construction (MILCON), civil works projects, topographic engineering projects, and community civic action projects. These operations do not have a direct impact on the international environment, but they are critical peacetime tasks.

LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT

There are numerous factors that contribute to the development of a LIC environment in a country or region. Among these are change, poverty, and discontent. These circumstances are often interrelated, particularly in developing nations of the Third World. The failure of political and social institutions to incorporate the general populace into the process of modernization and development may cause discontent within a society. By its very nature, modernization makes the people aware of the disparity between the haves and have-nots. This leads to rising expectations that the government of the developing nation may not be able to fulfill. The inability or unwillingness of a developing nation to meet the real or perceived needs of its people provides a fertile ground for unrest within the society. Groups within that nation, as well as other governments, may exploit such unrest.

Since the end of World War II, a host of groups and states have pursued their interests in the LIC environment. International wars and insurgencies have taken a heavy toll on lives and resources. Most have occurred in the Third World and have changed the international environment. Many Third World conflicts originated in the struggle to end the system of European colonialism. As nations were created, clashes occurred as relationships were established or conflicts developed among newly independent states. In many cases, insurgents sought to alter the political, social, and economic organization of these states, bringing about internal conflicts. The proliferation within these regions of chemical and biological weapons, and to some degree nuclear weapons, has increased the lethality of the environment. These weapons have greatly increased the ability of small states and terrorist groups to influence larger and traditionally more powerful countries.

The rapid growth of the international, illegal drug trade also contributes to instability within the world community. Drug traffickers are using increasingly sophisticated communications, transportation, and support systems in their operations. They are also using more lethal weapons in their confrontations with authorities. In many cases, the equipment used by the drug traffickers is more modern than that used by the governmental forces combatting them. Together, these factors suggest a high potential for violent conflict in the world. The current conditions that exist in the Third World suggest that future confrontations will most likely occur in that region and in the context of a LIC environment.

The most significant threats to US interests in the LIC environment do not come from individual incidents of insurgency, economic instability, drug trafficking, or isolated acts of terrorism. Rather, they result from the accumulation of unfavorable outcomes from such activities. Failure in the LIC environment can lead to the following:

• Isolation of the US from its allies, its global trading partners, and the world community.

• Loss of US access to strategic mineral and energy supplies.

• Loss of US military basing, transit, and access rights.

• Loss of international support in the counterdrug war.

• Movement of US friends and allies to positions of accommodation with hostile groups.

• Long-term gains for US adversaries.

Successful operations in a LIC environment can advance US international goals, such as the growth of freedom, democratic institutions, and free-market economies.

Success in the LIC environment requires planning and conducting operations based on the following set of imperatives:

• Primacy of the political element.

• Unity of effort.

• Adaptability.

• Legitimacy.

• Perseverance.

• Restricted use of force.

During operations in a LIC environment, political objectives drive military decisions at every level from the strategic to the tactical. Commanders and their staff officers must understand the specific political objectives and the impact of military operations on them. They must adopt courses of action that legally support those objectives even if the courses of action appear to be outside what traditional military doctrine encompasses. Direct involvement by National Command Authorities (NCA) is likely in this environment.

Unity of effort dictates that military leaders must integrate their efforts with other governmental agencies to gain a mutual advantage in the LIC environment. Commanders must consider how their plans contribute to initiatives that are also political, economic, and informational in nature. Unity of effort requires interagency integration and coordination to permit effective action within the framework of the US government.

Adaptability is the skill and willingness to change or modify existing structures and methods to accommodate different situations (for example, tactics, techniques, procedures, training, and leadership). It requires careful mission analysis, comprehensive intelligence, and regional expertise. Adaptability is more than tailoring or flexibility, which imply the use of standard techniques or structures for a variety of cases. Successful operations in a LIC environment will require the armed forces to adapt existing methods and to develop new ones appropriate to each situation.

Legitimacy is the willing acceptance by a people of the right of their government to govern or of a group or agency to make and enforce decisions. It also includes acceptance of the presence and actions of representatives of US government agencies (to include military forces) in a country. Legitimacy is not tangible nor easily quantifiable. Popular votes do not always confer or reflect real legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from the perception that authority is genuine and effective and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. No group or force can decree legitimacy for itself, but it can create and sustain legitimacy by its actions. Legitimacy is the central concern of all parties directly involved in a conflict.

Perseverance is the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives. Low intensity conflicts rarely have a clear beginning or end marked by decisive actions culminating in victory. By their nature, they are protracted struggles. Even those short, sharp contingency encounters which do occur must be assessed in the context of their contribution to long-term objectives. Perseverance does not preclude taking decisive action. In fact, it requires every effort to gain and maintain social, economic, political, and military initiatives. Perseverance is needed for both civilian and military leadership to reject limited, short-term goals.

Restricted use of force refers to the judicious, prudent, and thoughtful selection and employment of forces most suitable to the mission. Restricted use of force does not preclude the possibility of applying massive or overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The ROE in the LIC environment will usually be more restrictive, detailed, and subject to political scrutiny than during other types of conflict. As a result, this environment is often marked by constraints on weaponry, tacticts, and the level of violence. Excessive violence can adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-term and long-term goals.

All US operations within the LIC environment must be planned with due consideration for the people of the area in which the action is occurring. In countries where a representative government now exists, US operations must strengthen the image of the national and local governments in the eyes of the populace. This may not be the primary objective of any given operation, but it must be a secondary one. It is essential that the perception of the host government's strength and independence be reinforced.

A perception that the US is imposing its will in an area rather than cooperating with the nation's government is unacceptable. That perception will weaken that government and possibly worsen the conditions that caused the LIC environment. Operations conducted without regard for this aspect of LIC may meet with short-term success but will have a negative impact on the long-term interests of the US. As an example, take a friendly nation threatened by instability, unrest, or violence. Security assistance is one example of a military tool for this environment. US security assistance efforts should aid that nation's military in developing the capability to provide security for its citizens and government.

The US will employ combat operations in a LIC environment in exceptional circumstances when it cannot protect its national interests by other means. When a US response is called for, it must be according to the principles of international and domestic law. These principles affirm the inherent right of states to use force in individual or collective self-defense.

There are four broad categories of operations in the LIC environment. These are support for insurgency and counterinsurgency, combatting terrorism, peacekeeping operations (PKOs), and contingency operations (CONOPs). A US force operating in a LIC environment may be engaged in one or more of these operations at the same time. For example, a unit operating in the Middle East as part of a peacekeeping force may become the target of terrorist activities. Commanders must ensure that their planning covers the entire spectrum of the threat that they face. Detailed, accurate, and current intelligence is essential for maintaining an up-to-date threat analysis.

SUPPORT FOR INSURGENCIES AND COUNTERINSURGENCIES

An insurgency is an armed, organized political struggle. Its goals may be the seizure of power through revolutionary takeover and the replacement of an existing government. In other cases, an insurgency may only intend to extract limited political concessions that are deemed or considered unattainable through less violent means. For example, the objective of an insurgency may be to free an area from governmental control and establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or territorial boundaries. Insurgency and counterinsurgency are two aspects of the same process. Insurgency focuses on change in political control and requires the extensive use of covert instruments and methods. Counterinsurgency, on the other hand, uses mainly overt methods. It includes promises of orderly change within the existing system. Because of these differences, supporting doctrine varies for insurgency and counterinsurgency.

Since there is a political goal in all insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, political leadership is of paramount importance. Military power plays a supporting role. The leadership of the US may choose to assist in either countering or supporting an insurgency. This will depend on the aims of the insurgents. To effectively operate in this arena, US leaders must identify the root causes of an insurgency. They must then assess the current situation, estimate the insurgency's near-term course, and carry out measures to either support or thwart it. The better a decision maker understands the motivations of the contenders in an insurgency, the more likely he will be able to anticipate and influence their behavior. Whether the US government supports or opposes an insurgency, knowledge of the nature of the conflict and the cultural and geographic environment is essential for determining appropriate actions.

Insurgencies succeed by mobilizing human and material resources to provide both active and passive support to the insurgent movement. These resources provide skilled workers and willing fighters, raise money, and acquire weapons, intelligence, and supplies of all kinds. The mobilization of an insurgent movement may stem from a growing popular dissatisfaction with existing political, social, economic, ethnic, cultural, or religious conditions. The insurgent leadership broadcasts these dissatisfactions and attempts to place the blame for the grievances on the existing government. The insurgents attempt to convince the people that the government cannot or will not act to remedy the problems. At the same time, the insurgents may offer a program or proposal to improve conditions. A government's inability or unwillingness to exercise economic foresight, to recognize the magnitude of the people's grievances, and to effectively coordinate activities may inhibit social progress. This can increase the risk of insurgent exploitation.

An insurgency attempts to exploit actual or perceived governmental weaknesses, such as failure to maintain law and order, or overreaction to civil disturbances. Critical to the insurgent movement is the need to form a support base among the population, regardless of whether support is voluntary or provided by force or coercion. The key requirement for insurgents is to provide organizational and management skills to transform disaffected people into an effective political element. Insurgencies calling for the overthrow of the government incorporate a revolutionary doctrine and use armed force as an element of policy. The insurgents vie with the existing government for political legitimacy and the right to lead and represent the people.

Support to insurgencies (resistance movements) is termed a special activity within US regulatory and statutory guidelines. Although support to resistance movements can be conducted overtly or with low visibility, much of this support must be provided covertly. Such action may require the use of clandestine techniques. These include grey and black propaganda, secret funding, deception, paramilitary operations, and covert logistical networks. US armed forces will aid an insurgency as part of an interagency effort. Military support will primarily consist of training and advising insurgent forces in the tactics, techniques, and procedures of unconventional warfare (UW). In this context, UW is intended to be a protracted politico-military activity that seeks to weaken the control and legitimacy of the established government or occupying power. At the same time, it attempts to increase the control and legitimacy of the resistance movement.

The US supports HN counterinsurgency efforts based on the concept of internal defense and development (IDAD). This concept assumes a HN government is responsible for developing and executing programs to prevent or defeat subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency. The host government must identify the genuine grievances of its people and take political, economic, and social actions to redress them. Carefully planned and implemented and properly publicized development programs can serve the interests of population groups and deny exploitable issues to insurgents. IDAD is a strategy to prevent subversion, lawlessness, or insurgency and if such threats should develop, to combat them.

The US uses its military resources to provide support to an HN's counterinsurgency operations in the context of foreign internal defense (FID). FID is participation by US civilian and military agencies in another nation's action programs to free and protect that nation's society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. FID operations are US efforts to support a friendly government facing a threat to its internal stability and security. The US armed forces can provide resources such as material, advisors, and trainers to support HN counterinsurgency operations. The US may provide more direct forms of armed support when it is in the security interest of the US and the HN requests it.

All US FID resources must be coordinated with the country team in the US diplomatic mission. This is to ensure that only those resources appropriate to local conditions are employed to achieve HN IDAD goals. FID programs should enhance the capability of indigenous military and paramilitary forces to perform unilateral internal defense missions. Military civic-action programs are a subset of FID. These programs use predominantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels. They support such areas as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, health, and sanitation. The programs also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. This serves to increase the legitimacy of the government while alleviating some conditions that cause hardship and dissatisfaction among the people.

COMBATTING TERRORISM

The Department of Defense (DOD) defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. Terrorists' objectives may range from the advancement of separatist causes to gaining revenge for ethnic grievances to fundamental social and political revolution. Unstated objectives may include provoking over-reaction by their adversary or stimulating a response that acknowledges the terrorists' power and legitimacy. Their methods may be equally diverse, ranging from planting explosive devices in public places to carrying out kidnappings and assassinations. Other techniques include hijacking, arson, hoaxes, and armed attacks. Regardless of their approach, the goal of all terrorists is to impose their will on society by using violence to create an atmosphere of fear. Terrorists want people to feel defenseless and doubt their government's capacity to protect them. This in turn undermines the legitimacy of the government, its policies, or both.

The key feature that distinguishes terrorism from other forms of political violence is the willingness of terrorists to attack "innocent" targets. International law restrains the use of armed forces to minimize harm to noncombatants. The same laws apply to recognized insurgencies. The terrorist has no such restraints and often attacks people with no connection to his cause or issue. This is why terrorist acts are by definition illegal in conditions of peace, conflict, or war. This is also why, by committing illegal acts of violence, insurgents can become terrorists.

Terrorist groups are distinguished primarily by governmental affiliation. This helps security planners anticipate terrorists targets and their degree of sophistication in intelligence and weaponry. Terrorists are generally classified as nonstate-supported, state-supported, or state-directed. However, networking and mutual support make any categorization somewhat arbitrary. Nonstate-supported terrorist groups operate autonomously, receiving no significant support from any government. Italy's Red Brigades and the Basque Euskadi ta Askatasuna are examples of such nonstate-supported groups. State-supported terrorist groups generally operate independently but receive support from one or more governments. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is one example of this type of group. State-directed terrorist groups operate as an agent of a government. They receive intelligence, logistics, and operational support from that government. Libyan "hit teams" targeted against Libyan exiles are an example of state-directed terrorists. Terrorist events may be classified by their immediate objectives. Five types of terrorist objectives are--

• Recognition.

• Coercion.

• Intimidation.

• Provocation.

• Insurgency support.

National or international recognition of a cause may be the objective of a terrorist campaign at its outset. The reasons for seeking recognition may include attracting recruits, obtaining funds, or showing strength. Groups seeking this recognition use incidents that are likely to attract media attention. These include hijacking an aircraft, kidnapping prominent people, seizing occupied buildings, or hostage-barricade incidents.

Coercion is the attempt to force a desired behavior by persons, groups, or governments. This objective calls for a strategy of very selective targeting. It may rely on publicly announced bombings, destruction of property, and other acts that are less violent than taking human life.

Intimidation differs from coercion. Intimidation attempts to prevent persons or groups from acting. Terrorists may use intimidation to reduce the effectiveness of security forces by making them afraid to act. Intimidation can discourage competent citizens from seeking or accepting positions within the government. The threat of violence can also keep the general public from taking part in important political activities such as voting. As with coercion, terrorists use a strategy of selective targeting.

Provoking overreaction by government forces may be the objective of terrorist acts. This strategy calls for attacking targets symbolic of the government, such as the police, military, or other officials. Attacks of this type show vulnerability to terrorist acts and contribute to a loss of confidence in the government's ability to provide security. More importantly, if the security forces' response is heavy-handed, the resulting oppression can create public sympathy, passive acceptance, or active support for the terrorist group.

Terrorism in support of an insurgency is likely to include provocation, intimidation, coercion, and the quest for recognition. Terrorism can also aid an insurgency by causing the government to overextend itself in attempting to protect all possible targets. Other uses of terrorist skills in insurgencies include acquiring funds, coercing recruits, obtaining logistical support, and enforcing internal discipline. Use of these techniques must be weighed against the impact on attempts to gain popular support for the insurgency.

A terrorist organization may pursue one, some, or all of these objectives. The terrorist organization may establish its objectives and strategy, or the government supporting the terrorist organization may direct them. In either case, the military planner must identify these objectives and strategies to defeat the terrorist organization.

Terrorism can be international in scope and in some instances is aided and abetted by state sponsors. Therefore, the threat posed to US citizens and security interests abroad may require a US-armed-forces response. This response can occur in two ways: deterring acts of terrorism through active and passive measures (antiterrorism (AT)) or employing forces to directly combat terrorists (counterterrorism (CT)).

AT is the range of defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of persons and property to terrorism. The basics of AT include collecting and disseminating timely threat information, conducting terrorism awareness information programs, and using sound defensive measures. Because absolute protection against terrorist activities is not possible, protective plans and procedures are based on the threat. Protective measures should strike a reasonable balance between the protection desired, mission requirements, and available manpower and financial resources.

CT is the full range of offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. CT is based on extensive preparation and planning. CT operations normally require specially trained personnel capable of mounting swift and effective action. Response measures can include preemptive, retaliatory, and rescue operations. The type of forces and the command and control relations used in CT operations depend on the location, type of incident, and degree of force required. Force selection criteria are normally governed by legal and political restraints. In planning and conducting CT operations, it is essential that realistic and sensible ROE be prepared to minimize civilian and/or collateral damage. ROE may be developed by the NCA with the advice of their military and civilian advisors.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

PKOs are military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties in a conflict. The objective of PKOs is to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate diplomatic resolution of the conflict between the belligerents. The US may participate in PKOs sponsored by the United Nations (UN) or another organization, in cooperation with other countries, or unilaterally. US personnel may function as impartial observers, as part of an international peacekeeping force, or in a supervisory and assistance role. The operations may take many forms. Possible PKOs include supervision of--

• Cease-fires.

• Withdrawals and disengagements.

• Prisoner of war (POW) exchanges.

• Demilitarization and demobilization.

Peacekeeping often involves ambiguous situations requiring the peacekeeping force to deal with extreme tension and violence without becoming a participant. Peacekeeping operations follow diplomatic negotiations that establish the mandate for the peacekeeping force. The mandate describes the scope of PKOs in detail. It often states the size and type of force each participating nation will contribute. The mandate should clearly state the following:

• The terms or conditions the HN intends to impose on the presence of the force or mission.

• A clear statement of the rights and immunities of force or mission members under jurisdiction of the international agency.

• A clear statement of the functions the peacekeeping force is to perform.

Based on the mandate, diplomats will then establish stationing agreements with the advice of the commander concerned. These are often referred to as Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs). These agreements between the HNs, sponsor, and contributors will establish the detailed legal status of the force or mission. Based on the peacekeeping mandate and the stationing agreement, the specific terms of reference, follow-on command directives, and ROE are established. The terms of reference describe how the US will implement its portion of the PKO. They include the--

• Mission.

• Command relationships.

• Organization.

• Logistics support.

• Accounting procedures.

• Responsibilities of the US contingent to the peacekeeping force.

• Coordination and liaison arrangements.

They may also include public affairs procedures and any bilateral relationship with other national contingents, in addition to those described in the mandate.

PKOs generally have three levels (or tiers) of organization: the political council, the military peacekeeping command, and the military area command. The term "peacekeeping force" includes all three levels. The political council is the highest level of the peacekeeping organization. It provides a mechanism for negotiating and coordinating with leaders of disputing parties. Through negotiation, the council encourages self-sustaining solutions that are acceptable to disputing factions. The political council receives the mandate for the PKO and coordinates that status of forces with the belligerents. The chief of the peacekeeping force may be a member of the political council.

Overall control of peacekeeping forces exists at the military peacekeeping command level. Control and staffing at this level is normally multinational. The force commander exercises operational control of the combined forces, with command functions remaining within national channels. The military peacekeeping command rarely has the authority to negotiate political matters. The missions of the command include--

• Deterring violent acts by the disputants.

• Protecting vital installations and critical facilities.

• Informing the political council of peacekeeping force requirements.

• Collecting and providing information to the political council.

• Ensuring impartiality of peacekeeping forces.

The command issues directives and instructions concerning operations and procedures.

The operating level of the peacekeeping force is the military area command. The area command usually consists of forces from a single nation. It operates in a specific area of responsibility and reports to the military peacekeeping command. It may receive logistic support from the peacekeeping command or from its own national channels. The area command places distinctive markings on all uniforms and equipment to ensure that they are clearly identified as members of the peacekeeping force. The area command deters violent acts by its physical presence at locations prone to violence. It collects information through overt means such as observation posts, patrols, aerial reconnaissance, and conversations with local inhabitants.

The following eight principles are fundamental to PKOs. Some of them are discussed in the following paragraphs. For additional information on these principles and the other principles of peacekeeping, see Field Manual (FM) 100-20.

• Consent.

• Neutrality.

• Balance.

• Single manager control.

• Concurrent action.

• Unqualified sponsor support.

• Freedom of movement.

• Self-defense.

The degree of consent of all parties involved in a PKO has a major impact on its success. The disputing parties show their desire for this operation by their degree of consent. Nations participating in the peacekeeping force must do so without reservation or restriction. They must fully consent to PKOs, whether out of self-interest or for purely humanitarian reasons. Consent also applies to other interested states. They may support PKOs or at least refrain from impeding them.

Organizations or countries contributing to a PKO should give the peacekeeping force their full and unqualified support according to the terms of the mandate establishing the force. This support may be logistical, financial, or political. The contributing groups should permit the peacekeeping force to operate freely, within policy guidance, but without unnecessary interference.

The use of force in self-defense is essential to the concept of PKOs. Self-defense is an inherent right; it is the one principle that cannot be affected by consent. ROE describe circumstances and the manner in which peace keepers may use force to resist attempts to prevent them from doing their duties. ROE should be clearly and unambiguously stated in the mandate.

PKOs require commanders to position their units in potentially hostile environments. To be effective and maintain their security, the peacekeeping force must remain impartial. The commander should withdraw his force if conditions deteriorate and jeopardize the force's impartiality. Controlling violence in PKOs requires a combination of techniques. These include observing, patrolling, investigating complaints, negotiating, and mediating.

CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

CONOPs are politically sensitive military operations normally characterized by short-term, rapid projection or employment of forces in conditions short of war. They are often undertaken in crisis-avoidance or crisis-management situations requiring the use of military elements to enforce or support diplomatic and informational initiatives. CONOPs include but are not limited to the following missions:

• Disaster relief outside the US.

• Counterdrug operations.

• Security assistance surges.

• Noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).

• Rescue and recovery operations.

• Shows of force and demonstrations.

• Operations to restore order.

• Strikes and raids.

CONOPs involve tailored forces and are usually joint or combined in scope. Planners must establish clear command relationships and communications procedures because the lead organization varies according to the type of operation. Military forces employed in CONOPs will normally use service-specific tactical doctrine or joint tactics, techniques, and procedures to execute their mission. The forces employed will be chosen from designated contingency forces that have planned and trained to the required standard necessary for the rapid and successful conduct of the operation.

The three principles critical to CONOPs are coordination, balance, and planning for uncertainty. Coordination is essential for success due to the nature of the forces involved and the fact that the operations are being conducted to support political aims. Coordination must occur among the forces that will actually execute the operation and between military leaders and the lead and supporting federal agencies involved.

A balance must be struck between overriding political goals and the scale, intensity, and nature of military operations supporting those goals. A unit commander must provide for the security of his force within the constraints of the ROE and the political sensitivity of the situation. The commander requires clearly stated objectives and operational parameters to balance his security needs with national policies.

Situations filled with uncertainty require detailed but flexible planning that incorporates the principles of coordination and balance. This requires a full awareness of the political and social realities of the area in dispute. In preparing for CONOPs, operational-, logistical-, engineer-, and intelligence-support planning must be comprehensive.

CONOPs have a strong psychological impact on the attitudes and behavior of domestic and foreign audiences. The operations must be planned with this in mind. As an example, attacks on terrorist sanctuaries and shows of force show US resolve to isolate and/or punish violations of international law and human rights. However, these operations must be planned and executed with consideration for their impact on public opinion as well as their direct impact on the people living in the area of operations. In this environment, a military operation must be militarily, politically, and informationally successful to achieve its overall goal.

For a more detailed explanation of responsibilities, relationships, and operations in the LIC environment, refer to FM 100-20.