Early planning for the buildup and operations in Vietnam had little more to go on than tentative indications of the number of maneuver battalions that might be deployed. There was no generally accepted tactical concept, campaign plan, or scheme of logistics support upon which effective engineer planning could be based. In fact, subsequent difficulties tended to confirm that there had been a remarkable lack of appreciation of the amount of engineer effort required to support deployments of the scale being considered in 1965. The myriad factors to be considered in planning for any one of the hundreds of engineer tasks to be performed made the planning process much more complex than most commanders, who were not engineers, realized. The essence of engineer planning for force-projection operations involves a series of evaluations, improvisations, and compromises which, when given proper attention, produce comprehensive and effective engineer support.

In the spring of 1965, American air, ground, and naval forces deployed to the Caribbean nation of the Dominican Republic to restore order in the violence-plagued nation. Ultimately, a multinational force was involved in efforts to stabilize the country and end the fighting between warring factions. The basic difficulty stemmed from the fact that the US was officially neutral, and its forces could not fire unless fired on by hostile factions. The primary objectives were to contain opposing forces and separate the two major warring Dominican factions.

The initial engineer effort, for both Marine and Army engineers, was to establish the force ashore. Soon, force protection became the major task. Marine engineers used more than 300,000 sandbags and 3,000 rolls of concertina for defensive emplacements and outposts. Army engineers used 36,000 sandbags, 1,500 rolls of concertina, field-expedient chevaux-de-frise of timber and wire, and 300 earth-filled 55-gallon drums for Army force protection. This ultimately included rewiring streetlights to illuminate outposts that were under constant harassing attacks.

Engineers then turned to LOC construction to ensure logistics support to the joint task force. Road movement was complicated by countless burned-out vehicles and destroyed barricades. LOC construction included converting a small sugar port to a logistics port for landing ship tanks (LSTs). Navy and Army engineers built a floating POL discharge point to provide POL for the peacekeepers and to sustain power generation for the country. Army engineers even reopened the local incinerator and organized indigenous work parties to clean up the trash in their section as a health and welfare measure. In addition, engineers had provided more than 1 million gallons of water by the end of the first month of operations.