This appendix describes how the ADA sensor supports FAAD units during combat operations,. It covers the light and special divisions interim sensor (LSDIS) that will be fielded with all FAAD units in support of light infantry units. The mission of the supported unit is a prime factor influencing ADA employment. However, the basic mission of the ADA sensor in each employment is similar: provide time-sensitive radar alerting and tentative identification data for FAAD fire units and provide area radar coverage. This data is used to alert the air battle management operations center (ABMOC) of local air targets. It provides tentative aircraft identification. It also provides aircraft location so observers at the weapons can be cued to visually search a relatively small sector of airspace.
A sensor is a device that is used to detect and monitor aircraft, troops, and equipment. These devices provide information concerning locations and movements. They in turn alert and cue personnel and systems to potential targets. Sensors are typically of the following types:
- Optical.
- Infrared.
- Radar.
- Laser.
- Acoustical.
- Olfactory (chemical detection).
- Auditory.
ADA weapon systems, whether missile or gun, use sensors for the following:
- Early warning.
- Detection.
- Acquisition.
- Identification.
- Tracking.
- Surveillance.
Target information is obtained by sensors, surveillance and locating devices, and personnel. The effectiveness of countering an attack may depend on the accuracy and timeliness of this information.
EW equipment may be integrated with weapon systems. EW is provided to operation centers and to the ADA fire units. EW is the use of sensors (human or electronic) to perform the function of providing sufficient warning of a threat attack to tactical units.
Detection is discovering the existence of aircraft, troops, or equipment. This discovery permits alerting and cueing of friendly forces to the presence and location
of potentially hostile forces. Enemy locations, for example, C2 facilities, radars, and enemy weapon positions, can be accurately determined by the following:
- Electronic direction-finding equipment.
- Weapons-locating radars.
- Moving target-locating radars.
- Laser range finders and designators.
- Laser target acquisition devices.
- Infrared sensors.
Refer to FMs 6-121 and 6-30 (Appendix C) for additional information.
Acquisition is the gaining of information concerning forces, both friendly and hostile, and their actions. The means of acquisition varies with each ADA system.
Identification of potentially hostile targets is accomplished using visual, electronic, oral, or printing devices. Identification procedures are critical to prevent fratricide. Identification, friend or foe (IFF) interrogators are used to electronically challenge aircraft transponders to determine whether aircraft are friend or unknown. Certain ADA systems use visual identification as a backup or double verification of an aircraft status.
The capability to track aircraft using a sensor(s) is accomplished either manually or automatically. Tracking an aircraft can involve slewing, moving the sensor, or being stationary to cover a designated area.
Surveillance is the watching of someone or something by using devices or humans to monitor and report on actions or operations. Surveillance is either active or passive and employs techniques proven over time to be effective to gather information concerning overt and covert operations. Surveillance sensors provide information on activities. The information gathered is used to aid in planning, target designation, alerting, and cueing.
LSDIS provides ADA battalions with a sensor device meeting all-weather surveillance and detection requirements. LSDIS is the interim FAAD sensor for all light infantry ADA units. LSDIS is a lightweight, man-portable, rugged, EW sensor that provides FAAD units with cueing, alerting, and other EW information. LSDIS capabilities are as follows:
- Detects one square meter targets out to a range of 20 kilometers and from 0 to 3,000 meters above ground level.
- All weather.
- FAAD C3I/IFF compatible.
- Acquires high-speed maneuvering FW aircraft.
- Acquires hovering and pop-up helicopters up to 8 kilometers.
- Provides azimuth and range resolutions of 8 degrees or less and 1,500 meters or less, respectively.
- Provides visual display of target location in azimuth and range.
- Uses military power sources to include organic vehicle power sources.
- Two-man emplacement or march order.
- Operable by one man.
- Airdroppable or parachutable and transportable by medium helicopters and HMMWVs. The LSDIS platoon will be assigned to the headquarters and headquarters battery (HHB) of the FAAD battalion. The platoon will have six LSDIS for deployment. The LSDIS section consists of three crew members: a section chief, a sensor operator, and an operator/driver. The current employment concept requires that the LSDIS be transported by the HMMWV.
A platoon of six sensor sections is organic to the FAAD battalion. These sections are deployed in support of the Bradley Stinger Fighting Vehicle (BSFV), Chaparral, Avenger, and Stinger fire units to provide EW and assist the engagement process.
The ADA battalion S2 develops the reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan as part of the division R&S plan. The S3 and S2 determine the best positions for sensor employment per the IPB to cover NAIs and TAIs. The S3 controls the sensors to cover NAIs and the S2 has staff responsibility for integrating the use of the battalion's organic sensors into the division R&S plan. He coordinates with the ADA battalion S2 in the development of the battalion's R&S plan. The S3 prioritizes sensor employment and coordinates for the usage of terrain. The R&S plan is modified as the tactical situation dictates. The plan includes specific guidance for the deployment and operation of the sensors as well as organic weapon system sensors. Battery commanders, having two sensors allocated to their unit for support, have use of and positioning authority over those sensors under the guidance provided by the battalion R&S plan. Close coordination between battery commanders and the battalion S3 is required to ensure that overall sensor coverage is obtained.
Sensors are normally deployed under ADA battalion control to provide coordinated area coverage per the battalion R&S plan. However, sensors may be attached to or placed under the operational control of a firing battery commander to better fit or support the maneuver scheme. When employed in this manner, at least two sensors should be allocated to a battery. This will afford a continuous coverage capability. One of the sensors can remain in position while the other displaces (METT-T dependent). The ADA battalion commander must consider certain deployment factors to determine which method to use. These factors include, but are not limited to--
- Deployment of supported forces.
- Deployment of fire units.
- The enemy threat, both air and ground.
- Terrain: level, hills, valleys, water, et cetera.
- Electronic warfare environment.
The methods of employment are as follows:
- Method A. The sensor sections are deployed by the sensor platoon leader with staff supervision exercised by the ADA battalion S2 per the DST and DSM. The S3 coordinates the selected map positions with the division A2C2 cell. In this method, the platoon leader retains control of the sections.
- Method B. Two sensor sections are allocated to each firing battery. The firing battery recommends sensor positions to the ABMCC OIC. The S3 coordinates these positions with the ADA battalion S2 and division A2C2 cell. The S3 recommends approval or changes them, and forwards the approved positions to the firing battery commander.
- Method C. Two sensor sections could be attached to a firing battery, as in Method B. The rest of the sensor sections remain under the sensor platoon leader as in Method A.
Other variations are also possible (METT-T dependent).
The six sensors organic to the FAAD battalion are employed to provide data to ADA fire units in the battalion. This is accomplished by providing coverage of the low-altitude approaches to the division with priority to the front, followed by the flank and rear areas. The most forward sensors are placed close to the FEBA (within 2 to 5 kilometers) to provide timely early warning information. These forward sensors should be emplaced to receive protection from observation by use of light foliage, camouflage, and cover. Displacement, coordinated with the controlling authority, may be used to enhance survivability of the sensors, particularly those deployed well forward. The six sensors are not enough to provide coverage to an entire division area. The ADA battalion S2 must carefully integrate the sensors into the division R&S plan according to the DST and DSM and the aerial portion of the IPB. He should concentrate on covering critical NAIs, TAIs, and AAAs. Sensors should be employed no more than 10 to 15 kilometers apart. This will provide mutual support and overlapping coverage and will minimize no observation zones (dead spaces) caused by terrain masking. See the illustration on page G-4. Sensors are displaced to provide continual coverage of tactical operations. They also displace
on the initiative of the section chief when the receipt of direct or indirect fire indicates imminent destruction. The sensors will transmit according to the R&S plan. Blinking is not necessary unless the sensors are in position over 30 minutes (METT-T dependent). When sensors are employed in pairs (encouraged) they are emplaced not less than 2 kilometers apart to reduce interference to each other. This also increases the difficulty of locating them by enemy direction finders. See the Sensor Employment by Pairs illustration. Position selection for the sensor sections is critical to the timely transmission of EW information to the fire units. Equally important is EW coverage of the defended area. Final selection of positions for each sensor must be coordinated with the battalion S3. Positions selected must provide coverage throughout the area in which the weapons are employed. Sensor sections will--
- Pass alert data to the ABMOC in time for effective reaction by fire units to the air threat. To meet this requirement, radar coverage should extend beyond the unit positions at least 10 kilometers in the expected direction of air attack.
- Provide continuous alert warning. Move to support operations.
- Position not more than 10 to 15 kilometers apart for mutual radar coverage.
- Provide security from small arms and automatic weapons fire. When possible, the most forward radars should be employed in secure areas no closer than 2 to 5 kilometers to the FEBA or line of contact.
Sensor positions must provide alerting data in time to ensure effective reaction to the air threat. This requirement is met by ensuring that sensor coverage extends beyond the fire unit's position in the expected direction of attack. Individual section sites are chosen to obtain maximum low-altitude radar coverage of a designated area. Sites are also selected to provide radio line of sight (LOS) to the ABMOC and the maximum number of in-range fire units. Since the sensor will be an attractive target for air attack, consideration should be given to collocating the sensor with a fire unit, whenever position and mission requirements permit. Whenever possible, it should be located within the defense perimeter of ground security forces.
ADA missiles, automatic weapons, and radar units are lucrative targets for ground and air attack and usually are employed in secured areas. ADA survivability against enemy air and ground attack can often be improved by locating weapons and sensors as deep in friendly territory as possible. The location must provide the ability to perform the assigned mission without degradation.
Actions to improve battlefield survival include--
- Selecting a position that is hidden from enemy ground observation.
- Moving during darkness.
- Taking advantage of terrain to provide cover and concealment for the radar.
- Blending equipment into natural background.
- Erasing or covering tracks.
- Keeping positions litter-free.
- Enforcing noise and light discipline.
- Maintaining radio silence when possible; continuously practicing communications security.
- Exercising emission control orders (EMCONs) (for example, limiting number of operating radars and frequency management).
- Using camouflage netting, pattern painting, and natural material to camouflage the position.
One of the best ways to keep the enemy confused concerning the location of a sensor is to move often. When changing positions, it is not necessary to move a great distance. A move of 500 meters may be enough. Alternate positions are selected within a short distance from the primary position and occupied as required. The move should be as rapid as possible so that the section is again ready to detect enemy targets. Things to consider in regard to movement are--
- Move often to keep the enemy from targeting the position.
- Move a short distance.
- Move at night or when visibility is limited.
- Move quickly--get back in operation.
Consider moving after recent air reconnaissance of the area, the position has been fired upon, or when the system has radiated from the same location, continuously or intermittently, for two hours or more.
Use of field fortifications reduces damage to materiel and injury to section members when, despite other countersuppression measures, enemy forces locate and attack a sensor site. Two restrictions make it difficult for the section to construct adequate fortifications. One is the limited number of personnel to do the work. The other is the comparatively short time the section usually remains in the position. However, sections fortify each position to the extent possible. Fortifications are started as soon as practical upon arrival in a new position.
To make fortifications easier, select positions that are out of sight of enemy ground observation (for example, the reverse slope of a hill rather than its crest). The same barrier to enemy observation also provides a barrier to enemy direct fires. A patch of woods can provide concealment. Camouflage prevents pointing out the position. Field fortifications should complement camouflage, not degrade it. Look for areas that provide natural protection. Terrain irregularities (such as defilades or mounds) provide initial fortifications. These can easily be completed with sandbags or other fortifying materials. Engineer assistance may be available to aid in construction of protective positions and employment of camouflage and decoys. See the following illustration.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
