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CHAPTER 3

FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS

This chapter discusses the role of the BSFV platoon as part of the collection of forward area air defense weapon systems in force-projection operations. Air defense in force-projection operations will be a joint task. The Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps air elements will primarily counter threat fixed-wing assets while the Army and Marine Corps ground air defense units will counter the UAV, cruise missile, tactical ballistic missile, and rotary-wing threat. It discusses techniques and special planning considerations needed to support the maneuver force during force-projection operations. The focus is on how to counter and defeat enemy aerial platforms from early entry through postconflict activities. It includes discussion on echelons above platoon level so that BSFV platoon leaders can understand their role in the overall operation.

OVERVIEW

In general, FAAD doctrine for force-projection operations may be applied to both contingency and mature theaters of operations in which a force must operate without US base support, and in which the threat is capable of attacking any point in the area of operations (AO). The stages of force projection include mobilization (if necessary), predeployment activities, deployment, entry operations (which include expansion and buildup operations), postconflict or postcrisis operations, redeployment, and demobilization. This chapter will primarily concentrate on the stages of early entry through postconflict operations.

FAAD'S ROLE IN FORCE-PROJECTION OPERATIONS

The overall focus for forward area air defense is to protect the force from low-altitude aerial threats during force-projection operations. FAAD systems accomplish this by denying enemy intelligence gathering efforts through counter-RISTA, reducing the enemy's aerial combat power, allowing the force freedom of maneuver, and protecting the forces' critical assets. Each FAAD system plays a specific role. The BSFV provides freedom of maneuver to heavy forces, thereby providing the ground force commander with the opportunity to seize the initiative and achieve rapid, decisive victory. Stinger teams are essential for light and special forces and they enhance force protection for heavy forces. Also, the BSFV will assist in the counter-RISTA effort. They provide the flexibility and versatility needed on a fluid battlefield by augmenting the coverage of other FAAD systems. FAAD C³I allows for more effective air defense synchronization by providing detection and tracking data, early warning, and situational awareness as well as reducing the potential for fratricide.

CONTENTS

Overview

FAAD's Role in Force-Projection Operations

Low-Altitude Aerial Threat

Command and Control

Warfighting Overview

LOW-ALTITUDE AERIAL THREAT

The primary aerial threats that must be countered by FAAD systems are unmanned aerodynamic vehicles (UAVs), cruise missiles (CMs), and rotary-wing (RW) and fixed-wing (FW) aircraft. Key characteristics of these priority threats are summarized below.

UNMANNED AERODYNAMIC VEHICLES

UAVs include both drones and remotely piloted vehicles. They are inexpensive, easily procured or manufactured, and versatile. There are over 100 UAV programs being pursued by at least 30 countries. Their small radar cross sections make them very difficult to detect and track. Payloads may consist of radar seekers, high-explosive warheads, forward-looking infrared (FLIR) cameras, laser designators, TV thermal imaging devices, chaff, decoy, and electronic attack capabilities. Ranges vary from 25 to 800 kilometers, and the upper limit of flight endurance reaches 72 hours. They perform a wide variety of missions including RISTA, suppression of enemy air defense, ground attack, decoy, communications relay, and chemical detection. The RISTA mission, which uses UAVs to locate maneuver forces and key assets with the ability to pass real-time information back to threat long-range attack systems, is the greatest near-term concern for forward area air defenders and the force commander.

CRUISE MISSILE

Cruise missiles are considered the most stressing threat because of the difficulty in detecting them at launch, in flight, and in destroying them at extended ranges. Their ranges vary from 10 to 400 kilometers. They can be packaged with a variety of payload options. They may be ground, air, or sea launched. CMs with their increasing accuracies and warhead diversity make a potent threat.

ROTARY-WING AIRCRAFT

Rotary-wing versatility and survivability make them ideal for logistics resupply, air assault, command and control, and heavily armed weapons platforms for attack roles. RW aircraft currently exist in every potential theater US forces may enter.

Many countries around the world possess dedicated attack helicopters. Armed with standoff antitank guided missiles, helicopters can inflict heavy casualties on the force and destroy critical assets. The proliferation of helicopters is also of concern. Utility helicopters, combined with standoff munitions and state-of-the-art target acquisition technology, can produce less expensive, robust helicopter capabilities for any country.

FIXED-WING AIRCRAFT

Although other threats have taken the place of fixed-wing aircraft as the principal air threat to ground forces, the following types of fixed-wing aircraft may be employed by the enemy against friendly forces: bombers, fighter-bombers, fighters, and close air support aircraft. Any of the fixed-wing family may carry tactical air-to-surface missiles (TASM), while only the larger ones will carry cruise missiles. Improvements to fixed-wing aircraft will include increased survivability and improved fire control accuracy.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Air defense operations will be planned and controlled by an area air defense commander (AADC) designated by the joint task force or theater commander. The AADC establishes theaterwide rules of engagement (ROE). All forces will receive air defense warnings and weapon control status from the joint force air component commander (JFACC).

Platoon leaders must be aware of the unique and complex traits of the coordination effort required in projection operations. The constrained and structured environment adds pressure to all leaders. It is not likely that all forces employed in the JTF have trained and worked together. This demands that each person be oriented and motivated to accomplish the mission because without this, the possibility of fratricide increases. The platoon leader must also balance the physical security of forces between the mission and restrictive rules of engagement. This may be hard to do because the political concerns used to develop the ROE may conflict with the physical security needs of the force. Additionally, the ROE are sometimes established late, requiring flexibility on the part of air defenders at all levels.

WARFIGHTING OVERVIEW

A joint force entry operation may begin by forces deploying from CONUS and other locations via air and sealift for ports of debarkation contained within or near the area(s) of operation. Upon debarkation, the forces are marshaled into staging areas to prepare for future operations or further movements. Whenever possible, US forces will seek unopposed entry. Deploying forces are most vulnerable and the success of the operation is at greatest risk during initial entry operations, especially forced entry operations. Aerial ports and seaports of debarkation (APODs/SPODs), as well as staging areas, will be lucrative targets for threat aerial platforms. Throughout this stage, enemy UAVs conducting RISTA missions can reveal details about arriving forces and provide targeting information to long-range attack systems.

Early deployment of FAAD assets is crucial to the success of entry operations. The FAAD mission during this stage focuses on denying enemy RISTA efforts. FAAD weapon systems and FAAD C³I should be deployed with the earliest airlifts to ensure composite defense against the threat spectrum. The BSFV will provide force protection and assist in the counter RISTA effort while FAAD C³I furnishes requisite early warning of threat aerial platforms. In addition to integrating with other Army air defense artillery systems, FAAD elements integrate their weapon and sensor coverages with deployed joint and combined arms defenses.

Protection of forces and equipment in this stage requires FAAD systems to be positioned with coverage at least contiguous and perhaps overlapping, depending on the factors of air intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), METT-T and asset criticality. Positioning based on an in-depth IPB will provide for defense against threat aerial platforms. See the following illustration.

Expansion and buildup operations set the conditions for victory. Buildup in combat power and supporting forces and equipment occurs during this phase of entry operations. Expansion of the force and rapid buildup may include--

• Establishing forward operating and logistics bases.
• Expanding the lodgment.
• Closing the remainder of the force in country.
• Linking up with other forces.
• Preparing for future operations.

During this phase, units road march or maneuver to tactical assembly areas. These movements can be quite extensive, up to several hundred kilometers. Within the assembly areas, units are equipped and prepared to initiate decisive operations.

The BSFV platoon leader must be integrated in all phases of the operation to provide effective air defense protection against threat aerial platforms. At a minimum, when planning air defense protection, the BSFV platoon leader must consider the commander's intent and priorities, aerial IPB, supported force scheme of maneuver, and availability of assets. BSFV positioning during deployment to the tactical assembly area (TAA) is critical. Ultimately, the factors of METT-T will determine positions of BSFV squads. Nevertheless, BSFVs should be positioned forward and on the flanks of maneuver formations. The BSFV platoon must synchronize its movement so it does not mask fires of combined arms elements but optimizes observation and fields of fire on suspected air avenues of approach.

The threat will focus on locating unit movements, determining unit sizes and strengths, and postulating the ultimate destinations. The primary low-altitude threat platform during this stage is the RISTA UAV. Information obtained by UAVs will be relayed back to the enemy who will use any attack means necessary to inflict maximum casualties, inhibit momentum, and destroy forces. These attack means may include lethal UAVs, CMs, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. Unless FAAD systems counter threat RISTA efforts by denying detection and targeting, the enemy may disrupt the supported force commander's plan by inflicting significant casualties or preempting his actions. Denial of threat observation of force composition and routes of movement will require that the BSFV platoon and sensors be integrated in the supported force scheme of maneuver. See the following illustration.

Just prior to decisive operations, units will be positioned TAAs, completing their final preparations before launching the attack. BSFVs are positioned with their supported maneuver elements, prepared to execute decisive operations. Stinger teams augment air defense coverage. By countering the enemy's RISTA efforts throughout these initial stages, forward area air defense ensures that the supported force commander retains the element of surprise and the ability to mass forces at the place and time he chooses. See the FAAD Protection of TAAs (Expansion and Buildup Phase) illustration.

During decisive operations, maneuver forces deploy out of TAAs and into attack formations that ease movement and mass sufficient combat power to ensure decisive victory. Distances from TAAs to close combat areas can be extremely long with intermediate objectives designated along the routes. Numerous refuel and rearm points may be established along the way. During the deployment, Avenger and FAAD C³I screen along the flanks of the maneuver force and continue to deny threat RISTA efforts while protecting the movement. BSFV platoons deploy with their maneuver elements. Stingers augment air defense coverage of the maneuver force. See the FAAD in Decisive Operations (Deployment From TAAs).

The threat will attempt to counter the attack with a myriad of aerial weapons. RISTA UAVs will seek to determine friendly unit locations, movements, and objectives. Aerial and artillery strikes will be generated from the gathered intelligence against targets such as--

• The maneuver force.
• Forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).
• Aviation forward operating bases (FOBs).
• Command and control nodes.
• Reserve troop concentrations.
• Logistical support areas.
• Terrain features which could constrict unit movements (massed forces).

Lethal UAVs will be employed against maneuver forces as they advance toward and close with enemy forces. The lethal UAV's primary mission is to disrupt the tempo of the offensive by disabling and destroying armored vehicles and FAAD C³I elements. Cruise missiles will be targeted against logistical concentrations and command and control nodes. Rotary-wing aircraft will be used to attack the forward elements and the flanks of the advancing maneuver forces in order to slow their tempo, cause confusion, and inflict maximum casualties. They will also conduct cross-forward line of own troops (FLOT), close air support (CAS), and air insertion operations. These attack helicopters constitute the most widespread and capable air threats to ground forces in the close battle.

During this stage of force projection operations, the primary focus of FAAD shifts from counter-RISTA to force protection. The BSFV mission is paramount during the decisive operations stage. BSFV platoons will be in support of maneuver units. They will be primarily used to counter CAS threats such as rotary-wing aircraft and lethal UAVs. They should be integrated in the formation of the lead maneuver elements, positioned behind the lead vehicles of the lead company teams, and weighted toward the most likely air avenues of approach. Stingers augment air defense coverage of maneuver forces and provide flexible force protection to air defense commanders. Avengers will be deployed with the maneuver force to defend against rotary-wing aircraft and lethal UAVs and to counter enemy RISTA efforts. See the FAAD in Decisive Operations illustration.

At the close of the decisive battle, friendly forces may be required to prepare for follow-on operations. They must rearm, refuel, and reconstitute personnel and equipment. Friendly forces are extremely vulnerable while conducting these types of activities. They become lucrative targets for enemy long-range strike systems which are able to detect and target them based on information received from enemy RISTA UAVs. FAAD weapons, mainly Avengers, shield the force from the enemy reconnaissance and attack and ensure success of future operations.

While the most significant aerial attack capabilities may have been eliminated, friendly forces must be prepared to counter isolated air and missile attacks from any remaining threat forces. Avenger platoons will be primarily concerned with countering potential enemy RISTA efforts, thereby providing force security and preventing surprise attacks. These actions allow for unimpeded reconstitution and unharassed redeployment of forces.

During postconflict operations, friendly forces are marshalled into staging areas for follow-on operations or redeployment. Forces will either be redeployed to another theater of operation or back to CONUS.