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APPENDIX I

AIR INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

This appendix describes the air intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process as it applies to AD operations. The breakup of the former Soviet Union has caused the Army to shift its focus from the Soviet threat to regional threats. With the current lack of a single, well-defined threat to plan against, the IPB process will provide continuous input toward defining that threat. Developing templates will be more challenging and more critical in support of the IPB process.

PROCESS

FM 34-130 is the manual that explains the IPB process. IPB is the key for preparing for the next battle. The IPB process assists the commander and the intelligence staff in predicting where and when the enemy will surveil and attack and what assets will be used. The modern battlefield is viewed in three dimensions: width, depth, and airspace. Airspace, or the aerial dimension, is the most dynamic and fast-paced of the three dimensions. The intelligence staff must consider all the aspects of air operations and must he aware of the capabilities of all air threats to include UAVs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, TASMs, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The G2 and S2 have overall staff responsibility for IPB. The air defense artillery and aviation officers must provide input to the G2 and S2 when integrating air aspects into the IPB process.

The IPB process has four steps:

• Define the battlefield environment.
• Describe the battlefield's effects.
• Evaluate the threat.
• Determine threat courses of action.

Because IPB of the aerial dimension is conducted from a different perspective than that of ground IPB, the terrain and weather have correspondingly different effects on air and air defense operations. Enemy forces must be evaluated in relation to the effects that weather, terrain, and friendly operations will have on them. The most significant threats that must be evaluated for IPB are UAVs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, TASMs, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. IPB of the aerial dimension is an integral part of the IPB process at all levels as threat air operations may be tied directly to ground operations.

DEFINE THE BATTLEFIELD ENVIRONMENT

The battlefield includes aerial dimensions to an area of operations, battle space, and an area of interest. Because of the aerial dimension, each of these parts of the battlefield framework may be different from that of ground force operations.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

The air area of operations is the area where the commander is assigned responsibility and authority for military operations. It usually is, but does not necessarily need to be, identical to the ground area of operations in width and depth. It extends vertically up to the maximum altitude of friendly ADA systems.

BATTLE SPACE

Battle space is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It vanes in width, depth, and height as the commander positions and moves assets over time. Battle space is not assigned by a higher commander and can extend beyond the commander's area of operations.

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CONTENTS

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Process

Define the Battlefield Environment

Describe the Battlefield's Effects

Evaluate the Threat

Determine Threat Courses of Action

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AREA OF INTEREST

The area of interest is the geographic area and the airspace above it from which information and intelligence are required to facilitate planning or successful conduct of the commander's operation. Because the commander and staff need time to process information and to plan and synchronize operations, the commander's area of interest is generally larger than the area of operations or battle space. It is also larger due to the great distances that air and missile systems can rapidly cover. The air area of interest will extend vertically to cover the maximum service ceilings or trajectories of aircraft, UAVs, and missile systems. Horizontally, it will extend to cover the maximum range of aircraft, UAVs, and missiles plus threat airfields, forward arming and refueling points, navigation aids, and missile sites. The area of interest extends to the limits from which intelligence and information must be gathered about enemy forces which could affect friendly forces.

DESCRIBE THE BATTLEFIELD'S EFFECTS

The effects of terrain and weather on the enemy and friendly forces must be analyzed. They are different than the effects on ground operations.

TERRAIN ANALYSIS

Terrain analysis in support of air defense is significantly different from terrain analysis for ground operations. The nature of airspace dots not eliminate the need for terrain analysis because enemy air and friendly ADA will still attempt to use terrain to their own best advantage. IPB focuses on the impact of geographic factors on the ability of threat air to approach, acquire, and engage a target. Analysis of the terrain for IPB follows the same principles as ground analysis and uses the military aspects of terrain (OCOKA).

Observation and Fields of Fire

These aspects relate to the influence of terrain on reconnaissance and target acquisition. In the IPB context, observation relates to optical and electronic line of sight. Many battlefield systems require line of sight to effectively operate or acquire and engage targets. These systems include radios, radars, jammers, direct-fire weapons, and airborne and ground sensors as well as friendly ADA systems. Fields of fire relate to the terrain effects on weapon systems. Airspace must be analyzed with regard to routes which provide the best protection for air threats entering the target area, and those which provide the best fields of fire once they reach the target area.

Cover and Concealment (Masking)

Cover and concealment have slightly different applications with respect to air systems. The following tactics and techniques fall into the context of cover and concealment:

• Contour flying is flying a constant altitude above the surface of less than 22.8 meters (75 feet). This allows for maximum use of terrain masking.
• Pop-up tactics are the use of a low-altitude approach to the target area. Target acquisition and engagement is made by popping-up in altitude at a predetermined position or time to minimize exposure.
• Masking is using terrain to protect an air system from visual and electronic observation or detection. Electronic warfare supplements natural masking.
• Cover is using terrain to provide protection from direct-fire weapon systems.
• Ground clutter can be characterized as a reduction of electromagnetic signal-to-noise ratio due to the signature of a background. It is different for each type of terrain or feature.

Threat aircraft, cruise missiles, and possibly even UAVs will use contour flying, masking, and ground clutter to avoid detection and provide cover from direct fires. Aircraft will also use the terrain by loitering on reverse slopes, using pop-up tactics and ground clutter and vegetation as a backdrop to enhance concealment.

Obstacles

Obstacles are broken down into three primary types:

• Those which prevent the effective employment of ADA systems.
• Those which restrict contour flight.
• Those which force air threats to use a particular surveillance, attack profile, route, or to gain excessive altitude.

Of particular interest are obstacles and terrain which restrict lateral movement within an avenue of approach. This will canalize movement or restrict evasive action. Additionally, terrain may stop the employment of certain air threat systems if the terrain exceeds the system's maximum operating ceiling.

Key Terrain

Key terrain is any locality or area in which the seizure, retention, or control of it will afford a marked advantage to either combatant. In the aerial dimension, these consist of terrain features which canalize or constrain air threat systems and terrain with an elevation higher than the maximum ceiling of air threat systems. Additionally, areas that can be used for airfields, missile and UAV launch sites, landing and drop zones, or forward arming and refueling points also need to be considered as key terrain, since these areas could be used to support friendly or threat air operations. Terrain can be used as an aid to navigation. Man-made features are also used as cues to navigate to targets.

Air Avenues of Approach

Air avenues of approach are evaluated using the same criteria as for ground. A good air avenue of approach will permit maneuver while providing terrain masking from surface-to-air weapon systems. Some common air avenues of approach are valleys, direct lines from the enemy point of origin, and river beds. Factors which should be used to determine air avenues of approach, both ingress and egress, are the following:

• Type of air threat, attack profile, and ordnance.
• Air threat point of origin and ground control radar positions.
• Probable threat objective.
• Potential to support maneuver forces.
• Freedom to maneuver within the air avenue.
• Protection afforded to the air system and pilot.
• Air threat and pilot capabilities.

Type of air threat. UAVs are small and elusive. They usually fly low, and altitude can vary. Once in the target area, they may fly an orbit attempting to slay out of engagement range of ADA. Most surface-launched cruise missiles are terrain-following, and they use terrain- masking. Due to their range, they may take indirect approach routes. Ballistic missiles are not terrain-dependent. They fly a straight ground track from launch point to objective, and their flight is not restricted by terrain. TASMs usually fly direct routes from launch platform to the target. Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct contour flights. They follow ridge lines and military crests. Fixed-wing aircraft usually follow major terrain or man-made features. Depending on range, they may fly a straight line to the target. Ordnance or payload may affect range and altitude of the air system and thus influence the selection of avenues of approach.

Point of orgin. When determining air avenues, the staff looks at the commander's entire area of interest. Analysis begins at the threat airfield or UAV or missile launch site and works toward the probable enemy objective. This allows a look at the big picture. The staff considers the range of the air systems and location of navigation aids and ground control sites.

Probable threat objective. Each avenue of approach must end at a target or within reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, or target acquisition range of a target. Reverse IPB is used to pick threat objectives.

Potential to support maneuver forces. Air assets which are used to achieve ground objectives will seek to use air avenues of approach coincident with ground avenues of approach. Air assets attacking deep are not limited to these ground avenues. Missiles and RISTA UAVs are not limited by ground corridors.

Freedom to maneuver. Does the avenue--

• Canalize the air system?
• Have access to adjacent avenues?
• Provide the ability to acquire a target and use available munitions?
• Assist in navigation?

Protection for the air system and pilot. Does the avenue provide--

• Terrain masking (cover and concealment)?
• Full use of air system speed?
• Protection against radar detection?
• Protection from air defense weapon systems and tactical air support?

Air threat and pilot capabilities. Can the air system or pilot--

• Perform contour flying?
• Fly at night?
• Fly in all weather conditions?
• Range the targets?

WEATHER ANALYSIS

Air operations are especially susceptible to the effects of weather. Weather analysis for air and air defense operations considers the same factors as ground operations. These factors are as follows:

• Visibility has a significant impact on offensive air operations and RISTA. Visibility has the same effects on visually-directed ADA systems and sensors.
• High winds will hinder maneuver, close air support, and target engagement, especially in tight air avenues of approach. Missiles and UAVs will be adversely affected in performance and accuracy.
• Precipitation affects aircraft, missile, and UAV performance and reduces the effectiveness of sensors. Precipitation reduces ADA sensor range.
• Cloud cover and ceilings may restrict operations by setting low operational ceilings and restricting visibility and target engagement. Low ceilings, over-cast, and clouds may restrict visually-directed ADA weapons' detection and acquisition ranges.
• Extreme temperature and humidity have a severe effect on aircraft and UAVs by decreasing combat range, altitude (particularly rotary-wing aircraft), and ordnance loads.

EVALUATE THE THREAT

Threat evaluation for air operations consists of a detailed study of enemy air capabilities, organization, and doctrine. The following steps should be used when evaluating the threat:

• Collect and analyze doctrinal threat data.
• Analyze threat air capabilities.
• Conduct target evaluation.

COLLECT AND ANALYZE DOCTRINAL THREAT DATA

Typical questions include the commander's critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. Questions which should be answered during this step are listed below:

• What are the major strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of the enemy's air operations?
• Which objectives may be targeted for destruction or suppression?
• Where do friendly air defense assets fit into the enemy's objectives?
• Do they need to be destroyed or suppressed for the enemy plan to work? Answers to these two questions may result in modification to air avenues of approach.
• What is the enemy's air order of battle? How are the assets organized? Knowledge of threat organization and who has operational control will indicate the importance of the area of operations. For example, if the enemy's bombers are at theater level and are in the area of operations, then that area is probably receiving the theater's main attack. What is the size of his ballistic missile brigade, battalion, and battery? Does it fire as a unit? Does the threat have mobile, fixed, or both types of launchers?
• Who has tactical control of aircraft at the point of attack?
• How will UAVs be used, for example, battle damage assessment, attack, or RISTA? What are the associated profiles?
• How does the enemy doctrinally attack? Will the enemy use airborne, air assault, or special operations forces in conjunction with an air or ground attack? What size are these forces and to what depth are they used? Will the enemy synchronize the air attack? Does the enemy have the capability to coordinate an air attack (possibly with varied air threat platforms that can overmatch friendly air defense capability)?
• What are air system combat ingress and egress speeds?
• Where are missile and UAV launch points? What are the likely targets? What are the range, endurance, and profile of these systems?
• What are the doctrinal distances for forward arming and refueling points? If the enemy's maximum range falls short of the area of operations, where is the enemy likely to stop and refuel, or be aerially refuelled?
• What is the enemy's capability to coordinate air-to-ground attacks?
• How and where will the enemy attack ground targets for interdiction?
• What is the enemy's capability to coordinate air and artillery operations? Are ground forward air controllers used?
• What are the enemy's capabilities for suppression of friendly air defense?
• At what altitude will the enemy approach the target, deliver munitions, and exit the target area?
• What is the release authority of certain types of ordnance? This is particularly important when dealing with NBC threats.
• How does the enemy employ reconnaissance assets?
• How has the enemy historically fought?

ANALYZE THREAT AIR CAPABILITIES

ADA units evaluate a broad range of order of battle data and threat capabilities. They also evaluate the answers to the following questions:

Aircraft

What are the capabilities of the air systems in terms of--

• Performance (speed, altitude, airfield restrictions, troop, and weapon load capacity).
• Endurance and range. Ingress and egress altitudes and speeds.
• Levels of combat readiness and sortie generation rate.
• Ability to conduct pop-up maneuvers? What is the standoff range?
• Target acquisition capability, night and adverse weather capability, and identification ranges.
• The standoff ranges for cruise and tactical air-to-surface missiles.
• Ordnance load (maximum weight, type, load mixture, and level of sophistication).
• Combat personnel load. Navigational capability (type of radar; can it fly at night or in adverse conditions?).
• Combat radius (with or without external tanks, ordnance, and location of staging bases).
• Loiter time (how long will it have on station over the target area?).
• What is the countermeasures environment? For example, will standoff jammers, ground-based jammers, reconnaissance or chaff-laying UAVs, or aircraft degrade friendly air defense systems?
• What type, quantity, and quality of training has the pilot received? How much does he conform to doctrine?
• Can pilots fly at night or perform contour flying? During peacetime, did the pilot conduct the type of mission expected to be conducted during war?
• What are the types and capabilities of threat ordnance? Each type of ordnance should be evaluated for--

••Range: assume engagement at maximum range and two-thirds maximum range. What is the accuracy?
••Release altitude how high or low must the aircraft fly?
••Reload and refire time. What is the number of missiles available?
••Warhead type: for example, mass casualty, conventional, and submunitions. What is the release altitude?
••Guidance modes: how does the pilot acquire and engage?

Unmanned Aerodynamic Vehicles

What are the capabilities of threat UAVs in terms of--

• Performance (speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)?
• Endurance and range?
• Contour flying or terrain-limiting factors?
• Target acquisition and standoff range?
• Sensor package and payload (maximum weight, type, and load mixture)?
• Loiter time (how long can the UAV stay on station)?
• Visibility affecting acquisition?
• Modes of recovery and turnaround time?
• Their systems having a real-time data-link capability?
• Guidance modes (ground controlled and preprogrammed)?
• Crew proficiency?

Tactical Ballistic Missiles

What are the capabilities of threat TBM systems in terms of--

• Performance (flight time, speed, trajectory, launch restrictions)?
• Maximum and minimum ranges?
• Circular error of probability?
• Crew proficiency?
• Reload and refire time? Number of TBMs available per transporter erector launcher?
• Warhead type and size?
• Guidance modes?
• Location of presurveyed launch sites?

Cruise Missiles

What are the capabilities of threat cruise missiles in terms of--

• Performance (flight time, speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)?
• Maximum and minimum ranges?
• Circular error of probability?
• Targeting capabilities and type?
• Contour flying capability?
• Vulnerability to countermeasures?
• Guidance modes?
• Warhead type and size?

CONDUCT TARGET VALUE EVALUATION

This should determine what targets are to be labeled as high-value targets. High-value targets are assets the enemy or friendly commander has deemed as important for the successful accomplishment of his mission. High-value targets are determined by operational necessity and weapon system capability.

DETERMINE THREAT COURSES OF ACTION

Determining air threat courses of action, as with ground, relates the enemy's offensive air, air defense, and airborne and air assault doctrines with the effects of weather and terrain to determine how the enemy will employ assets. This is accomplished through the development of the situation, event, and decision sup-port templates. The process of developing these templates is covered in FM 34-130.

SITUATION TEMPLATE

The situation template integrates air attack and surveillance profiles with terrain. It focuses on specific air avenues of approach and mobility corridors to determine which avenues are the most capable of supporting specific attack techniques, and profiles. It also determines the most direct routes to landing and drop zones to protect and ensure the survivability of air threat systems.

EVENT TEMPLATE

The event template depicts named areas of interest (NAIs) where the commander expects to see certain activities of tactical significance and is used to confirm or deny an enemy course of action. These NAIs are based on the terrain constraints on air approach routes to potential targets and analysis of the enemy's attack and RISTA profiles. Examples of NAIs include landing and drop zones forward arming and refueling points; forward staging areas; aerial choke points; and TBM, cruise missile, and UAV launch points.

DECISION SUPPORT TEMPLATE

The decision support template is based on the event template and should depict--

• Air avenues of approach.
• Airborne and air assault objectives.
• Landing and drop zones and largest size enemy element which could be employed at the zone.
• Ranges of enemy systems.
• Ranges of friendly air defense systems.
• Target areas of interest (TAIs).
• Decision points (DPs).

Air TMs and DPs are determined in the same manner as for ground operations. However, due to the high speeds of air systems, decision points must be placed significantly farther in advance of the TAIs.

In conclusion, IPB in support of air defense operations is a quantified, step-by-step process that examines enemy air and ground activity and identifies gaps in available intelligence holdings. This process will allow the commander and staff to direct collection assets and request collection from other sources to enable them to visualize the battlefield and identify and understand the enemy's intentions. Preparation and continuous updates of aerial portions of IPB are fundamental to the execution of the air defense and land force missions on the modem battlefield.