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Chapter 6

Support Provided by Civil Affairs Forces

CA forces enhance the relationship of the military command with the civilian populace. They assist commanders in working with civil authorities and in controlling the populace in the operational area. Normally, treaties or other agreements address relationships with local authorities. In a friendly country or area, U.S. forces coordinate CA activities with local agencies or authorities when possible. In occupied territory, a military commander may exercise executive, legislative, and judicial authority over the local area until a civilian government is established. To gain the cooperation of the populace, CA forces integrate PSYOP resources in civil information operations. These operations can begin before, during, or after military action.


6-1. The President of the United States, through the SecDef, establishes a theater of operations under a unified or specified command. The JCS provide guidance and directives to the theater commander. All unified commands have CMO staffs to advise and assist the CINC in the execution of his CMO program. They also participate in deliberate and crisis-action planning and, when required, deploy as a member of the Deployable Joint Force Augmentation Cell (DJFAC). Depending on the theater, the CMO staffs are in the Plans Directorate of a joint staff (J5), Operations Directorate of a joint staff (J3), or the theater SOC. CA planning teams from respective theater-aligned CACOMs augment these staffs.


6-2. TA CA plans support the CINC's assigned politico-military objectives that are consistent with international laws, treaties and agreements, and NCA guidance. The plan contains general instructions for relations with national, local, and military authorities. When operations extend into territories of more than one nation, several national plans may exist. Individuals or teams from the theater-aligned CACOM, CA brigade, or CA battalion provide augmentation to the TA CMO staff.


6-3. CA personnel provide CMO staff augmentation for joint or multinational HQ conducting CMO. U.S. military staff planning and coordination, as well as interagency activities, are the most likely mission support activities CA teams undertake in a joint or multinational environment. Because of the rank and experience of team members, CAP3Ts or CAPTs are best suited for conducting joint or multinational operations.


6-4. The TA in the communications zone (COMMZ) has two types of support organizations--the TAACOM/TSC and the functional commands. The TAACOM/TSC and its subordinate ASGs are area oriented with geographic responsibilities. The functional commands are mission oriented with no geographic boundary. CA support to TAACOM/TSC is provided by teams from the war-traced CA brigades.


6-5. Close coordination is essential between tactical planners and those planning CS and CSS. Because access to critical CS and CSS may decisively influence combat operations, planners must consider all factors impacting on the mission. To provide effective support, CMO planners must understand the mission of the supported force. They must anticipate needs, assess capabilities, and recommend CA activities that result in the most responsive support possible. The priority of CA activities also change with the phases of the operation. A great degree of flexibility and forward thinking are critical in ensuring the relevancy of CA activities to the supported command mission.


6-6. Task-organized teams from war-traced CA battalions support ASGs. CA teams help coordinate and integrate rear battle operations with civilian police, emergency service agencies, and local forces to ensure mutual protection and efficient use of resources.

6-7. CA support may be centralized or decentralized in the ASG. When employed in centralized support, CA teams respond directly to the ASG commander. In decentralized support, CA teams are attached to major subordinate units (MSUs) located within the ASG's AOR.


6-8. Although CA forces have participated in all major contingencies, the majority of their operations revolve around the significant CINC-initiated peacetime engagement programs in each theater. Some examples of these programs are--

  • African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).
  • Joint or combined exchange training (JCET).
  • JCS exercises.
  • Mobile training teams (MTTs).
  • Humanitarian assistance survey teams (HASTs).
  • Professional development programs (PDPs).
  • MATs.

6-9. These operations can be performed with or in support of a larger mission or exercise, but they frequently are performed unilaterally. In the former case, CA forces rely on their supported unit for logistics and administrative support. In the latter case, CA forces may have to support themselves in austere environments.


6-10. Effective CMO require close contact between the U.S. military and the DOS and other U.S. Government agencies. Because DOS formulates and implements foreign policy, it has a vested interest in CA activities. In CMO, the DOS has primary or joint responsibility with DOD for policy. Some examples are plans for handing off CMO to civilian control during the transition process and matters involving PSYOP, public affairs (PA), civil information, or other measures to influence the attitudes of the populace.


6-11. The list of IOs and NGOs in an AO may be extensive. Approximately 350 agencies capable of conducting some form of humanitarian relief operation are registered with the USAID. Commanders must consider the presence and capabilities of IOs and NGOs and, when appropriate, coordinate and cooperate with their efforts. Because many of these organizations may have been established in the AO in advance of the Army's presence, they may be a good source of information and knowledge.


6-12. CMO occur throughout the battlespace, including close, rear, and deep operations and across all levels of command. Commanders must expect to encounter civilians and have a plan to deal with them in any mission. Rear areas, for example, contain supplies, facilities, services, and labor resources U.S. commanders can use to support military operations. Combat operations in or near these areas can be disrupted by--

  • Uncontrolled and uncoordinated movement of civilians in the battlespace.
  • Hostile actions by the populace.
  • Failure to cooperate and coordinate with friendly forces.


6-13. Chaos created by combat restricts CA activities in close operations. In this phase of the operation, controlling DCs and securing FNS are crucial. CA teams support the warfighting commander by--

  • Coordinating the use of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance or medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.
  • Minimizing local populace interference with U.S. military operations.
  • Identifying the local resources, facilities, and support available for U.S. operations. NOTE: FNS is normally prearranged through negotiated agreements.
  • Providing liaison to local agencies, government organizations, NGOs, IOs, and civilian authorities.
  • Advising on cultural and moral considerations.


6-14. In rear areas, CA battalions attached to ASGs, COSCOMs, and division support commands provide area support within the AOs of their supported commands. A secure rear area supports expanded CA activities. The CA battalion supports the military mission by--

  • Providing liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities. NOTE: CA battalions can conduct CA activities that help civilian authorities organize effective police and emergency services.

  • Identifying the local resources, facilities, and support available for U.S. operations.
  • Coordinating the use of local resources, facilities, and support, such as civilian labor, transportation, communications, medical facilities, and miscellaneous services and supplies.
  • Coordinating the efforts of NGOs, IOs, and FN agencies to develop and implement plans for using local resources, as well as coordinating civil information programs.
  • Minimizing civilian interference with U.S. military operations by developing populace-control measures, such as civilian evacuation plans that do not interfere with military movement.
  • Advising the command on cultural and moral considerations.


6-15. CA teams are rarely deployed in denied or enemy-held areas. Deep combat operations focus on defeating or diminishing the follow-on combat threat. CA teams, however, focus on the area surrounding the battle area. The strategic CA objective is to influence, control, or develop the conditions for conducting future close operations. Through analysis of historical information and the current area assessment, CA functional specialists can--

  • Predict movement of civilians and establish procedures and processes to minimize their interference with military operations.
  • Estimate the availability of resources.
  • Prepare area studies and conduct area assessments of the assigned area, as required, to support the mission.
  • Provide information and plans to U.S. and other agencies on the political, economic, social, and cultural characteristics of the local populace in support of U.S. and FN goals.
  • Recommend theater policy for H/CA, civil assistance, and civil administration activities and missions.
  • Act as the focal point for cultural considerations.
  • Act as a link between civil authorities and U.S. or allied military forces at the national level.
  • Establish procedures and processes to coordinate FNS.
  • Provide technical expertise in all civil functions.
  • Provide information to the intelligence system.
  • Provide technical advice to subordinate CA elements supporting civil administration of friendly and recovered areas.
  • Establish civil administration of occupied territory.


6-16. CA support to the posthostility phase of the operation depends on the condition of the target country at the cessation of the conflict. The CMO staff continually monitors the condition of the FN throughout the operation and recommends functional skills required to support this critical phase. CA activities support conventional forces, SOF, U.S. Government agencies, and the FN civil administration in transitioning the power back to the local government. See Appendix E for specific transition planning and coordination activities.

6-17. Conflict termination marks the start of new challenges for CA forces. These may include encounters with the local populace as it responds to a new or significantly changed government and to a new way of life. Problems may involve the unrealized hopes and aspirations of the local populace, as well as the desires of local leaders to be recognized as the legitimate power.

6-18. Resistance forces, if any, also present unique challenges for the commander. The complete demobilization of the resistance force and the return of those forces to civilian pursuits should be the ultimate goal. Demobilization involves, among other things, the collection of weapons. The demobilization effort may be difficult unless the resistance force receives assurances of transition assistance jobs and proper resettlement. A good example of how CA personnel participated in this effort occurred in Cambodia when CA personnel helped the government repatriate Khmer Rouge defectors. CA personnel coordinated with the FN, IOs, and NGOs to locate jobs and to provide training. Posthostility operations can have a long-term impact on the civilian sector and U.S. national interests and can be the most challenging and most significant part of military operations.


6-19. Numerous NGOs exist in an AO. Many of them offer significant resources and assistance in the conduct of CMO. CA units should, therefore, seek opportunities to train and interact with those NGOs.

6-20. NGOs have inevitably been, and will likely remain, in the AO long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers. These organizations continue to play important roles in providing support to FNs in need. They provide HA to more than 250 million people annually, totaling between $9 and $10 billion each year--more than any single nation or international body, for example, the UN.

6-21. NGOs can respond quickly and effectively to crises, thereby reducing the military resources a commander must devote to the civilian population in the AO. Although differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, the short-term objective is frequently very similar--to reduce the suffering of the people. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. In the final analysis, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.

6-22. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief, to small, newly created organizations dedicated to a particular aspect of a crisis, such as clean water, shelter, and food distribution. The professionalism, capability, resources, and expertise vary greatly from one to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. The connection between NGOs and the DOD is currently ad hoc, with no specific statutory linkage. Although the focus remains grassroots and the connections informal, NGOs and the DOD are major participants in the interagency effort. The sheer number of lives they affect and the resources they provide enable the NGO community to wield extensive power within the interagency community. The UN and the U.S. Government often designate individual organizations to perform specific relief functions.

6-23. The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make NGOs valuable sources of information on local and regional governments and on civilian attitudes toward an operation. Although some organizations seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the use of military aircraft to move relief supplies to overseas destinations, others avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous operations. Their rationale may be a fear of compromising their neutral position with the local populace or be a suspicion that military forces intend to control, influence, or prevent their operations. Staff planners should consult these organizations, along with the FN government (if sovereign), to identify local issues and concerns.

For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses--manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity--that only the military can deploy.

Philip Johnston
President and Chief Executive Officer


6-24. The NCA may determine that tasking U.S. military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with NGOs is in the national interest. In such cases, closely coordinating the activities of all participants is mutually beneficial. The goal should be to create a climate of cooperation between NGOs and the military forces. Taskings to support NGOs, such as providing trucks to transport humanitarian supplies, are normally short term. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security are the capabilities most needed by the NGOs. In such missions, the role of the armed forces must be to enable--not to perform--NGO tasks. Consequently, U.S. military assistance is frequently the critical difference that enables the success of an operation.


6-25. The transition plan for postconflict operations prioritizes and plans for information requirements and required connectivity to support mission activities of the civil administration; CA activities, such as emergency services, HA, and PRC; and unified planning with DOS, NGOs, IOs, and HN officials and agencies. CA personnel are uniquely qualified to advise the commander on activities that reduce postconflict turmoil and stabilize the situation until international relief organizations or FN agencies assume control.

6-26. Postconflict operations require close coordination between CA forces and those conducting CMO to ensure consistent, accurate dissemination of information. Internal information programs aid the transition to redeployment and reconstitution by reducing rumors and uncertainty. Information operations transition planning addresses the smooth retrograde of assets from the theater of operations, while considering the possibility of renewed hostilities. Fixed communications and information infrastructure of the FN should replace tactical and mobile information assets as soon as possible. Part of this stage may include transition of operations to DOS, IOs, NGOs, the FN, or other agencies that represent nonmilitary options to support FN rebuilding. Planning begins at this point for support of the redeployment of friendly forces and continued reconstitution of assets destroyed in the conflict or retained by the FN.

6-27. Commanders continually struggle with the need for timely, accurate information on the AO, the enemy, or even the status of their own forces. They also seek to deny the enemy accurate or timely information on friendly dispositions or to deceive the enemy through misinformation to seize and sustain a comparable information advantage. Developments in information technology are revolutionizing the way nations, organizations, and people interact. For further information on transition activities, see Appendix E.


6-28. The commander and the PAO are the only official spokespersons for the command. All news media queries should be referred to the PAO. As an official spokesperson, the PAO can make sure the command speaks with one voice and that OPSEC is observed.

6-29. CA, PSYOP, and PA elements use many of the same communications media with essentially the same messages but to different audiences. CA and PSYOP personnel address local populations and enemy forces, respectively. PA personnel address national and international news media and U.S. forces.

6-30. Popular U.S. public support contributes to the success of CMO. This support is gained by allowing the news media access to soldiers and to unclassified information. PA personnel escort news media representatives whenever they are in the AO.

6-31. Uncoordinated public support for CMO missions is usually inappropriate, expensive, logistically difficult, time-consuming, and often not useful in humanitarian relief operations. Financial contributions to favorite NGOs are much more desirable and helpful.

6-32. CA and PSYOP personnel provide news and information to the local populace on the effects of combat operations. PA personnel provide U.S. and international news media representatives information on Army operations.

6-33. PA products are a valuable source of news and information to soldiers in the AO. The importance of coordinating CA efforts with PSYOP and PA activities cannot be overstressed. Information released through one of these channels is available to, and has an effect upon, all audiences. If information released to the HN populace by CA and PSYOP personnel conflicts with information released to U.S. soldiers through PA channels, the result may be a loss of credibility for all involved and a negation of any positive accomplishments.

6-34. PA operations include a mix of AC and RC PA assets in HQ elements of TOE units and in TOE PA units. Based on the desires of the commander and staff officers, PA personnel inform U.S. personnel of--

  • Essential information.
  • Domestic information on home station, family members, and general national and international news, sports, and entertainment.

6-35. PA personnel, like CA personnel, also provide the soldier information on FN geography and culture, changes of command, receipt of new equipment by friendly forces, OPSEC reminders, foreign language phrases, and similar information. This flow of information serves to--

  • Maintain the morale, motivation, and competence of the soldier.
  • Disrupt the damaging effect of rumors, often caused by conflicting information.
  • Assist PSYOP in countering enemy propaganda and disinformation campaigns directed against friendly troops.

6-36. PA support of CMO varies according to the number and composition of PA units available. In general, PA personnel and PA TOE unit capabilities include--

  • Providing the resources and manpower necessary to write, edit, and produce fact sheets and field newspapers covering news, sports, and features.
  • Providing media escorts, news briefings, and conference support to all command levels.
  • Providing print, photo, video, and audio products for PA releases.
  • Providing media representatives with print, photo, electronic, or audio and video products not constrained by treaty, policy, law, or OPSEC.
  • Accrediting media representatives and coordinating limited logistics support for accredited or registered media representatives in communications, billeting, dining, and transportation unavailable commercially.
  • Acting as a clearinghouse for print, photographic, audio, video, and electronic products generated by PA personnel.
  • Providing broadcasts from either fixed or organic mobile facilities.

6-37. The relationship between PA and CA is mutually beneficial. CA personnel and units support PA by--

  • Providing information to meet PA requirements.
  • Providing feedback on the positive effect PA materials released to the news media have on the local populace.
  • Coordinating print and broadcast materials with PA and PSYOP. NOTE: Radio broadcasts are an open medium listened to by FN civilians and by soldiers.


6-38. ARSOF perform various missions and collateral activities (Figure 6-1). ARSOF missions direct the way ARSOF are organized, equipped, and trained, while ARSOF collateral activities are the capabilities these forces can readily perform due to their primary missions.

Figure 6-1. ARSOF Missions and Collateral Activities

6-39. Successful CA activities depend on the support of the populace. Most U.S. military operations occur in a low-threat environment with the objective of winning popular support. CA units must, therefore, help other SOF to mobilize this support, keeping in mind the impact of the operation on the civilian populace. CA forces, as part of SOF, must remain politically attuned, regionally oriented, and linguistically capable of supporting SO.

6-40. The theater SOC integrates CA into joint SO activities. Task-organized CA teams (CAPT-Bs) may be attached to the theater SOC for a specific period of time to provide dedicated planning support. Additionally, the CA battalion (SO) is specially designed, equipped, and trained to support the SO community. For specific capabilities of this battalion, see Chapter 3 of this manual.


6-41. From the U.S. perspective, the intent of UW is to develop and sustain resistance organizations. In that regard, UW synchronizes the operations of those organizations to further U.S. national security objectives.

CA Role in Unconventional Warfare

6-42. The SF group or battalion S5 exercises staff control over attached CA elements. CA units support SF units in the conduct of UW. They provide advice and assistance relating to social, economic, and political considerations within the joint special operations area (JSOA). Although the nature of UW normally limits the use of supporting CA units outside the JSOA, certain CA personnel may accompany deploying SF units, depending on mission requirements. The most important role of CA in UW is to support a swift transition of power from resistance forces to the legitimate government upon cessation of hostilities.

6-43. CA personnel support SF units with timely advice on the impact of proposed operations on the local populace within the JSOA. They also advise SF units on the development of resistance organizations and the expansion of the JSOA in gaining and keeping popular support. Consequently, CMO planners at the strategic level must have the political knowledge to support the planning and conduct of resistance operations.

6-44. CA teams also advise and assist SO commanders in the operation of DC camps, as needed. These camps can serve as recruiting and training bases for UW operations. The actual operation of these camps, however, is resource intensive and implies a commitment of resources from conventional forces and NGOs.

Planning for the JSOA

6-45. The success of UW operations depends on many factors, primarily the support of the civilian populace. Without active popular support, the UW mission will fail. Planners must, therefore, consider the steps necessary to mobilize the populace to support the resistance. They must also consider the physical and psychological impact of resistance or U.S. unilateral operations on civilians. CA units perform tasks that support this goal by training resistance military and political elements in techniques to motivate and mobilize popular support of the resistance movement. This support must extend through the period in which victory has been achieved and a new government is trying to maintain internal stability.

CA Preparation for SF Operational Detachments

6-46. The supporting CA team advises and assists deploying SFODs in CMO. The element also advises the teams on the political, economic, social, and cultural factors they must understand before deploying to the JSOA. CA planning and training for UW must consider the following factors:

  • The theater CINC's politico-military mission (for example, to restore the government-in-exile) and its effect on the resistance organization during and after hostilities.
  • The strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and likely intentions of the hostile political organization.
  • Hostile countermeasures likely to isolate the resistance organization physically or psychologically from the local populace.
  • Resistance activities the hostile political organization can exploit to neutralize U.S. support or to mobilize world opinion against the resistance organization.
  • Organization and potential development of the resistance.
  • The political, social, economic, and security needs of the various segments of the local populace.


6-47. The proper use of CA assets in FID is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter a resistance movement. When used to its full potential, CMO can be crucial in preventing the escalation of an insurgency to higher phases. A national development program can solidify the position of the FN government and improve conditions for the people. CA activities vary with the capabilities of the host government and with the level of insurgent activity. The economic, social, and political situations also are major influences.

CA Role in Foreign Internal Defense

6-48. CA units conduct CA activities that support the internal development of an FN. CA teams may support other military forces and nonmilitary agencies, but they must coordinate with the FN. These operations focus on the indigenous infrastructures and population in the operational areas.

6-49. CA teams provide expertise in HA and PRC and in medical and engineer advisory capabilities. The CA battalion (SO) civic action teams provide additional resources to perform this mission. CA personnel supporting FID are normally assigned to the highest-level military elements supervising FID operations or to U.S. military advisory elements that train and aid FN military units. CA elements supporting FID--

  • Review U.S. SA program goals and FN internal defense and development (IDAD) goals and plan CMO to support the FN plan.
  • Plan CMO based on the three phases of insurgency described in FM 100-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, and FM 31-20, Doctrine for Special Forces Operations.
  • Train FN military to plan, train for, and conduct MCA, PRC, and other CA activities appropriate to the IDAD of its country.
  • Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.
  • Identify specific CMO missions the FN military can and should conduct.


6-50. PSYOP are operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The intent of PSYOP is to influence target audience behaviors that support U.S. national policy objectives and the geographic CINC's intentions at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. PSYOP provide the commander the means to employ a nonlethal capability across the range of military operations. For further information, see FM 33-1, Psychological Operations, and JP 3-53, Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations.

CA Support to PSYOP

6-51. CA forces support the theater PSYOP plan by conducting public information activities and providing timely feedback on the effectiveness of the PSYOP plan. These activities are integrated into the battle plans, to include providing for accurate reporting of the operation and combatting distorted or misrepresented information that may be disseminated by an adversary. CA planners can--

  • Represent CA concerns in PSYOP activities.
  • Coordinate with the psychological operations task force (POTF) to ensure consistency of messages and OPSEC without compromising CA credibility.
  • Prepare CMO estimates, assessments, and the annex to the OPLAN or OPORD to identify and integrate CA support.
  • Coordinate the use of local resources, facilities, and support--for example, civilian labor, transportation, communications, maintenance, or medical facilities and miscellaneous services and supplies.
  • Provide liaison to local agencies and civilian authorities.
  • Coordinate civic action projects in support of PSYOP plans.
  • Advise on cultural and moral considerations.

During Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY and RESTORE DEMOCRACY in 1994, the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) nominated two HA missions to the JTF commander that, in its estimation, would produce positive results with the population of Haiti--restore electricity to the island and remove the trash from the streets of the capital, Port-au-Prince. The collapse of the government had resulted in these services being discontinued, leaving the island in darkness and the streets filled with refuse. CA forces coordinated with Air Force Prime Power Teams and the 20th Engineer Brigade to execute these missions. In less than 30 days, power was restored and the major roads in the capital were free of trash. The success of these missions was highlighted in numerous broadcasts from major U.S. and international news organizations and showed the people of Haiti that the JTF was there to help them.



6-52. Commanders and staffs at all levels encounter an expanding information domain termed the global information infrastructure (GII). The GII contains information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military or the NCA but, nevertheless, may directly impact the success or failure of military operations. The media, NGOs, IOs, and selected individuals represent a partial list of GII participants.

6-53. All military operations occur within the GII, both interactive and pervasive in its presence and influence. Current, emerging electronic technologies permit a global audience in near-real-time and without the benefit of filters to be knowledgeable of any aspect of a military operation. With easy access to the global or national information network, the suppression, control, or censorship of the spread of information may be neither feasible nor desirable.

6-54. Adversaries and other non-DOD organizations--including many participants, agencies, and influences outside the traditional view of military conflict--intrude on the military information environment. Adversaries, perhaps supported by nonaligned nations, seek to gain an advantage in the GII by employing battlespace systems and organizations. In addition, the media, think tanks, academic institutions, NGOs, international agencies, and individuals with access to the information highway are all potentially significant participants in the GII. These entities can affect the strategic and operational direction of military operations before they begin. Independent of military control, their impact is always situationally dependent. Their activities may cause an unanticipated or unintentional effect on military operations. Such participants include--

  • Government agencies, such as the DOS or the FEMA.
  • NGOs.
  • International agencies that provide a commercial service, such as the European Space Agency.
  • Agencies that coordinate international efforts, such as the ICRC or the World Health Organization.
  • Social and cultural elements, including religious movements and their leaders.
  • Intelligence and military communications systems of allies, adversaries, and other Services.
  • Individuals with the appropriate hardware and software to communicate with a worldwide audience.

6-55. Harnessing the potential of information to transform how the commander operates is critical to success in the future. Technology alone, however, cannot give commanders and staffs automatic battlespace visualization, flawless situational awareness, easily expanded vision, or highly effective information management. In the final analysis, the products of command initiative to harness the potential of information can only support the application of a leader's judgment, wisdom, experience, and intuition to enhance his battle command.

6-56. Commanders currently synchronize CA activities with command and control warfare (C2W) and PA to gain and maintain information dominance, as well as effective C2. Successful operations require effective C2 to transform military capabilities into applied military power.

6-57. An increase in the amount of information available does not guarantee certainty. In fact, it potentially increases ambiguity. Current staff organizations, procedures, and analytical methods must adjust to master the richer flow, faster pace, and huge volume of information. The challenge is to find better, not just faster, analysis and decision-making procedures.

6-58. In many situations, GII organizations are present in the AOR before conventional forces arrive. They are often well-entrenched, with an established logistical framework and long-standing coordination and liaison arrangements. The media, for example, may initially know the AOR better than the military. As the media cover the buildup, they gain a thorough understanding of the situation, particularly in stability and support operations, and form their own perspectives. The projection of forces into the situation is of national interest, with national and international media watching from the moment forces arrive. CA personnel need to deploy early to support the commander and the force in their interactions with these organizations. CA activities not only reduce the potential distractions to a commander but also educate these organizations and facilitate their efforts to provide accurate, balanced, credible, and timely information to local officials and agencies, as well as external audiences. Some unique considerations apply to force-projection operations and stability and support operations.

CA Support to Information Operations

6-59. CA support to information operations provides an integral role of interfacing with critical actors and influences in the GII. Whether in stability or support operations or war, conducting military operations, consolidating combat power, and seeking information dominance are improved when leveraging CA support. Although conditions differ across the spectrum of conflict, CA forces establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations among military forces, civil authorities, and the civilian populace in an AO to facilitate military operations. During Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, for example, CA forces informed the local populace through the news media, public discussion, and PSYOP information products and programs on the reestablishment of the legitimate Haitian Government. These measures created an information exchange that promoted understanding of, confidence in, and positive perception of measures supporting military operations.

6-60. A CMOC can be established to interact with key participants and influences in the GII, such as local authorities, NGOs, and IOs. CA teams support military operations by applying their skills and experience in public administration, economics, public facilities, linguistics, cultural affairs, and civil information and by providing information relevant to the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR).

6-61. Commanders must include CA activities in their planning guidance. CMO planners must consider all available support and information to ensure successful completion of the CMO mission. CA forces are well suited to plan, coordinate, support, and, if directed, supervise various operations to support U.S. objectives.

6-62. CA activities, when interrelated with C2W and PA, support the commander's objective of achieving information dominance in any operational environment--combat or peace. CA activities provide liaison and connectivity with essential participants and influences in the GII and interact with specific elements of C2W. Grouping CA activities, C2W, and PA together as specific information operations provides a framework to promote synergy and to facilitate staff planning and execution. This idea is reinforced by including the CMO and PA staff representatives in the information operations cell or on the information operations battle staff (IOBS) in routine staff coordination. This structure conceptually provides greater integration and synchronization of CA activities and PA with the more traditional warfighting elements of C2W.

Functional Specialty Support to Information Operations

6-63. CMO encompass the relationship between military forces and the civil authorities and civilian populace in a friendly or foreign country or area. CA activities support national policy and implement U.S. national objectives by coordinating with, influencing, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures in operational areas. CMO secure local acceptance of and support for U.S. forces. CMO are important in gaining information dominance because of the capability of interfacing with key organizations and individuals in the GII--for example, CA's traditional relationship with NGOs and IOs, such as the ICRC.

6-64. Commanders fully integrate CMO into all operations and use CMO to influence, coordinate, control, or develop civilian activities and civil organizations. CA activities play a command support role in all operational environments and across the operational continuum. CA activities are most common, however, when supporting the lower end of the range of military operations.

6-65. Many CA activities require specific civilian skills. CA activities most relevant to the GII and supporting information operations are categorized into four major sections:

  • Government team -- Provides liaison to the civilian government.

  • Economics and commerce team -- Monitors government economic and commercial agencies.

  • Public facilities team -- Allocates civilian communications resources for civilian and military use and directs civil communications agencies as required.

  • Special functions team -- Advises, assists, supervises, controls, or operates civil information agencies and provides television, radio, or newspaper services.

6-66. Each CA functional specialty section should consider collection activities, information sources, interrelationships, and coordination and support requirements in its mission analysis.

6-67. The nature of CA activities and the need for CA personnel to develop and maintain a close relationship with the civilian populace put them in a favorable position to collect information. CA public information collection activities encompass the complete spectrum of cultural, social, political, and economic issues within the present or potential AOs. In their daily operations, CA personnel work with people, equipment, and documents that are prime sources of information. Information collected supports the CCIR and is often important to other agencies and to staff sections of other units. This information is particularly important to PSYOP and SF.

6-68. CA units are included in the information collection plan of the supported unit. CA units report information that meets the criteria of the supported unit's collection plan. Prime sources of information available to CA units include but are not limited to--

  • Civilians billeted with, catered to, or associated with enemy personnel.
  • DCs and other personnel participating in movement control, relief, or other assistance (normally referred to appropriate intelligence personnel).
  • Government documents, libraries, or archives.
  • Files of newspapers or periodicals.
  • Industrial and commercial records.
  • Technical equipment, blueprints, plans, or information of interest related to transportation, signal, engineer, and medical fields.

6-69. The information collected can supplement the intelligence effort. U.S. forces need timely, accurate information and intelligence to plan missions, to secure the element of surprise, to identify and develop targets, and to protect U.S. interests across the range of military operations. CA activities further provide timely information to the CCIR.

6-70. CA personnel are not, and must not have the appearance of being, intelligence agents. The mission of the unit drives the intelligence cycle. As operational planning begins, so does intelligence planning. Requirements for operational planning are normally for finished intelligence studies, estimates, or briefings. CMO planners prepare their estimates from basic intelligence documents not primarily written for CA use, such as an area study. Intelligence is the product resulting from the collection, evaluation, and processing of information.

6-71. CA functional specialists may collect information the G2 or J2 turns into intelligence. CA functional specialists, if used correctly, complement the intelligence collection process, especially HUMINT. In some cases, the functional specialists also enhance the capabilities of technical intelligence or intelligence on foreign technological development that may have eventual application for military use.

6-72. CA activities require close coordination with military forces and U.S., FN, and nonmilitary agencies that have a vested interest in military operations. CMO planners must consider all available support to ensure successful completion of the CMO mission. In most cases, CMO planners directly or indirectly support the agencies assigned by law to carry out national policy. CMO planning is a command responsibility. It must be coordinated, at a minimum, with all other staff planners. To ensure success, coordination and cooperation with the following are vital to the conduct of all operations: other U.S. staffs and units, the FN military, the U.S. Government, foreign governments, international agencies, IOs, and NGOs.


6-73. Public Law 92-539 assigns primary, concurrent jurisdiction and overall responsibility to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for the direction of operations to counter certain criminal acts committed in the United States. Congress identified the need for the Federal government's involvement in situations that may have international repercussions or in incidents that may impact on U.S. relations. In such cases, the FBI may need specialized military protective-type equipment or weaponry and technical support personnel. By agreement between the DOJ and the DOD, appropriate DOD components respond to all reasonable FBI requests for resources, including materiel, facilities, and personnel. DOD personnel act in a technical advisory but not a law enforcement capacity in combatting acts of terrorism. The SecDef extended the Secretary of the Army's designation as executive agent for civil disturbance matters to cover the employment of military resources in support of the FBI. For detailed responsibilities of SOF in combatting terrorism, see FM 100-25, Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces.


6-74. Antiterrorism includes all measures that installations, units, and individuals take to reduce the probability of falling victim to a terrorist act. Antiterrorism includes defensive measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property. These measures vary, based on assessments of the local threat, and include personnel awareness and knowledge of personal protection techniques. They also include crime prevention and physical security programs to "harden" the target, making Army installations and personnel less appealing as terrorist targets.

6-75. CA forces participate in their own antiterrorism programs and support the antiterrorism programs of other units or agencies by planning and conducting CMO as requested.


6-76. Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Counterterrorism measures include preemption, intervention, or retaliation with specialized forces operating under the direction of the NCA and have the characteristics of strikes or raids. CA forces do not participate in counterterrorism activities.


6-77. Counterproliferation involves actions taken to locate, identify, seize, destroy, render safe, transport, capture, or recover weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In arms control, WMD are weapons capable of a high order of destruction or of being used in a manner that kills or injures a large number of people. WMD may be radiological or NBC. The term WMD excludes the means of transporting or propelling the weapon.

6-78. Counterproliferation is a special mission, not applicable to most CA forces. CA forces may be capable of responding to "consequence management" requirements involving WMD. CA is particularly well suited to address requirements that focus on regional, cultural, and linguistic capabilities.

CA Support to Consequence Management

6-79. Consequence management operations are closely related to existing doctrine for disaster relief and humanitarian assistance. The commonalities among all types of technological and natural disasters suggest strongly that many of the same management strategies can apply to all such emergencies. Consequence management is essentially disaster relief in response to an NBC or a WMD event.

6-80. Consequence management is an emerging operation defined as the actions taken to mitigate and recover from the effects of an NBC or a WMD incident. The incidents may be inadvertent or intentional. Consequence management may include providing water, food, mass care, shelter, transportation, communications, SAR, and decontamination. The emphasis is to preserve life and to minimize suffering. Consequence management includes planning actions and preparation to identify, organize, equip, and train emergency response forces and to develop the executable plans implemented in response to an incident. The U.S. Government may also provide assistance in restoring essential government services.

6-81. An overarching principle in consequence management operations is that the HN has primary responsibility for responding to the incident. The DOS is the lead U.S. Government agency for OCONUS consequence management operations, and any U.S. Government response to an incident originates at the request of an HN.

Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39)

6-82. In response to the threat of terrorism, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) in 1996 as a follow-on action to the Federal Response Plan of 1992. The plan is a national-level response plan in which 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross are signatories. PDD-39 defines how the United States deals with terrorist attacks involving WMD, providing guidance to Federal agencies on actions to prevent and protect against WMD attacks (crisis management) and, should those efforts fail, dealing with the effects of the attack (consequence management).

6-83. In 1996, Congress passed Public Law 104-201, The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act. This act designates the DOD as the lead agent for the domestic preparedness against WMD destruction. For those events outside the territorial limits of the United States, the DOS is responsible for negotiating disaster response agreements and for coordinating support requested by foreign nations. The culminating effect of these actions led the Chairman, JCS, to direct each CINC to develop contingency plans to respond to a crisis management or consequence management event.

Preincident Assessment Database

6-84. One of the critical roles CA units perform is to conduct a capability assessment survey of countries within each theater. This preincident assessment survey identifies critical assets within the country that could be used in a consequence management scenario. The information gathered in the assessment is maintained at the Embassy and at each theater HQ and is formatted into a database. The assessment augments the preparation and mitigation of any potential consequence management event.


6-85. Special reconnaissance (SR) operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by SOF to confirm, refute, or obtain by visual observation or other collection methods information on the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data on the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. SR operations include target acquisition, area assessments, and poststrike reconnaissance. For further information, see FM 100-25. CA forces do not normally participate in SR missions.


6-86. Direct action operations are short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by SOF to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or material. In the conduct of these operations, SOF may--

  • Employ raid, ambush, or direct assault tactics, including close quarters battle.
  • Emplace mines and other munitions.
  • Conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms.
  • Provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions.
  • Conduct independent sabotage.
  • Conduct antiship operations.

6-87. For further information, see FM 100-25. CA forces do not normally participate in direct action missions.


6-88. Collateral activities are applications of ARSOF capabilities in missions other than those directed by Congress. The inherent capabilities of ARSOF mission profiles make ARSOF suitable for employment in a range of collateral activities. These activities are other than primary missions for organizing, training, and equipping such forces. Collateral activities in which ARSOF may participate include coalition support activities, CSAR, CD activities, HA, CM activities, SA, and special activities.

Coalition Support Activities

6-89. Coalition support by liaison elements improves the interaction of coalition partners and the U.S. military forces, particularly in coalition warfare. Coalition support includes training coalition partners on tactics, techniques, and procedures; providing communications to integrate them into the coalition command and intelligence structure; and establishing liaisons to coordinate for CS and CSS. Liaison elements often give the JFC an accurate evaluation of the capabilities, location, and activities of coalition forces, thus facilitating JFC C2.

6-90. CA forces support coalition warfare by--

  • Providing staff augmentation to the coalition CMO staff.
  • Establishing coalition CMOCs as required.
  • Providing CMO training to coalition partners.
  • Assisting in the development of the CA Annex and CMO Estimate to the OPLAN.
  • Conducting area assessments.
  • Providing functional specialists to transition planning as required.

Combat Search and Rescue

6-91. Personnel recovery (PR) is a term for a broad spectrum of activities that locate, recover, and restore to friendly control selected persons or material isolated and threatened in sensitive, denied, or contested areas. PR includes SAR; CSAR; survival, evasion, resistance, and escape (SERE); evasion and escape (E&E); and the coordination of negotiated and forcible recovery options. These situations may arise from a political change, combat action, chance happening, or mechanical mishap. For further information, see FM 100-25, FM 31-20, or USAJFKSWCS Pub 525-5-14, Unconventional Assisted Recovery.

6-92. CA soldiers have an inherent role in early PR planning and intelligence analysis. During the SOF mission planning process and the subsequent development of a PR contingency plan, CA soldiers are an essential information source. Specifically, CA input to nominating selected areas for evasion (SAFEs) and directed areas for recovery (DARs) aids SOC planners with pragmatic, timely data.

6-93. CA units maintain valuable tools to assist SOF recovery teams and mechanisms. CA subject matter experts deployed in the target area can assist by elaborating on infrastructure details. Cultural studies highlight the prevailing moods, attitudes, and historical trends of a population. CA units have a wealth of information from lines of communication to population needs in country studies, country surveys, and AARs. Population density studies can, for example, help SOF planners develop a recovery mechanism feasibility study. Additionally, after deployment, CA units produce reports that give factual, timely information to the SOF community via the special operations debrief and retrieval system (SODARS). Details on critical facilities, political parties and factions, social and economic factors, the military, paramilitary, police, and demographics are examples of some of the relevant information available from CA-authored SODARS reports.

6-94. Once SOF soldiers initiate their evasion plan of action (EPA) or a SOF recovery operation, CA units and soldiers help synchronize the recovery plan. CA soldiers have direct access to NGOs and government organizations that may influence the indigenous environment. CA soldiers augment Interagency Working Groups with their ability to coordinate and focus otherwise diverse organizations toward the common PR mission. Should negotiations become necessary, CA teams may provide negotiators with key information through analysis of the situation and the operational environment. As planners identify possible intermediate staging bases (ISBs), CA teams can bring all participants together in the CMOC to centralize resources and to provide the greatest unity of effort toward the PR mission.

6-95. CA planners collaborate with the DOS to develop, review, and recommend actions or initiatives to support current Embassy drawdown plans. These plans prioritize personnel for extraction and identify assembly areas; however, these plans do not address unconventional assisted recovery (UAR) operations requirements beyond the scope of a NEO.

6-96. DOD and DOS are currently working on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) for mutual support to PR. The MOA allows the DOS to identify UAR requirements and capabilities necessary in recovering isolated individuals who cannot get to the extraction site. UAR requirements may include SOF recovery teams to assist in the recovery of U.S. citizens, NGOs, and IOs during NEO. CA planners' knowledge of DOS UAR requirements help ensure NEO adequately address PR contingency issues. All SOF planning agencies should, therefore, consider CA knowledge on current NEO plans to capitalize on a prudent PR design.

6-97. CA soldiers and units assist PR planners by providing factual, timely, and culturally relevant information. CA soldiers have ongoing relationships with NGOs, IOs, and other government agencies that may give negotiators increased advantage should negotiations become necessary. Finally, CA teams synchronize otherwise diverse players in a PR effort using the CMOC to augment existing C2 nodes from CONUS to the ISB. Unity of effort is best achieved using CA soldiers and units early in the PR planning process. Finally, the CA component of a solid PR strategy gives planners increased flexibility should operational and tactical situations change.

Counterdrug Activities

6-98. CD activities involve measures taken to disrupt, interdict, and destroy illicit drug activities. The level of violence by the drug infrastructure dictates the increased use of military and paramilitary force in CD operations. A 1981 amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act (Chapter 18, USC, Section 1385) authorizes specific DOD assistance in CD activities. The primary SOF role in this interagency activity is to support U.S. and FN CD efforts abroad. CA forces support CD activities by--

  • Coordinating FNS for FN forces as well as U.S. forces.
  • Coordinating HA projects with the FN, the U.S. forces, and the U.S. country team to develop H/CA "spin off" missions that build a bond between the FN government and the local populace. NOTE: The support could further develop into programs that promote an infrastructure steering people away from drug-related income activities to legal means of making a living. It could possibly integrate functional area expertise--for example agricultural and medical expertise.
  • Training FN forces on PRC methods to enhance FN military or police efforts in areas where drugs are produced or processed.
  • Training FN CA forces on ways to conduct CMO to enhance mission success. The training includes battle staff training for CMO officers of the FN force on ways to integrate CA activities into the overall mission plan. The training leads to MCA projects that "win the hearts and minds" and do not further isolate the remote villages from the HN government.
  • Providing liaison between the local populace and U.S. soldiers and HN ministries.

Along with elements from the 7th SFG(A), CA teams deployed to Ecuador and Columbia to train HN counterdrug forces on PRC, HA, and MCA activities. Specifically, the CA teams trained selected HN officers on battle staff procedures and ways to establish a CMOC to coordinate CMO. The CA teams were instrumental in coordinating the activities of various NGOs, IOs, and U.S. Government agencies to support HN activities in creating a synergy of effort sustainable and relevant to the needs and culture of the two countries..

96th CA Battalion (A) AAR

Humanitarian Assistance

6-99. HA is a group of programs U.S. DOD resources to conduct military acts and operations of a humanitarian nature. HA includes H/CA, foreign disaster relief, NEOs, and support to DCs. Combatants, including members of groups engaged in paramilitary activities, can receive assistance under some HA programs--for example, the DOD nonlethal property program. For further information on HA, see Chapter 2 of this manual.

Countermine Activities

6-100. CA teams support CM as part of a coordinated effort with SF and PSYOP forces to support country team objectives. The effort involves creating and training an FN national demining office (NDO) capable of sustaining, planning, coordinating, executing, and recording demining operations. CA support includes conducting liaison with the FN, UN, other IOs or local NGOs, and commercial contractors to the extent that the activities of those organizations complement the NDO mission. The primary objective of these activities is to establish a self-sustaining NDO operations center with a functional data-collection capability. CA elements supporting humanitarian demining operations (HDO)--

  • Assess the capabilities of the potential NDO staff, equipment, and facilities.
  • Train and equip the NDO staff in staff coordination and operations procedures.
  • Identify the required budget, personnel, and equipment, such as training aids, furniture, computers, and vehicles.
  • Identify the required potential resources of additional support--for example, UN, NGOs, contractors, or OSD.
  • Conduct the predeployment site survey and confirm the budget.
  • Coordinate for the translation of lesson plans, when required.
  • Procure necessary equipment and complete contracting requirements.

A CA team from the 96th CA Battalion deployed to Zimbabwe in May 1998 for 7 weeks on a mission to establish, equip, and train an NDO. This mission was conducted in six phases:

Phase 1 - Meet HN participants and the NDO staff and assess the facilities.

Phase 2 - Upgrade facilities (power, lights, structural improvements) and order equipment (furniture, computers, office supplies).

Phase 3 - Conduct initial job-oriented computer training for the NDO staff and conduct classes on demining operations, the orders process, NDO staff operations, data collection and management (minefield data), and property accountability. Completely equip the NDO.

Phase 4 - Lead the staff through an orders process drill, resulting in actual deployment orders for the newly trained demining squadron to deploy and initiate demining operations in the Victoria Falls minefields. Integrate the PSYOP effort in support of the Mine Awareness Section of the NDO so that mine awareness products are completed and available to support the squadron's initial demining operations.

Phase 5 - Consolidate data for remaining minefields in preparation for future missions. Ensure proper accountability of all donated equipment and provide a stock of office supplies to keep the office operational for many months.

Phase 6 - Conduct mission handoff to the U.S. Embassy staff.

Theater Support Team (TST) 46 returned to Zimbabwe in October 1998 for 2 weeks to assess the progress of the program and to confirm the plan for the follow-on deployment. At this time, they also restocked office supplies. They coordinated with the Department of State and wrote the country plan for the demining project. TST 46 returned in March 1999 for 6 weeks and facilitated the acquisition of more than $700,000 of heavy equipment to be donated to the program. Demining operations continue in Zimbabwe..

96th CA Battalion (A) AAR

Security Assistance

6-101. Narrowly defined, SA is a group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services that support national policies and objectives. Considered more properly as a strategic element, SA is a critical tool of U.S. foreign policy. It has application across the range of military operations and is a bridge that links collective security with U.S. friends and allies in times of peace and crisis.

6-102. When the United States provides SA to an FN, a primary concern is the FN's ability to plan and manage its defense resources by itself. FN military organizations may never develop this ability if they continue to request help in areas where they have already achieved self-sufficiency.

6-103. SA programs are normally conducted by MTTs. These teams consist of subject matter experts who deploy to an FN to provide training and expertise in areas beyond the capability of the target country.

6-104. The main purpose of a CA MTT is to develop FN CMO expertise and training capabilities in a particular CA activity--for example, in 1996 when a CA MTT deployed to Cambodia to train a platoon of Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) in CMO. The Cambodian Minister of Defense had read about the CA activities in Operations DESERT STORM and DESERT SHIELD and wanted a similar capability in the RCAF. Upon completing its training, this platoon played a pivotal role in the repatriation of Khmer Rouge defectors by coordinating the delivery of relief supplies to defector camps. This training improves the FN CA capability by educating specialists to train their people further in conducting CMO (train-the-trainer).

6-105. CA MTTs can also provide training in--

  • Agriculture.
  • Animal husbandry.
  • Communications.
  • Economics and commerce.
  • Education.
  • Public health.
  • Public information.
  • Public safety.
  • Public works.
  • Sanitation.
  • Relief activities.

6-106. For further information on MTTs, see AR 12-1, Security Assistance--Policy, Objectives, and Responsibilities; AR 12-7, Security Assistance Teams; and the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Program Handbook.

Special Activities

6-107. Special activities fall under Executive Order 12333 and require a Presidential finding and Congressional oversight. ARSOF conduct special activities abroad that support national foreign policy objectives; however, they conduct these activities in such a manner that U.S. Government participation is neither apparent nor publicly acknowledged. Whether supporting or conducting a special activity, ARSOF may perform any of their primary wartime missions, subject to the limitations imposed on special activities. Such activities are highly compartmentalized and centrally managed and controlled.

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