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Chapter 5

Employment of Civil Affairs Forces

CA forces augment CMO staffs of geographic, theater Army component, and maneuver commanders, down to battalion level, as well as U.S. country teams, other government agencies, and multinational forces. They accomplish this mission by assisting in planning, coordinating, and supervising CA activities in support of CMO. The specific activities are mission dependent and determined after applying the special operations mission evaluation criteria and the military decision-making process. CA commanders tailor their forces to meet mission requirements and to ensure the timely employment of the proper mix of strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level forces, as well as functional specialists. Key to this effort is the early deployment of planning teams to provide relevant CA input to OPLANs, functional plans, and CONPLANs.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

5-1. CMO staffs at every level--augmented by periodic and regular deployments of CAP3Ts, CAPT-Bs, and CAPT-As--continually review and, if necessary, update OPLANs and CONPLANs. The organic CMO staffs, augmented by CA planning teams as necessary, maintain situational awareness by participating in their respective supported command and staff updates, as well as relevant crisis-action exercises. When a crisis occurs, the CMO staff requests augmentation by its war-traced CA planning teams to begin developing the CMO estimate and, if needed, a CA annex (Appendix F). An important element of this deliberate or crisis-action planning process focuses on developing a recommended CA task organization, to include identifying needs for functional specialists. The supported commander validates the recommendation and forwards it through the respective CINC to USSOCOM for resourcing. NOTE: Requests for deployment must go through the JCS.

5-2. USASOC receives the USSOCOM-validated mission taskings and validates them again to ensure they meet SOF mission criteria. If validated, the taskings go to USACAPOC, where they are again validated and resourced. USACAPOC assigns the mission planning authority to a regional CACOM or, in the case of missions that require rapid deployment, to the AC CA battalion. AC CA forces task-organize to address specific mission requirements and to deploy to the operational area or directly to the supported unit. This rapid-response capability enhances the supported commander's efforts to coordinate with government and nongovernment agencies and organizations. This capability ultimately enhances the support and force protection posture of the command.

5-3. Following the rapid deployment of AC CA forces and initial CA assessments, which validate or invalidate the original CMO estimate, a long-term plan is developed that articulates the specific functional skills to support the mission. This plan is formulated with significant input from CONUS-based CA functional specialists. (NOTE: Functional specialists should deploy only when a specific need exists for their expertise.) The results of the assessment and recommended task organization flows from the theater commander to USCINCSOC for validation, feasibility assessment, and eventual resourcing. The regionally aligned CACOM normally provides resourcing.

5-4. Concurrently, requests for a Presidential Selected Reserve Callup (PSRC) (if required) or other authorities for mobilization are initiated through the JCS and DOD. When authorized, CA elements are mobilized and deployed. Mission handoff or transition occurs when the RC CA forces arrive. The AC CA forces are redeployed (Figure 5-1) or reassigned in theater, as needed.

Figure 5-1. Concept of CA Employment

ACCESS TO CIVIL AFFAIRS FORCES

5-5. One of the major obstacles to RC CA employment is timely access. During peacetime operations, proper long-range planning overcomes this obstacle. In contingency operations, however, the authority to deploy RC forces is a lengthy process.

5-6. Missions requiring long-duration, robust CA force packages inevitably require an authority for partial mobilization of the RC under the provisions of a PSRC. Without this authority, RC units must rely on individual volunteers to fill requirements. Although this method is adequate for short-duration missions, it is unsustainable over the long term. Historically, sustainment of long-term missions (more than 1 year), requires CA elements to deploy on 180- to 270-day rotations. Short-term missions (less than 1 year) can be sustained by CA elements on a 90- to 180-day rotation. A temporary tour of active duty (TTAD) can best support these missions.

5-7. The requirement for CA forces begins with the receipt of a mission by the geographic CINC. The CINC staff analyzes the mission and determines the assets needed to support the mission. If mission analysis determines the need for CA forces and the respective CINC does not have organic forces to fill the requirement, the CINC staff forwards to the JCS a request for CA forces. Once validated, the request goes to the USCINCSOC, who, in turn, tasks USASOC to provide forces.USASOC receives task orders (TASKORD) for Army CA support and forwards the orders to USACAPOC. USACAPOC conducts a final mission analysis, validates the mission, and tasks the regional CACOM or the 96th CA battalion to provide the requested support.

5-8. USASOC receives task orders (TASKORD) for Army CA support and forwards the orders to USACAPOC. USACAPOC conducts a final mission analysis, validates the mission, and tasks the regional CACOM or the 96th CA battalion to provide the requested support.

5-9. CA forces (Figure 5-2) are task-organized and deployed based on mission requirements. The difficulty of deploying an entire CA unit has led to deployments under derivative unit identification codes (UICs). Such deployment impacts on the supported unit, as it implies CA forces are attached to the gaining unit and require complete administrative and logistic support.

Figure 5-2. Access to CA

SELECTIVE MOBILIZATION

5-10. Selective mobilization is an expansion of active duty forces in response to a domestic crisis. The President, or Congress upon special action, may order expansion of the active duty forces by mobilizing units and individuals of the Reserves to protect life and federal property and functions or to prevent disruption of federal activities.

PRESIDENTIAL SELECTED RESERVE CALLUP

5-11. PSRC occurs when the President determines that active duty forces must be augmented for an operational mission. By executive order, the President may augment the active duty forces with up to 200,000 members of the Reserves for up to 270 days. A PSRC does not require a declaration of national emergency; however, the President must report to Congress within 24 hours on the current situation and anticipated use of the called-up forces.

Partial Mobilization

5-12. Partial mobilization requires a Presidential or Congressional declaration of a state of national emergency. A partial mobilization may occur without a PSRC. Under a Presidential declaration of national emergency, members of the Ready Reserve may be mobilized for up to 24 months.

Full Mobilization

5-13. Full mobilization expands the forces on active duty to meet the requirements of war or other national emergency involving an external threat to national security. The President, or Congress upon special action, may mobilize all RC units, all individual reservists, retired military personnel, and the resources needed to support war or other national emergencies involving an external threat to the United States.

Total Mobilization

5-14. Total mobilization expands the forces on active duty, in consequence of actions by Congress or the President, to organize additional units or personnel and the resources needed for their support to meet the total requirement of war or other national emergencies involving an external threat to the United States.

5-15. Other means of bringing RC forces on active duty are--

  • TTAD.
  • Active duty for special work (ADSW).
  • Annual training (AT).
  • Active duty for training (ADT).

5-16. These various categories are explained in detail in Army Regulation 135-210, Order to Active Duty as Individuals for Other Than a Presidential Selective Reserve Call-Up, Partial or Full Mobilization. The categories vary in terms of length and the types of missions they can support. These tours are usually limited to individuals or small groups.

Temporary Tour of Active Duty

5-17. TTAD is voluntary active duty performed by USAR or Army National Guard (ARNG) soldiers in support of the Active Army, a unified or specified command, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), or an active force mission of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

5-18. The objective of the TTAD program is to use a soldier's primary or duty skill to accomplish a specified Active Army, OSD, OJCS, joint project, or essential mission for which no active duty soldier is available. TTADs meet a short-term need of the Active Army for a prescribed period, normally not to exceed 139 days. TTADs may not be used to accomplish Reserve force missions, support, special projects, or staff augmentation.

5-19. TTADs may be used to perform a wartime (support) mission assigned to the RCs under current mobilization and OPLANs. Used only in limited- duration contingency situations, TTADs are still bound by time limits.

Active Duty for Special Work

5-20. ADSW is authorized for temporary projects or missions normally not to exceed 139 days. These missions are in support of ARNG and USAR programs. Duties must exceed the scope of those performed by the Active Army in support of the ARNG and USAR. Duties include, but are not limited to, the operation of training activities, centers, and sites, and short-term mission and administrative support work on a special short-term project or study group vital to the ARNG or the USAR.

Annual Training

5-21. AT usually includes training that cannot be conducted effectively at the home station. Training is in support of USAR missions, projects, or training for nonactivated or mobilized USAR force structure. Soldiers assigned to troop program units normally serve for 14 days each year. However, they can serve as long as 29 days when participating in an exercise away from home station or for 21 days OCONUS. Soldiers may also perform AT individually or in small groups. During exercises, RC CA personnel frequently support the Active Army by providing cultural and area expertise for the commander. Important relationships between RC CA personnel and AC personnel are developed during this time, which further increases understanding in future missions.

Active Duty for Training

5-21. The primary purpose and content of ADT is training. ADT is authorized for full-time attendance at organized and planned training approved by DA. This type of duty includes such activities as--

  • Specialized skills training.
  • Refresher and proficiency training.
  • Professional development and education programs.

5-22. A soldier normally may not perform more than 179 cumulative days of ADT per fiscal year.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS STAFF OFFICER, G5 OR S5

5-23. The G5 or S5, the principal staff officer for all CMO matters, conducts the initial assessment that determines CA force augmentation. The war-traced CAPT-A or CAPT-B helps in this process.

5-24. The G5 or S5 enhances the relationship between the military forces and the civilian authorities and personnel in the area of operations to ensure mission success. The G5 or S5 has staff planning and oversight of--

  • Attached CA units.
  • Area assessments (Appendix G) and area studies.
  • Military support to emergency defense and civic-action projects.
  • Protection of culturally significant sites.
  • HA and disaster relief.
  • NEO.
  • Emergency food, shelter, clothing, and fuel for local civilians.
  • Public order and safety applicable to military operations.

5-25. The G5 or S5 is required at all echelons from battalion through corps level but is authorized only at division and corps levels. Once deployed, units and task forces below division level may be authorized an S5.

5-26. The CMO staff officer ensures the effective integration of the "C" (civil considerations) of the METT-TC mission analysis formula into the planning cycle. Like operations and intelligence officers, CMO staff officers focus on the operational area, but like personnel and logistics officers, they must also focus on CS and CSS issues, particularly those regarding FNS and the care of DCs.

5-27. To plan and orchestrate unit operations, in peace or in war, the supported unit's operations officer must rely heavily upon items from the intelligence officer and the CMO officer, such as--

  • Situational and planning maps.
  • Overlays (in this instance, overlays of DC movement routes; sources of FNS; national, religious, and cultural monuments; hospitals; and power plants).

5-28. The supported unit's operations officer plans and integrates the overall operations effort. The unit CMO staff officer plans, coordinates, and provides staff oversight of CMO and issues only through direct coordination with the supported unit's operations officer.

5-29. The CMO staff officer, like other primary staff officers, is authorized personnel on an MTOE. The CMO staff is augmented by planning teams from regionally aligned AC and USAR CA units. This augmentation gives the unit CMO staff officer enough personnel to accomplish assigned tasks, including the requirement to establish and sustain a staff presence at the main command post (CP), rear CP, and CMOC.

5-30. Mission profile, phase of the operation, and the commander's preference determine the location of the G5 or S5 in sector; however, the G5 or S5 normally operates from a CMO cell within the main CP. The CMO staff officer may also task-organize his section (Figure 5-3) to support 24-hour operations at the main and rear CPs and at the CMOC, as follows:

  • Main CP - A tailored CMO cell to coordinate closely with the plans, current operations, intelligence, and CSS cells to monitor the effects of the operation on the civilian populace; also to plan for emerging operations.
  • Rear CP - A tailored CMO cell to monitor the main battle and rear areas; to plan for and coordinate any required FNS, the flow and disposition of DCs, and transition planning. NOTE: Close coordination with the operations and CSS cells is essential for mission success.
  • CMOC - The G5 or S5 section to provide the nucleus for a tailored cell that gives the unit commander a 24-hour capability to handle requests for assistance (RFAs) from participating government organizations, IOs, and NGOs.

Figure 5-3. CMO Section

Administrative and Logistics Section

5-31. The administrative and logistics section provides general and specific support to the G5, CMO section elements and cells. In addition to the normal operational support required from each staff section, specific support can include--

  • Identifying linguistic (interpreter or translator) support resources.
  • Collating and maintaining detailed CMO-related data obtained from assessments.
  • Recording CMO-related data for historical purposes.
  • Providing clerical support for briefings, charts, and other CMO-related documents, as required.
  • Coordinating with the logistics staff officer for FNS.

Operations Section

5-32. The operations section provides operations-related support to the CMO staff officer. It usually consists of at least three subsections: current operations, plans, and technical support.

5-33. The current operations section--

  • Monitors the current civil-military and operational situation.
  • Maintains the CMO estimate.
  • Prepares either the CMO (Army) or the CA (Joint) annexes to the concept of operations (CONOPS), OPLANs, functional plans, and OPORDs.
  • Recommends CA force allocation changes in the form of fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).
  • Develops the CMO periodic report.
  • Maintains and updates the many overlays and data used by the operations, intelligence, fire support, and CSS cells. NOTE: The overlays and data depict locations of FN resources, key public facilities, key monuments, and cultural or religious shrines that require protection.
  • Develops required reports and receives, analyzes, coordinates, disseminates, and monitors CA-related reports from subordinate corps and division units.
  • Coordinates the validation of and staff coordination for executing support to government organizations, IOs, and NGOs, from CMOC-coordinated RFAs.
  • Disseminates data and planned activities of the various government organizations, IOs, and NGOs operating within the corps and division AOR or within their area of interest.

5-34. The plans section--

  • Works closely with the corps and division plans officer and section.
  • Analyzes data and the commander's intent, forecasts requirements, and integrates all CMO into corps and division plans. NOTE: These tasks require the CMO plans officer to operate from the main CP, yet coordinate continually with his counterparts at the rear CP, the CMOC, and the U.S. Embassy, as required.

  • Closely monitors progress toward the DOD-defined, CMO-related, desired end state.

5-35. The technical support section--

  • Provides, as required, the CA functional experts to provide the CMO staff officer with current, detailed advice on their various areas of expertise.
  • May also include contracted civilians whose expertise is beyond the scope of the military force but well within the requirements of the current operation.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CELL (MAIN)

5-36. The CMO staff officer task-organizes his section to provide for two distinct support cells at the main and rear CPs. The main cell provides the direct interface and daily staff coordination with the corps and division primary and special staff officers within the corps tactical operations center (CTOC) and the division tactical operations center (DTOC). The CTOC and DTOC generally have restricted size, space, and mobility requirements. The CMO staff officer, therefore, task-organizes his section to provide for a CMO cell (Figure 5-4) with an immediate operations and plans capability. He may also provide for civil-military representatives to the plans, current operations, intelligence, and CSS cells of the main CP. The requirement to maintain 24-hour capability is inherent.

Figure 5-4. CMO Cell (Main)

5-37. After completing his mission analysis, the corps or division commander decides where to place his main cell. In some operations, CMO are central to the corps and division mission; therefore, the CMO staff officer is close to plans, intelligence, and current operations. Higher intensity combat operations may not require the CMO staff officer to be immediately present. The CMO staff officer needs to be located where he can coordinate all CMO and be appropriately responsive to the commander's guidance and the commander's need for staff integration. In carrying out this mission, the CMO cell--

  • Identifies CA requirements and recommends taskings for attached subordinate units.
  • Assists the G5 in preparing and maintaining the CA estimate, annex, periodic report, and the numerous overlays and data used by the division or corps.
  • Coordinates with relevant military and civilian organizations and agencies.
  • Collects and analyzes CA-related information.
  • Ensures the implementation of CA doctrine and procedures.
  • Disseminates, through the G3 or the S3, intelligence gained from CA operations to higher and lateral headquarters.
  • Maintains current information on assigned and implied missions, situation maps with overlays, the status of CA personnel and DCs, and the availability of basic sustenance items, such as food, shelter, and medical care.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CELL (REAR)

5-39. The CMO staff officer task-organizes his section to provide continuous support to the rear CP. The duties and functions of the rear cell (Figure 5-5) are similar to the duties and functions of the main cell. However, the rear cell focuses on rear operations, FNS issues, transition planning, and CSS issues that do not occur in the main battle area. The rear cell must also maintain a 24-hour capability.

Figure 5-5. CMO Cell (Rear)

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER

5-40. In simple terminology, the CMOC is a coordination center. Commanders at every level may establish and tailor a CMOC to help anticipate, facilitate, coordinate, and orchestrate CMO with the civilian populace, government, and economy in areas where military forces and government organizations, IOs, and NGOs are employed. As such, the CMOC may consist of personnel from any Service having a capability to provide support to the affected civilian populace. Any Army element can execute the operation of the CMOC, and elements of the supporting CA command, brigade, or battalion normally support the CMOC. See Appendix H for a sample CMOC layout.

5-41. The CMOC is neither a unit nor an organization. Instead, it is an extension of the command that facilitates access to civilian agencies and nonmilitary organizations participating in or having peripheral interest in a particular operation. As an extension or capability of the unit, the CMOC reports and transmits data normally in the form of RFAs from government organizations, IOs, and NGOs, through the CMO officer, to the supported commander.

5-42. The CMOC (Figure 5-6) may include military and civilian representatives from many different agencies. Mission requirements, command directives, operational security, workload, and accessibility to government organizations, IOs, and NGOs have an impact on the actual organization of the CMOC.

Figure 5-6. CMOC

Requirement and Responsibility

5-43. The number of CMOCs supporting a given operation varies, based on the mission. CMOCs may be established--

  • In operations where the joint force commander's HQ and the majority of subordinate units are located close to the civilian and HN diplomatic center and government organizations, IOs, and NGOs.
  • In operations where the joint force HQ is in one locale and subordinate units are spread throughout the AOR.
  • At every level of command, from geographic down to brigade, depending on the geographic area and the tactical control measures.

5-44. More than one CMOC may, therefore, exist in an AOR, all based on METT-TC. Commanders usually establish a CMOC after an initial situation assessment shows the need to coordinate with various agencies and operational security requirements prohibit access to the main HQ.

Location

5-45. The security situation and force protection posture dictate the general location of a CMOC. Normally, the CMOC is in the rear area to prevent nonmilitary traffic in and around the CMOC from interrupting military operations. Also, the rear area is more suitable for transition operations when the CMOC is transferred to UN, foreign military, or nonmilitary agency control. In environments where hostilities are unlikely and the operation is purely civil-military in nature, the CMOC may, however, be near the military force operations center.

Major Functions

5-46. The CMOC assists in the coordination of U.S. and multinational forces operations with FN agencies and authorities and government organizations, IOs, and NGOs. The CMOC provides access for government organizations, IOs, and NGOs desiring help and coordination from the military. An extension of the CMO cell provides access and CA-related data and information from and to government organizations, IOs, and NGOs operating away from the military HQ. Major functions of the CMOC include--

  • Providing government organizations, IOs, and NGOs with a single point for civilian-related activities and matters. (NOTE: The CMOC is a coordination center for receiving and answering government organization, IO, and NGO requests for military assistance.)

  • Coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and allied commands, the UN, the HN, and other nonmilitary agencies.
  • Providing interface with DOS.
  • Assisting in the transfer of authority and handoff of operations from U.S. military forces to the DOS, UN, NATO, or FN, or to other nonmilitary agency control.

CIVIL AFFAIRS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS

5-46. The majority of U.S. Army CA capabilities reside in the USAR. As such, most CA personnel hold civilian jobs and perform their military duties on a part-time basis. As part of their service obligation, Reservists must participate in prescribed training activities. This training focuses on the skills Reservists need when called to active duty. Thousands of reservists normally volunteer for operations when required to assist active-duty forces.

5-47. The successful integration of reservists into the AC force, quickly and effectively, requires an understanding of the similarities and differences of the AC and RC systems. The AC force must constantly review the subtle differences, particularly differences in personnel, finance, logistics, and training.

5-48. The amount of time an RC soldier has to transition from citizen to full-time soldier varies from operation to operation. The normal amount of time is 3 weeks from alert notification to awaiting entrance into the theater of operations from the power projection platform (PPP).

5-49. AC commanders must understand that the transition from Reserve systems in personnel, medical, finance, and logistics management often occurs in an unscheduled, geographically dispersed area. The transition is often without all the support elements of a full-time, operations-oriented military installation and its various facilities and staff. Some of the areas an AC commander and staff must consider are--

  • Personnel Issues.
    • Noncommissioned Officer Evaluation Reports (NCOERs), Officer Evaluation Reports (OERs), and Awards. RC soldiers require profiles not required of AC and NG soldiers. The routing of NCOERs, OERs, awards is also different for RC soldiers. These items go to the Army Personnel Command (ARPERCOM) in Saint Louis, Missouri, rather than the Personnel Command (PERSCOM) in Alexandria, Virginia.

    • Medical. RC soldiers complete most of the required medical checks and immunizations before arriving in theater. The exceptions are the immunizations--such as hepatitis and anthrax--and protocols given in series over 2 to 3 weeks.

    • Finance. RC soldiers, as part of mobilization, experience major changes to their pay. Although soldiers must participate in SurePay, even before mobilization, the changes to eligibility, rates, allowances, and incentives all at once can lead to major disruptions in the timely disbursement and correctness of pay and allowances. The AC commander's finance personnel must review and have on hand RC pay regulations.

    • Media, Community, and Employer Support. The gaining of community support of the RC soldiers, through the use of the news media and PAO, is a necessary consideration. Use of the hometown news release program is encouraged.

    • Security Clearance. RC CA soldiers must have a SECRET clearance. If the AC unit requires them to have a higher clearance, the unit must initiate upgrades as soon as possible. When supported by RC soldiers, the AC unit may, however, consider employing the lowest security classification so the RC soldiers may participate fully.
  • Logistics.
    • Equipment, Vehicles, and Supplies. Depending on the priority in equipment issue, RC units may not have the latest or AC-equivalent equipment, as well as individual equipment items.

    • Licensing. RC units must know, as early as possible, the special licensing requirements needed to operate equipment in the specific theater. The units should integrate licensing requirements as part of their training.
  • Training.
    • RC units may require new equipment training, especially in new communication equipment and specific ADP software programs.
    • The sharing of unit SOPs and forms, mission-specific documentation, and unique staff procedures before deployment decreases integration time and leads to mission success.

5-51. For further information, see FORSCOM Regulation 500-3-3, FORSCOM Mobilization and Deployment Planning System (FORMDEPS), Volume III, Reserve Component Unit Commander's Handbook (RCUCH). Also see JP 4-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve Component (RC) Callup.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

5-52. CA soldiers must not appear to be active intelligence gatherers. They do, however, have unique information requirements (IRs)--items of information on the enemy and his environment that may affect mission accomplishment. Before deploying into any AO--whether by friendly agreement, as part of a liberating force, or in an occupational role--CA units develop specific CA-unique IRs. The necessity to gather information on the target area and its people and on source material and agencies relevant to the operation is essential to mission preparation and execution. The CA functional specialists provide broad guidelines for CA IRs, including--

  • Topography, hydrography, climate, weather, and terrain, including landforms, drainage, vegetation, and soils.
  • Census, location, ethnic composition, and health factors of the population.
  • Attitude of the population, including ideological, religious, and cultural aspects.
  • Government structure, including forms, personalities, existing laws, and political heritage.
  • Educational standards and facilities and important cultural activities and repositories.
  • Communications, transportation, utility, power, and natural resources.
  • Labor potential, including availability by type and skill, practices, and organizations.
  • Economic development, including principal industries, scientific and technical capabilities, commercial processes, banking structure, monetary system, price and commodity controls, extent and nature of agricultural production, and accustomed population dietary habits.
  • Cores of resistance movements.
  • Organization and operation of guerrilla forces in rear areas and the extent and degree of volition involved in local support.
  • Hostile activities, including espionage, sabotage, and other factors of subversion and disaffection.

CA Collection Plan

5-52. The CA collection plan is predicated on priority intelligence requirements (PIR)--those critical items of information the commander needs at a particular time to reach a logical decision on what COAs to adopt to best accomplish his mission. The collection plan provides a systematic analysis of requirements and identifies the assets or resources for procuring the required information. (NOTE: Assets are organic to the unit; resources are not.) Once the staff analyzes the commander's PIR, the CA G2 or his collection manager prepares the collection plan for integration into the overall OPLAN.

5-53. The CA unit G2 or S2 normally directs and supervises the collection effort. He prepares collection plans, usually with the intelligence officer (S2 or G2) or collection manager of the supported command. In addition, the CA unit G2 or S2 prepares an intelligence collection plan for his own HQ.

5-54. A sound collection plan that effectively uses collection assets results in a large volume of information. The extent to which the CA G2 or S2 processes the information depends on the--

  • Size of his staff.
  • Proximity and availability of other intelligence-processing agencies.
  • Desires of his commander.

5-55. The intelligence officer maintains files, a journal, worksheets, and a situation map with overlays as required by the mission.

CA Intelligence-Collection Requirements

5-56. CA intelligence planning identifies the collection assets or resources for collecting intelligence to satisfy CA requirements. The CA G2 or S2 forwards those requirements that organic CA assets cannot answer to the supported command's G2 or S2. Channeling intelligence requirements through the G2 or S2 ensures that--

  • Intelligence requirements are tasked to the proper agencies.
  • CA-specific IRs are integrated with other IRs.
  • Duplication of effort is minimized.
  • Intelligence requirements are coordinated with other sources.
  • Intelligence requirements receive proper command emphasis.

5-58. During intelligence planning, the CA staff analyzes PIR and IRs to determine the information needed and the priority of need for each information item. The CA staff also determines--

  • Indicators that answer the intelligence requirement.
  • Sources and agencies that can best answer each intelligence item.
  • The media that can properly disseminate the information.

COMMUNICATIONS

5-59. Civilian agencies normally communicate via handheld Motorola-type radios, commercial telephone (landline, cellular, and global), and the Internet. Military organizations communicate via the Single-Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), satellite communications, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), commercial telephone, and automated systems--such as the LAN, WAN, and Internet.

5-60. CA forces coordinate with military and civilian agencies (Figure 5-7). They have a limited organic capability in all forms of communications and, thus, require significant augmentation from their supported command. By TOE, CA units are authorized SINCGARS radios and laptop computers with access to the Internet. Specific requirements beyond these capabilities are determined during mission analysis and forwarded to the supported command as a statement of requirements (SOR).

Figure 5-7. CA Communications Requirements

FORCE PROTECTION

5-61. Force protection is a paramount concern of all commanders. Every CINC and major subordinate command has standing force protection rules that must be fully understood and adhered to by all personnel. USASOC has force protection requirements as well. CA forces must incorporate these requirements in their planning to ensure compliance.

5-62. CA forces are most effective working in small units that interact with a wide variety of agencies, civilian and military. This interaction implies a degree of risk higher than the risks encountered by conventional forces. The risks can, however, be mitigated by a thorough analysis of the environment as it relates to mission requirements and by strict adherence to resultant force protection measures. The force protection requirements of the supported command may prove to be less than optimal for the CA team mission. It may, for example, be culturally inappropriate and counterproductive for CA personnel in full combat attire to conduct liaison with local officials. In such cases, the senior CA officer should coordinate with the supported commander to formulate plans that lead to mission success while allowing for cultural sensitivities.

5-63. CA forces, at a minimum, must abide by the guidelines for ROE and force protection. For further information, see Appendix G of USASOC Directive 525-13, Force Protection.

5-64. Deployed commanders and individuals will, within 72 hours of arrival, report to their higher SOF HQ--through administrative channels--on the sufficiency of ROE and force protection measures in the AO, in terms of the following questions:

  • ROE -- Do the ROE of individual or unit self-defense prevent the safeguarding of cryptographic materials and sensitive communications equipment?

  • OPSEC -- Is unclassified information disclosed that could compromise the mission? Is the unit continually evaluating essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) countermeasures for applicability?

  • Physical Security (PHYSEC) -- Is access to unit and individual work and billeting areas controlled? Are other safeguards--such as guards, barriers, or patrols--available, if necessary? Do local PHYSEC measures match the terrorist threat condition (THREATCON)?

  • Personal Security (PERSEC) -- Can the unit or individual vary routines? As far as the mission permits, can individuals blend with the local environment? Do simple ROE exist?

  • Law Enforcement -- Does liaison exist with local law enforcement? Are law enforcement capabilities sufficient to counter the anticipated threat? Are the locations of civilian police, military police, government agencies, the U.S. Embassy, and other safe locations available? Can the unit maintain points of contact with foreign organizations in the deployment area?

  • Antiterrorism -- Is an updated threat briefing available? Does a plan exist for coping with a terrorist attack? Has the plan been rehearsed? Does an alert system exist? Can the unit reduce signature where possible? Is a means in place to identify the location of all personnel at all times? Is the two-man rule in effect?

5-64. If measures are insufficient, the report must include measures taken locally to remedy the problem and, if external support is required, to solve the problem. Reports must be updated weekly or when the THREATCON changes. For further information, see USASOC Directive 525-13.



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