Military

7-1. To be successful in battle, commanders must make sound decisions rapidly. Battle staffs assist the commander in making these decisions and translating them into coherent changes to the concept of support. Units must act quickly and decisively once changes are received to maintain logistical support.

7-2. This chapter describes C4ISR techniques and procedures that exploit the unique capabilities of digitized forces. It will assist the battalion commander and his battle staff in realizing the advantages of automated information exchange during the planning, preparation, and execution phases of combat operations.

7-3. Battle command is the art and science of battle decision-making and leading. It includes controlling operations and motivating soldiers to accomplish the mission. Armed with the knowledge of the current state and the desired end state, commanders visualize those actions necessary to achieve the desired future state and then translate that battlefield visualization into action. It also includes the following:

• Assigning missions.

• Prioritizing and allocating resources.

• Selecting the critical time and place to act.

• Knowing how and when to make adjustments during the fight.

7-4. The ABCS is designed to provide the commander and his battle staff with the needed information to effectively plan, coordinate, control, and direct the battle. To achieve the desired actions the battle staff utilizes the army battle command systems (ABCS), which includes the global command and control system-Army (GCCS-A), the army tactical command and control system (ATCCS) of which CSSCS is the CSS component, and the Force XXI command brigade and below (FBCB2) system. The ABCS provide the battle staff with the information they require to ensure the battalion commander sees the battlefield with unprecedented clarity in near-real time.

7-5. The key echelon in knowledge base is the battalion HQ. Currently, FBCB2 data is received at MCS. The information is provided to the battalion TOC via the tactical internet. From the battalion it is transmitted to the companies for their common, relevant picture and brigade, for its knowledge base. This system places a significant burden on the battalion battle staff to analyze and move information from one location to the other.

7-6. The definition of battlefield visualization is the process whereby the commander develops a clear understanding of the current state with relation to the enemy and environment, envisions a desired end state which represents mission accomplishment, and then subsequently visualizes the sequence of activities that moves the commander's force from its current state to the end state.

7-7. Battlefield visualization is the mental process that supports the commander's decision-making process and his ability to anticipate support. Using a vision of proposed support of the battle allows the commander to know when, where, and if a decision should be made. It is a continuous process that commences with the receipt of the first warning order and continues through the end of an operation. It provides the key to where and how the commander can best support the maneuver brigade.

7-8. Digital information systems have the capability of providing a clearer picture to the commander. Digital systems enhance the commander's ability to have an understanding of the current state of friendly and enemy forces. This extends beyond the knowledge of their physical location and includes environmental, readiness, and human considerations. It includes the ability to see and understand the dynamic relationship between opposing forces as the commander leads his forces through the sequence of events.

7-9. The available digital information systems enhance the commander's situational awareness by providing him with an unprecedented level of friendly and enemy information. Commanders must recognize that the common relevant picture that is produced by a myriad of information systems represents both known and estimated information, and is possibly flawed by human input. The commanders must tailor this information with his judgment, intuition, and experience.

7-10. The C2 system refers to the arrangement and functions of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures a commander employs in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of a mission. The C2 are two dependent concepts that have distinctive meanings rather than one word or system. Command is the art and science of assigning missions, prioritizing resources, guiding and directing subordinates, and focusing the entire division's energy to accomplish clear objectives. Control is defining limits, computing requirements, allocating resources, prescribing requirements for reports, monitoring performance, identifying and correcting deviations from guidance, and directing subordinate actions to accomplish the commander's intent. The C2 system must support the ability of the commander and his battle staff to anticipate plans for future operations even while focusing on current support requirements. The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence.

7-11. There are two types of control; procedural and positive. The ABCS will allow us to move from procedural to positive control. Procedural control is indirect. Commanders use regulations, policies, doctrine (principles and graphic control measures), techniques and procedures, and SOPs to impose procedures that control subordinate unit actions. Digitization of the battalion's C2 systems will increase the commander's situational awareness and reduce the requirement for excessive control measures. Positive control requires the active involvement of all leaders. The dangers of positive control are that it will also lend itself to information overload, increase in fatigue, and the risk of allowing the commander to over control the situation. Commanders must guard against robbing subordinates of their latitude by micromanaging the movement of small units. For further information concerning C2 refer to FM 6-0 (100-34) (Command and Control).

7-12. The common relevant picture is derived from multiple databases and can be tailored to specific unit needs. The systems that provide input to the commander's maneuver control system (MCS) terminal include the following:

• FBCB2. Provides situational awareness of friendly ground maneuver elements from individual weapons platforms through battalion echelons with near-real time information. Unit databases continuously exchange information producing the common relevant picture. The friendly situation is automatically updated with current unit locations, their CP locations, and logistical status.

• ASAS. Combines the information from many sources to include space and aerial platforms, sensors, and reports from other units, human intelligence, and information derived from computer-assisted intelligence analysis to provide a detailed picture of the enemy's situation and intent.

• CTIS. Engineer terrain visualization gained through combined terrain information system (CTIS) and MCS will allow the commander to view terrain represented digitally in three dimensions, showing percent of slope, types of vegetation and trafficability and other man-made features (including known and templated obstacles).

7-13. The ATCCS with MCS as the central focus at the battalion level will enhance mission planning, rehearsal, and execution. Simulation will facilitate the decision making process by assisting the commander in the wargaming process and evaluating courses of action. The MCS will also allow the commander to conduct rehearsals remotely using distributed communications on digital terrain. During execution of the operation, MCS provides the commander the tools to monitor, coordinate, and revise execution across the entire spectrum of his battlespace.

7-14. The key to the experienced and intuitive commander's effective exercise of battle command is information management. All information that is produced and processed, whether by automated or manual information systems, has one overriding purpose, and this is to help the commander formulate and answer sustainment requirements and then make timely decisions.

7-15. The digital information system employed by the commander and battle staff is as sophisticated as the weapon systems they employ. The information available to the commander is only valuable if it can be focused to a manageable level. Information that the battle staff generates focuses on and is driven by the CCIR. The commander and his battle staff prepare it. They are based upon the commander's continuously evolving vision for the concept of support (current, future, and sequel to the future) and the commander's continuing, independent estimate of the situation. The battle staff supports the commander's development of CCIR, develops the common relevant picture in response to the CCIR and other parameters the commander identifies. The battle staff manages the type and volume of information fed to the commander based upon satisfying the commander's CCIR. In response to the CCIR, information systems focus on getting the right information to the commander or decision maker as soon as possible. The battle staff processes most information into an information product (knowledge) that enables the commander to quickly grasp the meaning of the information and its impact. This should not imply that the commander does not receive any unanalyzed data. He does, in the form of spot reports, situation reports and other combat information from his subordinate commanders.

7-16. The use of CCIR focuses the information gathering process for the battle staff. It is that information which the battle staff will notify the commander, regardless of his location or time. They vary with each phase of an operation and consist of only those essential information requirements that the commander must know to make a decision concerning logistical support of a particular phase of a battle. The battle staff must continuously update the CCIR so that they are current with the ongoing operation. The following sources normally feed the CCIR:

• Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) - What we want to know about the enemy?

• Essential elements of information (EEI) - Crucial information on enemy and environment needed by commander by a specific time.

• Essential elements of friendly information (EEFI) - How the enemy sees the friendly unit?

• Friendly forces information requirement (FFIR) - Information commander needs on forces available for the operation such as personnel, maintenance, supply, ammunition, POL, experience and leadership capability.

7-17. How can the commander anticipate logistics requirements to best support the maneuver brigade's combat mission? The CCIR allows the commander to define information needs and, in turn, focuses the battle staff (and subordinate commanders) on information acquisition, fusion, and analysis. The CCIR can be further described as being:

• Logistics preparation of the battlefield (LPB) process.

• Dependent upon the situation.

• Specified by the commander for each operation or phase.

• Generally time-sensitive in terms of the decision point on a decision support template or the event requirements of the synchronization matrix driving their collection.

• Applicable only to the commander, who specifies and publishes them; normally published in the applicable operations plan/order; and transmitted via specified means.

• A link between current, future, and sequel to the future operations.

7-18. Logistics preparation of the battlefield is the process of gathering data against pertinent battlefield components, analyzing their impact on sustainment, and integrating them into tactical planning so that support actions are synchronized with maneuver. It is a conscious effort to identify and assess those factors, which facilitate, inhibit, or deny support to combat forces. Just as intelligence preparation of the battlefield is important to the conduct of actual combat operations, logistics preparation of the battlefield is equally important to sustaining the combat power of the force. Although it may be true that even the most optimal support plan may not win the battle, it is also true that poorly planned support can certainly lose it. Working together leaders must synchronize support actions with maneuver in a unified plan so that logistics is a factor in the success of a mission rather than a cause of failure. In addition to mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available and civilians (METT-TC), logistics preparation of the battlefield focuses on determining the status and impact of the specific components that make up tactical logistics. It assesses how time and space requirements and restrictions of the battlefield affect support. This logistics preparation of the battlefield shows how battlefield data, when systematically collected and processed, provide meaningful information for the development of effective logistics estimates.

7-19. The process requires tacticians to understand the data needed by logisticians to plan and provide timely, effective support. It requires TF logisticians to understand the mission, the tactical plan, and the battlefield's time and space implications for support. It is a coordinated effort to prepare the battlefield logistically. The basic steps in systematizing the process are:

• Determine battlefield data pertinent to support actions.

• Determine sources from which raw data can be derived.

• Gather pertinent data.

• Analyze collected data elements and translate them into decision information by assessing their impact on the mission and the competing courses of action.

• Integrate decision information into tactical planning by incorporating it in logistics estimates and TF plans and orders.

7-20. When determining what battlefield data are relevant to sustainment, it's helpful to break down combat service support (CSS) operations into certain key elements against which data can be collected for study and analysis. These data elements are called the components of tactical logistics. The following descriptions of the components of tactical logistics are not intended to be all-inclusive. They are offered here, however, to stimulate thought and to facilitate an understanding of those factors that impact on tactical logistics support:

• Logistics resources are the wherewithal to effect support, including CSS organizational structures, command and control, task organizing for support, communications, information automation systems, medical facilities, and materiel such as transportation assets and supply, maintenance and field services equipment.

• Logistics capabilities include soldier and leader skills and the personnel staffing which, collectively, activate logistics resources and bring to life the required support. Capabilities are degraded in adverse situations such as severe climatic conditions, night operations, or elevated mission-oriented protective postures (MOPP).

• Logistics capacities include reception and clearance capacities, carrying capacities of transportation assets, volumes of storage facilities, maintenance production output rates, and supply route characteristics such as surface composition, tunnels, overhead obstructions, bridge weight limits and traffic circulation rates.

• Materiel stocks include the quantity and status of weapon systems, ancillary equipment, ammunition, repair parts and consumable supplies required or available to sustain or reconstitute combat power of deployed units. Also included are logistics status reports and known or projected shortfalls.

• Consumption and attrition rates include experienced or expected usages of consumable supplies and weapon systems that must be considered to anticipate support requirements.

• Time and space factors are those requirements and restrictions of the battlefield that influence whether logistic support is provided to deployed forces at the right place and time. Included here are plans, orders, rehearsals, priority of support, positioning for support, tempo of support (intensity of demand), security, risk assessment, the effects of terrain, weather, contaminated areas, minefields, nighttime enemy threat on logistics operations, and the battlefield signatures of logistic resources. Time and space factors, especially, impact on the synchronization and integration of logistics on the battlefield.

7-21. Sources from which relevant battlefield data are derived include:

• Higher headquarters briefs, plans and orders.

• The commander's planning guidance. This is made up of the restated mission, initial concept of the operation, scheme of maneuver, deception objective, rear operations priorities, time plan, type of order to be issued, and type of rehearsal (backbrief, reduced force, full force). It may indicate what support tasks are required before, during, and after the mission.

• The commander's intent (or concept). The intent may indicate when and where support actions are to be synchronized with maneuver, thereby suggesting logistics triggering mechanisms.

• Operations and intelligence briefings and overlays. These provide locations of friendly and enemy forces, weather, terrain, likely logistics release points, resupply routes and distances.

• Modified table of equipment (MTOE) of task force units. These provide data on logistics resources, capabilities and capacities.

• Logistics status reports. These reports from CSSCS and FBCB2 provide data on the readiness of primary weapon systems and materiel stocks.

• Scouts. They are especially helpful if the need to gather data against the components of tactical logistics is included in their collection requirements (such as airlift resupply landing zones).

• Engineer route reconnaissance overlays.

• Traffic circulation and highway regulating plans.

• Personal reconnaissance. Logistics battlestaff members may be required to collect data on likely resupply routes, obstructions, bridge weight limits or the composition of streambeds.

7-22. Logisticians routinely apply, more or less, available battlefield data in developing logistics estimates without thinking of it as a formal process. By focusing on the components of tactical logistics while collecting, analyzing, and applying this critical information in planning, logisticians systematically help prepare the battlefield for their commanders. These lessons are offered to stimulate a reciprocal understanding among tacticians and logisticians of the interdependency that exists between maneuver and support in planning, preparing, and executing combat missions.

7-23. Logisticians should treat the components of tactical logistics as essential factors that should be assessed for each plan. By doing so, they bring a professional approach to the contributions they make in the planning process. The components are variables. Some are dynamic and change with METT-TC so they should be validated daily, even hourly, if necessary. Commanders should appreciate the unique contributions their logisticians make in the planning process and when they've done a thorough job of collecting and analyzing pertinent battlefield data. Commanders must not accept less. The lessons that follow show how the components of tactical logistics relate to the sustainment imperatives of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness and improvisation, see Chapter 1. They also show how the components of tactical logistics are used in developing effective logistics estimates.

7-24. The commander and staff conduct LPB. Successful LPB contributes immeasurably to the favorable outcome of battle. Logistics preparation of the battlefield is an on-going process by which logisticians analyze:

• Tactical commander's plan/concept of operation.

• Tactical commander's intents.

• Supported force CSS requirements.

• Available CSS resources.

• Combat service support shortfalls.

• The enemy (intentions, capabilities, weaknesses, doctrine).

• Terrain and weather.

• Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products.

• Transportation infrastructure.

• Host nation support available.

• Time/distance factors.

7-25. Logistics preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products are:

• A logistics estimate.

• A visualization of the pending battle and logistics activity required by phase of operation.

• Anticipated logistics challenges and shortfalls.

• Solutions to logistics challenges and shortfalls.

• How, when, and where to position logistics units to best support the tactical commander's plan.

• A synchronized tactical and logistical effort.

7-26. The battalion commander appoints an information manager because of the importance and amount of information in the digitized FSB. The information manager oversees the battle staff in the processing of information to support the operation and that feeds the force level knowledge system. Because the CCIRs are directly linked to current, future, and sequel operational situations and previously identified decision requirements, the XO ensures that the battle staff collects, analyzes, and presents information meeting the CCIRs on a timely and accurate basis. In particular, he supervises the FSB TOC in maintaining and disseminating the brigade's knowledge base, which is a logical database that contains information meeting the commander's common relevant picture requirements. The common relevant picture is a comprehensive view of the commander's battlespace, consisting of a graphic portrayal of the enemy and friendly situation on the same display. In the digital CP, these are typically computer-generated flat board displays. The operations section of the TOC CP generates specific requests for information from BOS or other sources to answer the commander's CCIR. The S2/S3 or support operations section generates requests to answer specific planning questions. Specific queries can be initiated within MCS and CSSCS or flags placed on select information to ensure that it is rapidly forwarded to the commander.

7-27. The two types of support operations are shown below. These operations include regular resupply of all classes of supply:

• Mission support. Mission support is designed for a specific maneuver operation. The designated maneuver CSS elements conduct mission support to ensure maximum unit resources is available to support the fight and the specific operation is not hampered by a lack of supply support.

• Continuous Support. Continuous support operations keep the maneuver unit's resources sustained over a period of time. Continuous support operations are conducted as close to the supported unit as practical.

7-28. For classes of supply other than ammunition, basic loads are supplies kept by units for use in combat. The quantity of each item of supply in a basic load is based on the number of days the combat unit may have to sustain itself without resupply and on available transportation assets. For ammunition, the basic load is the quantity of ammunition required to be on hand to meet combat needs until resupply can be accomplished. The basic ammunition load is specified by the Army service component commander/Army forces commander (ASCC/ARFOR) and is expressed in rounds, units, or units of weight, as appropriate.

7-29. Mission loads consist of those materials required for a specific mission (for example, a standard fixed minefield). The basic load can be used for missions to save time; however, it is to be replenished from the materials in the mission load.

7-30. Mission loads are a BN/TF responsibility regardless of the command and support relationships, they normally stretch or exceed the transportation assets of the BN/TF and the HDC S&T platoon. Palletized standard loads/flat racks help solve the planning and distribution problem. Class IV/Class V resupply for the defense is one of the most demanding mission load operations the BN/TF must carry out and requires all the assets that can be made available. A total cooperative effort by the BN/TF, including engineers, is required if the defense is to be adequately resourced.

7-31. There are ten classes of supplies. During defensive operations Class IV/Class V supplies require special engineer considerations. During offensive operations Class III(B) requires special consideration.

7-32. Class I consists of subsistence and gratuitous health and welfare items. Quantities are determined by the unit strength sent forward on digitized reports.

7-33. Organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE) support is not normally available at battalion. The supply and transportation (S&T) platoon of the HDC in the FSB provides supply point distribution of limited quantities of OCIE in the BSA. The HDC also provides supply support for other Class II items, such as tentage, tool sets, and administrative and housekeeping supplies. These items are moved to forward locations when dictated by the tactical situation and METT-TC.

7-34. Class III consists of POL, including petroleum fuels, lubricants, hydraulic and insulating oils, preservatives, liquids and gases, bulk chemical products, coolants, deicer and antifreeze compounds. Refueling operations are conducted using a combination of unit distribution and supply point distribution.

7-35. Cache or throughput to the barrier site of Class IV is a procedure used in preparation for defensive operations. The following items are normally throughput from corps assets based on unit requirements:

• Construction materials.

• Barrier materials.

7-36. Technological advancements in real-time forecasting of Class V sustainment requirements allow more effective planning of this support. In addition, throughput distribution of Class V items, packaged to weapon system requirements reduces the need for stockage of ammunition at ammunition supply points (ASP) and the resultant use of ammunition transfer points.

7-37. This class covers personal demand items, such as candy, and toiletry articles that are normally sold through the exchange system during peacetime. In a combat environment, these items are sent with Class I as health and comfort packs (sundry packs).

7-38. This class includes major end items. These are major pieces of equipment, assembled and ready for intended use, such as radios, tool sets, combat vehicles, and other major end items. Major end items that are destroyed or become inoperative are reported immediately to CSSCS using the FBCB2 LOGSITREP. The supporting CSS unit replaces them as they become available.

7-39. This class includes medical equipment sets and their components, and medical supplies which are provided through the FSMC of the FSB. Included are individual medical supplies such as first-aid dressings, refills for first-aid kits, water purification tablets, and foot powder. Combat Lifesaver bags are reported to CSSCS in the FSB support operations using the FBCB2 LOGSITREP .

7-40. Repair parts are stocked at FSC and BSC maintenance platoon level based on usage requirements (shop stock and PLL). The FSC and BSC maintenance control section manages repair parts. The FBCB2 equipped brigade obtains repair parts either from the Class IX supply point in the HDC or by throughput from other echelons of supply support organizations. Parts are moved forward to the combat repair teams location during routine logistics package (LOGPAC) operations or as required. The maintenance platoons request Class IX items (less reparable exchange) and major Class IX subassemblies, such as engines and transmissions, by submitting requests to the supporting FSC or HDC supply and transportation platoons.

7-41. Class X consists of materials and all other classes of supply to support nonmilitary programs, such as agriculture and economic development.

7-42. A logistics release point (LRP) is the point along the supply route where the supported unit meets the supporting unit to transfer supplies. Likely functions performed at the LRP are:

• Synchronization.

• Load adjustment and cargo diversion.

• Transfer of responsibility.

• Updating battlefield intelligence.

• Driver briefing/vehicle maintenance.

• Decision making/C2 node.

• Link-up point for convoy guides.

• Empty flatrack backhaul.

• Human remains transfer.

7-43. Within a division's battlespace, one LRP is normally established in the vicinity of the BSA for each FSB, one for the DSB, and one for the DASB. Additional LRPs may be established based on METT-TC.

7-44. Optimally, the LRP is located along a well-protected supply route. The exact location takes advantage of cover and concealment. The LRP is large enough to accommodate expected inbound and outbound convoys under all weather conditions. At the LRP, dry cargo, liquid cargo, and flatrack transfer may occur. Trailer transfer may occur also. If practical, convoys may proceed past the support area LRP to the vicinity of the supported unit where supplies are then transloaded on to customer vehicles or downloaded on to the ground. When rotary wing aircraft are available for logistics resupply, the forward LZ may also be at or near the LRP.

7-45. Logistics release point security and C2 are critical. Routes into and out of each LRP must be secure. Security arrangements must be preplanned, synchronized, and executed. Convoys must include self-protection measures such as a combination of gun trucks, military police escort vehicles, armed helicopters, and combat vehicle escorts. Field artillery, engineer, and air defense unit support may also be required.

7-46. Logistics release point C2 considerations include:

• Which HQ is in charge?

• Assured, secure communications.

• Dissemination of LRP location to all CSS and supported units.

• Requirement for LNOs from supporting and supported units.

• Twenty-four hour operations.

• Situational awareness and situational understanding mechanism.

• Decision making authority or access to key decision makers.

• Need for linguists at LRPs.

• Location(s) of future LRPs.

• Frequency of LRP displacement.

7-47. Flatrack collection points are predetermined points conveniently located to facilitate the harvesting and management of common user flatracks. Flatrack employment, management, and retrograde operations are the responsibility of distribution managers integrated at each echelon of support throughout the distribution pipeline. For detailed flatrack management operations and reporting procedures see the moving the force section in CSS operations chapter of this manual.

7-48. Proposed FRCP locations are identified and reported to higher headquarters early in the planning process. Exact locations are reported immediately upon occupation. FRCP location considerations include:

• Collocation with existing logistical nodes (SSAs, ATP vicinity, other supply points and collections points) or consolidation with other FRCPs on an area basis

• Access to supply routes (MSRs/ASRs), feeder routes to supply routes, and traffic circulation

• Maximize force protection, cover and concealment, and other security resources

7-49. A company uses voice or digital means to request resupply and report status. The method used is determined after an analysis of the factors of METT-TC. The two distribution methods of resupply are:

• Supply point. Supply point distribution requires unit representatives to move to a supply point to pick up their supplies.

• Unit. Unit distribution provides delivery of supplies directly to the unit. A unit representative meets the resupply package at the LRP and guides the package to the company's position.

7-50. Throughput to forward areas leverages configured loads, containerization, information, force structure design, technological enablers, and command and control relationships to deliver sustainment from the operational level directly to the customer or its direct support unit. Throughput bypasses one or more echelons in the supply system to minimize handling and speed delivery forward. Direct throughput relies on unity of command and situational awareness.

7-51. The tactical situation will dictate which technique of resupply the company will use: tailgate, service station, a variation of one type, or a combination of both types. The situation will also dictate when to resupply. Generally, the company should attempt to avoid resupply during offensive operations; resupply should be done during mission transition. Resupply is unavoidable during defensive missions of long duration.

7-52. In the tailgate technique, fuel and ammunition trucks, which have been handed off to the platoon sergeants (PSGs), are brought to individual vehicles. This method is used when routes leading to vehicle positions are available, and the company is not under direct enemy observation and fire. It is time-consuming, but it is useful in maintaining stealth during defensive missions because the vehicles do not have to move. If necessary, certain supplies can be hand-carried to vehicle positions to further minimize signatures. See Figure 7-1.

7-53. In the service station technique, vehicles move to a centrally located point for rearming and refueling, either by section, platoon, or an entire company. Service station resupply is inherently faster than the tailgate method, because vehicles must move and concentrate, however, it increases the security risk. See Figure 7-2.

7-54. A company commander can vary the specifics of the two basic techniques, or he can use them in combination for various platoons. During a defensive mission, for example, he may use the tailgate technique for selected forward observation post (OPs), and the service station method for the remainder of the company located in their positions. See Figure 7-3.

7-55. Immediate resupply, normally involving Classes III, IV, and V, is executed when the company has such an urgent need for resupply that it cannot wait for the routine LOGPAC. Immediate resupply procedures start with the redistribution of supplies, for example, the redistribution of ammunition in individual vehicles, followed by cross leveling of ammunition within the platoon. It is better to have four Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) with 50 rounds of 25-millimeter ammunition each than two BFVs with 100 rounds and two others with none.

7-56. The commander, XO, or 1SG transmits a "call for support" for Class III/IV/V through FBCB2, FM, MSE, or most expedient means to the support operations section of the FSB. Immediate supplies are brought forward by the S&T platoon of the HDC. Based on the enemy situation, the platoon may conduct resupply while in contact with the enemy. Two techniques are used to resupply platoons in contact:

• Limited supplies are brought forward to the closest concealed position, where the tailgate technique of resupply is used.

• Individual vehicles or sections disengage and move to a resupply point, obtain their supplies, and then return to the tactical mission. This is a version of the service station technique.

7-57. The planning for offensive operations must be well developed and complete. Accurate offensive CSS planning and tracking of consumption will reduce the requirement for immediate resupply to the individual combat vehicle. Conducting sustainment operations during the offensive is critical to the success of the attack. By identifying the point of consumption by the warfighters, the brigade S4 and FSB support operations will be able to position mission tailored support.

7-58. The two most critical supplies for offensive operations are Class III and V, but all aspects of support must be addressed. The FSB support operations will direct the movement of resources to designated LRPs to resupply planned or forecasted requirements, as stated in the logistics support matrix. The resupply of the FSCs may come from the HDC, BSC, DSB, or directly from corps.

7-59. The FSB commander may find it necessary to echelon his assets to better support the maneuver brigade operation.

7-60. The brigade S4 produces the CSS overlay. The FSB commander and the support operations personnel assist with this overlay. The overlay ensures that both the supported units and the FSB know the location of all support assets in relation to the maneuver units and maximize the support given.

7-61. The CSS defensive plans are developed to support the defensive battles and facilitate rapid transition to the offensive. Defensive operations take many forms. They range from static, relying on firepower from fixed positions, to wholly dynamic, based on maneuver to disrupt and destroy the attacking force. Combat service support commanders must be involved early in the defensive planning. This allows for planning for the right support and to anticipate changing priorities. Planning considerations that should be addressed while planning for defensive operations are:

• Plan for the support to be provided to the covering force and the counter recon units.

• Anticipate the amounts of ammunition, fuel, food, and barrier material that must be delivered and have it positioned forward at LRPs to minimize resupply turn around times.

• Conduct resupplies operations during periods of limited visibility to the maximum extent possible to reduce the CSS signature and the opportunity for enemy observation and interference.

• Develop control measures that will allow the support personnel to switch from a support role to defense, force protection, and survivability operations at the appropriate time.

7-62. For defensive operations, throughput supply will be used to expedite deliveries as far forward as possible. Class IV will be pushed from corps directly to the emplacement site. The Class III(B) resupply of the FSCs may come from the HDC or directly from corps. Class V is given the highest priority of all critical supplies during defensive operations. The increased expenditures of ammunition will significantly impact transportation assets.

7-63. In the same manner as described in the offensive operation paragraph, the brigade S4 must prepare the CSS overlay. This overlay should have everything on it that the offensive overlay had with the addition of any LRPs designated and the locations of any prestockages of Class IV (barrier material) and Class V.

7-64. There is an increased likelihood of U.S. Forces fighting in urban environments that is the preferred battlespace for many potential adversaries. Most wars have included major battles in and around urban areas with U.S. deployments being centered on or in the vicinity of urban areas. The CSS organizations must have the capabilities to support units in combat and peace operations in urban environments. Mechanized and armored divisions, although not ideally suited for urban operations, may have to conduct various missions in or in the vicinity of urban areas.

7-65. The MOUT is a significant challenge for CSS personnel to prepare for. Commanders identify those cities in their areas of responsibility that could become urban battlefields and direct their staffs to prepare detailed studies for those possible contingencies. Developments and refinements in force structure, equipment design, and CSS procedures support the tactical mission. During MOUT, the terrain and the nature of the operations create unique demands on support units and operations. The CSS units must be included in joint and multinational urban warfare training. Increased ammunition consumption, high casualty rates, and transportation difficulties resulting from rubble and the decentralized nature of operations all make CSS challenging.

7-66. Historically, urban combat operations have required a significant amount of time and quantities of ammunition and other CSS. Assaults on cities cause heavy military and civilian casualties and shattered cities resulting in increased stress on CSS systems. The DISCOM may be called upon to supply food, shelter and public safety services to indigenous populations.

7-67. Knowledge of the urban battlespace as it pertains to logistics preparation of the (urban) battlefield (LPB) is critical in terms of the following:

• Supported commanders' intents and concepts of operation.

• Transportation infrastructure (air, rail, waterways, pipelines, subway).

• Telecommunications and automation network posture.

• Traffic patterns/flow/selection of main and alternate supply routes.

• Local resources with military sustainment value.

• Local population sentiments (friendly/non-friendly).

• Contracting, bartering, and trading capabilities.

• The CSS commanders' access to intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) products.

7-68. Other CSS factors in an urban environment:

• Expect increased consumption of small arms ammunition and explosives.

• Expect increased consumption of precision munitions.

• Expect decreased consumption in certain large-caliber and area-type munitions.

• Expect increased usage of non-lethal munitions.

• Expect increased aerial resupply requests.

• Expect increased medical workload (increased casualties).

• Expect increased mortuary affairs workload.

• Routes within an urban area can be denied easily.

• Movements control is more complex.

• Force protection of CSS nodes and convoys is exacerbated in urban areas. Vertical ambushes and other terrorist-type attacks are real threats to CSS activities. Close fight may be fought between 1st and 2nd floors of a building.

• Smaller resupply vehicles (HEMTT/PLS) may be in greater demand than tractor-trailers.

• Gun trucks are required to protect convoys.

• Expect the operation to be asymetric (not linear) and multi-dimensional (building tops can be the high ground).

• Adequate CSS C4ISR may be nearly impossible within a large urban area. Avoid sites where communications are severely degraded.

• Urban areas afford numerous CSS hide locations (warehouses/industrial parks).

• Understanding The Law of Land Warfare (FM 27-10) and applicable rules of engagement (ROE) are imperative.

• Expect refugee and displaced person sustainment missions.

• Expect support requirements from other services, combined or coalition organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and private volunteer organizations (PVOs).