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Military

Chapter 2

CSS in Unified Action

As emphasized throughout this manual, the Army does not operate alone. In today's world, the U.S. military conducts joint operations and often participates in multinational and interagency operations. Therefore, a great degree of coordination, cooperation, integration, and unity of effort in combat service support (CSS) operations is imperative for success. This chapter addresses Army CSS participation in joint and multinational operations. This information is consistent with joint and multinational doctrine.

 

CONTENTS
Joint Logistics and Personnel Operations
The Army Role in Joint Logistics and Personnel Operations
Multinational CSS Operations

 

JOINT LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

 

2-1. Per JP 4-0, each service is responsible for the logistics and personnel support of its own forces, except when support is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or multinational partners, or by assignment to common, joint, or cross-servicing support arrangements. The combatant commander may determine that common servicing would be beneficial within the theater. If common servicing is more beneficial, the combatant commander may delegate the responsibility for providing (or coordinating) that support for all service components in the theater (or designated area) to the service component that is the dominant user, or most capable of providing that service.

2-2. Joint logistics and personnel support and Army CSS are inherently linked, although there are slight differences in their functions. Figure 2-1 shows the differences between joint logistics and personnel support functions, and Army CSS functions. Joint logistics and Army CSS include supply, services (the Army calls them field services), maintenance, transportation, and health service support (which Army doctrine defines slightly differently than joint doctrine). Additionally, joint logistics include general engineering, which is not an Army CSS function. Army CSS includes explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), which is not a joint logistics function. Under joint doctrine, personnel support includes legal, religious, and finance support as functions. Army CSS doctrine uses the term human resource support but lists legal, religious, financial management, and band support as separate functions.

Joint Logistic
Functions
Combat Service Support
Functions
Supply
Services
Maintenance
Transportation Health Services Support
General Engineering
Supply
Field Services
Maintenance
Transportation
Health Service Support
Explosive Ordnance Disposal
Human Resource Support
Legal Support
Religious Support
Financial Management
Band Support
Joint Personnel
Functions
Personnel Support
Legal Support
Religious Ministry
Financial Management

Figure 2-1. Relationship between Joint Logistics and
Joint Personnel, and CSS Functions

RESPONSIBILITIES

 

2-3. Planning, preparing for, and executing joint logistics begin at the top level of U.S. military. This section discusses the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, service component commanders, and joint land force component commanders.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

 

2-4. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible for preparing joint logistics and mobility contingency plans, and for recommending the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those plans. He is also responsible for advising the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) on manpower and personnel issues affecting the readiness of the armed forces and the force structure required for attaining national security objectives.

Combatant Commander

 

2-5. For a combatant commander, there are three important facets of CSS: command, management of CSS operations, and execution of support operations.

2-6. Command. First, CSS is a function of command. In the logistics area, the combatant commander's directive authority for logistics meets this principle. The combatant commander's directive authority includes issuing subordinate commanders' directives, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure-

  • Effective execution of approved operation plans (OPLANs).
  • Effectiveness and economy of operation.
  • Prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities.
  • Avoidance of the overlapping of functions among the service component commands).

The combatant commander's directive authority for logistics cannot be delegated, except for common item support. When the combatant commander gives a service component common-user logistics (CUL) responsibilities, he must specifically define the responsibilities. On the personnel side, the combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) of the combatant commanders allows them to direct and approve the aspects of personnel support necessary to carry out assigned missions and to standardize personnel policies within the command, as necessary, to carry out assigned missions.

2-7. Management. Joint doctrine describes several techniques for managing/controlling joint logistics and personnel operations. JP 5-00.2 discusses how a joint task force (JTF) manpower and personnel directorate (J1) handles manpower and personnel, and also establishes a joint reception center (JRC), as described in JP 1-0. The logistics directorate (J4) manages logistics operations, including establishing a logistics readiness center (LRC). JP 4-0 describes the boards and centers that J4s may use to monitor and coordinate logistics activities. It also describes how a joint force commander (JFC) may establish in OPLANs a joint theater logistics management (JTLM) element to fuse movement control and materiel management to synchronize the capabilities of the joint force. In addition to the JRC and a JTLM element, potential joint logistics centers, offices, and boards include-

  • Joint movement center.
  • Subarea petroleum office.
  • Joint civil-military engineering board.
  • Joint facilities utilization board.
  • Combatant commander logistics procurement support board.
  • Theater patient-movement requirements center.
  • Joint blood program office.
  • Joint mortuary affairs office.
  • Global patient-movement requirements center.
  • Joint materiel priorities and allocation board.
  • Joint transportation board.

2-8. Execution. Services and service components execute CSS functions. Title 10, United States Code (10 USC), and JP 0-2 specify that individual services retain responsibility for logistics support. However, CUL support may be controlled and provided by other means. Authority for such arrangements may come from four sources:

  • DOD executive agent directives and instructions.
  • Interservice support agreements (ISSAs).
  • Acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs).
  • Combatant commander's OPLANs, orders, and directives.


Note: Logistics DOD executive agent directives and instructions are normally focused on strategic-level activities, but they may be directly related to CUL-related functions in a particular joint or multinational operation. In all U.S. military operations, the geographic combatant commander is responsible for ensuring that the specific CUL responsibilities are clearly delineated within his area of responsibility (AOR).


 

2-9. Options for executing logistics support to a joint force include any combination of the following:

  • Single service component dedicated support-each service component supports its own forces.
  • Lead service or agency support-a lead service or agency provides common user/item support to one or more service components, and governmental or other organizations. In some operational situations, lead service support may include operational control (OPCON) or tactical control (TACON) of other service logistics organizations.

2-10. JP 4-07 has more information on these authorities and options.

Service Component Commander

 

2-11. Service component commanders normally provide personnel support to service forces assigned to joint commands. When service representation within an area of operations (AO) is limited, the joint force J1 coordinates appropriate personnel support through other service components.

Joint Force Land Component Commander

 

2-12. Establishment of a joint force land component may influence the process of providing CSS to a joint force. When a JFC decides a joint force land component is required, he establishes it. The joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is normally the commander of the ground component (Army or Marine Corps) that has the preponderance of land forces. The JFC makes the JFLCC responsible for-

  • Recommending the proper employment of land forces.
  • Planning and coordinating land operations.
  • Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.

2-13. While the JFLCC is responsible for conducting (planning, preparing, executing, and assessing) land operations, the responsibility for CSS to joint/multinational land forces remains primarily with the service components. The individual service component commands retain overall responsibility for providing logistics and personnel support to their own forces, unless otherwise directed. The JFLCC J1 and J4 provide critical functional expertise to the JFLCC in the areas of personnel and logistics. These primary staff officers focus on key personnel and logistics issues that may have a significant effect on the land portion of the campaign. Generally, they manage by exception. Routine administrative/personnel and logistics management are the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate service component commands. The JFLCC only becomes involved in logistics and personnel issues that the individual services are unable to resolve on their own and that have a direct impact on the ground portion of the campaign.

2-14. Normally the JFLCC J1 and J4 do not participate in the JFC boards and centers; these are predominately service responsibilities. The JFLCC J1 and J4 may participate on JFC boards and centers when there are issues critical to conducting ground operations. This JFLCC participation is separate and distinct from the service component participation. The joint transportation board and joint movement center may have a significant impact on the ability of the JFLCC to execute ground operations successfully. When there are logistics issues that only affect ground operations, the JFLCC J4 may elect to convene a board or center to coordinate the ground logistics effort or prioritize scarce resources. Separate JFLCC boards and centers are established by exception only. Existing JFC boards and centers should be the normal forum to facilitate ground operations.

CUL Responsibilities

 

2-15. Service component forces, especially the Army service component command (ASCC), as well as agencies such as the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) are often required to provide significant levels of CUL support to other service components, multinational partners, and other organizations (such as nongovernmental organizations [NGOs]). Army echelons above corps (EAC) support units (such as the theater support command [TSC]) normally provide Army CUL support; however, these actions are carried out under the auspices of the ARFOR commander and are not a JFLCC responsibility.

JOINT LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL PLANNING

 

2-16. Joint logistics and personnel activities are complicated operations that can enhance or hinder a combatant commander's combat power. An understanding of the combatant commander's concept of operations and early involvement by the joint logistics and personnel staffs ensure that theater deployment and sustainment requirements are balanced with the right type and amount of joint logistics and personnel capabilities. This balance allows successful accomplishment the mission. Logistics and personnel planning are the responsibility of the combatant commander, in close coordination with the services, defense agencies, and multinational partners.

2-17. Proper joint logistics and personnel planning, adequate resource availability, and transportation assets reduce the need for emergency measures and improvisations, which are usually expensive and often have an adverse effect on subordinate and adjacent commands. Joint logistics and personnel planners avoid focusing solely on the deployment problem at the expense of sustaining the employment portion of the campaign. Planners identify critical issues distinct to a specific OPLAN they must support. These issues include the increased demand associated with an expanding force, critical supply items, constrictive distribution bottlenecks, control of all means of transportation, and the provision of supplies and services.

2-18. The combatant commander's strategic and operational joint logistics and personnel planning focuses on the ability to generate and move forces and materiel into the theater base and on to desired operating locations, where the operational CSS concepts are employed. The service components perform tactical logistics planning. JP 1-0, JP 4-0, and JP 5-0 provide guidance on joint CSS planning.

THE ARMY ROLE IN JOINT LOGISTICS AND PERSONNEL OPERATIONS

 

2-19. The ASCC commander exercises administrative control (ADCON) over all Army forces within the combatant commander's AOR. The ASCC commander is responsible for preparing, training, equipping, administering, and providing CSS to Army forces assigned to combatant commands. The ASCC commander is responsible for providing ARFOR to subordinate joint forces, including CSS forces and support resources to support those subordinate joint forces. The ASCC commander is also responsible for meeting any CUL requirements within a particular joint force and tailors the ARFOR accordingly.

2-20. The ASCC is responsible for all Title 10 functions within the combatant commander's AOR.


Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Army is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Army, including the following functions:
    (1) Recruiting.
    (2) Organizing.
    (3) Supplying.
    (4) Equipping (including research and development).
    (5) Training.
    (6) Servicing.
    (7) Mobilizing.
    (8) Demobilizing.
    (9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).
    (10) Maintaining.
    (11) Construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.
    (12) Construction, maintenance, repairs of buildings and structures, utilities, acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.

10 USC


 

2-21. The ASCC commander's principal CSS focus is on operational-level CSS. Operational-level CSS focuses on theater support involving force generation and force sustainment. Chapter 4 discusses functions associated with operational-level CSS.

2-22. Support stems from a variety of sources, including contractors, DA/DOD civilians, U.S. and allied military organizations, and host-nation support (HNS) resources.

2-23. The ASCC commander focuses on generating and moving forces and materiel into theater as well as sustaining these forces during campaigns and other joint operations. In all joint operations, coordinating and executing CSS operations is a service responsibility unless otherwise directed by executive agent directives, combatant commander lead service designations, or ISSAs. The ASCCs, in concert with their associated geographic combatant commanders, are responsible for identifying CSS requirements, coordinating resource distribution from the strategic base, allocating necessary CSS capabilities, and establishing requisite Army CSS command and control (C2) relationships within the theater. Furthermore, the ASCC commander is responsible for properly executing all Army lead service or ISSA-related CUL requirements within the theater.

2-24. An ARFOR is designated whenever Army forces are involved in an operation. Even if separate Army forces are conducting independent operations within a joint operations area (JOA), there is only one ARFOR headquarters in that JOA. ASCCs, numbered Army, and corps headquarters (with augmentation) are capable of serving as ARFOR headquarters. In certain small-scale contingencies, a division headquarters may be designated as ARFOR headquarters; however, a division headquarters requires extensive augmentation for this mission.

2-25. Within the context of the JFC's plan, the ARFOR headquarters conducts both the operational and tactical-level sustaining operations to include-

  • Support of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I) operations.
  • Tactical-level CSS.
  • Distribution management operations, to include synchronization of materiel management and movement control.
  • Support to reconstitution of Army units.
  • Execution of CUL support responsibilities.
  • Security of CSS, maintenance of the lines of communication (LOC), and C2 of tactical combat forces (TCFs).

2-26. Within the JFC's framework of responsibilities, the ARFOR headquarters carries out planning responsibilities associated with CSS, as well as assigned lead service support to other services and organizations. The support structure starts with a nucleus of minimum essential support functions and capabilities focused on force generation within the theater. As the deployed force grows, the support structure gains required capabilities. The theater support structure must provide support to the engaged forces; to units in (or passing through) the communications zone (COMMZ); and to other units, activities, forces, and individuals as the JFC directs.

2-27. ARFOR include the tactical-level CSS organizations (discussed in chapter 4) that provide support to tactical forces. The ASCC commander tailors an ARFOR to its mission, providing any EAC-level support organizations it requires. These may be the multifunctional TSC as well as specialized engineer, finance, medical, personnel, and transportation EAC-level commands. (FM 4-93.4 discusses the early entry and buildup of the TSC.) Each of these Army EAC support units is structured to deploy tailorable, early-entry, functional modules during the early stages of force projection operations. These tailored organizations give the ARFOR commander the requisite CSS functional expertise and C2 capabilities to execute operational-level support missions assigned to the ARFOR. Furthermore, these modular organizations may expand as necessary to provide the proper level of support for each operation or phase. Additionally, the DLA and the U.S. Army Materiel Command (USAMC) may provide support teams that expand the functional expertise and service capabilities of the ARFOR. When tailoring an ARFOR, the ASCC commander balances the ARFOR's tactical and operational requirements against other support requirements, such as CUL.

2-28. The ASCC commander ensures that the ARFOR not only has adequate operational-level CSS capability to meet both Army Title 10 and lead service requirements, but also has adequate C2 and staff capabilities to plan, prepare for, execute, and assess operations to meet them. This is especially significant when a tactical-level unit, such as a division or corps, is the foundation of the ARFOR. In these situations, the ASCC/ARFOR commander may choose to establish a single operational-level support headquarters to assist in planning and executing Army Title 10 and CUL functions. The TSC, in many cases, is the preferred building block for such a headquarters. However, it could be built on other support commands, such as an engineer command (ENCOM) or area support group (ASG). In any case, staff representatives or liaison personnel from other attached support units, other services as appropriate, and multinational partners, as required, should staff the operational-level support command. Chapter 4 contains more details on the role of the ASCC and TSC.

2-29. Although CSS is a service responsibility, the Army has been designated to provide certain support to other services and organizations in a variety of Department of Defense directives (DODD). As previously noted, these directives focus on strategic-level activities, but they may be related to CUL support in a specific operation. Normally EAC support organizations provide this support. As stated above, a corps or division as the ARFOR may provide very limited support depending on the size and scope of the mission, but either will most likely require augmentation. Support to other services and organizations must be coordinated with all responsible agencies and integrated into the support plan. Table 2-1 lists tasking documents and responsibilities assigned to the Army on a relatively permanent basis. However, the support responsibilities of the Army vary for each of these. In addition, despite these guidelines, the geographic combatant commander retains the authority to assign lead responsibility for a specific operation to the service or agency to best meet the operational requirements.

Table 2-1. Representative Army Lead Responsibilities for Support to Other Services and Agencies.
Tasking DocumentSupport Responsibility
SECDEF MemoVeterinary Support including food inspection
DOD MemoMortuary Affairs
DODD 1315.6Troop Construction Support to OCONUS USAF
DODD 2310.1Executive Agent for DOD Enemy Prisoner of War Detainee Program
DODD 4500.9Common-User Land Transportation in Overseas Areas
DODD 4500.9Intermodal Container Management
DODD 4500.9Overseas Ocean Terminal Operations
DODD 4525.6Management of Military Postal Services
DODD 4705.1Executive Agent for Land-Based Water Resources
DODD 5030.49Executive Agent for the Customs Inspection Program
DODD 5160.65Management of Conventional Ammunition
DODI 4140.50Locomotive Management
DODD 4140.25Management of Bulk Petroleum Products, Natural Gas, and Coal
SECDEF MemoExecutive Agent for the Joint Mortuary Affairs Program

 

2-30. A combatant commander may designate a service, usually the dominant user or most capable service/agency, to provide other common item/service support (see JP 4-07). ARFOR CUL functions may include-

  • In-theater receipt, storage, and issue Class I, II, III (B), IV, VIII and IX, and water during wartime.
  • Medical evacuation (ground and rotary-wing aircraft) on the battlefield.
  • Transportation engineering for highway movements.
  • Finance, banking, and currency support.
  • Processing and settlement of claims by (or against) the United States, as designated in DODD 5515.8.
  • Settlement of Federal tort claims by employees.
  • Unexploded ordnance (UXO) disposal.
  • Controlled disposal of waste explosives and munitions.
  • Mortuary affairs support.
  • Providing airdrop equipment and systems.
  • Billeting, medical, and food service support for transient personnel during other-than-unit moves.
  • Handling of hazardous materials (HAZMAT).

MULTINATIONAL CSS OPERATIONS

 

2-31. Army forces support multinational operations throughout the world. They operate in alliances and coalitions. A major objective when Army forces participate in multinational CSS operations is to maximize operational effectiveness while improving cost effectiveness and economy of effort for all nations involved.

2-32. In multinational operations, CSS is primarily a national responsibility. However, relations between the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies have evolved to where CSS is viewed as a collective responsibility (NATO Military Committee Decision [MCD] 319/1). In multinational operations, the multinational commander must have sufficient authority and control mechanisms over assets, resources, and forces to achieve his mission. It would be very inefficient and expensive for each nation of an alliance or coalition to perform CSS functions separately. This separate support would also hinder the multinational commander's ability to influence and prioritize limited CSS resources to support the operation and accomplish the mission.

2-33. The focus of multinational CSS operations is integrated, coordinated, and cohesive support. Major challenges of multinational CSS may include differences in language, doctrine, stockage levels, mobility, interoperability (especially of automated C2 systems), infrastructure, standards of support, and national resource limitations.

2-34. Support provided and received in multinational operations must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. For example, 10 USC, Chapter 138, authorizes exchanging support between U.S. services and those of other countries. It authorizes DOD acquisition from other countries by payment or replacement-in-kind, without establishing a cross-servicing agreement. CSS authorized under 10 USC, Chapter 138, does not include major end items, missiles, or bombs. It does include food, billeting, petroleum, oils, transportation, communications services, medical services, ammunition, storage, spare parts, maintenance services, and training.

2-35. Under ACSA authority (10 USC 2341 and 2342), the Secretary of Defense can enter into agreements for the acquisition or cross-service of logistics support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange-for-equal-value basis. These agreements may be with eligible nations and international organizations of which the United States is a member. An ACSA is a broad overall agreement that is generally supplemented with an implementing agreement (IA). The IA contains points of contact and specific details of the transaction and payment procedures for orders for logistics support. Neither party is obligated until the order is accepted.

2-36. Under these agreements, common logistics support includes food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications services, medical services, ammunition, base operations, storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, calibration services, and port services. Items that may not be acquired or transferred under the ACSA authority include weapon systems, major end items of equipment, guided missiles, nuclear ammunition, and chemical ammunition (excluding riot control agents).

2-37. Typically, multinational operations occur within the structure of a coalition or alliance, both of which provide challenges for executing common support. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. It is clearly the more challenging common support environment. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (such as treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members (JP 1-02). NATO is an example of an alliance. No single command structure fits the needs of all alliances or coalitions and various models could evolve depending on the operation.

COALITIONS

 

2-38. Coalitions normally form as a rapid response to unforeseen crises, for limited purposes and for a limited length of time. Many coalitions are formed under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). The UN does not have a military organization and, therefore, no preplanned formal military structures.

Parallel Command

 

2-39. During the early stages of a contingency, nations rely on their own military command systems to control the activities of their forces. Hence, the initial coalition arrangement most likely involves a parallel command structure. (See FM 3-0, para 2-50.) Under a parallel command structure, the coalition does not designate a single, multinational commander. Member nations retain control of their own national forces, and the coalition partners write a plan effecting coordination among the participants. Parallel command is the simplest to establish. While other command structures may emerge as the coalition matures, the parallel model is often the starting point. For multinational CSS operations, the parallel command structure is the least effective.

Lead Nation Command

 

2-40. As the coalition matures, members often opt to centralize their efforts by establishing a command structure built around the structure of one of the nations. If nations are very similar in cultures, doctrine, training, and equipment, or if extensive cooperative experience exists, an integrated command structure may be effective. This direct approach requires each armed force to receive, understand, plan, and implement missions in the same manner as the other nations. This is known as lead nation command (FM 3-0, para 2-51). The lead nation command structure concept recognizes one nation in the lead role and its C2 system predominates.

2-41. Other nations participating in the operation provide liaison personnel to the lead nation headquarters. The lead nation commander, working in close coordination with the commanders of the other national contingents, determines appropriate command, control, communications, intelligence, and CSS procedures. Robust liaison is essential to develop and maintain unity of effort in multinational operations. Staff augmentation may also be required if a partner has unique organizations or capabilities not found in forces of the lead nation. This augmentation provides the commander with a ready source of expertise on the respective partners' capabilities during planning and execution.

Role Specialization

 

2-42. Although not a command structure, role specialization is a method used in multinational CSS operations to maximize unity of effort and efficiencies for the multinational force. In role specialization, one nation or organization assumes the sole responsibility for procuring and providing a particular class or subclass of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Normally performed at EAC, role specialization may be executed at a lower level, depending on the size of the force. Role specialization is normally used for a finite mission and time because of the great burden it places on the nation or organization. If properly planned and negotiated, this approach promotes greater efficiency if one multinational force member-

  • Is already well established in the area.
  • Has contractual arrangements in place.
  • Has a unique relationship with the populace
  • Has a much greater capability than other nations.

ALLIANCES

 

2-43. Alliance participants establish formal, standard agreements for broad objectives. Alliance nations strive to field compatible military systems, follow common procedures, and develop contingency plans to meet potential threats. As forces of these nations plan and train together, they develop mutual trust and respect.

2-44. An alliance may use an integrated staff, instead of merely augmenting the staff of one nation's organization with other national representatives. Each primary staff officer could be a different nationality; usually the deputy commander represents a major participant other than the lead nation. An integrated staff demonstrates the burden sharing and commitment of the partner nations. An alliance organized under a multinational, integrated command structure provides unity of command. The NATO command structure is a good example. NATO has a single commander, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR), who is designated from a member nation. His staff and the subordinate commands and staffs several tiers removed (EAC, corps, and below) are multinational and multi-Service. The key ingredients in an integrated alliance command are a single designated commander, a staff comprised of representatives from all member nations, and subordinate commands and staffs integrated to the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission.

2-45. In most recent operations, the United States has operated within the NATO alliance, which has a military organization to support its political goals. The United States has also agreed to various NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs) and NATO MCDs that enhance interoperability. For example, NATO MCD 389 addresses the emergence of smaller, but diverse and unpredictable risks to peace and stability. In particular, the committee agreed that future security arrangements would require easily deployable, multinational, multi-Service military formations tailored to specific kinds of military tasks. These include humanitarian relief, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement, as well as collective defense. The forces required would vary according to the circumstances and would need to be generated rapidly at short notice.

2-46. Effective command and control arrangements are essential to allow multinational JTFs to operate effectively. A multinational JTF headquarters is formed around core elements from selected parent headquarters. NATO headquarters and other contributing partner countries augment it as necessary, using a modular approach, to meet the requirements of the specific mission.

2-47. NATO's multinational JTF attains a much higher degree of multinational integration than previous attempts. This is true both in the number of existing and emerging multinational units and in the deeper multinational integration at lower levels of command. Consequently, CSS systems and structures must adapt to that reality. To assure the enhanced logistics authorities and responsibilities of NATO commanders and enable NATO headquarters at the different levels of command to coordinate logistics support properly within their AO, the NATO nations developed the Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC). The MJLC provides structural and procedural tools for the NATO commander to exercise his logistics authorities and responsibilities in an effective and well-coordinated fashion.

MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS PLANNING

 

2-48. Maximum unit effectiveness requires commanders to assemble the optimal array of support assets, relationships, and procedures. To do this, commanders must concurrently analyze engineer support of the multinational force with mission clarification and force composition. Commanders must emphasize their analyses of coalition/alliance member capabilities and willingness to support organic elements and other force components equally with combat planning.

2-49. Staffs should evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations and, when situations permit, agree on which nations will provide support functions for the multinational force, and the procedures and methods for how to provide the support. (See JP 3-16 and FM 100-8 for multinational operations doctrine. See JP 4-08 for logistics support to multinational forces doctrine. See Allied joint publication [AJP] 4, and Allied logistics publication [ALP] 4.2 for NATO logistics support operations doctrine, to include employing an MJLC.)

 



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