Appendix G
Multinational Considerations
GENERAL
G-1. To most effectively exploit the capabilities of multinational land forces, the multinational force commander (MNFC) normally designates an overall land component commander (LCC). The LCC must shift focus, tailor forces, and move from one role or mission to another rapidly and efficiently. In the absence of an LCC, the MNFC must plan, direct, and control land operations. Due to the complexity and fluidity of land operations, designation of an LCC may provide the MNFC greater flexibility to conduct multinational operations. Multinational force considerations consist of coalition and alliance operations. Each coalition or alliance will create the structure that best meets the needs, political goals, constraints, and objectives of the participating nations.
G-2. In alliance operations, such as those conducted by NATO, there are normally existing land commands that serve as the JFLCC or coalition force land component command.
G-3. In coalition operations, which are ad hoc, the JFC/coalition force commander (CFC) has the option to establish a land component command. When the JFC/CFC establishes a land component command, then the LCC and his staff must be aware of a myriad of additional issues that the JFLCC does not deal with because of the nature of coalition warfare. These issues include but are not limited to
C2considerations.
Intelligence sharing.
Operational constraints.
ROEs.
Logistics.
G-4. To be successful in coalition operations, it is imperative that sound and effective command relationships are developed. The national authorities providing forces to the coalition normally assign national forces under OPCON/TACON of the CFC. The assignment of these national forces under OPCON/TACON may be qualified by caveats from the respective nations in accordance with their national policies. Further assignment to functional component commanders in an OPCON/TACON status by the CFC is subject to approval by the respective NCA.
LAND COMPONENT COMMAND HEADQUARTERS AND STAFF
G-5. The establishment of the land component command headquarters will most likely be based on the structure of the JFC headquarters. It may be a lead or framework nation headquarters, a parallel command structure, or both depending on the command structure of the coalition itself. In the lead or framework nation concept, appropriate C2, communications, and intelligence procedures are determined by the lead or framework nation, working in close consultation with the other national contingents. In coalition operations, unity of effort must be achieved. The principle of unity of command also applies, but this principle may be more difficult to attain.
G-6. Depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff augmentation from other national contingents may be required to supplement the lead nation LCC staff to ensure that the lead nation headquarters is representative of the entire coalition. Such augmentation may include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates the planning process by providing the LCC with a source of expertise on coalition members. Augmentation is required if a coalition partner possesses unique organizations or capabilities not found in the forces of the lead nation.
G-7. The LCC staff should be composed of appropriate members in key positions from each country having forces in the coalition. Positions on the staff should be divided so that country representation and influence generally reflect the composition of the force, but are also based in part on the mission and type of operations to be conducted. Coalition commanders must also look at force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support. The importance of knowing, trusting, and quickly reaching a comfort level with staff members may make it desirable for the LCC to handpick some members of his staff, such as the chief of staff or G-3.
COMMAND FOCUS
G-8. Successful coalitions are built on the commander's focus on the political objective, assigned mission, sensitivity to the needs of other coalition members, a willingness to compromise or come to a consensus when necessary, and mutual confidence.
G-9. The intangible considerations that guide the actions of all participants, especially the senior commander, are rapport, respect, knowledge of partners, team building, and patience. These factors cannot guarantee success for the coalition, but ignoring them can usually guarantee failure of the coalition in accomplishing its mission.
COORDINATION AND CONTROL
G-10. There are two essential structural enhancements that improve control of coalition forces: the establishment of a liaison network and coordination centers. Regardless of the command structure established, the need for effective liaison is vital in any coalition force.
G-11. The use of liaison is an invaluable confidence-building tool between the coalition force and subordinate commands. It also fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitates the transfer of vital information, enhances mutual trust, and develops an increased level of teamwork. It is also a significant source of information for the LCC about subordinate force readiness, training, and other factors. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures. Once established, the liaison teams are the direct representatives of their respective commanders.
G-12. Another proven means of enhancing stability, synchronization, deconfliction, and interaction and improving control within a coalition is the use of a coordination center. Coalition forces should routinely create such a center in the early stages of any coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. The coordination center can be used for C2, and variations can organize and control a variety of functional areas, including logistics and civil-military operations. Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, host-nation support, and movement control. However, as a coalition matures, the role of the coordination center can be expanded to include command activities. When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide action officers who are familiar with its activities. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters. Early establishment and staffing of skilled personnel adds to the success of such centers.
STANDARDIZE PROCEDURES
G-13. All coalition force troops must fully understand the mission, goals, and objectives of the operation. SOPs should be established.
G-14. SOPs should be clear and easy to understand. When there is a lead nation, its SOP is used for most purposes. The coalition force must remember that many countries are not staffed or equipped to offer a full spectrum of support. They may not possess a full array of combat support or combat service support assets, maps of the projected AO, or the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other coalition forces. These military forces probably will look to other nations for equipment and supplies. It is important to know what agreements exist with these forces before their arrival in the projected AO.
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND DISSEMINATION
G-15. As every coalition is different, so too are the ways in which intelligence is collected and disseminated within the coalition. LCCs may use existing international standardization agreements to establish rules and policies or may tailor rules and policy based on theater guidance and national policy as contained in National Disclosure Policy 1. The following general principles provide a starting point:
Maintain unity of effort.
Make adjustments.
Plan early and plan concurrently.
Share all necessary information.
Conduct complementary operations.
G-16. Classification may present a problem in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as feasible improves interoperability and trust within the coalition. The commander must know what his own and other nation's positions are on intelligence sharing. Early sharing of information during planning ensures that coalition requirements are clearly stated, that guidance supports the commander's intent, and the coalition uses procedures supportable by other nations.
G-17. An intelligence operational architecture must be established. A land component command intelligence center is necessary for merging and prioritizing the intelligence requirements. A standardized methodology for disseminating and exchanging intelligence is required as well as the exchange of intelligence liaison personnel. In some situations, there may be more than one level of intelligence required.
COMMUNICATIONS
G-18. The capability to communicate is fundamental to successful operations. Key to successful communications is the preparation during planning. The mission analysis and assessment process provides the opportunity for the land component command communications officer to identify communication requirements and evaluate in-country capability. Many communication issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. Continual liaison between communications planners helps alleviate interoperability issues.
G-19. Communication requirements vary with the mission, composition, and geography of the land component command AO. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. The land component command force should address the need for integrated communications among all forces early in the planning phase of the operation. Communications should be provided between the land component command and its coalition land subordinates, which may go through national contingent headquarters. In MOOTW, it is important to communicate with civilian agencies. In the transition phase/planning, the communications transition may involve follow-on units, commercial communications, or agencies like the United Nations being considered early in the operation
G-20. The LCC should plan for adequate communications to include the ability to communicate using voice (secure and nonsecure), data, and video teleconferencing. The LCC needs a deployable communications capability and enough trained operators for sustained operations, with multiple means of communication to avoid the possibility of a single-point failure.
INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES
G-21. Each participating nation provides its own distinct forces and capabilities to a coalition. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, and equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. The orchestration of these capabilities into land component command operations is dependent on differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine. If other nations are also involved, these differences will be much greater. Understanding these differences is the difference between success and failure in coalition operations. Units of the same type in one nation's army may not perform the same functions as units in another army. An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another may be limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.
G-22. The LCC must integrate these capabilities to achieve the desired end state. Selecting the right mix is a challenge. The coalition staff must be proactive in understanding the capabilities and limitations of the nations in the coalition force. Representatives of each nation must be present during planning. If a unit is given a mission it is incapable of performing, the plan will not work. National representatives can ensure that taskings are appropriate to the force. If possible, national representatives should be available in each staff element. They must be thoroughly familiar with their nation's capabilities and limitations.
RULES OF ENGAGEMENT
G-23. ROEs are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which forces or actions may or may not be applied. Although the participants may have similar political mandates, each nation is likely to come to the coalition with different national ROEs reflecting its reason for entering the coalition. Some national ROEs are relatively free of constraint while others may be severely constrained. In many cases, commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROEs should be sought, but may not be achievable.
G-24. The LCC needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROEs that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies. For the individual soldier to understand and implement ROEs, they must be clear and simple. Trying to obtain concurrence for ROEs from national authorities is a time-consuming process and should be addressed early in the planning process.
G-25. When consensus on ROEs cannot be achieved, the commander must consider how to employ multinational forces within their own ROEs.
LOGISTICS
G-26. Logistics are more complex in multinational operations and require more planning and coordination than that of a single nation. Although logistics is the overall responsibility of each contributing nation, some force-contributing nations do not have the assets to provide and/or transport their own logistical support when deployed and therefore must rely on nations with these capabilities. In these cases, the LCC must coordinate required support to both military and civilian organizations within the guidelines and plans of the higher level multinational command. Support may include both deployment and sustainment. For deployment, close liaison with theater airlift C2can assist in coordinating approval and facilitating airlift once approved. When support is required, ensure funding lines are clearly identified.
G-27. Unity of effort is essential to land component command logistics operations; however, multinational logistics planning is primarily the responsibility of the lead C-4, not land component command C-4. This requires coordination not only between nations, but also with civilian agencies in the AO. The execution of land component command logistics may be a collective responsibility, but must be coordinated and planned within the higher level multinational command guidance. When possible, mutual land-operations-oriented logistics support should be developed for economy of effort. Land component command logistics should be flexible, responsive, predictive, and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire force. The land component command logistics plan should incorporate the logistics requirements and capabilities of all land forces to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. Consensus on land component command logistics issues and requirements should be formed early. This requires thorough knowledge of coalition force doctrine and good relations with subordinate commanders and civilian leaders as well as cooperation and continuous coordination between all elements providing logistics support and the operational elements. This must begin during the initial planning phase and continue through the operation's termination. (Refer to JP 4-08 for further discussion.)
G-28. It is essential that logistics be planned for the entire coalition force with a single command providing as much control as possible and within the limitations of interoperability. The creation of a single coalition logistics command provides economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if coalition participants insist upon maintaining a national logistics structure, assigning a lead for logistics responsibility precludes duplication of effort. The G-4/S-4 should establish a planning group to define the extent of interoperability that exists between coalition forces. Funding authority to support coalition forces should be identified as early as possible and procedures developed to ensure there is no adverse impact on operations.
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