Military

C-1. Organizing FA units for combat is guided by five fundamentals remembered by the memory aid AWIFM:

• A—Adequate FA support for committed units.

• W—Weight the main attack in the offense or the main effort in the defense.

• I—Immediately available FA support for the commander to influence the action.

• F—Facilitate future operations.

• M—Maximum feasible centralized control.

C-2. The following is an example of an FA organization for combat with an explanation of the use of the five fundamentals.

C-3. On D-Day, H-hour, the corps conducts the main attack (with the 32d Mechanized Division [Mech Div]) in the center sector and the 35th Mech Div (-) conducts the supporting attack to secure the corps eastern flank. The 309th ACR guards the corps western flank where the corps is accepting risk. The 23d Armored (Armd) Div will follow the main attack as the corps reserve and the 1st Brigade (Bde)/35th Mech Div will be the corps TCF.

C-4. The corps troop list includes the FA formations shown in Figure C-1.

C-5. FA support is most responsive to committed maneuver elements when given a DS tactical mission. In this scenario, all maneuver units are initially committed with the exception of the 23d Armored Division as the corps reserve. Not changing the command relationship or assigning a tactical mission to the div artys provides adequate FA support for committed units. The div artys automatically assume the tactical mission of DS and the ACR howitzer batteries remain under the control of the ACR commander. The TCF is considered a committed unit and has its habitually associated DS battalion for support. An example organization for combat is provided in Figure C-2.

C-6. This fundamental is implemented by assigning a tactical mission of R or GSR to FA units to provide additional responsive fires for subordinate elements (Table C-3). It can also be implemented by providing positioning guidance to FA units and assigning azimuths of fire to concentrate fire in the main attack sector or zone. This allows units with the tactical mission of GS to add weight to the main attack or strength to the defensive main effort. In this scenario, the corps commander adds weight to the main attack by assigning an R tactical mission to one of his FA brigades. Since the corps commander gave the FA brigade a tactical mission of R, the FA brigade commander cannot sub-assign tactical missions to the attached battalions unless specifically authorized by the corps commander. The only way that div arty commanders can sub-assign tactical missions to battalions in an FA brigade is if it is attached to the division. (Note: Only changes or additions are shown in Figure C-3; a complete roll-up will be at the end of this example).

C-7. The force FA commander (in this scenario the corps FA commander) should retain direct control over some artillery which the force commander can use to influence the action. This is accomplished by assigning GS, GSR, or nonstandard tactical missions to artillery units. In the scenario, two new units have been placed under corps control. Additionally, the commander continues to add weight to the main attack by assigning a GSR tactical mission to the 23d Div Arty in support of the 32d Div Arty as shown in the example in Figure C-4.

C-8. This fundamental guarantees the smooth transition from one phase to another. Assigning o/o tactical missions, positioning artillery, and allocating CSS resources accomplish this. On-order tactical missions help units anticipate FA support needs in future situations. Another method of facilitating future operations is to modify the current tactical mission by anticipating future requirements such as limiting ammunition expenditures relative to the CSR. Examples of possible o/o tactical missions are included in Figure C-5.

C-9. FA is most effective when control is centralized at the highest force level. Centralized control of FA allows flexibility in its employment to the force as a whole. However, this scenario is based on an offensive situation calling for as much reinforcing fire as possible based on the fact that friendly forces have a good knowledge of the enemy situation and positions. In the scenario the corps has given up most of its artillery and has only retained two MLRS battalions and the 23d Armd Div Arty. (Even with a GSR tactical mission in support of current operations, corps arty retained centralized control while weighting the main attack.) If this were a defensive scenario, then more of the 63d FA Bde would be kept under corps control (GSR instead of R), giving the corps commander the flexibility to respond to a less defined enemy situation. The final FA organization for combat in this scenario is shown in Figure C-6.