Military

B-1. FM 2-01.3 explains the IPB process in detail. The commander uses IPB to understand the battlefield and the options it presents to friendly and threat forces. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific area. By applying the IPB process, the commander gains the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space on the battlefield. Airspace, or the aerial dimension, is the most dynamic and fast paced of the three dimensions. The intelligence staff must consider all the aspects of air operations and must be aware of the capabilities of all air threats, to include UAVs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, TASMs, and rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft. The G2 and S2 have overall staff responsibility for IPB. ADA and aviation officers must provide input to the G2 and S2 when integrating air aspects into the IPB process. The IPB process has four steps:

• Define the battlefield environment
• Describe the battlefield's effects
• Evaluate the threat
• Determine threat courses of action

B-2. Since terrain, weather, and other characteristics of the battlefield have different effects on air operations and AMD operations, aerial IPB differs from ground IPB. Enemy forces must be evaluated in relation to the effects that weather, terrain, and friendly operations will have on them. The most significant threats that must be evaluated for aerial IPB are UAVs, ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Aerial IPB is an integral part of the IPB process at all levels.

B-3. The battlefield includes aerial dimensions to an area of operations, battle space, and an area of interest. Therefore, each of these parts of the battlefield framework may be different from that of ground force operations.

B-4. The air area of operations is the area where the commander is assigned responsibility and authority for military operations. It usually is, but does not necessarily need to be, identical to the ground area of operations in width and depth. It extends vertically up to the maximum altitude of friendly ADA systems.

B-5. Battle space is a physical volume that expands or contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy. It varies in width, depth, and height as the commander positions and moves assets over time. Battle space is not assigned by a higher commander and can extend beyond the commander's area of operations.

B-6. The area of interest is the geographic area and the airspace above it from which information and intelligence are required to facilitate planning or successful conduct of the commander's operation. Because the commander and staff need time to process information and plan and synchronize operations, the commander's area of interest is generally larger than the area of operations or battle space. It is also larger due to the great distances that air and missile systems can rapidly cover. The air area of interest will extend vertically to cover the maximum service ceilings or trajectories of aircraft, UAVs, and missile systems. Horizontally, it will extend to cover the maximum range of aircraft, UAVs, and missiles, plus threat airfields, forward arming and refueling points, navigation aids, and missile sites. The area of interest extends to the limits from which intelligence and information must be gathered about enemy forces, which could affect friendly forces.

B-7. The effects of terrain and weather on the enemy and friendly forces must be analyzed. They are different than the effects on ground operations.

B-8. Terrain analysis in support of air and missile defense is significantly different from terrain analysis for ground operations. The nature of airspace does not eliminate the need for terrain analysis because enemy air and friendly ADA will still attempt to use terrain to their own best advantage. IPB focuses on the impact of geographic factors on the ability of threat air to approach, acquire, and engage a target, or deliver airborne or air assault troops. Analysis of the terrain for IPB follows the same principles as ground analysis and uses the military aspects of terrain (OCOKA).

B-9. These aspects relate to the influence of terrain on reconnaissance and target acquisition. In the IPB context, observation relates to optical and electronic line of sight. Many battlefield systems require line of sight to effectively operate or acquire and engage targets. These systems include radios, radars, jammers, direct-fire weapons, and airborne and ground sensors as well as friendly ADA systems. Fields of fire relate to the terrain effects on weapon systems. Airspace must be analyzed with regard to routes, which provide the best protection for air threats entering the target area, and those, which provide the best fields of fire once they reach the target area.

B-10. Cover and concealment have slightly different applications with respect to air systems. The following tactics and techniques fall into the context of cover and concealment:

• Contour flying is flying a constant altitude above ground level (AGL) of less than 22.8 meters (75 feet). This allows for maximum use of terrain masking.
• Pop-up tactics are the use of a low-altitude approach to the target area. Target acquisition and engagement is made by popping up in altitude at a predetermined position or time to minimize exposure.
• Masking is using terrain to protect an air system from visual and electronic observation or detection. Electronic warfare supplements natural masking.
• Cover is using terrain to provide protection from direct-fire weapon systems.
• Ground clutter can be characterized as a reduction of electromagnetic signal-to-noise ratio due to the signature of a background. It is different for each type of terrain or feature.

B-11. Threat aircraft, cruise missiles, and possibly even UAVs will use contour flying, masking, and ground clutter to avoid detection and to provide cover from direct fires. Aircraft will also use the terrain by loitering on reverse slopes, using pop-up tactics, and by using ground clutter and vegetation as a backdrop to enhance concealment.

B-12. Obstacles are broken down into three primary types:

• Those, which prevent the effective employment of ADA systems
• Those, which restrict contour flight
• Those, which force air threats to employ a particular surveillance or attack profile or route, or to gain excessive altitude

B-13. Of particular interest are obstacles and terrain, which restrict lateral movement within an avenue of approach. This will canalize movement or restrict evasive action. Additionally, terrain may stop the employment of certain air threat systems if the terrain exceeds the system's maximum operating ceiling. Obstacles should be plotted on a Modified Combined Obstacles Overlay (MCOO).

B-14. Key terrain is any locality or area in which the seizure, retention, or control of it will afford a marked advantage to either combatant. In the aerial dimension, key terrain consists of terrain features that canalize or constrain air threat systems and terrain with an elevation higher than the maximum ceiling of air threat systems. Additionally, areas that can be used for airfields, landing and drop zones, or forward arming and refueling points also need to be considered as key terrain, since these areas could be used to support friendly or threat air operations. Terrain can be used as an aid to navigation. Man-made features are also used as cues to navigate to targets.

B-15. Air avenues of approach are evaluated using the same criteria as for ground. A good air avenue of approach will permit maneuver while providing terrain masking from surface-to-air weapon systems. Some common air avenues of approach are valleys, direct lines from the enemy point of origin, and river beds. In order to determine air avenues of approach, both ingress and egress, the following factors should be considered:

• Type of air threat, attack profile, and ordnance
• Air threat point of origin and ground control radar positions
• Probable threat objective
• Potential to support maneuver forces
• Freedom to maneuver within the air avenue
• Protection afforded to the air system and pilot
• Air threat and pilot capabilities

B-16. UAVs are small and elusive. They usually fly low. Altitude can vary. Once in the target area, they may fly an orbit attempting to stay out of engagement range of ADA. Most surfaced-launched cruise missiles are terrain following and use terrain masking. Due to their range, they may take indirect approach routes. Ballistic missiles are not terrain dependent, and they are not restricted by terrain. They fly a straight ground track from launch point to objective. TASMs usually fly direct routes from launch platform to the target. Rotary-wing aircraft primarily conduct contour flights. They follow ridge lines and military crests, using the terrain to mask their approach to the target area. Fixed-wing aircraft usually follow major terrain or man-made features. Depending on range, they may fly a straight line to the target. Ordnance or payload may affect range and altitude of the air system and thus influence the selection of avenues of approach.

B-17. When determining air avenues, the staff looks at the commander's entire area of interest. Analysis begins at the threat airfield or UAV or missile launch site and works toward the probable enemy objective. This allows a look at the big picture. The staff considers the range of the air systems and location of navigation aids and ground control sites.

B-18. Each avenue of approach must end at a target, drop zone, or landing zone; or within reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, or target acquisition range of a target. Reverse IPB is used to pick threat objectives that support maneuver forces. Air assets, which are used to achieve ground objectives, will seek to use air avenues of approach coincident with ground avenues of approach. Air assets attacking deep are not limited to these ground avenues. Ground corridors do not limit missiles and ISR UAVs. The answers to the following questions determine the value of the avenue of approach. For freedom to maneuver, does the avenue—

• canalize the air system,
• have access to adjacent avenues,
• provide for target acquisition and use of available munitions,
• assist in navigation?

For protection for the air system and the pilot, does the avenue provide—

• terrain masking (cover and concealment),
• for the full use of air system speed,
• protection against radar detection,
• protection from air defense weapon systems and tactical air support,
• a standoff orbit location,
• a standoff orbit?

For air threat and pilot capabilities, can the air system or pilot—

• perform contour flying,
• fly at night,
• fly in all weather conditions,
• range the targets?

B-19. Air operations are especially susceptible to the effects of weather. Weather analysis for air and AMD operations is designed to predict the most likely time over target and other considerations based on weather effects and light data.

B-20. Many of the same factors the G2 or S2 considers for ground operations are as follows:

• Visibility has a significant impact on offensive air operations and ISR. Visibility has the same effects on visually-directed ADA systems and sensors.
• High winds will hinder maneuver, close air support, and target engagement, especially in tight air avenues of approach. Missiles and UAVs will be adversely affected in performance and accuracy.
• Precipitation affects aircraft, missile, and UAV performance and reduces the effectiveness of sensors. Precipitation reduces ADA sensor range.
• Cloud cover and ceilings may restrict operations by setting low operational ceilings and restricting visibility and target engagement.
• Low ceilings, overcast, and clouds may restrict visually-directed ADA weapons' detection and acquisition ranges.
• Extreme temperature and humidity have a severe effect on aircraft and UAVs by decreasing combat range, altitude (particularly rotary-wing aircraft), and ordnance loads.

B-21. Threat evaluation for air operations consists of a detailed study of enemy air capabilities, organization, and doctrine. The following steps should be used when evaluating the threat:

• Collect and analyze doctrinal threat data
• Analyze threat air capabilities
• Conduct target evaluation

B-22. Typical questions, which should be answered during this step, must also include the commander's critical information requirements and priority intelligence requirements. They are as follows:

• What are the major strategic, operational, and tactical objectives of the enemy's air operations?
• Which objectives may be targeted for destruction or suppression?
• Where do friendly air and missile defense assets fit into the enemy's objectives? Do they need to be destroyed or suppressed for the enemy plan to work? Answers to these two questions may result in modification to air avenues of approach.
• What is the enemy's air order of battle? How are the assets organized? Knowledge of threat organization, and who has operational control, will indicate the importance of the area of operations. For example, if the enemy's bombers are at theater level and are in the area of operations, then that area is probably receiving the theater's main attack. What is the size of his ballistic missile brigade, battalion, and battery? Does it fire as a unit? Does the threat have mobile, fixed, or both types of launchers?
• Who has tactical control of aircraft at the point of attack?
• How will UAVs be used, for example, battle damage assessment, attack, or ISR? What are the associated profiles?
• How does the enemy doctrinally attack? Will the enemy use airborne, air assault, or special operations forces in conjunction with an air or ground attack? What sizes are these forces and to what depth are they used? Will the enemy synchronize the air attack? Does the enemy have the capability to coordinate an air attack (possibly with varied air threat platforms that can overmatch friendly air and missile defense capability)?
• What are air system combat ingress and egress speeds?
• Where are previously reported missile launch positions? What are the likely targets? What are the range, endurance, and profile of these systems?
• What are the doctrinal distances for forward arming and refueling points? If the enemy's maximum range falls short of the area of operations, where is the enemy likely to stop and refuel, or be aerially refueled?
• How and where will the enemy attack ground targets for interdiction?
• At what altitude will the enemy approach the target, deliver munitions, and exit the target area?
• What is the release authority of certain types of ordnance? This is particularly important when dealing with NBC threats.
• How does the enemy employ reconnaissance assets?
• How has the enemy historically fought?

B-23. ADA units evaluate a broad range of order of battle data and threat capabilities to include the ground force and EW threat to ADA units. They also evaluate the answers to the following questions.

B-24. What are the capabilities of the air systems in terms of—

• The enemy's capability to coordinate air-to-ground attacks?
• The enemy's capability to coordinate air and artillery operations? Are ground forward air controllers used?
• The enemy's capabilities for suppression of friendly air and missile defense?
• Performance (speed, altitude, airfield restrictions, troop and weapon load capacity)?
• Endurance and range (ingress and egress altitudes and speeds)?
• Levels of combat readiness and sortie generation rate?
• Ability to conduct pop-up maneuvers? What is the standoff range?
• Target acquisition capability, night and adverse-weather capability, and identification ranges?
• The standoff ranges for cruise and tactical air-to-surface missiles?
• Ordnance load (maximum weight, type, load mixture, and level of sophistication)?
• Combat personnel load?
• Navigational capability (type of radar; can it fly at night or in adverse conditions)?
• Combat radius (with or without external tanks, ordnance, and location of staging bases)?
• Loiter time (how long can they stay on station over the target area)?
• Countermeasures environment? For example, will standoff jammers, ground-based jammers, reconnaissance or chaff-laying UAVs, or aircraft degrade friendly air and missile defense systems?
• Type, quantity, and quality of training the pilot has received?
• How much do they conform to doctrine?
• Ability of pilots to fly at night or perform contour flying? During peacetime, did the pilot conduct the type of mission expected to be conducted during war?
• Types and capabilities of threat ordnance? Each type of ordnance should be evaluated for range, accuracy, release altitude, reload and refire time, warhead type, and guidance type.

B-25. What are the capabilities of threat UAVs in terms of—

• Performance (speeds, altitude, and launch restrictions)
• Endurance and range
• Contour flying or terrain limiting factors
• Target acquisition and standoff range
• Sensor package and payload (maximum weight, type, and load mixture)
• Loiter time (how long can the UAV stay on station)
• Visibility effects on acquisition
• Modes of recovery and turnaround time
• Real-time, data-link capability
• Guidance modes (ground controlled and preprogrammed)
• Crew proficiency

B-26. What are the capabilities of threat TBM systems in terms of—

• Performance (flight time, speed, trajectory, launch restrictions)
• Maximum and minimum ranges
• Circular error probable
• Crew proficiency
• Reload and refire time? What is the number of TBMs available per transporter erector launcher
• Warhead type and size
• Guidance modes
• Location of surveyed launch sites

B-27. What are the capabilities of threat cruise missiles in terms of—

• Performance (flight time, speed, altitude, and launch restrictions)
• Maximum and minimum ranges
• Circular error of probability
• Targeting capabilities and type
• Contour flying capability
• Vulnerability to countermeasures
• Guidance modes
• Warhead type and size

B-28. This should determine what targets are to be labeled as high-value targets. High-value targets are assets the enemy or friendly commander has deemed as important for the successful accomplishment of his mission. High-value targets are determined by operational necessity and weapon system capability.

B-29. Determining both the threat air and ground courses of action, integrates the results of the previous three steps into a meaningful conclusion. After evaluating the threat, what are the enemy's likely objectives and what COAs are available to him? The G2 or S2 develops enemy threat models that depict the threat's air and missile COAs. They also prepare event templates and matrices that focus intelligence collection on identifying which COA the threat will execute. The process of developing these templates and matrices is covered in depth in FM 2-01.3. The decision support template is an integrated staff product that results from the war gaming of potential friendly COAs.

B-30. Situation templates are graphic depictions of expected threat dispositions should they adopt a particular COA. They usually depict the most critical point in the operation as agreed upon by the G2 and G3. However, the G2 or S2 might prepare several templates representing different snapshots in time starting with the initial threat array. The situation template integrates air attack and surveillance profiles with terrain. It focuses on specific air avenues of approach and mobility corridors. It determines which avenues are the most capable of supporting attack techniques and profiles. It will identify the most direct routes to landing and drop zones to protect and ensure the survivability of air threat systems.

B-31. The event template is a guide for collection and reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) planning. It depicts named areas of interest (NAIs) where the commander expects to see certain activities of tactical significance and is used to confirm or deny an enemy course of action. These NAIs are based on the terrain constraints on air approach routes to potential targets and analysis of the enemy's attack and ISR profiles. The G2 or S2 develops an event matrix to support the event template by providing details on the type of activity expected in each NAI, the times the NAI is expected to be active, and its relationship to other events on the battlefield. Examples of NAI include landing and drop zones, forward arming and refueling points, forward staging areas, and previous TBM launch locations.

B-32. The decision support template is based on the situation and event templates, event matrix, and the war gaming of friendly COA results. It should depict the following events:

• Air avenues of approach
• Airborne and air assault objectives
• Landing and drop zones and largest size enemy element which could be employed at the zone
• Ranges of enemy systems
• Ranges of friendly air and missile defense systems
• Target areas of interest (TAIs)
• Decision points (DPs)

B-33. Air TAIs and DPs are determined in the same manner as they are for ground operations. However, due to the high speeds of air systems, decision points must be placed significantly farther in advance of the TAIs.

B-34. Correlation of Forces-Air (COFA) is a method of comparing weapon systems, and more importantly, evaluating probable results of both enemy and friendly courses of action. The COFA is based on the probability of kill (pk) of specific weapon systems against other specific weapon systems. The COFA takes into account weapon range, velocity, lethality, and survivability. The COFA is calculated for both enemy and friendly courses of action. The intelligence officer and operations officer analyze the probable result of the enemy course of action against the friendly air and missile defense design. COFA cannot be used in isolation. The total capabilities of weapon systems must be applied and factors such as training, TTP, weather, and visibility conditions must be considered. Additionally, the advantage of the defense should be factored into the analysis. Part of that advantage is an availability of an external air picture which allows Patriot radars to operate in passive modes. Friendly forces will know the location of enemy aircraft without revealing their locations. Tables B-1 through B-4 list COFA values for various weapon systems. These values are utilized for planning purposes only.

B-35. The methodology for calculating COFA and performing analysis consists of multiplying the number of weapon systems by their value to obtain a COFA value that can be compared to other weapon systems. For example, if a flight of four MiG 29s attacked one Patriot battery the COFA would be:

One (1) Patriot battery defeats a flight of four (4) MiG 29 aircraft.

B-36. The enemy may attack with several weapon systems with different COFA values. To calculate the COFA for several different systems, determine each system separately and then add the values together. For example, the enemy attacks one Patriot battery with six MiG 29 and four SU-17.

Six (6) MiG 29 and four (4) SU-17 defeat one (1) Patriot battery

B-37. The same methodology applies to defending with different weapon systems. If, in the above example, one Avenger platoon were incorporated into the defense, the COFA would change.

One (1) Patriot battery and one (1) Avenger platoon defeat six (6) MiG 29 and four (4) SU-17.

B-38. COFA analysis is a tool used by the S2 and S3. The COFA analysis is used during the war gaming process and the analysis of the COA.

B-39. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic setting. Applying the IPB process helps the commander apply and maximize his combat power at critical points in time and space by determining the threat's likely COA, and describing the environment and its effects on operations. Preparation and continuous updates of the aerial portion of IPB are fundamental to the execution of the air and missile defense and land force missions on the modern battlefield.