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Chapter 10

Support Operations

Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil military operations center, to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center.
Lieutenant General A. C. Zinni, USMC
Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force



Characteristics of Support Operations
Types of Support Operations
     Domestic Support Operations
     Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
     The Army's Role in Support Operations
Forms of Support Operations
     Relief Operations
     Support to Domestic CBRNE
          Consequence Management
     Support to Civil Law Enforcement
     Community Assistance
Considerations for Support Operations

10-1.     Support operations use Army forces to assist civil authorities, foreign or domestic, as they prepare for or respond to crises and relieve suffering. In support operations, Army forces provide essential support, services, assets, or specialized resources to help civil authorities deal with situations beyond their capabilities. The purpose of support operations is to meet the immediate needs of designated groups for a limited time, until civil authorities can do so without Army assistance. In extreme or exceptional cases, Army forces may provide relief or assistance directly to those in need. More commonly, Army forces help civil authorities or nongovernmental organizations provide support. Army forces often conduct support operations as stand-alone missions. However, most offensive, defensive, and stability operations require complementary support operations before, during, and after execution.


10-2.     Support operations are usually nonlinear and noncontiguous. Leaders tailor the application of the operational framework, elements of operational design, and METT-TC to fit each situation. Commanders designate the decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations necessary for mission success. However, identifying centers of gravity, decisive points—and even the desired end state—can be more complex and unorthodox than in offensive and defensive operations. When visualizing a support operation, commanders recognize that they may have to define the enemy differently. In support operations, the adversary is often disease, hunger, or the consequences of disaster.


Domestic support operations are those activities and measures taken by DOD to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies.

10-3.     The two types of support operations are domestic support operations (DSO) and foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA). Army forces conduct DSO within, and FHA outside, the US and its territories. Army forces have broader requirements and more significant and extensive obligations in DSO than FHA. Army forces normally conduct FHA operations only in permissive environments. In uncertain and hostile environments, Army forces conduct FHA operations as part of larger stability, offensive, or defensive operations.


10-4.     Army support to DSO supplements the efforts and resources of state and local governments and organizations. A presidential declaration of a major disaster or emergency usually precedes DSO. DSO require extensive coordination and liaison among many organizations—interagency, joint, active component (AC), and reserve component (RC)—as well as with state and local governments. The Federal Response Plan provides a national-level architecture to coordinate the actions of all supporting federal agencies.

10-5.     Under the Constitution, civil authorities are responsible for preserving public order and carrying out governmental operations within their jurisdictions—using force if necessary. The Constitution allows the use of Army forces to protect the states against invasion and, upon request of a state, to protect it against domestic violence. Army forces—under joint command— provide the nation with critical capabilities, such as missile defense, necessary to secure and defend the homeland. However, the amended Posse Comitatus Act significantly restricts using federal military forces, to include federalized RC soldiers and units, in law enforcement. It prescribes criminal penalties for using the Army or Air Force to execute laws or to perform civilian law enforcement functions within the US, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or Congress. DOD policy extends this prohibition to the Navy and Marine Corps. The Stafford Act also defines and clarifies the role of US military forces in support of domestic civil authorities. Since the law may prohibit certain types of activities during DSO, commanders need a detailed analysis of their legal authorities for each mission.

10-6.     The primary reference for military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) is DODD 3025.15. It is wide-ranging, addressing such actions as civil disturbance control, counterdrug activities, combatting terrorism, and law enforcement. The secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for MACA. In DSO, Army forces always support civil authorities—local, state, and federal (see JP 3-07.7; FM 3-07).

Refugee Processing—A Support Operation

The nature of support operations often requires Army force commanders to report directly to a lead federal agency. In May 1980, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) established a Cuban refugee processing center at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. An Army task force consisting of AC and RC forces supported the operation and reported to FEMA.

In 1994, Logistics Task Force 64 supported Department of State and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) representatives in establishing refugee camps in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Army engineers, military police, medical personnel, logisticians, and legal representatives provided a variety of services—including food, water, laundry, billeting, security, and maintenance—for 14,000 Haitian and 30,000 Cuban refugees.

In August 1999, over 550 Army AC and RC soldiers formed Task Force Provide Refuge, an administrative and logistic organization to care for Kosovo refugees at Fort Dix, New Jersey. The task force commander responded to the INS while receiving, screening, and processing the refugees until they returned home or relocated within the US.


10-7.     Army forces usually conduct FHA operations to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters (see DODD 5100.46). They also relieve conditions—such as pain, disease, hunger, or privation—that present a serious threat to life or loss of property. Army forces supplement or complement efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that provide assistance. FHA is limited in scope and duration. It focuses exclusively on prompt aid to resolve an immediate crisis. Longer-term activities designed to support full recovery and a return to predisaster conditions will normally become part of a combatant commander's theater engagement plan. In such cases, an FHA operation transitions to a stability operation.

10-8.     Many FHA and DSO activities, especially those involving relief operations, are similar. Specific legal restrictions apply to US forces operating within the US and its territories. In some cases, similar restrictions apply to US forces conducting FHA. For example, DOD has extended the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act to US forces overseas (see DODD 5525.5).

10-9.     Army forces execute FHA operations, usually as part of a joint task force (JTF), with the US country team of the affected country. They provide support under appropriate treaties, memorandums of agreement, memorandums of understanding, and US fiscal authority and foreign policy. The US Agency for International Development is the lead US agency for coordinating FHA. Army forces usually conduct FHA operations to support host nation civil authorities and in concert with other civilian agencies-US, international, governmental and private.

JTF Support Hope—Foreign Humanitarian Assistance in Africa

On 6 April 1994, an aircraft carrying the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi crashed while landing at Kigali, Rwanda. The Rwandan president's death unleashed ethnic conflict that saw the deaths of between 500,000 and 1 million members of the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups. By August 1994, so many Rwandan refugees had fled to neighboring Zaire that they overwhelmed the humanitarian resources there. Thousands of refugees died of malnutrition and cholera, prompting a United Nations response to the crisis.

President Clinton ordered the US European Command (USEUCOM) to assist humanitarian agencies and third nation forces conducting relief operations. USEUCOM activated JTF Support Hope to support the multinational effort. The JTF consisted of 3,000 personnel, including soldiers from the 21st Theater Army Area Command in Germany. US forces provided water distribution and purification systems at Goma, Zaire, and operated an airhead and cargo distribution center at Entebbe, Uganda. They also provided airfield services and logistic support to UN forces. The JTF efforts helped humanitarian relief agencies in Goma to recover. By late August, refugee deaths dropped from 25,000 per day to fewer than 250. As the situation stabilized, civilian agencies assumed terminal operations responsibility. US forces returned to home station on 29 September 1994.


10-10.     The Army is not specifically organized, trained, or equipped for support operations. Army forces are designed and organized for warfighting. However, their warfighting capabilities are particularly suited to DSO and FHA. The Army is a disciplined force with well-established, flexible, and adaptable procedures. Army units have a functional chain of command, reliable communications, and well-trained and well-equipped organizations. They can operate and sustain themselves in austere environments with organic assets. The Army can rapidly move large forces to the affected location using military transportation. Army engineer, military police, medical, transportation, aviation, and civil affairs assets are especially valuable for support operations.

10-11.     The special qualities, capabilities, and geographic dispersion of RC units make them especially suitable for DSO. The long-term relationships with state and local officials and the locations of RC units facilitate rapid response. The US Army Reserve has more than 2,000 units in the US, Guam, North Mariana Islands, American Samoa, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and Germany. The Army National Guard (ARNG) has units in 2,700 communities in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. State control of ARNG units allows them to respond quickly in emergencies. Nonfederalized ARNG units act on orders of their state governor. When in a state supporting or nonfederalized role, the ARNG is not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.


10-12.     During DSO Army forces perform relief operations, support to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive consequence management (CBRNE-CM), support to civil law enforcement, and community assistance. In FHA Army forces most often conduct relief operations; however, FHA may also involve support to incidents involving CBRNE and community assistance. Army forces involved in support operations execute overlapping activities (see Figure 10-1).

Figure 10-1. Types and Forms od Support Operations


Critical Relief Functions

  • Search and rescue
  • Emergency flood control
  • Hazard identification
  • Food distribution
  • Water production, purification, and distribution
  • Temporary shelter
  • Transportation support
  • Fire fighting
  • Medical support
  • Power generation
  • Communications support
  • Sanitation

10-13.     In case of a disaster, state, local, and host nation authorities are responsible for restoring essential services. To support their efforts or those of the lead agency, the National Command Authorities (NCA) can deploy Army forces (see Figure 10-2). Army forces execute similar actions during relief operations under DSO and FHA. Disaster relief focuses on recovery of critical infrastructure after a natural or manmade disaster. Humanitarian relief focuses on the well-being of supported populations. Both normally occur simultaneously.

Figure 10-2. Domestic Support Operations in Disaster Relief

Disaster Relief

10-14.     Disaster relief restores or recreates essential infrastructure. It includes establishing and maintaining the minimum safe working conditions, less security measures, necessary to protect relief workers and the affected population. (Overseas, Army forces may provide security as part of a stability operation, such as Haiti in 1994. Domestically, Army forces may provide security as support to civil law enforcement, as was done during the 1996 Atlanta Olympics.) Disaster relief allows effective humanitarian relief and creates the conditions for long-term recovery. It may involve consultation on and provision of emergency medical treatment and evacuation; repairing or demolishing damaged structures; restoring or building bridges, roads, and airfields; and removing debris from supply routes and relief sites. Army engineers are well suited and often critical for disaster relief.

JTF Andrew—Disaster Relief in the Continental United States

On 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew blasted the southern Florida coast with winds exceeding 160 miles per hour, cutting a 35-mile path of destruction just south of Miami. The hurricane destroyed 65,000 homes, leaving survivors without water, electricity, or telephone service. Heavy debris blocked most roads, making ambulance and fire services difficult and slowing food delivery.

As DOD executive agent for disaster relief, the Department of the Army directed Forces Command and the Second Continental US Army to form JTF Andrew. The 82d Airborne Division alerted, and its lead battalion departed for Florida nine hours later. Forty-eight hours after that, additional soldiers from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, New York, joined Army advance elements. Within five days, JTF Andrew grew to 9,500 soldiers, 3,400 sailors, 800 Marines, and 1,000 airmen from the active and reserve components.

JTF Andrew worked closely with federal, state, and local agencies to provide housing and meals for disaster victims. It operated 24 support sites that produced 35,000 meals per day. The JTF also established four life support centers that provided tents, medical care, potable drinking water, showers, housing repair materials, and donated items. Army Material Command distributed clothes, diapers, bottled water, and food. Army Medical Command provided combat stress, preventive medicine, veterinary, and health facilities planning augmentation to the 44th Medical Brigade and divisional medical elements. Army forces significantly contributed to the unified action that relieved human suffering and aided victims in rebuilding their communities.

Humanitarian Relief

10-15.     Humanitarian relief focuses on lifesaving measures that alleviate the immediate needs of a population in crisis. It often includes providing medical support, food, water, medicine, clothing, blankets, shelter, and heating or cooking fuels. In some cases, it involves transporting affected people from a disaster area. Civilian relief agencies, governmental and nongovernmental, are best suited to provide this type of relief. Army forces conducting humanitarian relief usually facilitate civil relief efforts.


10-16.     Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents are deliberate or unintentional events involving a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive, that produce catastrophic loss of life or property. Army forces assist civil authorities in protecting US territory, population, and infrastructure before an attack by supporting domestic preparedness and protecting critical assets. When directed by DOD, Army forces can respond to a CBRNE incident and deal with the consequences.

Domestic Preparedness

10-17.     The National Domestic Preparedness Office, under the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), orchestrates the national domestic preparedness effort. Army forces have an important role in aiding domestic preparedness efforts at the local, state, and federal level. These efforts strengthen the existing expertise of civil authorities through training. They also provide the expert assistance necessary to respond to nuclear, biological, or chemical incidents. Army forces provide training to enhance state and local emergency response capabilities so they can respond to incidents. An interagency agreement establishes the Department of Justice as domestic preparedness coordinator.

10-18.     Under the Department of Justice, the Center for Domestic Preparedness at McClellan, Alabama, trains emergency first responders, emergency management officials, and state and local officials to respond to terrorist acts involving CBRNE. The US Army's Soldier and Biological Chemical Command is engaged in implementing the city training program mandated by The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996. Also, the Army Medical Department (AMEDD), in close cooperation with federal, state, and local health organizations, presents courses in the medical management of nuclear, chemical, and biological casualties.

Protection of Critical Assets

10-19.     Hostile forces may attack facilities essential to society, the government, and the military. These assaults can disrupt civilian commerce, government operations, and military capabilities. Critical assets include telecommunications, electric power, public health services and facilities, gas and oil, banking and finance, transportation, water, emergency services, and government continuity. DODD 5160.54 identifies specific civil infrastructure assets necessary to conduct military operations. The integrity, availability, survivability, and capability of these assets are vital for conducting full spectrum operations. In conjunction with civil law enforcement, Army forces may protect these assets or temporarily restore lost capability. Army involvement in protecting critical assets complements and leverages related interagency programs and activities.

Response to CBRNE Incidents

10-20.     Other government agencies have primary responsibility for responding to domestic CBRNE incidents. Local authorities will be the first to respond to a CBRNE incident. However, Army forces have a key supporting role and can quickly respond when authorized. For example, the ARNG has specialized CBRNE response teams that act as advance parties to facilitate follow-on deployment of other DOD assets. In a permissive overseas environment, the NCA may make Army assets available to assist a foreign government after a CBRNE incident. Such assistance may be linked to concurrent relief operations. Figure 10-3 illustrates joint and Army command and support relationships in domestic incidents involving CBRNE consequence management.

Figure 10-3. Domestic Support Relationships for CBRNE Consequence Management Support

10-21.     The Federal Response Plan is the key plan that affects the use of Army forces in CBRNE incidents. The distinctions between the responsibilities of DOD and other agencies are embedded in federal law, the Federal Response Plan and other federal plans, the Federal Response Plan terrorist incident annex, joint doctrine, and directives.

10-22.     The resources required to deal with CBRNE incidents differ from those needed during conventional disasters. Mass casualties may require decontamination and a surge of medical resources, to include antidotes, vaccines, and antibiotics. The sudden onset of a large number of casualties may pose public health threats related to food, vectors, water, waste, and mental health. Damage to chemical and industrial plants and secondary hazards such as fires may cause toxic environmental hazards. Mass evacuation may be necessary.

Consequence Management Activities

  • Bomb dogs
  • Casualty and medical assistance
  • Electrical and structural engineering
  • Imagery
  • Explosive ordnance disposal
  • Linguist support
  • Mortuary affairs
  • Ground transportation
  • Helicopter support
  • Public affairs

10-23.     The Army possesses capabilities suited to respond to CBRNE incidents. Chemical units can detect chemical and biological agents and decontaminate equipment and property. The US Army Medical Command (USAMEDCOM) can provide large-scale medical care. Its experienced, clinicians, planners, and support staffs can furnish assessment, triage, treatment, trauma care, hospitalization, and follow-up care for chemical and biological casualties. It can deploy a field hospital or evacuate victims to fixed facilities. USAMEDCOM maintains special medical augmentation response teams (SMARTs) that rapidly deploy to assist in medical treatment and response. SMARTs focus on chemical and biological casualties, trauma and critical care, stress management, burns, and preventive medical threat assessment.


10-24.     Support to domestic civil law enforcement involves activities related to counterterrorism, counterdrug operations, military assistance during civil disturbances, and general support. Army support involves providing resources, training, or augmentation. Federal military forces remain under the military chain of command while supporting civil law enforcement. The supported law enforcement agency coordinates Army force activities under appropriate civil laws and interagency agreements. ARNG units in state status can be a particularly useful military resource. They may be able to provide assistance to civil authorities when federal units cannot due to the Posse Comitatus Act.

Support to Counterterrorism

10-25.     When the NCA directs, military assets supporting a lead agency may operate with the Department of Justice to provide support to counterterrorism. Army forces may provide transportation, equipment, training, and personnel. When terrorists pose an imminent threat, Army forces may be used to counter it. The demonstrated capability to conduct these operations helps keep US territory from becoming a target.

10-26.     Crisis management of a terrorist incident includes measures to resolve a situation and investigate a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead agency, with responsibility for crisis management in the US. Army forces may provide specialized or technical capabilities to help defuse or resolve a crisis. Support of crisis management includes opening lines of communication for military assistance, evacuating casualties, reconnaissance, and decontaminating or assessing CBRNE. After a terrorist incident, the military may support consequence management activities.

Support to Counterdrug Operations

10-27.     The Department of Justice, primarily through the Drug Enforcement Administration, is responsible for enforcing US drug laws. Drug-related crime often affects multiple local, state, and federal jurisdictions. Law enforcement agencies at all levels deal with counterdrug activities. Title 10 US Code (USC) strictly limits Army and federalized ARNG support to counterdrug operations. Title 32 USC, section 112, governs the use of the state-controlled ARNG forces in counterdrug operations.

Title 10 USC prohibits the military from directly participating in arrests, searches, seizures, or other similar activities unless authorized by law.

10-28.     Four combatant commands have counterdrug responsibilities: US Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), US Pacific Command (USPACOM), North American Air Defense Command (NORAD) and USJFCOM. Each commander has dedicated a subordinate organization, in whole or in part, to the counterdrug mission. For example, USJFCOM maintains JTF 6 as a coordinating headquarters for military support to multiagency counterdrug operations in the continental US (see JP 3-07.4).

Civil Disturbance Operations

10-29.     The Army assists civil authorities in restoring law and order when state and local law enforcement agencies cannot control civil disturbances. The ARNG is the first military responder during most civil disturbance situations. It usually remains on state active duty status throughout the operation. When the conditions of domestic violence and disorder endanger life and property to the extent that state law enforcement agencies, to include the ARNG, cannot suppress violence and restore law and order, the president may federalize ARNG units under Title 10 USC, Chapter 15. The president may use federalized ARNG and federal forces to restore law and order. Restrictions may be placed on federal military forces, either in the presidential executive order directing their use or through the rules for the use of force outlined in the DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (Garden Plot).

General Support

10-30.     Title 10 USC, sections 371—382, and other federal laws allow for additional limited military support to law enforcement agencies. The military may share information and provide equipment, facilities, and other services (see DODD 5525.5). Other exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are contained in the annual DOD Authorization Act, which allows specific types of military support, usually related to the national counterdrug effort.

10-31.     DOD may direct Army forces to provide training to federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement agencies. This training may include operation and maintenance of military equipment. Training of federal, state, and local civilian law enforcement officials is provided as follows:

  • Military departments and defense agencies may provide expert advice to federal, state, or local law enforcement officials in accordance with Title 10 USC, section 373.

  • Assistance is normally limited to situations when using non-DOD personnel is infeasible or impractical from a cost or time perspective and when the assistance will not compromise national security or military preparedness.

  • Assistance may not involve DOD personnel in a direct role in a law enforcement operation, except as otherwise authorized by law.

  • Assistance must be where there is not a reasonable likelihood of armed confrontation with civilians, except as otherwise authorized by law.


10-32.     Community assistance is a broad range of activities that provide support and maintain a strong connection between the military and civilian communities. Community assistance activities provide effective means of projecting a positive military image, providing training opportunities, and enhancing the relationship between the Army and the American public. They should fulfill community needs that would not otherwise be met.

National-Level Community Assistance Efforts

  • Civilian Community Corps
  • Science and Technology Academies Reinforcing Basic Aviation and Space Exploration (STARBASE) Program
  • Civilian Youth Opportunities Program (Challenge)
  • Drug Demand Reduction Programs
  • Youth Physical Fitness Clinic Program
  • Medical Readiness Program
  • Military Assistance to Safety and Traffic (MAST) Program

10-33.     Community assistance activities can enhance individual and unit combat readiness. Projects should exercise individual soldier skills, encourage teamwork, and challenge leader planning and coordination skills. They should result in measurable accomplishments and increase soldier proficiency. Commanders of forward-deployed Army units may apply these concepts to foster or establish relationships with host nation communities.

10-34.     Community assistance at the national level enhances cooperation between the Army and the American people. National efforts take advantage of the technical, vocational, and group skills of military professionals. They supplement programs available from the civil sector and other government agencies. The Army's involvement focuses on economic and social issues with long-term national security implications. They provide opportunities for the Army to contribute to the growth and welfare of the nation, improving its perception of the military. Army and DOD regulations provide guidance on national-level programs.

10-35.     The Army has extensive national-level responsibilities related to public works maintenance and management. The Department of the Army exercises its federal engineering executive oversight responsibilities through the US Army Corps of Engineers. The Corps of Engineers manages much of the nation's public works infrastructure. Executed principally, but not solely, through the Civil Works Directorate, this military organization integrates complex federal, state, and local regulations and policies governing the national infrastructure. These include the national waterways, environmental remediation and recovery operations, real estate, disaster recovery operations, and general project management functions.

Sample Critical Services

  • Air ambulance support
  • Search and rescue
  • Firefighting capability
  • Explosive ordnance disposal
  • Emergency or broad-based medical care
  • Wildlife and domestic animal management
  • Assistance in safety and traffic control
  • Emergency snow removal
  • Temporary supplemental housing for the displaced or disadvantaged

10-36.     Efforts at the state and local levels also improve community perception of the Army. Community assistance varies widely, ranging from individual soldier involvement to full installation participation. An installation or organization can enter agreements with the local community to provide critical services not otherwise available, augment community services unable to meet demand, or ensure that emergency services are available in the shortest possible time.

10-37.     Army participation in public events, memorials, and exhibits allows interaction between soldiers and the local community. This contact communicates Army professionalism, readiness, and standards. Individual soldiers serve as representatives and role models, promote and inspire patriotism, and generate interest in the Army. Increased public awareness enhances the Army's reputation and secures the American people's confidence.

10-38.     Laws, regulations, and policies limit Army participation in community assistance activities. Commanders consider the objective and purpose of an activity when deciding whether to approve it. They also consider authorized limits of Army participation. Commanders ensure that their initiatives do not compete with local resources or services and will not result in reimbursement in any form. Commanders also avoid providing assistance and support to one segment of a community that cannot also be provided to others. Actions that appear to benefit a particular group can foster perceptions of bias or partisanship. Ideally, support should be provided only to events and activities of common interest and benefit across the community.


10-39.     Although each support operation is different, the visualization process, military decision making process, and troop leading procedures apply. The following considerations supplement those processes and can help commanders develop tailored concepts for support operations.


10-40.     The principle commanders use to prioritize missions and allocate support is, essential support to the largest number. Commanders allocate finite resources to achieve the greatest possible good. Initial efforts usually focus on restoring vital services: food and water distribution, medical aid, power generation, search and rescue, firefighting, and community relations. It may be necessary to complete a lower priority task before accomplishing a higher priority one. For example, Army forces may have to restore limited electrical services before restoring hospital emergency rooms and shelter operations.

10-41.     Commanders assess requirements to determine how and where to apply limited assets to benefit the most people. In some cases, warfighting reconnaissance capabilities and techniques can be used. For example, unmanned aerial vehicles can survey relief routes and locate civilian refugee groups. Civil affairs or dedicated disaster assessment teams, as well as interagency, host nation, and nongovernmental organization sources, can reinforce and supplement standard information collection methods. Combining traditional and nontraditional means of collecting information allows commanders to obtain a clear understanding of the situation and adjust plans accordingly.


10-42.     DSO and FHA operations are typically joint and interagency; FHA operations are also multinational. The potential for duplicating effort and working at cross-purposes is high. Unity of effort requires, at least, a common understanding of purposes and direction among all agencies. Ensuring unity of effort and efficient resource use requires constant coordination. In FHA operations, Army forces enhance unity of effort by establishing a civil-military operations center. In DSO, they provide liaison elements, planning support, advisors, and technical experts to the lead agency. Through these contacts, commanders determine where their objectives and plans complement or conflict with those of other agencies. Each participant's capabilities will be in constant demand.


10-43.     With supported agencies and governments, commanders establish measures of effectiveness to gauge mission accomplishment. Measures of effectiveness focus on the condition and activity of those being supported. Those that are discrete, measurable, and link cause and effect help commanders understand and measure progress and success. In famine relief, for example, it may be tempting to measure effectiveness by the gross amount of food delivered. In some cases, this may be an acceptable gauge. However, a better one may be the total nourishment delivered, as measured by the total number of calories delivered per person per day, or the rate of decline of deaths directly attributable to starvation. Measures of effectiveness depend on the situation and require readjustment as the situation and guidance change.

Measures of Effectiveness—Operation Support Hope

Mission statements generally provide goals from which to develop measures of effectiveness. The first and most urgent task facing planners for Operation Support Hope in Rwanda, July 1994, was the US Commander in Chief, Europe, directive to "stop the dying." Initial action focused on the massive refugee deaths from cholera around Goma, Zaire. The JTF commander decided to measure US effectiveness by whether refugee camp death rates dropped to the level the UN determined was consistent with "normal" camp operations. A related mission requirement was to open Kigali airfield for 24-hour operations; success was measured by statistical data that showed the surge in airfield use and cargo throughput after US forces arrived. Both measures of effectiveness derived from the mission statement were used throughout the operation to communicate progress to all participants.


10-44.     The timing and feasibility of transferring control from military to civil authorities depends on mission-specific considerations. The two most important are the ability of civil authorities to resume operations without Army assistance and the need to commit Army forces to other operations. Commanders identify and include other civil considerations as early in the planning process as possible. They continually consider the long-term goals of the civil leadership and communities they assist. While the immediate goal of support operations is relieving hardship and suffering, the ultimate goal is creating conditions necessary for civil follow-on operations. Transferring activities to civil authorities and withdrawing Army forces are positive signals to the supported population and the Army. It indicates that the community has recovered enough for civil agencies to resume control, that life is returning to normal, and that the Army has successfully completed its support mission.

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