FM 25-101: Battle Focused Training

CHAPTER 4
EXECUTION

In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military.

General Douglas MacArthur


Training is the peacetime mission of the Army.  The execution of 
training to standard is the payoff for all other phases of training
management.  Training proficiency assessments, METL development, 
and detailed planning are important, but ineffective if we fail to
execute scheduled training to standard.

Leader supervision and participation at all levels are essential to the
successful execution of training. Battle focused leaders ensure that planned
training is started on time and executed vigorously to standard. Leaders
assess subordinate soldier, leader, and unit performance throughout the
execution phase. They provide feedback to allow subordinates to learn from
their strengths and weaknesses and to subsequently adjust their own training
programs.

Execution of training is decentralized to tailor soldier, leader, and unit
training requirements to the available resources. These training needs
are identified through the bottom-up communication of the chain of command.
Prior to execution, leaders must properly prepare themselves, their units,
and their soldiers to execute training to standard. During the execution
phase soldiers, leaders, and units perform realistic hands-on training for
war. This chapter focuses on presentation of the training task and
performance of the task to standard. Example field exercises in this
chapter illustrate how well planned multiechelon training is executed.

The proper execution of training to standard is a difficult but rewarding process. It places a significant burden on the trainer in terms of preparation and assessment of performance. The payoff for properly executed training is a unit trained to standard on its wartime mission. Division and brigade commanders, and their staffs, must be actively involved in the execution of battalion and company training. A unit executes training the same way it executes a combat mission. The chain of command is present, in charge, and responsible.

ROLES IN EXECUTING TRAINING

Leaders at all levels must know and understand their roles in executing training. Commanders must--

Be tactically and technically proficient.

Protect subordinate unit training from distracters.

Ruthlessly enforce the lock in of training schedules.

Ensure pre-execution and precombat checks are completed.

Provide the resources required for training.

Ensure training resources are properly used.

Be an active participant in training.

Personally check to ensure planned training is conducted to standard.

Evaluate training using T&EOs based upon training objectives.

Assess soldier, leader, and unit performance.

Senior NCOs are responsible for getting soldiers, subordinate leaders, and units to the training sites. They ensure that soldiers are at the right location, in the right uniform, with the right equipment, at the right time. Further, senior NCOs ensure--

Detailed inspections and checks are performed prior to the execution of all training.

Prerequisite training is completed so that soldiers' time is not wasted.

Leaders are trained and prepared to train their sections, squads, teams, or crews. They train the trainers.

Preliminary training for section, squad, team, and crew has the right focus and is executed to Army standard.

Number of tasks scheduled to be trained is realistic.

Training is conducted to standard and meets the training objectives. Special emphasis is placed on low-density MOSs.

Adequate time is scheduled to repeat tasks not performed to standard the first time.

Soldiers are properly motivated and well led.

Soldiers are present and accounted for, especially during prime-time training.

Unit leaders are the primary trainers. They are responsible to--

Account for their soldiers.

Know their units' and soldiers' training needs and, based on that assessment, plan appropriate time to train tasks to standard.

Identify and conduct appropriate prerequisite training.

Ensure training is conducted to standard.

Retrain soldiers when standards are not met.

Be properly prepared to conduct opportunity training whenever time is available.

Before presenting training to the soldier, trainers must prepare for the training.Figure 4-1, and Figure 4-1 cont. outline guidance for trainers.

PRECOMBAT CHECKS

Pre-execution and precombat checks are key to ensuring trainers and soldiers are adequately prepared to execute training to Army standard. Pre-execution checks (discussed in Chapter 3) ensure that all planning and prerequisite training (soldier, leader, and collective) are conducted prior to the execution of training. Precombat checks are the bridge between pre-execution checks and execution of training.

Precombat checks are detailed final checks that all units conduct before and during execution of training and combat operations. They are also conducted at the beginning of each event or exercise as part of the troop leading procedures. Although precombat checks start in garrison, some checks may be completed in the assembly area or in the battle position; for example, applying camouflage, setting radio frequencies, and distributing ammunition.

Figure 4-2. Sample precombat checks.

Additionally, precombat checks should be performed as part of stand-to. They are continuous and are repeated when mission changes occur.

The chain of command is responsible for developing, validating, and verifying all precombat checks. These checks should be included in the unit tactical standing operating procedures (SOP). They can be as simple or as complex as the mission dictates. Sufficient time must be allocated on the training schedule for their execution. Items that may be found on precombat checks are at Figure 4-2.

PRESENTATION OF TRAINING

Presentation of training provides soldiers with the specific training objectives (tasks, conditions, and standards) to be trained, and the evaluation methods to be used. The exact type and amount of information presented prior to performing the task depend on the task and the state of training of the soldiers being trained.

Whenever possible, training is presented by the chain of command. The unit leader is responsible for training his unit even if a technical trainer provides the information. Trainers primarily use three methods to present training to soldiers. They are--

Lecture.

Conference.

Demonstration (preferred method).

These three methods may be used in any combination to present training.

Lecture presents information with little discussion. Lectures are used when there is a large group and no performance-oriented training will be given; when time is limited; when soldiers know little about the subject; and when the lecture is preparing them for demonstration and practice. It is the least preferred method of presentation. An example of a lecture is a predeployment briefing.

Conference provides soldiers the opportunity to discuss the information presented. The trainer initiates and guides the discussion. Conferences are effective when soldiers are familiar with the subject, when there is more than one correct technique or solution, and when time is not critical. Conferences do not require hands-on performance. An example of a conference is an AAR.

Demonstration is the preferred method of presentation used at company level and below. The visual impact of a brief demonstration on the proper method of performing a task assists the learning process. Seeing a task performed correctly provides greater understanding than any amount of explanation. A picture is worth a thousand words. Demonstrations tend to stimulate soldier interest by providing realism that other techniques do not offer. Demonstrations--

Save time by showing soldiers the correct way to perform a task; for example, using task, conditions, and standards.

Use the leader as the primary trainer whenever possible.

Present information in a manner that properly motivates.

Conclude when soldiers understand the task well enough to perform it.

Trainers can conduct demonstrations on map boards, chalkboards, and sand tables before actual execution in the field. Models are also often used to supplement demonstrations. In addition to those available at the local Training and Audiovisual Support Center (TASC), imaginative models can easily be constructed by the trainer.

Sand tables are a good means to demonstrate tasks before and after executing them on terrain. Guidance for effective use of sand tables includes--

Keep the model interesting. Cardboard cutouts, bits of wood, or stones may represent equipment. For training squad-sized units, soldiers may be depicted with paper cutouts or coins.

Keep them simple. Piles of soil outdoors will do. Lights, colored sand, and similar features may be distracting.

Keep the training informal. Soldier participation is essential because soldiers learn from one another.

The trainer presents information that soldiers and leaders need to perform the task. He then checks for soldier understanding by asking pertinent questions. The task is explained again, as required, until the task is understood by all soldiers.

PERFORMANCE OF TRAINING

Performance begins immediately following presentation. It is the hands-on execution of a training task or event. Early performance reinforces newly acquired skills and converts them into usable soldier, leader, and unit skills. For the soldiers being trained, it reinforces the instruction, fixes the Army standard for the task, and builds confidence.

Performance of soldiers, leaders, and units is evaluated against ARTEP, MTP, MQS, or SM standards for all training. AARs must be planned and conducted after each major event or at logical breaks in training.

Leaders emphasize accomplishing training to standard by identifying the Army standard and, more important, by demanding that standards be achieved. They ensure soldiers understand when they have not performed training to standard. Leaders must allow sufficient time to retrain the task until it can be performed correctly.

Time and other resources must be allocated to retrain and reexecute tasks not performed to standard.

Further, leaders tailor conditions to the appropriate level of training. They add progressively difficult conditions to increase the challenge as proficiency increases. They add realism and complexity as rapidly as possible to achieve actual wartime conditions.

There are three stages of training. Each stage can occur separately or in combination. Leaders must ensure soldiers and units move through the first two stages as soon as standards are met. These stages are--

Initial training (little or no familiarity with a given task).

Refresher training (requires training on certain subtasks).

Sustainment training (meets the training objective, but will lose proficiency without practice).

Key points of these stages are summarized at Figure 4-3.

Figure 4-3. Stages of training.

The following shows how the stages of training can be applied. In this example, leaders vary the difficulty of conditions as soldier proficiency improves. A communications jamming squad had received new soldiers within the past two months. To integrate them into the teams and ensure they were trained, the squad leader requested and received training time at a platoon meeting. He provided his training plan to his platoon leader. It was incorporated into the company training schedule and published four weeks out. The teams executed their precombat checks, to include before-operations PMCS of their vehicles and communications equipment. They then moved from the motor pool and established initial jamming sites on a local vacant lot.

Once the task was accomplished to standard, the team leaders tactically deployed the teams to a wooded area during daylight hours to reexecute the task. When the teams received a go on the task, the squad leader increased the difficulty by requiring them to practice in mission oriented protection posture (MOPP) 4. They were then required, as a final degree of difficulty, to relocate and establish the sites several times that night.

After the next morning's stand-to, the teams moved to the wash rack, cleaned their vehicles, and returned to the motor pool. They performed their after-operations PMCS and cleaned and turned in their weapons and other equipment. Before releasing his teams, the squad leader conducted an informal AAR to take advantage of the lessons learned during the training.

KEYS TO SUCCESS

Using the principles of training discussed in Chapter 1, commanders ensure that properly executed training is well structured, realistic, safe, and effective. Other important considerations which help ensure success in training and in combat follow.

FOCUS ON THE FUNDAMENTALS

Commanders and leaders must keep it simple: move, shoot, communicate, sustain, and secure. Units must be proficient on basic tasks before progressing to the more complex tasks. All basic tasks provide the foundation on which to build performance of soldier tasks, drills, and METL tasks to standard. Command and control, logistical operations, and NBC must be incorporated into all training.

LIVE FIRE EXERCISES

Live fire exercises (LFXs) closely replicate battlefield conditions. They develop confidence and esprit, as well as reinforce soldier, leader, and unit discipline. Whenever possible, combined arms LFXs (CALFEXs) should be conducted to train on the coordination and control measures required to effectively synchronize combat power on the battlefield. LFXs are a critical link in providing soldiers with an understanding of the danger, confusion, and speed of combat operations. Section, squad, team, and crew proficiencymust be demonstrated before LFXs are conducted at platoon level and above.

NIGHT AND ADVERSE WEATHER TRAINING

Night training and adverse weather training are keys to success in combat. All units in the US Army, not just combat units, must be totally proficient in operating at night and during adverse weather conditions. Routinely training under these conditions gives units a distinct advantage when executing combat operations.

Soldiers must be proficient in the use of limited visibility equipment, such as night observation devices, thermal sights, and laser equipment. Maneuver forces can gain an advantage by performing logistical functions (resupply, maintenance, and medical) during night and adverse weather conditions. This impairs the enemy's intelligence collection efforts and aids deception operations. Reverse cycle training should be planned, when possible, to take advantage of every opportunity to replicate a 24-hour wartime environment.

Training must be structured to expose soldiers and leaders to unexpected situations, both favorable and unfavorable. Tasks must be executed confidently and competently during the fog of battle. Tough and realistic training challenges the leader and soldier to overcome the hardships and uncertainties of combat. Leaders must teach their soldiers that combat cannot be reduced to a set of calculations or checklists. Challenging training inspires excellence by fostering initiative, enthusiasm, confidence, and the ability to apply the learned tasks in the dynamic environment of combat.

DRILLS

Drills provide small units standard procedures essential for building strong, aggressive units. A unit's ability to accomplish its mission often depends on soldiers, leaders, and units executing key actions quickly. All soldiers and their leaders must understand their immediate reaction to enemy contact. They must also understand squad or platoon follow-up actions to maintain momentum and offensive spirit on the battlefield. Drills are limited to situations requiring instantaneous response; therefore, soldiers must execute drills instinctively. This results from continual practice.

Drills provide standardized actions that link soldier and collective tasks at platoon level and below. At company and above, integration of systems and synchronization demand an analysis of METT-T. Standard tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) help to speed the decision and action cycle of units above platoon level, but they are not drills. There are two types of drills which apply to all type units--battle drills and crew drills.

A battle drill is a collective action rapidly executed without applying a deliberate decision making process. Characteristics of battle drills follow:

They require minimal leader orders to accomplish and are standard throughout the Army.

Sequential actions are vital to success in combat or critical to preserving life.

They apply to platoon or smaller units.

They are trained responses to enemy actions or leaders' orders.

They represent mental steps followed for offensive and defensive actions in training and combat. For example, an infantry squad battle drill, Battle Drill 1A, React to Contact, is found in ARTEP 7-8-Drill.

A crew drill is a collective action that the crew of a weapon or piece of equipment must perform to use the weapon or equipment. This action is a trained response to a given stimulus, such as a leader order or the status of the weapon or equipment. Like the battle drill, it requires minimal leader orders to accomplish and is standard throughout the Army. An example CSS crew drill is Drill #5: Preparing Heavy Equipment Transporter (HET), M747 and XM747 Semitrailer for Loading a Tank, from ARTEP 55-188-30-Drill.

LANE TRAINING

Lane training is a technique for training primarily company team-level and smaller units on a series of selected soldier, leader, and collective tasks using specific terrain. Lane training uses multiechelon techniques to maximize the efficient use of limited terrain and control conditions for formal or informal evaluations. Lane training is externally supported, resourced, and evaluated. It enables similar units to simultaneously or sequentially train to standard on mission-related scenarios. Lane training is resource-intensive, so commanders must maximize its benefit. They narrow the focus and select only the most critical METL or collective tasks for training.

Lane training is especially valuable for conducting specific METL tasks, situational training exercises (STXs), and competitions. It is often associated with training requiring movement over terrain; for example, Movement to Contact and Assault. However, the concept also applies to rotating through stationary training sites. This round robin technique may be effectively used for Expert Field Medic Badge (EFMB), Expert Infantryman Badge (EIB), common task, NBC, or MOS-specific training. Other examples of lane training are at pages 4-22, 4-37, 4-42, and 4-46. Lane training is an effective way to standardize TTP. It also enables commanders to control tasks, conditions, and standards during competition.

COMPETITION

Effective training can be competitive. Although soldiers, leaders, and units may sometimes compete with one another, they should always compete to achieve the prescribed Army standard. Once units can perform a task to Army standards, leaders progressively increase the difficulty of conditions under which the task is executed. During competition, leaders should recognize soldiers or units exceeding established standards.

Competition can be used to stimulate soldier interest and morale, select participants for higher level competitions, encourage higher levels of performance, and provide an event for a rigorous training period. Examples are marksmanship, physical training, howitzer or air defense section evaluations, and tank and BFV crew live fire exercises.

POST OPERATIONS CHECKS

Post operations checks are those tasks a unit accomplishes at the conclusion of training. These checks should be part of the unit SOP. They will vary depending on the type of training; for example, an FTX would require more extensive post operations checks than garrison type training. Sample post operations checks include the following:

Soldier accountability.

Sensitive item accountability (such as weapons or communications security (COSEC).

Report closure of unit to higher headquarters.

Ammunition and equipment turn-in (TADSS).

Maintenance (vehicle, weapons, communications):

--Thorough PMCS after-operations checks.

--Required services performed.

Training assessments:

--AARs completed.

--After action report initiated, if appropriate.

Soldier recovery.

Chain of command inspections of soldiers and equipment.

EXAMPLE EXERCISES

As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, execution of training to standard is the payoff for all other phases of the training management cycle. Leaders must ensure that training is properly planned and vigorously executed to the established standard. Effective execution depends on proper preparation and attention to detail. It is based on accomplishment of the training objectives established for the training period.

Leaders at all levels must be personally involved and present during the training to ensure it is conducted to standard. Figure 4-4 shows other keys to successful training execution.

One way to train and evaluate skills is to use a multiechelon training event. Exercises such as FTXs, CFXs, and CPXs allow the simultaneous training and evaluation on any combination of soldier, leader, and collective tasks at more than one echelon. The following multiechelon examples (TF 1-77 FTX, 52d Engineer Battalion CFX, and 1st FSB FTX EXEVAL) highlight efficient and effective ways to train and sustain on a diverse number of mission essential tasks with limited time and terrain.

The FTX conducted by TF 1-77 is based on the METL developed in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3, the commander used his assessment and higher headquarters' guidance (Appendix A) to form a training strategy and, subsequently, a plan to train on specific METL tasks. Additionally, CS (52d Engineer Battalion CFX) and CSS (lst FSB FTX EXEVAL) exercise examples are provided to demonstrate how these type units apply training execution techniques and procedures. In the exercises, leaders at every level set training objectives for selected tasks based on their assessments of training strengths and weaknesses. They also planned opportunity training to meet the needs of their particular units. All three exercises describe examples of prerequisite training which occurs prior to the exercise.

Figure 4-4.

The exercises also provide example functions and activities conducted during execution and after redeployment to home station. RC leaders could apply these same techniques during annual or inactive duty training.

TF 1-77 FTX

Pre-FTX

TF 1-77 was scheduled to participate in the 1st Brigade CPX (15 through 18 March) which was supported by the division simulation center. The battalion commander planned an FTX to follow the brigade CPX. In the short-range planning phase, the battalion commander and S3 began planning the FTX. At battalion training meetings, they discussed the training needs of the battalion with the company commanders. The company commanders and CSM provided feedback on their soldier and collective training needs based on the METL and their assessments. From this input, the battalion S3 put together a proposed task list from which the battalion commander selected battalion tasks to be trained during the FTX. The commander based his selection on his most recent assessment of unit proficiency. A sample of the tasks to be trained is at Figure 4-5.

The S3 planned a five-phase FTX (Figure 4-6) to train the tasks selected by the battalion commander. The plan included the time the battalion commander, staff, and company commanders were involved in the brigade CPX as well as the scheduled time period of the battalion FTX. The highlights of events to be scheduled follow:

Prerequisite training (during the brigade CPX, 15 through 17 March).

CSS and C2 operations throughout.

Alert, conduct of precombat checks, and movement to assembly area.

Companies occupy and prepare defensive positions.

Company STX and FCX lanes.

Task force defense in sector.

CALFEX.

Post operations recovery.

Figure 4-5. Sample TF 1-77 FTX training tasks.

Figure 4-6. FTX Plan.

The plan the battalion commander approved emphasized company and lower training utilizing STX lanes. Each company is to be given a day on each lane to allow the company commanders to train or retrain based on their assessments. The events to be trained on the STX lanes are found at Figure 4-7. This figure provides the collective tasks and a sampling of soldier tasks to be trained during the FTX. The T&EOs used during the FTX were from applicable ARTEP MTPs and were used to guide soldier, leader, and unit training. This enabled the staff to plan the training based on doctrinal publications without developing T&EOs from scratch.

The FTX was briefed first to the brigade commander and then to the division commander during the QTB. It was approved as planned. The training objectives for the brigade CPX were based on the brigade commander's assessment of brigade's training needs.

The simulation-driven CPX provided the battalion commander and staff excellent prerequisite training on staff actions, production of orders, andcommand and control. It was conducted in a field environment to replicate wartime conditions. The CPX allowed sufficient time for the staff to use the backward planning sequence to give the companies their two-thirds planning time for the TF FTX and company STXs.

The battalion commander, staff, and company commanders were involved in the simulation driven brigade CPX. At the same time, company commanders were training their platoon leaders on STX tasks by conducting a MAPEX and a battalion-directed TEWT on the terrain to be used during the STXs. The MAPEX and TEWT were included as part of the brigade CPX, which allowed the battalion commander to supervise these activities. The squad and section leaders conducted soldier training and executed drills that they had assessed as needing training. These tasks were reviewed by the 1SGs and platoon leaders to ensure they supported the planned collective tasks.

Figure 4-7. TF execution and evaluation plan.

Time was allocated on the training schedule, and a detailed training plan was prepared. Figure 4-8 shows some activities the TF 1-77 conducted prior to the FTX.

A sample of training prior to the battalion FTX follows. During a platoon meeting in mid-February, Staff Sergeant (SSG) Steele, a squad leader in Bravo Company, learned of the training time he had available 15 through 17 March. He also learned the collective tasks the company and platoon were to execute during the FTX. SSG Steele completed his training plan several days later and received approval from his platoon leader and PSG. The plan was based on his training assessment of his squad, the platoon leader's guidance, and the PSG's and 1SG's input. He completed the plan quickly and developed his pre-execution checks. This ensured he had plenty of time to gather his resources, prepare himself, and rehearse his training with the PSG and platoon leader. Figure 4-9 shows the tasks he planned for those days.

Figure 4-8. TF 1-77 pre-FTX activities

Figure 4-9. Sample squad tasks.

The training schedule for 15 March allotted time for the squad to conduct precombat checks. SSG Steele used the time to inspect his soldiers to ensure they were prepared for training. With the precombat checks complete, he moved his squad, using tactical movement techniques, to a close-in training area.

SSG Steele gathered his squad together and covered the tasks, conditions, and standards that were required for the day's training. He had the soldier's manual, drill book, and ARTEP MTP at the training site to answer any questions. He walked the soldiers through each task before they performed it.

After this portion of the training, SSG Steele emplaced his squad into a position he had reconned the week prior to conduct the tasks under simulated combat conditions. The soldiers were required to use the tasks they had learned by constructing a complete fighting position.

Once the soldiers were well on their way digging their fighting positions, SSG Steele assembled the team leaders for leader training on emplacing a minefield. This reinforced the train the trainer technique, ensuring that the leaders could conduct the task to standard prior to training their soldiers. He structured this training so that the team leaders could periodically return to supervise the preparation of the defense.

When the positions were complete, the squad leader held an AAR. He found that two of the soldiers still did not understand how to properly prepare the Dragon range card. He tasked the team leader to retrain those soldiers after the mine training was conducted.

SSG Steele then reinforced the mine training by having the team leaders emplace a minefield. He conducted an AAR that reviewed all the tasks trained that day. Before the squad departed the training area, SSG Steele ensured that all personnel and equipment were accounted for.

SSG Steele supervised post operations checks in accordance with the training plan and the training schedule. Upon arrival in the company area, he kept his squad together while they cleaned their weapons and equipment. This allowed him to continue to informally train his squad as well as to supervise proper weapons maintenance.

During this period, SSG Steele reinforced the day's training by questioning the soldiers on the characteristics of mines, fighting positions, and range cards. Additionally, he talked about the training to be conducted the next day. He told the soldiers the preparations they were to make before First Call.

In another company, one of the platoons was going to conduct marksmanship training. Each squad leader was responsible for conducting prerequisite training prior to the FTX. The following training situation is an illustration of one squad leader's training.

The squad leader learned at a platoon meeting that a dismounted live fire ambush was to be conducted during the FTX. He requested and received training time prior to the FTX to conduct preliminary marksmanship instruction. Seven of the nine squad members were authorized M16A2 rifles (the other two soldiers were authorized M249 Squad Automatic Weapons (SAWs)). His assessment of his soldiers' marksmanship proficiency indicated--

One soldier (new to the unit) needed initial training because he failed to qualify on his weapon at his last unit and showed little familiarity with the M16A2.

Four soldiers needed refresher training. One soldier qualified marksman and three qualified as sharpshooter during the last range firing.

Two soldiers needed sustainment training. Both qualified expert during the last range firing.

The squad leader developed a training plan to ensure that his soldiers were prepared for the firing. The squad leader, as the primary trainer, used the team leaders who qualified expert to assist in the training. Execution of his training plan follows:

Initial training: The team leader (assistant squad leader) (who qualified expert) trained the new soldier on each of the following steps until all steps were performed properly and in the correct sequence.

Refresher training: The squad leader (who qualified expert) trained the other four soldiers in the following steps:

Sustainment Training: Prior to conducting the ambush, the squad leader reviewed marksmanship fundamentals with his squad.

In another platoon, prerequisite training was scheduled based on the platoon leader's assessment and tasks to be conducted during the TF FTX. During the preparation for the FTX, Lieutenant (LT) Jones sustained the gunnery skills that his squads had developed during previous qualification gunnery exercises. He built on current skills and conducted training in fire distribution and control. His assessment of his platoon's status for the CALFEX was that his crews were strong in crew gunnery skills and individual marksmanship but relatively weak in platoon fire distribution and control.

Lieutenant Jones used the time available in the unit conduct-of-fire trainer (UCOFT) to sustain his crew proficiency and cross train some of his more experienced crew members to replace combat losses. A gunnery skills test was conducted to evaluate the technical proficiency of vehicle crews and a crew proficiency course was conducted to sustain crew teamwork. LT Jones began his training in fire distribution and control with a sand table exercise. He wanted to ensure that his subordinate leaders understood how to control fires within the platoon. He used subcaliber devices in conjunction with a minitank range to begin live fire training. Platoon leaders and tank commanders participated in company run simulations networking (SIMNET) exercises to ensure integration of company and platoon fire planning.

FTX

Specific events are highlighted throughout the FTX and activities are identified for different unit levels. The FTX uses the phases found in Figure 4-6 . Chapter 5 covers assessment for the TF 1-77 FTX.

Phases A and B. At 2400 hours on 17 March, the battalion commander called an alert to test the readiness SOP. He had the battalion executive officer and staff inspect the battalion's compliance with its load plans. He also had the CSM check on the NCOs' supervision and conduct of precombat checks.

The battalion promptly executed the first phase of the FTX. The alert stressed the battalion's EDRE SOP and the alert's decentralized execution. A sample of the battalion's execution activities is at Figure 4-10.

As the soldiers of a squad in Charlie Company began to arrive, the squad leader, SSG Campbell, began to conduct his precombat checks to prepare his squad for the exercise. He found that his squad's fighting vehicle was not loaded in accordance with (IAW) the load plan. SSG Campbell stopped the precombat check process and had the squad off-load the vehicle. He made it clear that the standard would be enforced. He reemphasized to his soldiers the importance of a load plan. They then reloaded the vehicle according to the load plan.

While waiting to start movement to the assembly area, SSG Campbell seized the opportunity to reinforce the training. He blindfolded the soldiers and made them identify and or find items in their vehicle. At the AAR, the feedback from the soldiers indicated that the extra time spent to properly prepare for combat was one of the most important tasks.

The companies completed their troop leading procedures and precombat checks. They dispatched their quartering parties for occupation of the assembly area. The headquarters company commander led a quartering party to the new TOC location before the TOC jumped.

Figure 4-10. Battalion FTX execution activities.

The sequence of events left little time to rehearse actions upon arrival at the assembly areas (AAs). The battalion planned separate company routes to the AAs and gave the units extra time to make the movement. This allowed the platoons to rehearse Reaction to Contact battle drills enroute to the AAs. For practice, the battalion command group exercised control over the companies while the main TOC was displacing.

First Platoon, A Company, was conducting battle drill, React to Indirect Fire, (7-3/4-9036) from ARTEP 7-8-Drill; it was having difficulty reorganizing after moving out of the artillery impact area. The platoon leader, LT Sherrill, gathered the platoon and conducted an AAR. He determined that some of the new soldiers did not know and understand key visual signals. Unable to retrain immediately, LT Sherrill moved the platoon to the AA.

After occupation was complete, LT Sherrill was called to conduct a recon of the defensive position. Sergeant First Class (SFC) Caine finished preparing the platoon for the upcoming Defend mission. He then seized the opportunity to retrain React to Indirect Fire while the platoon leader was on the leaders' recon.

SFC Caine reviewed the battle drill to ensure he knew the task, conditions, standards, performance measures, and supporting soldier tasks before he started the training. He then prepared a training plan of key tasks that the soldiers and platoon needed to train on. SFC Caine focused this training plan on the task, conditions, standards, and supporting tasks shown in Figure 4-11.

While the soldiers ate chow, SFC Caine used a sand table to demonstrate the drill to the squad leaders. He emphasized the hand and arm signals as he moved the squad and soldier figures on the sand table. The squad leaders returned to train their squads. While the squads were conducting this training, SFC Caine located terrain close by to conduct the drill collectively as a platoon.

After the squads had completed the squad training to standard, the platoon assembled and SFC Caine reviewed the training. Satisfied that the soldiers knew the supporting tasks, he took them to the piece of terrain chosen earlier. He walked them through the drill, and after the second iteration, the platoon executed the drill with artillery simulators.

After the AAR, the soldiers returned to the AA, prepared to execute the drill during theoccupation of the defense if required. Once the companies had occupied their defensive positions, the leaders prepared their soldiers for theSTX and FCX lanes.

Figure 4-11. Battle Drill 4A.

Phase C. The companies continued to improve their defensive positions and conduct maintenance and sustainment operations when not on an STX or FCX lane. The teams and companies moved to their assigned STX or FCX lanes early each day and linked up with OCs and the OPFOR commander. TF 1-77 had already coordinated the training events for each STX or FCX four weeks prior during an OC and OPFOR training and coordination meeting. The 1-2 Armor supplied the OCs, OPFOR, and STX and FCX lane support. Each company in 1-2 Armor was assigned responsibility for one of the lanes. TF 1-77 commander and S3 conducted a TEWT with the 1-2 Armor commander, S3, and company commanders after the OC and OPFOR training.

TF 1-77 provided T&EOs to 1-2 Armor for each STX and FCX lane. These T&EOs provided the basis for 1-2 Armor's selection of OPFOR T&EOs. The 1-2 Armor also planned OPFOR opportunity training. The coordination meeting and TEWT provided the company commanders the information needed to complete their training schedules prior to the four-week training schedule lock in.

The STX and FCX lanes were designed to allow the company commander to vary the conditions to the appropriate training level of the unit (initial, refresher, sustainment) and to support prerequisite training and retraining. The modular format of the lane enabled the commander to retrain a specific event if required. An example of a STX lane is at Figure 4-12.

The battalion commander, CSM, and S3 observed and supervised training at the three STX lanes. The lane training was sequenced to allow the battalion commander to consistently move to different training sites to assess all companies' training.

The STX and FCX lanes were executed with mixed results. The OCs, OPFOR, leader and soldier observations, and AARs helped identify strengths and weaknesses from soldier to company level. The leaders used all their time on the lanes to correct weaknesses; however, some units ran out of time. In these cases, the leaders took advantage of any opportunity to correct these weaknesses during the FTX.

The teams and companies rotated through each lane during Phase C. Each night the units improved their defensive positions. These defensive positions would be their assigned battle positions for the battalion defensive FCX and CALFEX in Phase D.

A mass casualty (MASCAL) exercise was scheduled to test the evaluation system from company level to the brigade support area (BSA). The 1st FSB had coordinated for support of this event during the short-range planning process. Team A and the OPFOR were tasked to provide the casualties at the end of their conduct of the STX lane C/D (Figure 4-6). Further discussion of this event is found in the 1st FSB example.

Phase D. The preparation of the defense involved the entire battalion to meet the Be Prepared to Defend time in the OPORD. A snapshot of the battalion's execution during this phase is at Figure 4-13

The battalion commander ordered reconnaissance patrols in sector while the companies occupied their defensive positions at night. As the patrols were debriefed, the S2 determined that the enemy was using one trail heavily. The OPFOR had conducted Movement to Portray a Realistic Situation to Support a Squad Live Fire Ambush starting-on 19 March.

One infantry squad per platoon in the TF conducted the ambush evening. The execution of the exercise was rotated among the companies. Each squad was given a fragmentary order (FRAGO) and time to conduct a blank fire and MILES rehearsal on terrain similar to the live fire site. Precombat checks were conducted in an assembly area before the squads departed to the live fire site. The squads moved to an objective rally point (ORP), and the leaders went on a leaders' recon. The recon also served as a key leader walk-through to ensure the exercise would be conducted safely.

The 1-2 Armor provided OCs to evaluate the squads throughout the exercise. The chain of command was responsible for the safety and evaluation of the squads' performance. The exercise was phased to allow an AAR at the site. If retraining was required, resources and time were made available the next night. The squad live fire exercises were completed with only one squad having to retrain and execute again.

The task force FSO and the battalion mortar platoon leader planned to rotate the mortar platoon through each STX or FCX lane and support a different company daily. At night the platoon, minus one section, would displace to a firing point to provide offset live fire support for the defensive STXs with the artillery battery. Each night, a different mortar section would operate as a split section to support the squad live fire ambushes. Each evening's training objectives culminated in a combined artillery and mortar live fire. The company forward observers (FOs) were rotated to the observation point to adjust the fire. As planned, 1-2 Armor provided mortar OCs to help evaluate the mortar training.

Figure 4-12. Example company STX lane.

The 1-2 Armor also ensured time standards were met. The artillery battalion provided OCs to evaluate TF 1-77's supporting artillery battery. The battery supported the FCX and defensive STXs throughout Phase C.

The defense was well on its way to being completed. Leaders ensured that soldier, leader,and collective tasks were linked and performed to standard.

The Commander, Team A (TF 1-77's tank heavy unit), wanted his chain of command personally involved. He wanted them to supervise throughout the preparation of battle positions during the defense. Some of the platoon and crew collective tasks were assessed as "P" as a result of the last field exercise. The commander wanted extra attention paid to those tasks.

As the team commander and 1SG checked the defensive sector with platoon leaders, they found that PSGs and other NCO leaders were coaching soldiers and checking each battle position. However, one new PSG was not enforcing the standard to the commander's satisfaction. The PSG had checked a position, but had not corrected a problem the tank crew was having in clearing fields of fire and preparing a range card. The commander discussed the situation with the platoon leader to reinforce the chain of command. He wanted to ensure the platoon leader understood the collective task and supporting soldier tasks and how they linked to the TF's METL.

As the platoon leader discussed the problem with the PSG, he used this same leader training process and emphasized corrections be made through the chain of command to the soldiers. The NCOs are the key to accomplishing all tasks. Figure 4-13. Phase D execution activities.

The TF defense was emplaced to facilitate a CALFEX. Since 18 March, when they were not training on STX lanes, the units in the task force had been preparing their defensive positions. The defensive concept of operation to be executed as a CALFEX was planned during the brigade CPX. Figure 4-14 shows the scenario for the CALFEX.

The CALFEX OC plan included a terrain walk of the entire defense to familiarize OCs with all safety requirements. The OC training included the following:

Purpose and scope.

Training objectives.

Range regulations and restrictions.

Enemy situation and its relationship to the target arrays.

Control measures.

Communications plan.

Controller duties.

Controller reporting formats and responsibilities.

Safety before, during, and after the LFX.

Medical treatment and evacuation procedures.

The TF conducted the CALFEX according to plan. The defense provided the battalion with valuable lessons in integration and control of fires, coordination between units, rates and distribution of fire, and effectiveness of the combined arms team against realistic targets. The chief OC and TF commander conducted an AAR with the chain of command and OC personnel. They discussed the following:

Troop-leading procedures.

Integration and control of fires.

Weapons employment.

Communication of orders and directives.

Figure 4-14. CALFEX scenario.

The final event in Phase D was conducted after the battalion commander had verified through the chain of command that all ammunition was expended and weapons were safe. The TF was surprised by an OPFOR flank attack which forced them to withdraw under enemy pressure. After the TF had occupied its new position and conducted an AAR, the commander directed the TF to commence Phase E.

Phase E. The commander gathered the officers together to discuss and refight the withdrawal which took place in Phase D. Their job was to determine what happened, why it happened and what to do about it. The CSM took control of the rest of the battalion while the officers were retraining.

The final event was for the units to redeploy to garrison. To maximize resources, the CSM included a mounted land navigation course of two points for each platoon or section. Using four routes, and 20-minute intervals, the platoon and sections moved to garrison. As the units arrived at each point, they were given tasks, conditions, and standards for the leaders to call for fire and for selected soldiers to identify enemy weapons and vehicles. As the units arrived at the release point, the CSM and 1SGs took the opportunity to professionally develop the leaders by discussing what had happened and recommending ways to correct the shortcomings.

SSG Lope started his recovery during post operations. Instead of splitting his squad up to accomplish the many tasks simultaneously, he kept them together. This allowed him to obtain additional feedback for the final AAR and train the soldiers informally on their weaknesses. During the land navigation exercise, two soldiers were weak on threat identification tasks. As the squad cleaned weapons, he retrained the soldiers on those particular tasks. He also retrained tasks he had noted in his leader book during the FTX. SSG Lope inspected the weapons before they were turned in and ensured they were cleaned and maintained to standard. The BFV crew conducted after-operations PMCS. The squad assisted in cleaning and maintaining the BFV.

The recovery process is an extension of precombat checks, and once completed formally, it signifies end of exercise. The squad leader supervises this final phase of the FTX. The unit SOP dictated a three-step recovery process during post operations that culminated in a chain of command inspection. An example of a recovery process is at Figure 4-15 .

52D ENGINEER BATTALION CFX

This is an in-depth discussion of the application of the training techniques, procedures, and multiechelon training by a CS unit. Even though an engineer battalion CFX is used to demonstrate certain techniques and procedures, all combat support units can apply these techniques.

Pre-CFX

During his long-range planning, the commander of the 52d Engineer Battalion scheduled a battalion CFX (See Appendix C) to occur concurrently with a projected 1st Brigade CPX (Mar, 9X). The battalion commander chose a CFX because the battalion's S3, S4, and Bravo Company commander had changed within 45 days of the 1st Brigade CPX. Additionally, Alpha Company would be in the field to support TF1-77's FTX (see Appendix A). A CFX provided an excellent opportunity to practice C2 tasks assessed as "P" during the commander's short-range planning. It also allowed the commander to assess the leader development needs of the new company commander and staff officers. During the CFX, the NCO leaders of the battalion units not in the field would conduct training on collective and soldier tasks which supported the battalion's METL.

The battalion commander assessed the unit's ability to execute its METL prior to publishing his second quarter QTG. He assessed the battalion as "P" in its ability to execute three of its METL tasks: Perform Combined Arms Engineer Reconnaissance, Prepare Combined Arms Obstacle Plan, and Reorganize as Infantry. The first two tasks were selected for emphasis during the CFX.

The battalion staff officers and company commanders identified those critical tasks which support the battalion's tasks and that were assessed as "P." Their training assessments determined the following battalion battle tasks (critical company and staff METL tasks) needed emphasis during the upcoming CFX:

Figure 4-15.

Prepare an operations plan (OPLAN) and operations order (OPORD) (staff).

Prepare combined arms obstacle plan (staff).

Plan and direct combined arms engineer reconnaissance (staff).

Secure and defend unit position (company).

Prepare an engineer annex (company).

Conduct engineer reconnaissance (company).

Prepare a combined arms obstacle plan (company).

Conduct minefield reduction operations (company).

Their assessment identified these collective tasks for Company A:

Conduct enemy obstacle reconnaissance (platoon).

Conduct an in-stride breach of a minefield (platoon).

Emplace a tactical minefield (platoon).

Conduct an engineer reconnaissance (squad or section).

Create an Assault Lane in a Threat Surface Laid Minefield with Hand Emplaced Explosives (Squad Drill #2).

In addition to the above listed tasks, the NCO leaders compiled a list of supporting soldier tasks chosen for training during the CFX. The NCOs chose those tasks that they assessed needed training and that supported their platoons', sections', and squads' critical collective tasks. They used applicable military occupational skill STPs, such as STP 5-12B24-SM-TG and STP 5-12F1-SM, and the Soldier's Manual of Common Tasks. The NCOs selected the tasks shown in Figure 4-16 (example list does not include all tasks or MOSs).

Figure 4-16. Sample supporting leader and soldier tasks.

Because 1st Brigade's simulation-driven CPX was based on the division's wartime OPLAN, the 52d Engineer Battalion commander decided to synchronize the battalion's CFX scenario with 1st Brigade's scenario. Figure 4-17 is a matrix used by the commander and staff to plan the schedule of events during the CFX. The battalion commander and CSM briefed the division commander during the QTB on their training plan for the CFX. The division commander approved the plan and agreed to resource the battalion.

The OCs for the 52d Engineer Battalion CFX and Company A FTX would come from an RC engineer battalion. The 25th Engineer Battalion was aligned with the 52d Engineer Battalion under the partnership program. As OCs, the 25th Engineer Battalion leadership could learn new TTP as well as provide a valuable service to the 52d Engineer Battalion.

Figure 4-17. Engineer Battalion execution and evaluation plan.

The staff developed a pre-execution checklist for the exercise. Example pre-execution checks follow:

Ensure that sufficient maps (1:50,000) and weather and terrain overlays are on hand.

Coordinate with the 25th Engineer Battalion for evaluators.

Develop an exercise scenario portraying division and brigade operations in coordination with the division and brigade G3s and S3s.

Coordinate development of division and brigade OPORDs to support the exercise scenario.

Conduct a TEWT in early March (battalion).

Arrange for Army aviation assets for aerial reconnaissance.

Arrange for division terrain team support.

Conduct prerequisite training on threat engineer vehicles, capabilities, and tactics.

Conduct training on the collective and soldier tasks required for the exercise (emphasize drills).

The officer and NCO leaders reviewed the list of tasks the CFX would focus on and determined which prerequisite tasks to train prior to the start of the exercise. Figure 4-18 shows common leader and soldier tasks which the leaders selected to train before the CFX.

The leaders decided the training time each prerequisite task required. During the next company training meeting, the PSGs and section noncommissioned officers in charge (NCOICs) presented their training time requirements to the company commander and 1SG. The company commander and 1SG examined the requests to see if the platoons' training could be effectively combined, or if the training could be accomplished in a multiechelon format. The requested training was then approved and placed on the draft training schedule for the appropriate week.

Master Sergeant (MSG) Ruddy, the battalion operations sergeant, recommended setup and takedown of the battalion command post (CP). He estimated the NCOs and soldiers needed to practice the procedures at least three times prior to the CFX. He based this estimate on many factors, including personnel turnover and the length of time since the last field deployment.

Figure 4-18. Sample prerequisite training tasks.

MSG Ruddy recommended the training be conducted during the last week of February and the first week of March. The company commander and 1SG agreed and directed the training be placed on the training schedule. Later that week, MSG Ruddy suggested the officers' February MAPEX be conducted in the tactical CP after the NCOs completed training the setup procedures. The battalion S3 concurred and talked to the battalion commander about the idea. The commander approved the recommendation but directed that the MAPEX start in the afternoon. This gave the NCOs adequate time for retraining, if required.

During the last week of February, MSG Ruddy and the section NCOICs taught CP setup on a nearby field. The section NCOs walked the soldiers completely through the process of setting up and taking down the CP. The soldiers then set up the CP at their own pace. The section NCOICs provided individual instruction whenever it was clear a soldier did not understand the task he was required to accomplish. After the CP complex was established, each section NCOIC conducted training on the procedures outlined in the tactical SOP for those soldiers who had arrived since the last field exercise.

When the CP setup was completed, the staff officers moved into the CP and conducted a MAPEX. The NCOs supervised the soldiers to take down the CP after they finished the MAPEX. Before meeting the ARTEP MTP standards, the soldiers rehearsed the CP's setup, operation, and takedown two more times prior to start of exercise (STARTEX).

CFX

This section focuses on the actual conduct of the CFX. The situations illustrate methods of conducting multiechelon training. The sequence of events is keyed to the CFX phases as outlined in Figure 4-17. A discussion of recommended evaluations and AARs can be found in Chapter 5.

Phase A. Early on the first day of the CFX, the battalion alerted the HHC, Bravo Company, remaining company commanders, and platoon leaders. Leaders conducted the following precombat checks:

Accounted for soldiers and weapons.

Verified status of vehicles and trailers.

Verified status of supplies; for example, packaged Class III and maps.

Verified status of communications equipment, signal operation instructions (SOI), and other COMSEC equipment.

Checked battle rosters and load plans.

Completed before-operation PMCS.

Inspected soldiers to ensure they have the needed equipment and they are properly camouflaged.

Ensured blank rounds and blank adapters were issued.

Ensured safety checks and briefings were completed.

Ensured advance and quartering parties were briefed and ready.

Two hours after the alert notice, the units departed garrison and moved to and occupied their AAs. After the AAs were occupied, the evaluators facilitated an AAR. The battalion received the division OPORD two hours after arriving in the assembly area. The staff received the commander's approved course of action at 1220. Figure 4-19 shows training conducted at the AA as the staff prepared the battalion OPORD.

While the battalion commander was walking the battalion CP defensive perimeter, he discovered the guard post at the dismount point had no communications with the CP. The soldiers also had not selected a temporary fighting position from which to observe the road. Upon questioning the soldiers, the battalion commander realized they did not understand what was required of them. The battalion commander found the HHC company commander and explained the situation to him. The battalion commander emphasized he wanted the situation corrected using the NCO chain. This would ensure that the NCOs were aware of the deficiency and that all training weaknesses were identified and corrected.

A battalion OPORD was issued at 1400. The battalion was ordered to deploy into its primary positions NLT 0300. After the division's obstacle plan was approved and an AAR conducted, the battalion deployed.

Phase B. The battalion executed its deployment and established the battalion's CP in accordance with MTP standards. The staff's success in setting up and operating the CP was directly attributed to the training and rehearsals held prior to the exercise. Once all subordinate elements were in position, the battalion planned and directed the platoons in engineer reconnaissance of specific routes. The battalion primary staff and company commanders conducted a map and aerial reconnaissance of selected portions of the area of operations.

Figure 4-19. Sample assembly area training.

The engineer reconnaissance was an excellent opportunity to conduct multiechelon training. Figure 4-20 shows training which occurred during the conduct of the reconnaissance.

MSG Ruddy, the battalion operations sergeant, found time to evaluate the S3 section soldiers' ability to use proper radio procedures while the commander and staff were on the reconnaissance. He then presented training which he had prepared in garrison to the soldiers who needed it. Specialist Jones failed to properly execute the task to standard during the training. MSG Ruddy recognized that Specialist Jones was

Figure 4-20. Sample multiechelon training.

having problems understanding how to use the SOI authentication tables. He placed SSG Goode in charge of the section after the training was completed and coached Specialist Jones through several authentication problems until he could perform the task to standard.

The battalion staff analyzed the results of the reconnaissance and held an AAR to discuss its conduct. The battalion commander was very pleased with how quickly and accurately the reconnaissance was completed. The CSM reported his assessment that soldier training was going well. He did point out that some instructors needed more practice making and utilizing field expedient training devices.

Phases C and D. Early on the third day of the exercise, Alpha Company was alerted and moved to an AA near TF 1-77. The company evaluators

(B Company, 25th Engineer Battalion) were positioned in the unit's area prior to the alert notice. Once in the AA, the company commander and platoon leaders went to TF 1-77's Main CP to receive the warning order and a situation update. The company executive officer, 1SG, and other leaders oversaw the Preparation of a Hasty Defense. An AAR was conducted once the officers returned from TF 1-77's CP.

The other 52d Engineer Battalion elements in the field conducted a withdrawal during Phase C of the exercise. Using the results of the reconnaissance conducted during Phase B, the battalion prepared obstacle plans to support the division's withdrawal operation. The plans were evaluated as a go by evaluators from the 25th Engineer Battalion staff and, concurrently, the battalion conducted a night withdrawal.

The battalion CP was attacked by OPFOR (a platoon provided and evaluated by 1-2 Armor) early the next day. The CP reacted quickly IAW its plan to fight off the attack. The rest of Phase D was spent performing an engineer reconnaissance and preparing plans to support a counterattack by the division's reserve brigade. Although the exercise's pace continued to be hectic, individual soldiers and sections and squads experienced periods when they were not participating actively in the exercise play or sleeping. NCOs used these slack periods to identify collective and soldier task training needs and to present training.

Phase E. The battalion was ordered to be prepared to support offensive operations at the completion of the division's successful defense. An engineer reconnaissance was conducted to support the operation. The division issued an OPORD at 1800 for deliberate attack at 2200 the next day (Day Five). A battalion OPORD was issued and breaching plans were developed to support the division's plan. Alpha Company continued to support TF 1-77's FTX. The remaining units began a night land navigation exercise which was planned prior to the CFX. The battalion commander decided that soldiers would be evaluated on a critical common task at each checkpoint as part of his commander's evaluation program (CEP). Figure 4-21 shows training conducted between 2200 and 0100.

Figure 4-21. Sample training conducted during Phase E.

The battalion S3 issued a list of grid coordinates that each section NCO would require his junior NCOs and enlisted soldiers to navigate within a specified time limit. SFC Fast, the battalion S2 NCOIC, divided the coordinates between the sergeant and the two specialists in his section. To start the exercise, he had the sergeant provide navigation for the S2 section. As the section moved about, the section NCOIC pointed out to the two specialists where they were on the map and how to use landmarks to determine the location. At each stop, the section dismounted and SFC Fast conducted a quick AAR. After the last point was found, the section returned to the battalion CP.

During Day Four, Alpha Company's officers developed obstacle plans to support TF 1-77's defensive operations and participated in the TF 1-77's FCXs. The NCO leaders took charge of the units and conducted engineer reconnaissance to support the defense.

Phase F. After stand-to at 0630 the next morning, the battalion commander ended the CFX. At that time the soldiers took down the CP under the supervision of their NCOs. NCO leaders conducted a thorough inspection to ensure all blank ammunition was turned in and all sensitive items were accounted for. The battalion S3 conducted a convoy briefing prior to the return to garrison. The battalion elements redeployed to garrison and began post operations checks. The 52d Battalion's TSOP contained an appendix which outlined the three-day process associated with field deployments. Unit integrity was maintained throughout the post operations period.

SFC Smith was the NCOIC of the S1 section and the PSG for the platoon containing all of the battalion staff. He instructed his section leaders to maintain squad integrity throughout the post operations period. During the first day SSG Jay, the S4 section leader, assembled his soldiers in the supply room for weapons cleaning. He coached them on cleaning their weapons and questioned them about the weapons' various characteristics.

SSG Jay recalled that when the enemy attacked the CP with chemical agents, no one had informed the S4 van. Since he had forgotten to mention this during the AAR which followed the attack, he told the PSG when he came by to check on the weapons cleaning. The PSG wrote this point down so that he could discuss it with the 1SG later that afternoon.

After the first day of post operations activities, the senior NCOs met with the CSM. They discussed soldier training weaknesses that were identified during the AARs and recorded in their leader books. Some weaknesses had not been corrected during the exercise due to lack of time. Those soldier weaknesses not retrained were rescheduled to be trained later.

While the battalion redeployed to garrison, Alpha Company's platoons were attached to TF 1-77's companies and teams for company-level lane training. The training lanes for Movement to Contact and Defense contained precoordinated situations which required the engineer platoons to execute their battle drills. Following is an example of the training received by 1st Platoon, Alpha Company, while it supported Team A, TF 1-77.

Team A, conducting Movement to Contact encountered a small enemy force defending a large minefield. The engineer platoon leader rapidly assessed the situation, developed a plan to create three assault vehicle lanes, and assigned three squads the mission. In addition, he coordinated for artillery-delivered smoke to conceal the squads. Once the mission was assigned, each squad executed Drill #2: Create an Assault Lane in a Threat Surface Laid Minefield with Hand Emplaced Explosives, from ARTEP 5-145-Drill. Supporting leader and soldier tasks were--

Supervise minefield breaching operations.

Use and maintain demolition equipment.

Construct a nonelectric initiating and or detonating assembly.

Prime explosives nonelectrically.

Prime explosives with detonating cord.

All materials listed in the battle drill were available except the explosive charges. These were replaced by training aids. A PSG from the 25th Engineer Battalion evaluated 1st Squad's performance and held an AAR after the drill was completed.

SSG Brady, the first squad leader, correctly executed the troop leading procedures and moved his squad to the job site. The squad worked quickly and effectively. It executed the drill in fourteen minutes, a minute faster than the drill standard. At the AAR, the evaluator emphasized how well 1st Squad executed the drill. SSG Brady recorded the results of the lane training evaluation in his leader book during the AAR.

Phase G. During the next three days, every engineer platoon was evaluated on its ability to conduct operations in support of offensive and defensive operations. The engineer company commander, Captain (CPT) Mann, was pleased with his platoons' performance. He was also impressed with the training benefit obtained through lane training. He made a note to set up platoon lanes during the company's next FTX.

Phase H. The company redeployed to garrison eight days after it was alerted. CPT Mann had his company conduct post operations IAW the battalion's SOP. He also emphasized that all leaders must reassess their elements' training proficiency based on the exercise results. The company leaders discussed their new assessments and methods for correcting weaknesses during the next weekly company training meeting.

1ST FSB FTX (EXEVAL)

Pre-FTX

During the battalion QTB, the 1st FSB commander presented a plan for a battalion external evaluation (EXEVAL) in conjunction with 1st Brigade's CPX. The 1st FSB had been assigned the mission to conduct CSS operations (supply, maintenance, medical) to support the CPX and TF 1-77's FTX. The FSB commander considered this an excellent opportunity to assess the results of the battalion's training efforts since the last EXEVAL. Therefore, he decided to deploy the battalion on an FTX and support the entire brigade from the BSA. The 2d FSB was prepared to provide evaluators if the EXEVAL was approved. The DISCOM and division commanders agreed with the plan and approved the necessary resources.

The FSB S3 and maintenance operations officer finished planning the FTX. Their training and evaluation plan focused on the assessed weaknesses shown in Figure 4-22. The FSB commander decided to focus on--

Deploy to combat area of operations.

Conduct CSS operations (emphasize supporting forward).

Direct response to BSA threat.

Casualty evacuation.

The FTX was planned and refined throughout the short-range and near-term planning periods. Some of the key points of planning for the FTX follow.

The FSB commander and his staff coordinated with the 1st Brigade to ensure they knew all support requirements. They discussed the completed EXEVAL plan with the brigade commander. The brigade commander requested additional emphasis on refueling operations and combat lifesaver (CLS) training. He wanted to ensure refueling operations were conducted as close as possible to the combat trains and under realistic conditions.Treatment and evacuation of casualties had been problems in past exercises. They were also weaknesses for the FSB. The FSB's S3 ensured that the 1st Brigade's training needs were emphasized during the EXEVAL. The FSB commander also coordinated and integrated his plan with the main support battalion (MSB).

The FSB commander used as a planning tool a matrix to depict his execution and evaluation plan (Figure 4-23). The missions and tasks were derived from the applicable MTP (ARTEP 63-005-MTP). The FSB commander briefed his subordinate leaders on the tasks and the training objectives for the FTX. He explained how the battalion could get the most out of the FTX through multiechelon training.

Company commanders, platoon leaders, and key NCOs used the battalion's execution and evaluation plan, the results from the last EXEVAL, and subordinate leader input to develop situational training exercises for their units.

Figure 4-22. Sample FSB assessment.

Figure 4-23. 1st FSB execution and evaluation plan.

These STXs would allow the leader the flexibility to conduct training when opportunities became available. The commanders also planned time for the squad leaders to conduct prerequisite training while the officers and senior NCOs were involved in the 1st Brigade CPX.

Platoon sergeants briefed their squad leaders on all requirements. Squad leaders used the platoon guidance to prepare prerequisite training on deficient tasks while the officers were involved in the CPX (Figure 4-24). A sample of one squad's training prior to the FTX follows.

SSG Cruz of the Class III section was told that the squad would use trailer transfer operations to facilitate the movement of fuel in support of 1st Brigade. He knew that his drivers would be required to haul 5,000-gallon tankers that were not their own. He was therefore particularly concerned for the safety of the drivers. His training plan would focus on quick and accurate before-operations PMCS of the trailers. By focusing on this aspect, his section would be able to transfer fuel tankers quickly and safely.

SSG Cruz used command maintenance to evaluate his soldiers' proficiency. He scheduled refresher training for his soldiers during his sergeants' time training. He required each soldier to correctly perform before-operations checks on a 5,000 gallon tanker. He also took the soldiers on a TEWT to several locations he had picked out the week prior when he was preparing for the training. At each location, he pointed out how the first tanker should be positioned, how subsequent tankers would be parked, and how to maneuver the tankers in and out of the transfer points. SSG Cruz emphasized METT-T and safety throughout this training.

Figure 4-24. Sample prerequisite training.

SSG Cruz then used a nearby field to coach the squad through the transfer. Again he emphasized safety throughout the training. After each iteration, he gathered the squad together and conducted an AAR. Specialist Kim recommended adding the trailer transfer operation to the company's SOP. SSG Cruz noted in his leader book to pass the recommendation to the platoon leader. The soldiers completed the training and returned to the motor pool under the supervision of the assistant squad leader. SSG Cruz started the squad on its recovery operations, found the platoon leader, and discussed the SOP change with him.

SSG Cruz planned additional training during the week prior to the FTX. He developed a lane with three transfer points over various terrain conditions. The platoon leader and PSG evaluated the squad's performance. As each driver completed the lane, the evaluator conducted an AAR. One driver and assistant driver had difficulty with a hilly part of the lane. SSG Cruz accompanied them to another training site and retrained them after releasing the other soldiers.

FTX

The following is a by-phase discussion of execution of the FSB FTX (Figure 4-23). Highlighted events under each phase for different units show the linkage of collective and soldier tasks.

The battalion developed pre-execution checks prior to the FTX. This detailed list ensured the battalion was prepared to execute the FTX. Figure 4-25 is a sample of the battalion's pre-execution checklist.

Figure 4-25. Sample pre-execution checklist.

Phase A. The battalion started the FTX with an alert to test the unit's readiness SOP. After detailed precombat checks were completed, the FSB deployed to the assembly area. Figure 4-26 is a sample of the FSB units' actions prior to deployment.

Squad leaders briefed their soldiers on the mission, and what was expected. They questioned their soldiers in detail about their responsibilities and ensured they understood. The following is an example of one squad conducting precombat checks.

Sergeant (SGT) Duke discovered Private (PVT) Ames was in the wrong uniform because he did not have on his field jacket nor had he drawn his protective mask and carrier. He made an on-the-spot correction by having PVT Ames take his field jacket out of his duffel bag and put it on. He then sent PVT Ames to the NBC room to draw his protective mask and rejoin the squad. Some additional precombat checks were--

Figure 4-26. Predeployment activities.

Accountability of personnel.

Accountability and serviceability of weapons and sensitive items.

Status of vehicles and trailers.

Soldiers briefed and knowledgeable about the mission.

Soldiers and equipment camouflaged and inspected; for example, weapons, load bearing equipment (LBE), identification (ID) tags, and meal cards.

Before the battalion moved to the field, the chain of command conducted AARs. All soldiers were involved and the feedback was noted. The battalion then deployed to the AA.

The 2d FSB evaluated the 1st FSB's road march to the AA. The 1st FSB occupied the AA, established perimeter defenses, and began conducting CSS operations. Figure 4-27 shows tasks the battalion conducted.

Figure 4-27. FSB road march and assembly area activities.

AARs were conducted after the last battalion unit occupied its assembly area. Later on Day One, the FSB received the 1st Brigade's OPORD for deploying into sector. The battalion was required to establish the BSA prior to 0400 the next day. While the battalion staff developed an OPORD, the battalion's subordinate units continued to provide CSS support to the brigade. NCOs took advantage of slow periods by presenting opportunity training to refresh soldiers' memories on tasks, such as Construct Individual Fighting Position; Practice Noise, Light, and Litter Discipline; and Construct a Range Card.

To replicate wartime conditions, the FSB commander ordered all movement off primary roads and within 1 kilometer of the BSA be conducted in black-out drive. The commander emphasized safety during the establishment of the BSA. He also emphasized constant leader involvement during black-out drive operations. Subordinate commanders emphasized safety when issuing their OPORDs.

Phase B. The FSB began moving forward to the BSA site at 2000. The FSB's occupation of the BSA went well. The 2d FSB OCs evaluated this task as a go. The FSB started its proactive CSS operations in support of 1st Brigade. Selected NCOs supervised the construction of defensive positions immediately after stand-to on Day Two. SGT Smothers of the maintenance company was responsible for preparing fighting positions in his squad's sector during the occupation of the AA. He ensured--

Observation posts (OPs) and listening posts (LPs) were manned.

Fighting positions were properly prepared and camouflaged.

Early warning devices were emplaced.

Sector sketches and range cards were completed and accurate.

This task required him to carefully manage his squad. The 1st Brigade had already evacuated a piece of equipment for repair. Intelligence on the enemy situation indicated a high probability of being attacked. SGT Smothers had half his section prepare the defense as the other half worked on customer equipment. During this period, an OPFOR patrol was sighted and a BSA alert went out to man the fighting positions. As the soldiers ran to occupy their fighting positions, confusion arose as to who was to go to which position. SGT Smothers noted also that there were not enough fighting positions.

The alert status was reduced and an AAR was conducted. The soldiers and SGT Smothers were able to revise their defensive position's occupation plan. As this phase of training progressed, SGT Smothers conducted several rehearsals to reinforce the plan's execution.

Phase C. During Phase C, the FSB continued to conduct CSS operations. OPFOR attacks occurred on Days Three, Four, and Five. A MASCAL exercise was conducted on Day Six. A sample of some of the training that occurred follows.

The FSB commander positioned his 5,000 gallon tankers halfway between the maneuver battalion combat trains and the BSA at forward tactical refueling points IAW METT-T. This facilitated fast refueling of the TF. The plan included the tankers moving when the combat trains moved. Logisticians tracked the battle, forecasting Class III and coordinating delivery from the MSB. The delivery of Class III was conducted by tanker transfer. These actions greatly improved the supported units' ability to refuel, and reduced the signature of the BSA.

The BSA was attacked three times during the FTX. The reaction force (composed of all the tenant elements of the BSA) and the MP platoon reacted too slowly to defeat the initial attack. The AAR held following the attack revealed the majority of BSA personnel had not heard the alert signal.

During the BSA AAR, the FSB commander concluded critical information, such as size and direction of attack, was disseminated too slowly. The AAR identified these additional problems:

The LPS and OPs were not properly emplaced or camouflaged and did not have back-up communications.

The TOC was not passing along threat levels.

The communications wires were not properly laid. After the attack, wire from the TOC to the companies was found cut where it crossed a road.

There was no messenger plan in case of communications failure.

There was no audio or visual alternate signal.

Targeting and fire support were poor.

The defensive plan did not include vehicle mounted machine guns.

After the AAR, the FSB commander and CSM held leader classes to correct the problems. After the classes, the NCO and officer leaders conducted a rehearsal of BSA defense on a sand table. Subsequently the leaders returned to their units to retrain their soldiers.

The FSB commander scheduled a walk-through with the entire BSA. After several rehearsals, the commander assessed that the BSA was ready to conduct the task under combat conditions. The BSA was attacked twice more during the FTX with little loss of soldiers, material, or support to the 1st Brigade. An AAR was conducted after each attack and minor shortcomings were corrected. An important aspect of this training is that BSA personnel continued to provide CSS operations. Figure 4-28 shows unit activities while defending the BSA.

Figure 4-28. Unit activities in BSA.

Phase D. During Phase D, a MASCAL was scheduled by the FSB and 1st Brigade. It was conducted in conjunction with Team A, TF 1-77's, assault STX. The medical company had conducted prerequisite training prior to the FSB FTX.

CPT Thomas, commander of Company C, knew the MASCAL exercise would be the most difficult part of the exercise for her unit. She also knew a MASCAL situation in a realistic combat environment would require additional support from external assets. Further, her soldiers needed to know how to coordinate for such support.

CPT Thomas had her ambulance platoon establish an ambulance exchange point (AXP) to speed up casualty evacuation. The AXP allowed the exchange of a fresh FSB ambulance loaded with medical supplies with an ambulance carrying casualties from the supported unit. The exchange was at a transfer point typically halfway between the FSB and battalion aid station IAW METT-T. This significantly decreased evacuation time because supported units did not have to travel to the BSA to evacuate patients.

The AXP can move easily and is responsive to changing situations on the battlefield. CPT Thomas had read in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) bulletins that CTCs had successfully used this approach; therefore, she trained her unit extensively on this technique. She also conducted prior coordination and training with the supported units.

Dr. (CPT) Lance, a physician with C Company, 1st FSB, used a color-coded triage technique during the FTX. This involved marking areas under the camouflage nets with multicolored signs that indicated the level of triage of casualties; for example; green for routine and red for immediate. At night the triage areas were marked with colored chemical lights. This technique expedited casualty evacuation and treatment and was essential to the execution of the MASCAL exercise.

The treatment platoon's training objectives for the FTX were planned during the near-term planning phase. The platoons were evaluated on the following tasks during the MASCAL exercise:

Conduct triage.

Provide initial medical service.

Provide ground ambulance support.

Dispatch ambulances to supported units.

Immobilize fractures or suspected fractures.

Control hemorrhage.

Treat environment injuries.

Treat burns.

Perform examinations.

Treat enemy prisoners or war (EPWs) IAW Geneva Conventions.

The MASCAL exercise stressed the medical system to near collapse; however, the MASCAL AARs indicated the medical company had responded well. The movement of casualties was conducted superbly. Problems did arise in the triage system. The AARs revealed that the front line medical personnel and the medical company were marking casualties differently. The company commander noted this for future coordination.

Phase E. During Phase E, many training events focused on platoon, section, squad, team, and crew execution of critical collective tasks. The 2d FSB provided evaluators for the different events, while 1-2 Armor provided the OPFOR. An example training event was a lane developed to test the convoys' reaction to an ambush.

SFC Ramon's convoy was returning to the BSA after picking up a load of simulated special weapons. He was advised by radio that a bridge was out on his planned route. The TOC provided him with an alternate route, which led his convoy through the ambush site. The lead truck encountered a road block after rounding a sharp curve. The convoy reacted to the ambush using the drill, Convoy Reacts to Road Blocked (ARTEP 55-188-30-DRILL).

SFC Ramon had trained his platoon to execute the drill as part of prerequisite training for the FTX. The convoy reacted quickly and accurately to the ambush. Only minor mistakes were raised during the AAR.

A platoon-sized OPFOR attack on the BSA occurred during Day Eight of the exercise. During the attack, the OPFOR employed smoke. An OC caused one of the BSA's NBC alarms to activate. Soldiers masked and relayed the warning using hand and arm signals, and the appropriate vehicle horn signals. Once the attack was repelled, the units' leaders conducted unmasking procedures. The AAR that followed identified several problem areas, which were later corrected.

The FSB continued to support TF 1-77's FTX until the exercise ended. Prior to redeploying to garrison, the FSB accomplished the actions shown in Figure 4-29.

SFC Wilson, Recovery Section Leader, B Company, was responsible for providing recovery assistance to supported units with NMC or damaged equipment. He prepared the section for the upcoming recovery and evacuation mission by--

Organizing the recovery team.

Briefing the recovery team on the concept of operation.

Identifying resource requirements.

Requesting a communications relay site to facilitate C2.

Figure 4-29. FSB actions prior to redeployment.

The recovery section assisted TF 1-77 and the FSB in moving equipment from maintenance collection points. The recovery operation was efficiently conducted and resulted in the rapid repair of NMC equipment.

During this phase, the FSB began to move equipment and supplies to the rear. By conducting some movement of equipment and operational loads early, the FSB was prepared to assist TF 1-77's movement back to garrison. This also gave rear elements an opportunity to start repairing NMC equipment.

Phase F. The BSA coordinated and supported the redeployment of TF 1-77. The FSB operations officer ensured medical, fuel, and recovery assets were in position to support the movement. The BSA stayed in position until TF 1-77 closed into its motor pool.

The FSB commander saw the movement of the FSB to garrison as a training opportunity. He directed the redeployment to be conducted as a tactical operation until all elements had closed in garrison. He also directed the assistant S3 to control the movement.

Once in garrison, the battalion started its recovery process. The unit SOP established a three-step recovery process of accountability, maintenance, and retraining. This process is an extension of precombat checks and, once completed, signifies the end of the exercise. However, the FSB recovery process is longer and more difficult for CSS than for combat arms and CS units; the FSB must work on its own equipment as well as the supported units' equipment.

The FSB commander conducted an AAR and prepared his assessment. The exercise provided valuable data on the battalion's strengths and weaknesses. The new assessment provided the basis for the next short-range plan.

All training must be evaluated. This forms the base from which leaders
assess proficiency. Leaders must record the results and use them to adjust
training requirements.

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Military

CHAPTER 4
EXECUTION

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

PRESENTATION OF TRAINING

PERFORMANCE OF TRAINING

KEYS TO SUCCESS

EXAMPLE EXERCISES

Military

CHAPTER 4 EXECUTION

EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

PRESENTATION OF TRAINING

PERFORMANCE OF TRAINING

KEYS TO SUCCESS

EXAMPLE EXERCISES

CHAPTER 4
EXECUTION