CHAPTER 1
Division Communications in the AirLand Battle
The ability of Army units to fight in low-, mid-, and high-intensity conflicts with other services and with allies is critical. All elements of combat power must be integrated to win the conflict. An integrated battlefield combines conventional, chemical, nuclear, and directed energy weapons and electronic jamming equipment. The commander must be able to see deep into Threat territory to delay, disrupt, and destroy Threat second echelon forces and create opportunities for decisive maneuver. This deep attack principle is the extended battlefield. Thus, the integrated and extended battlefields are the AirLand Battle concept and subsequently AirLand Battle doctrine.
a. For combat initiative, US forces must have enough command and control to integrate intelligence and to target the Threat with maneuver forces. This requires timely and responsive communications. There is an increased need to link air and land operations elements. The circuits over the division multichannel systems are critical in the AirLand Battle. Continuity of operations is vital. Tactical communicators must consider the total flow of information from source to consumer. This requires close coordination and cooperation between corps and division signal units. All signal personnel must understand the AirLand Battle concept to participate successfully in the AirLand Battle. It calls for aggressive action to maintain communications and to rapidly establish new communications links.
b. Elements of the division can be dispersed over areas extending 90 by 170 kilometers (55 by 105 miles). Figures 1-1 and 1-2 show the typical organization of the heavy and light divisions. Figure 1-3 shows the air assault division; Figure 1-4 shows the airborne division. This dispersion of division units requires a flexible communications system. The division signal battalion meets this requirement.
a. Because AirLand Battle demands effective command and control, it requires changes and enhancements in signal doctrine. The communications structure must be area based and for common use (dial-up rather than dedicated or "hotline" circuits between users) to maintain maximum flexibility for operations. This Area Common-User System (ACUS) will have one to three nodes. Users accept more responsibilities to own, operate, and install phones, communications terminals, facsimile devices, or workstations. Record traffic is limited to two entry ports (or gateways to corps) in a division. Within the division, informal record traffic using common-user facsimile is recommended. The role of the user is clarified in FM 24-1.
Figure 1-1.Typical organization of the heavy division.
Figure 1-2.Typical organization of the light division.
Figure 1-3. Air assault division
Figure 1-4. Airborne division.
b. The communications network must be flexible and able to support deep, close, and rear operations. At the same time, it must be resilient and mobile to survive on the AirLand Battlefield. Timely relocation of signal nodes and command posts (CPs) ensures survivability. In a dispersed CP, communications assets are distributed to each operational cell. This requires signal soldiers and signal systems to be as dispersed as the units they support.
c. The signal battalion commander and staff must understand the division commander's concept of operation and intent to plan signal support operations.
Deep, Close, and Rear Operations
a. AirLand Battle consists of deep, close, and rear operations synchronized at all echelons. The deep operation is combat power projected into the Threat rear to delay, destroy, or cause early deployment of the Threat's second echelon's forces. The close operation is the battle fought on the forward line of own troops (FLOT). Rear battle operation is action taken to defeat the Threat deep attack forces and to ensure continuity of our lines. Attacking deep is a decision based on more than fire power and command wisdom. The decision to attack deep or create an operational maneuver is based on intelligence. Beyond the FLOT direct fire ranges, intelligence systems gather information. Strategic and tactical reconnaissance operatives assess Threat intent and capability. Unmanned sensors monitor movements in the Threat area. This information is passed through communications links provided by the user and signal community. Once the input is provided, the commander determines whether a deep maneuver may involve undue risk.
b. While fighting close operations, the division relies heavily on combat net radio (CNR). Multichannel service is provided among the division headquarters, major subordinate commands, separate battalion headquarters, and brigade support areas (BSAs). Thus, communications is provided for the close and rear battles. Host nation enhancement of division communications is encouraged to eliminate unclassified traffic on tactical circuits.
(1) Mobility of a division is restricted on the ground. Close operations or any engagement demands a communications system that provides redundancy in alternate signal paths. An example of this is a simple wiring system. Since World War I, foxhole wire communications have been installed along two paths. They are buried to protect against indirect fire outage.
(2) For security measures, messengers should use different routes to the same CP. Otherwise, the enemy may predict the time and location the messenger uses.
(3) Security of communications assets can be enhanced by--
- Arranging shelters so that signal entry panels face inward,
thereby protecting cables from frontal or lengthwise firing.
- Backing vehicles into position to allow for rapid displacement.
- "Sandbagging" generators to muffle their noise.
- Camouflaging.
- Providing good site security.
c. The division rear is vulnerable in either low-, mid-, or highintensity conflict. Threat operations are continual in the division rear. The spectrum of hostility ranges from planned riots to regular Threat forces. These Threat combinations require special signal support consideration. Rear operations are planned, coordinated, and controlled by the rear command post (Div Rear CP) through the rear operations FM net and by other available rear operations communications systems. Rear operations planners use existing net structure at brigade and below. Rear operations command and control begin on the ground in site defense, in colocated unit control, and in rear base clusters.
a. To successfully execute the AirLand Battle, the command and control system must allow the commander to control and synchronize deep, close, and rear operations. The commander must be able to receive, process, and transmit information in a timely manner and his decisions require rapid distribution. If the commander sees the same battle as his subordinates, he can provide faster and more effective orders and support. The commander cannot be tied to one location if he is to influence these three areas. Superior communications facilitate the commander's mobility.
b. AirLand Battle command and control generates many concerns on information flow--generation, transmission, fusion, resolution, and interoperability. AirLand Battle envisions information as a force multiplier giving the commander an advantage. Corps, division, or task force commanders often look to national resources for intelligence information. They must be able to receive and disseminate this information through a data distribution system. The rapid dissemination of information is a key to success on the battlefield. Many communications systems can pass data. Those used are largely a matter of SOP and criticality.
c. The division must be able to plan and conduct operations with the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marines. Interfacing must be done at the appropriate level and automated when required. Operating in the joint arena is imperative.
d. The Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS), a subset of the Army Command and Control System (ACCS), is the objective command and control architecture. ATCCS includes automated information systems for maneuver control, air defense, fire support, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW), and combat service support (CSS). All echelons from brigade to corps are linked by data distribution, CNR, and/or area common-user system. The information systems must be integrated vertically within systems and horizontally within echelons for effective command and control.
a. The division signal office manages the division automation. The trend of automation in the Army is toward decentralization and user-owned and -operated equipment. The decentralization of CSS Standard Army Management Information System (STAMIS), the increase of embedded computers in communications equipment, and the proliferation of Battlefield Automated Systems (BASs) by the five major functional areas of ATCCS impact on the Army's communications networks. Multiple types of BASs will coexist in many CPs. They will have similar requirements for software support and maintenance and they must be integrated with the supporting distribution networks. Automation personnel assigned to the division signal office are responsible for centralized staff level planning and force integration of the division's tactical information management resources. In this capacity, the division signal officer (DSO) will serve as the integrator of the ATCCS within the division.
b. ATCCS is an integrated system of equipment, software, information, and staff. This system allows tactical commanders and staff at each of the five battlefield functional areas to plan and control their operations and to coordinate these with other functional commanders. Therefore, ATCCS consists of the automated command and control systems for the battlefield functional areas and the communications links between and among the control systems.
c. Information management is the policy, process, and procedures used to manage information systems and services. It includes, but is not limited to, resources and activities that create, gather, manipulate, classify, store, display, retrieve, secure, transmit, disseminate, or access elements of information. Elements of information may be visual, aural, or electrical. Information management occurs at strategic, theater/tactical, and sustaining base levels.
(1) Strategic information is required by theater Army, joint or combined commands, defense, and other federal agencies to execute national policies and theater goals.
(2) Theater/tactical information is used in the theater of operations, normally at corps level and below, and is required to conduct maneuver warfare. Tactical information includes unit status, unit employability, fire support capabilities, supply routes, key terrain, avenues of approach, and Threat disposition, capabilities, and intentions. It includes information systems needed to direct, coordinate, and support combat power during peace, transition to war, and conflict. This information is processed from the foxhole to the successive command headquarters of the joint, unified, specified, or combined commands.
(3) Sustaining base information is primarily concerned with base operations and training. Sustaining base information systems function during peace, mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment of the fighting force.
d. Personnel responsible for information management coordinate, process, and manage information vertically between the strategic, theater/tactical, and sustaining base; and horizontally and vertically between the five major functional areas. The effectiveness of this force level information exchange network is the key to the Army's success to fight IAW the four basic tenets of AirLand Battle. The tenets are initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. The AirLand Battle command and control system must facilitate the commander's ability to operate, delegate authority, and exert leadership from any critical point on the battlefield.
e. The Information Mission Area (IMA) has five disciplines: automation, communications, visual information, records management, and printing and publications. As defined below., the five disciplines encompass strategic, theater/tactical, and sustaining base information. The IMA responsibilities of the ADSO address only those aspects of the tactical environment, systems, and services.
(1) Automation is implementing processes or procedures using automated electronic equipment in tactical and nontactical environments. The technologies include, but are not limited to micrographics, word processing, copiers, printing, communications, decision aids, and general-purpose (GP) data processing.
(2) Communications is disseminating information through transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds or data of any nature using audio, visual, electro-optical, or electromagnetic systems.
(3) Visual information is using sound and visual material or processes to communicate information. Visual information includes, but is not limited to, motion pictures, still and motion photography (combat camera), television, audio, graphic art, and audiovisual libraries.
(4) Records management is managing and maintaining documentation. It includes distribution, use and disposition, storage, declassification, and the implementation of responsibilities under the freedom of information and privacy acts. Media includes correspondence, reports, forms, directives, publications, electronic mail/messages, mail, magnetic tape/disk, and electro-optical storage/retrieval. The Information Services Support Office (ISSO), formerly the ASD, is responsible for the "Battlefield Information Services (BIS)."
(5) Printing and publications is the process for producing documents on media such as micropublishing, plate making, press work, photocomposition, and binding for issue and distribution. For the most part, this is accomplished through Signal Corps channels to the garrison/wartime DOIM.
a. Sound ECCM techniques require a thorough understanding of the threat to the electromagnetic spectrum. Radio electronic combat (REC) is one such threat. REC is the total integration of electronic and physical destruction resources to deny the use of electronic systems. It also protects friendly electronic control systems from disruption by the enemy. The Threat considers REC integral to all combat actions. Therefore, the Threat has made investments in developing techniques and equipment to deny enemies the effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum for communications.
b. The purpose of REC is to disrupt or destroy command and control systems at the most advantageous time. A goal of REC is to disrupt or destroy at least 60 percent of command, control, intelligence, and weapons system communications: 30 percent by jamming and 30 percent by destructive fires. To accomplish this goal, enemy forces expend considerable effort and resources to gather combat information about their enemies. As locations are determined and units are identified, enemy forces establish priorities as follows:
- To fire suppressive fires.
- To jam communications assets.
- To deceptively enter radio nets.
- To interfere with the normal flow of the enemy's communications.
Battlefield Spectrum Management
a. Managing the use of the electromagnetic spectrum is crucial in the AirLand Battle. Battlefield spectrum management (BSM) is systematic planning, managing, coordinating, and using tactical electromagnetic spectrum-dependent material in tactical units. Spectrum management or frequency management involves US forces and international governing bodies. Each military branch and the Department of Defense (DOD) maintains its own spectrum management agencies and staff elements. For national as well as international harmony's sake, therefore, it must be clear to all that BSM is critical on the ALB, and is further described below.
b. The US Military Communications-Electronics Board (MCEB) is the primary agency for coordinating military signal matters among DOD components, departments, and agencies. The MCEB provides guidance and direction for preparing and coordinating joint and combined signal directives and agreements. The MCEB allocates spectrum from allotments received from the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The Army member of the MCEB is the Army Spectrum Manager. The Army Spectrum Manager is under the direction of the Director for Information Systems for Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (DISC4). The MCEB includes the--
-
Joint Staff (JS).
Defense Communications Agency (DCA).
National Security Agency (NSA).
Army.
Navy.
Air Force.
Marines.
c. Unified and specified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) are responsible for US military spectrum use within their commands. The theater commander exercises control over spectrum use through the joint staff. The Director of Communications-Electronics in the theater, called the J6, has primary responsibility for spectrum management. The Allied Communication Publications (ACPs) provide guidance to unified and specified commands for spectrum use.
d. Frequency support for US forces in a foreign host nation is guided by International Telecommunications Union (ITU) regulations. The host nation, also guided by ITU regulations, allocates and controls frequencies.
(1) US forces have no rights to any portion of the frequency spectrum other than those authorized by host nation allotments. Frequency allotments contain authorizations as well as limitations. Misuse of such allotments or use of non-allotted frequencies can cause serious interference to authorized users, danger to life and property, and unnecessary embarrassment to the US government and the respective host nation.
(2) The senior US military signal officer in a foreign country obtains frequency support from the host nation. The host nation usually provides a frequency allotment list. Requests for frequencies are submitted through the appropriate signal channels.
(3) A contingency operation involving US forces in a hostile country is governed by some logical considerations as well as existing international policy.
(a) Existing telecommunications in the invaded country could be useful to our purposes, particularly in the police/peacekeeping phase. We may want to protect certain portions of the already used spectrum for our own eventual use.
(b) International law as governed by the International Telecommunications Union directs the spectrum in use by neighboring and allied nations to be protected during a contingency operation.
Mission Spectrum Planning Considerations
a. Signal support must exist across the full operational continuum: peacetime competition, conflict, and war. Operations within this continuum, focused on the Threat and constrained to well-defined objectives, can take place in an environment that is--
- Allied to US interests/policy--peacetime competition.
- Hostile and in a state of unsettled control--conflict.
- Totally hostile--limited or general war.
b. Elements of the division may be committed across the entire operational continuum. They must be prepared to cover the entire spectrum from terrorist operations to sustained combat against a modern air defense and armor-heavy foe, with possible chemical and nuclear attacks. Overall mission requirements dictate the combat task force size and the command relationships with other US and allied commands. These factors influence the information systems tasked to support and sustain operations. As with other elements of the force, information planners must determine the appropriate personnel and equipment for the mission. The stated and implied tasks must be identified and prioritized. Any constraints, such as lift capability or range limitations, must be applied. Risks must be identified and stated clearly to the commander. The commander must know the signal support limitations that may restrict his plans.
(1) In a low-intensity conflict, the Army opposes irregular or unconventional forces, Threat special operations forces, and terrorists. Low-intensity conflict threatens US interests at all times, not just during periods of active hostilities. In the most benign environment no overt hostile opposition is expected, although the continuous threat of terrorist activity must be considered. Hostile intercept and position locating activities are continuously conducted in peacetime by overt and covert means, from ships to embassy listening posts. During contingency operations, jamming and using intercept information for weapons targeting should be expected. Some Third World countries have sophisticated EW that can be used against US forces.
(2) In mid- or high-intensity conflicts, the Army must prepare to fight campaigns of considerable movement across a wider space of air, land, or sea. Hostile opposition is expected after deployment. In the most difficult environment, an opposed deployment is expected, requiring a combat assault to secure entry. Associated with the armed threat is the anticipated EW threat.
c. Depending on the environment and mission, some level of augmentation to the light division signal battalion will be required. Task organization of organic division signal battalion assets may provide communications for independent brigade operations. This negates the need for outside augmentation. Augmentation scenarios are being developed by the Combined Arms Center and will provide guidance for staff planning.
d. Communications planning for each operation should consider the following phases:
- Predeployment.
- Strategic deployment.
- Tactical deployment.
- Tactical employment.
- Sustainment operations.
e. The division or deployed element must be prepared to operate as an independent task force or as a part of a larger deployed force.
(1) Each tactical unit is provided minimal organic communications systems to support internal operations. The division signal battalion provides access to the ACUS by deploying communications terminals at the division main CP, division tactical CP, and division rear CP. It also provides the communications systems that link the division CP and major subordinate units. The division communications systems are prioritized to link the major tactical headquarters. These systems also provide communications to the brigade and divisionaL support areas for sustained operations.
(2) When the division is deployed, division signal battalion elements are under the command of the signal battalion commander. They are always under the operational control of the signal battalion systems control (SYSCON). The division signal battalion provides direct support (DS) maintenance for organic communications equipment, cryptographic equipment, plus control and distribution of all communications security (COMSEC) materiel to include two-man materiel, operations codes, and signal operation instructions (SOI). The division support command (DISCOM) maintenance battalion provides DS maintenance for declassified cryptographic equipment.
(3) When elements from the signal battalion are attached to a brigade or battalion task force, they come under the control of the unit signal officer for full integration into the unit's tactical communications system during deployment.
(4) The positioning of the terminals at each major unit headquarters dictates that the signal battalion element maintain close and continual coordination with the supported unit. This ensures that communications operations, technical planning, and execution remain current with tactical operations. It also assists in logistical support, primarily Class I and Class III.
(5) In a task force situation, the ADSO primarily provides general communications planning for the division staff. The ADSO also provides SOI, COMSEC, frequency management, and telephone system planning support for the entire division. While still under the purview of the DSO, automation, visual information, and the BIS play a less critical role. This will not be true for the integration of automation in the very near future.
a. Tactical information can be divided into four categories.
(1) Intelligence: Exchange of information on Threat forces, terrain, and weather between levels and elements of command.
(2) Command: Issuance of execution orders or guidance to subordinate commanders.
(3) Control: Exchange of information on subordinate forces between levels and elements of command to provide dynamic command of fires and maneuver forces.
(4) Sustainment: Exchange of logistical information between levels and elements of command.
b. Since communications are usually limited, failure to prioritize information may critically impede the tactical mission. The force commander sets the priority for his command.
a. All operational communications means, including commercial telephones and radios, should be securable. In particular, the administrative and logistical planning, routinely discussed as unclassified information, should be secured to avoid disclosing sensitive plans. During the planning phase couriers should be used when possible, and selected local telephones should be secured with Parkhill or VINSON (KY-57 used in conjunction with the HYX-57 wire line adapter). This should include the secure telephone unit (STU) II or III when available.
b. Multichannel system radios are secure. Total system security, allowing user-to-user security, is assured only if every wire line and terminal instrument using the multichannel system is physically safeguarded with controlled access. Each commander must ensure the security of his area of responsibility, otherwise the entire system is nonsecure. A nonsecure system, such as a local telephone network or AUTOVON circuit, should not be allowed to interface with the secure system.
c. All CNRs must be secure and associated classified documents (for example, SOI, key lists, hopsets) must be protected against compromise.
a. Reliable communications is critical; therefore, plans must include multiple communications systems in unit movement plans. Table 1-1 shows communications means and characteristics.
(1) Secure single-channel radio provides the most responsive means of communications on the battlefield. It allows direct voice communications between individuals using highly mobile communications terminals. Each system provides unique characteristics that complement each other by covering the various combinations of range, Threat electronic countermeasures (ECM) vulnerability, and inherent reliability. The types include ultra high frequency/tactical satellite (UHF/TACSAT), very high frequency/frequency modulation (VHF/FM), and high frequency/single side band (HF/SSB). These radios also support data system operations such as the Tactical Fire Direction System (TACFIRE). The radio teletypewriter (RATT) systems support transmission of hard copy messages. Careful use of nonsecured radios minimizes the intelligence value of transmitted information. Commercial radios are especially vulnerable to interception and exploitation. They must be secured if used to support an operation.
(2) Secure multichannel radio provides the high capacity systems required to support the simultaneous use by many users. The multichannel radio systems provide trunks to interconnect the automatic telephone network, allowing the use of direct-dial telephones for voice and facsimile. The multichannel system also supports other special purpose telephone and data terminals. The available systems are restricted to line of sight (LOS) operations with a limited number of relays to overcome terrain obstacles or to extend system range.
(3) Wire lines 5 to 8 kilometers (3 to 5 miles) long are not practical for quick, frequent CP moves. However, local wire networks are needed to support telephones, communications terminals, and facsimiles in local CP areas.
(4) The courier is a reliable means of communications. This is especially true in a high threat EW environment. For messenger service over extended distances or for critical messages, an aircraft may be required. Procedures to request air support are normally SOP. See paragraph 3-3b(1) for further explanation of the messenger service mission in the division.
b. The choice of communications means depends on the availability of systems that interconnect the desired locations, the urgency of the message, and the risk involved by using a particular means. One of the facets of the division is its capability to operate over vast distances and rugged terrain. In many cases, this requires the use of extended range communications. The appropriate systems are single-channel TACSAT terminals, multichannel TACSAT terminals, and HF/SSB radios. These systems are vulnerable to Threat ECM activity. HF/SSB radio also depends on favorable atmospheric propagation conditions and sunspot activity level combined with intensive frequency management techniques. TACSAT systems are currently limited in both terminal and space segment availability.
c. The most commonly used tactical communications system is the VHE/FM radio. While it id constrained by distance, larger units have at least one retransmission system. A strategically located retransmission capability can overcome terrain obstacles and extend the radio net operating range. Table 1-1.Communications means and characteristics.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
