SERVICE OPERATIONS AND PROCEDURES
This chapter defines recommended methodologies for use by the services for planning, reporting, and tracking to enhance operations in an UXO contaminated environment. While the focus is on tracking US and allied submunition ordnance, threat ordnance poses an equal hazard and must be incorporated into planning, reporting and tracking where appropriate.
Section A. Army
Effective operations in an unexploded ordnance environment require integrated planning, tracking, and reporting of submunition employment. The fire support coordinator (FSCOORD) advises the maneuver commander and the operations staff officer (G-3) on fire support employment. This includes CAS and considerations for various field artillery munitions. The maneuver commander must provide guidance on the use of submunitions (DPICM/CBU) after assessing the mission, the UXO risk to troops, intent to maneuver, and terrain management. The maneuver commander does so after consultation with the G-3 and FSCOORD. This does not mean that the maneuver commander must approve individual missions or weapon employment. Guidance concerning submunition employment is disseminated through operations and fire support channels to higher, subordinate, and supporting forces. Only exceptions to the commander's guidance (i.e., location or munition use) must be individually approved by the commander, G-3, or FSCOORD. Reporting and tracking of DPICM/CBU missions fired is an administrative task and must not impede the responsive fire support for the maneuver commander.
3. Staff Responsibilities
a. G-2 (Intelligence). The G-2 includes potential UXO obstacles in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB). The resulting reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plan should include UXO detection reporting and marking.
b. G-3 (Operations) Function. G-3 function is the primary staff responsibility for planning and publishing operations orders (OPORDs). Using the battlefield framework, the G-3 considers the mission, the commanders' intent, forces available, terrain, commander's risk tolerance, choice of available weapons, branches to follow-on operations, and terrain management. Within the OPORD, the coordinating instructions could include commander's guidance on the employment of UXO producing submunitions. Additionally, reporting of special information on UXO locations could be part of the commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). The coordinating instructions can include guidance on reporting procedures, density levels, locations restricted, and no fire areas. The planning factors addressed in this section are not all inclusive but illustrate some of the requirements necessary to minimize the impact of UXO on operations. Submunition planning considerations include-
(1) Availability of nonsubmunition producing ordnance.
(2) Effectiveness of nonsubmunition ordnance against anticipated targets.
(3) Availability of engineer and EOD support.
(4) Impact on terrain management.
(5) Impact on friendly troop movements or occupation of an area.
(6) Impact on proposed main supply route (MSR).
(7) Restriction on areas-proposed logistics bases, refuel-on-the-move (ROM), and forward arming and refueling point (FARP) sites.
(8) Requirements for communication and automation equipment to rapidly disseminate information.
(9) Requirements for UXO reporting.
(10) Information flow to inform operating forces of possible UXO locations.
(11) Preplanning, deconflicting, and coordinating with other components.
(12) Impact of UXO on operations.
(13) Future operational requirements for current enemy controlled airfields or airstrips.
(14) Requirements for dismounted operations in the area (security, patrolling, reconnaissance, etc.).
c. Fire Support Function. The FSCOORD and fire support element (FSE) are the commander's link into fire support channels. The FSCOORD ensures that commanders and staffs are aware of the capabilities and hazards associated with the use of submunition ordnance, adherence to the commander's guidance regarding use, and reporting to appropriate staff officers the expenditure of submunition ordnance. The FSCOORD conducts detailed planning of fire support assets to support the commanders' intent. The supporting field artillery headquarters tracks the execution of all indirect fire missions and reports to higher and subordinate units.
d. Engineer Staff Function. Engineer staff function is the primary staff responsibility for obstacle planning. The engineer staff officer, in coordination with the FSCOORD, EOD, G-2, and G-3, conducts mission analysis on the impact of UXO. Responsibilities include breaching, reducing, recording, and marking UXO hazard areas.
e. EOD Staff Function. EOD staff function advises maneuver and support commanders on all matters pertaining to EOD support; provides command and control for subordinate EOD units; and has primary responsibility for clearing UXO hazard areas.
a. Engineers. Engineers provide mobility and survivability in support of the operational plan. They conduct mine and countermine operations and in-depth UXO obstacle breaching.
b. EOD. EOD eliminates or reduces the hazards of domestic or foreign conventional, nuclear, chemical, biological munitions, and improvised explosive devices that threaten personnel, military operations, facilities, and materiel. EOD personnel and units provide technical assistance to units in conducting UXO obstacle breaching.
c. UXO hazard areas are potential obstacles that must be considered while developing and wargaming courses of action. Commanders use the battlefield framework to assess the impact of submunition ordnance and issue guidance on employment. This planning guidance establishes submunition employment constraints and restraints and includes recommendations for both surface and air delivered ordnance within current and projected boundaries. Air delivered submunition ordnance and the area outside current boundaries require coordination with the JFC, functional component commanders (if designated) service components, and adjacent allied forces.
d. Close/Deep Operations. Primary concerns in deep and close operations are fratricide and casualty prevention and retaining freedom of maneuver. Careful coordination prevents UXO from restricting or impeding maneuver space while decreasing fratricide.
(1) Detection. Submunitions and scatterable mines are very small in size and are difficult to detect in optimum circumstances. In some terrain, such as dense foliage, tall grass, or uneven ground, many of them will go undetected. During periods of limited visibility or at night, detection is almost impossible. Combat vehicle personnel traveling cross-county in a buttoned-up vehicle will be at a great disadvantage, because they will not be able to visually detect and avoid them.
(2) Reconnaissance. After detection, the characteristics and extent of UXO hazard areas must be determined using both ground and aerial reconnaissance and remote imagery. The unit detecting a submunition hazard area, scatterable minefield, or other UXO must mark and report it and, if directed, clear lanes. All areas remain marked until cleared.
(3) Clearing. Considering the factors of mission, enemy, troops, terrain, and time available (METT-T), clearance may be by breaching (see FM 90-13-1) or route clearance. Route clearance normally requires the deliberate sweep prior to opening a road. While there is no set time limits, an average of 1 to 3 kilometers can be covered per hour (see FM 20-32). Once detected, mechanical and explosive techniques are the preferred methods for sub munition neutralization.
e. Rear Operations. Planners must carefully consider use of submunition ordnance in rear operations due to the potential for fratricide. Forces that may come into contact with UXO in the rear area are the logistical sustainment forces, normally the most vulnerable and difficult to replace. The potential for contact increases during offensive operations as logistical forces move forward into areas of high density UXO. Employment of submunition ordnance or the discovery of UXO hazards in the rear area require immediate reporting and dissemination. EOD forces normally clear UXO hazards within the rear areas. Engineer forces provide equipment support as required. Clearing techniques include mechanical, explosive, and manual operations. Note: Only EOD is trained to render UXO safe without a high order detonation.
The commander uses established reporting and tracking requirements for protection of forces. UXO hazards are reported through appropriate channels and incorporated into intelligence data. Records are forwarded to the appropriate headquarters, where they are maintained on file. (See Figure III-l.)
a. Reports begin at the tactical level and forwarded through the senior Army headquarters to the JFC. Units encountering UXO hazard areas on the battlefield must assess, mark, and report using the 9-line spot report according to FM 21-16/FMFM 13-8-1. This report is forwarded to the force engineer. Friendly submunition management and reporting are the responsibility of FSE. The engineer representative at each level evaluates the reports and when appropriate integrates the reports into the obstacle overlay.
b. Dissemination. Forces receive information on UXO hazard areas via the obstacle overlay passed through intelligence and operations channels. The rear operations center (ROC) maintains UXO hazard information within the rear area.
c. Army/JFACC Interface. The battlefield coordination detachment (BCD) ensures the JFACC is aware of the Army forces (ARFOR) commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, and the constraints/restrictions on submunition use within the ARFOR AO. All wings and squadrons must be informed of ARFOR submunition restrictions through the SPINS of the ATO. The BCD Plans Section provides additional information to the ARFOR commander on JFACC planned submunition use within or near Army boundaries by highlighting CBU scheduled mission on the ATO. During the ATO development, the BCD Plans Section ensures that JFACC planned submunition missions conform to ARFOR policy. The Operations/Current Intelligence Section provides information of actual CBU employment within Army boundaries by highlighting CBU-scheduled missions on the ATO. BCD automation linkage is through the Standard Theater Army Command and Control System (STACCS), Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS), and Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS).
d. STACCS-CTAPS Interface (Figure III-2), STACCS cannot transfer directly to CTAPS. The ARFOR STACCS transfers target nominations to the BCD STACCS. The BCD Plans Section downloads the target nominations onto a diskette and gives the diskette to the Combat Plans Section in the AOC. The Combat Plans Section enters the target nominations to the rapid application of airpower (RAAP) portion of CTAPS. Consolidated nominations are submitted for integration into the joint integrated prioritized target list (JIPTL). The approved JIPTL is used to build the master air attack plan (MAAP) and the ATO. The ATO is passed to the BCD via CTAPS. The BCD then provides the ATO to the ARFOR.
(1) The BCD compiles results of the current ATO by correlating mission tasking with MISREPS received from the flying units. The BCD also informs the ARFOR commander of any reroled, targets of opportunity, or unexecuted missions employing CBUs.
(2) The air support operations center employment of submunition ordnance. The (ASOC) is another source of submunition information. The ASOC can access the JAOC database and provide submunition information (munitions' effectiveness assessments and air combat assessment summaries) directly to corps FSE.
a. Obstacle tracking is the traditional responsibility of the engineer element. The engineer representative converts the UXO reports into obstacle overlays for dissemination to subordinate units. See Appendix A for UXO obstacle numbering system.
b. The Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS) link to Maneuver Control System (MCS) relays information concerning field artillery primary interface is at the division and corps main command post (CP).
(1) ATCCS. ATCCS is an integrated, ground mobile, and fixed deployable network of common hardware and software for echelons at corps and below. Its purpose is to assist commanders and their staffs to obtain a near real-time access to command critical information requirements (task organization, maneuver, engineer, nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC), signal, army airspace command and control, fire support, air defense, intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW), CSS, resources, and enemy situation) through a force level database. The ATCCS architecture includes five constituent battlefield functions analysis systems. Two of those systems, MCS and AFATDS, are critical to reporting and tracking UXO.
(2) MCS. MCS is the primary automated decision support/information system supporting the tactical commander and staff. The MCS provides the functional applications necessary to access and manipulate the force level information (FLI) database to satisfy all stated CCIR for a specific operation, to effect timely control of current combat operations (deep, close, and rear), and to effectively develop and distribute plans and estimates.
(3) AFATDS. AFATDS provides automated decision support for the fire support function, including joint and combined fires. AFATDS provides a fully integrated fire support (FS) command, control, communications (C3) system, giving the FS coordinator automated support for the planning, coordinating, controlling, and executing of close support, counterfire, interdiction, and suppression of air defense systems. AFATDS performs all of the FS operational functions, including automated allocation and distribution of fires based on target value analysis.
c. Historical Records. Units forward UXO hazard records through operational channels to Army component (ARFOR) headquarters. The ARFOR engineer element maintains the hazard reports on file. These historical files are available for planning, use by subordinate units, and for dissemination to follow-on forces/units or for use by appropriate agencies during postconflict operations.
Section B. Marine Corps
Marine Corps units are task organized into Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs). MAGTF components are capable of delivering both air and artillery submunitions. The MAGTF commander (Marine expeditionary force (MEF) level), along with the force fires coordinator (FFC), is responsible for planning fires and reporting and tracking the use of submunitions as appropriate. Submunitions management and reporting are the responsibility of the force fires coordination center (FFCC). Tracking of potential UXO locations is the responsibility of the MAGTF engineer officer. Potential locations of UXO require tracking and integration into operations when developing the scheme of maneuver.
The FFC advises the MAGTF commander on employment of fires. This includes considerations for air and artillery delivered submunitions. Reporting use of submunitions is an administrative task and not intended to impede the responsive coordination of fires for the MAGTF commander.
a. Planning Factors. The following list provides abase line of planning requirements necessary to minimize the impact of UXOs on friendly operations. Primary responsibility for planning fires is the FFC. The FFC is the commander's link into fire support channels. Using the battlefield framework, the FFC considers the mission, commanders' intent (higher commander included), forces available, terrain, commander's risk tolerance, choice of available weapons, branches and sequels to the operation, and terrain management. The coordinating instructions of the OPORD contain the commander's guidance on the employment of submunitions. The coordinating instructions also contain guidance on reporting procedures, density levels, locations, and no fire areas. Information relating to the use of UXO producing ordnance is received and disseminated through a variety of means. The Marine Corps Fire Support System (MCFSS) link to the FFCC relays information concerning artillery employment of submunitions. This information is available to all MAGTF agencies concerned with tracking UXO; however, the actual delivery of the ordnance and the time and place of delivery requires confirmation. The direct air support center (DASC) receives initial reports upon delivery of the ordnance. The DASC forwards information from these reports to the senior FSCC, MAGTF FFCC, and tactical air command center (TACC) for further dissemination.
b. Deep Operations. Employing submunitions may be ideal in deep operations. Preparing to conduct deep operations, the commander and FFC must consider future maneuver in the deep operations area.
c. Close Operations. The primary principle when employing submunitions is to retain freedom of maneuver. The use of submunitions in close operations requires careful coordination. When used on flanks, coordination informs adjacent units of the possible UXO.
d. Rear Operations. The use of submunitions in the rear area also requires careful consideration due to the potential for fratricide. Forces that may come into contact with UXO in the rear area are the logistical sustainment forces-the most vulnerable and the hardest assets to replace. The division main must immediately disseminate information concerning submunition ordnance employment within the rear area to all units.
a. Artillery Reporting Format.
(1) MCFSS. Marine Corps artillery units and fires coordination agencies use MCFSS as a primary communications system. The Ammunition and Fire Unit Mission Fire Report (AFU; MFR) of the MCFSS informs all units of submunitions deployed in their AO. This message reports target information and ammunition expenditure after a mission execution. This report contains vital information such as target number, shells and fuses expended, and target locations. The MCFSS relays mission fire reports (MFRs) to the ground combat element (GCE) and to the senior fire direction center (FDC) as appropriate. The division FSCC determines impact on future operations.
(2) How to Report (Figure III-3). After mission execution, the artillery battalion FDC sends this report to the regimental FSCC and artillery regimental FDC. The artillery regiment FDC adds the MFR to the Message of Interest File for distribution to other agencies. Regimental FSCCS consolidate the MFRs periodically (based on operational tempo) and send the consolidated reports to the division FSCC for transfer to the historical file. The division engineer must maintain the consolidated MFRs and historical file of UXOs, minefield, and other obstacles. The division engineer then forwards consolidated reports to the MAGTF FFCC. There are a number of communication channels that are available to send this consolidated report to the division FSCC. These include courier, mobile subscriber equipment (MSE), and facsimile (FAX). The units' standing operating procedure will specify communication channel priority.
b. Offensive Air Support Reporting Format.
(1) Initial Report. Rotary-and fixed-wing aircraft that conduct CAS, deep air support (DAS), and terminal control provide the DASC with BDA. BDA reports provide results and munition expenditures after a target is attacked. The DASC then provides BDA reports to the appropriate FSCC. Units may obtain potential UXO hazard area information in their area of operation from these BDA reports.
(2) MISREP. The MISREP transmits results and amplifies an in-flight report. The MISREP message provides timely reports of mission results and other information obtained during postflight debriefing. The MISREP is used to retransmit or amplify an in-flight report and is submitted to the tasking agency, the requesting unit/agency, and to other interested organizations.
a. The Marine Corps employs the MCFSS to report and track artillery submunitions. The MCFSS provides automated connectivity between agencies. The MCFSS can perform automated allocation and distribution of fires based on target value analysis.
b. Potential Location of UXO, Plotting/Numbering. See Appendix A, UXO Obstacle Numbering.
Section C. Navy
Navy forces deliver submunition ordnance by either carrier-based strike aircraft or TLAM-D. If a JFACC is designated and an ATO is in use, both Navy aircraft sorties and TLAM missions are depicted on the ATO. Each carrier air wing commander (CAG) is responsible for strike mission reporting. The Mission Distribution System (MDS) maintains and distributes, upon request, TLAM-D postmission reports. All postmission submunition ordnance delivery information is available to the JFC.
a. Air Strike Planning. Navy strike planning is conducted by air wing strike teams led by designated strike leaders from within the wing. Targets are selected by higher authorities and the best aircraft, weapons, and tactics are chosen to accomplish the assigned mission. If a JFACC has been designated, the joint ATO delineates targets and normally specifies the weapon to accomplish the mission. Additionally, if the weapon load has been depicted on the ATO and the strike leader disagrees with the selection, changes are coordinated through liaison on the JFACC staff.
b. TLAM-DPlanning. The JFC through the JFACC, or through the Navy component commander if a JFACC has not been designated, determines targets appropriate for TLAM-D strike and provides that information to the TLAM strike coordinator. If a JFACC is designated, the type of TLAM used and its target appear on the ATO. If there is no JFACC, the Navy's INDIGO message contains the TLAM type and its target. TLAM can be used as a stand-alone weapon or with manned aircraft as part of a strike package. If used with strike aircraft, close coordination between the strike leader and the TLAM strike coordinator is essential.
c. Planning Coordination. Land components must identify concerns regarding submunition employment (by strike aircraft or TLAM-D) versus future operations to the appropriate planning commander (i.e., JFACC or naval component commander). Naval commanders conducting initial planning must consider the impacts of submunition employment regarding potential future use of airfields, ports, logistic sites, maneuver areas, etc.
a. Air Strike Reporting. Aircrews provide postmission debriefs to the strike warfare commander via each carrier air intelligence center (CVIC) that files the Joint Interoperability of Tactical Command and Control Systems (JINTACCS) formatted MISREP. This report includes target information and munitions used. Additionally, crews report the estimated location of jettisoned submunition ordnance. When using submunitions, REMARKS in the RESULT field should include observed weapons effectiveness. CVIC will enter the submunition danger area into the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS). The JFC is responsible for the collection and dissemination of information regarding submunition employment in theater. Therefore, it is imperative that the JFC is an addressee on all MISREPs.
b. TLAM-D Reporting. Combatant commanders provide postmission reports through the MDS. These reports give impact points and dispersion patterns. MDS is currently a component of the Afloat Planning System and the Rapid Deployment Suite, whichever is available to the combatant commander, naval component commander, and carrier battle group (CVBG) commander. CVIC enters TLAM-D dispersion patterns into JMCIS from the MDS report.
In addition to reports provided to the JFC, each CVIC enters and maintains Navy targets engaged/destroyed and subrnunition employment in the JMCIS historical database. Each CVBG provides historical information to the naval component commander upon request.
Section D. Air Force
The joint air operations center (JAOC), primary command and control for all joint air assets, has overall responsibility for planning the employment of munitions, to include CBUs. The intelligence section, within the Air Force AOC, tracks munition employment for BDA and munitions effectiveness assessment (MEA). The BDA and MEA tracking procedures are key mechanisms for reporting the success of the planned employment.
a. The JAOC selects targets from a joint list of targets normally called the JIPTL. The master air attack plan (MAAP) phase of the ATO planning cycle is the mechanism sometimes used to assign weapons to targets and develop mission profiles/packages. The final phase of ATO production occurs with the assignment of weapons to the aircraft. However, some selections are simply "best available" and the individual wings determine the final choice based on their weapons availability. Mission profiles/packages dissemination to the employing units is via the ATO. Units are responsible to develop specific mission plans to support the ATO. Units select weapons type if the ATO does not mandate a specific weapon. When the JAOC retargets or reroles aircraft based upon current situation requirements, units report CBU information through intelligence channels if so instructed. The JAOC normally annotates CBU exclusion areas using restricted operating zones (ROZ) or restricted fire areas (RFA). Planning factors to be considered before munitions/weapons selection to minimize the impact of UXOs on operations include-
(1) Friendly troops transiting or occupying the area.
(2) Locations of proposed main supply routes (MSRs).
(3) Locations of proposed logistics bases, forward operating locations (FOLs), and forward arming and refueling points (FARPs).
(4) Future operational requirements for current enemy controlled airfields/airstrips.
(5) Dismounted operations required in the area (medical evacuation or special operations force landing zones, etc.).
b. The Engineer function provides for damage assessment and recovery actions associated with UXO and the mitigation of UXO effects. The EOD function maintains a capability to eliminate or reduce the hazards of conventional, chemical, biological munitions, and improvised explosive devices that threaten personnel, operations, facilities, and materiel in support of theater operations. The engineer and EOD functions develop plans to support air base recovery actions and activities relating to the exploitation of forward areas such as FOLs and FARPs for Air Force forces (AFFOR). These activities include runway clearance and repair for aircraft use or the employment of techniques for air base denial.
a. The pilot submits INFLTREP. The INFLTREP is the initial report on target location and ordnance effects. Upon landing, local intelligence representatives debrief aircrews and then file a MISREP. Wing intelligence forwards the MISREP to JAOC intelligence representatives, who extract the data and provide essential mission results to operations and plans using the air combat assessment summary. This report contains the location, type, and amount of ordnance dropped. The JAOC operations section updates the CTAPS database and submits the air combat assessment summary reports to the joint force headquarters J-3 via CTAPS. The JAOC provides information copies to the BCD (Figure III-4). The BCD then forwards this information to the ARFOR G-3 current operations division.
b. ALO, If the air liaison officer (ALO) in the corps or division main coordinates the strike, then the ALO reports the submunition information (time, location, target number, and number of weapons/CBUs dropped) to the FSE or FSCC.
c. Special Operations Liaison Element (SOLE). The SOLE at the JFACC's headquarters reports submunition employment information to the joint forces special operations component commander (JFSOCC) headquarters. This information is then disseminated to the SOF components.
d. Units, At the main operating bases, the wing operations centers (WOCs). WOCs units report UXO to the survival recovery consolidate reports and submit them to the center (SRC). Away from the main operating bases (forward operating locations, FARPs, forward operating bases), units report using the standard 9-line spot report (Appendix B).
Executed air mission tracking is by MISREPs. Intelligence accumulates MEA and BDA for combat assessment purposes. MISREPs originate at squadron level. Squadrons forward MISREP summaries to JAOC. The JAOC updates the CTAPS database and furnishes reports to the J-3 and maintains copies for the historical file. The updated CTAPS database serves as the historical tracking system. JAOC operations section personnel use locally generated reports to sort and query the database. If it is not feasible to track CBUs due to too much data being generated, the JAOC may annotate areas where high concentrations of UXO may exist.
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