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Planning Considerations

An integrated approach to timely planning and conduct of operations is essential, across the military and civilian components and agencies of the United Nations and the nongovernment organizations, all the way from the United Nations secretariat, to the forward area for the duration of the mission.

                                    Lieutenant General John M. Sanderson
                                     Companion of the Order of Australia

The complex environment, changing circumstances, and multinational and political dynamics of peace operations complicate planning. The planning process itself is the same as for other types of operations, but considerations and emphasis may be different. For example, in many peace operations, CS and CSS units execute the primary mission of the force. This chapter highlights those aspects of planning that are unique or require special emphasis in peace operations.


A clearly defined mission is the key to the successful planning and execution of a peace operation. Commanders must continually work with higher authorities to ensure that the mission is well-defined. In peace operations, the conditions for success are often difficult to define. The 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) translated its security mission to clearly defined end states at the operational level during the relief stage of Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1992-1993. See Figure 3-1.


A campaign plan is an essential tool for linking the mission to the desired end state. Because, peace operations tend to unfold incrementally, planners develop a campaign plan that lays out a clear, definable path to the end state. Such a plan helps commanders assist political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving the end state. Essential considerations for developing a campaign plan in peace operations include understanding the mandate and TOR, analyzing the mission, and developing the ROE. A concept for transition and termination is absolutely essential to the campaign plan. Planners consider the media, NGOs, PVOs, and coalition partners and allies as primary players. Planners also consider friendly and belligerent party centers of gravity. See Appendix E for a sample campaign plan.

Transitions may occur from one kind of operation to another, such as from PE to PK or PK to PE, between authorizing entities, and during conflict termination. Transitions may involve the transfers of certain responsibilities to nonmilitary civil agencies. NGOs and PVOs may be responsible for the ultimate success of the peace operation, perhaps with significant US support, to include military forces. Transitions in peace operations may have no clear division between combat and peacetime activities, they may lack

Figure 3-1. UNITAF Security Operations

definable timetables for transferring responsibilities, and be conducted in a fluid, increasingly political environment.

US authorities, must determine when the conditions for the desired military end state are achieved. The transition to postconflict activities is decided by higher authorities. Some guidelines to this process which should commence prior to the introduction of peace operations forces may include--

  • Achievement of a successful end state.

  • Determination of correct players such as local government agencies, US agencies (DOS, USAID, United States Information Agency [USIA] as a minimum), NGOs and PVOs, regional powers, belligerent representatives, and other military forces.

  • Types of activities required such as security assistance and electoral assistance.

  • Determination of centers of gravity of belligerent parties.

PE forces should plan to exit the area when the agreements and buffer zones are formalized and should not attempt to transition to PK. The hand-over of operations and facilities should occur much like relief-in-place operations. Of prime importance are the establishment of liaison, linguistic assistance, sequencing of incoming and outgoing forces (combat, CS, and CSS), and coordination of logistics and equipment left in place.


The proper use of force is critical in a peace operation. The use of force to attain a short-term tactical success could lead to a long-term strategic failure. The use of force may affect other aspects of the operation. The use of force may attract a response in kind, heighten tension, polarize public opinion against the operation and participants, foreclose negotiating opportunities, prejudice the perceived impartiality of the peace operation force, and escalate the overall level of violence. Its inappropriate use may embroil a peace operation

Figure 3-2. In peace operations, as in military operations, the inherent right of self-defense applies.

force in a harmful long-term conflict that is counterproductive to the overall campaign objectives.

In PK, commanders should regard the use of force as a last resort; in PE, commanders should exercise restraint in employing force. In either case, sufficient force must be available to--

  • Achieve objectives rapidly through simultaneous application of combat power.

  • Protect the force.

In peace operations, as in all military operations, the inherent right of self-defense applies.


Commanders should consider all possible alternatives to the use of force before taking action. Peace operations demand restraint in the employment of force, as settlement --not victory--remains the objective. Alternatives to use of force include the following measures.


The skillful use of deterrent measures may avoid the use of force. The interposition of forces or a deployment in strength are effective deterrent measures. The presence of sufficient force at the scene of a potential incident tends to diminish the confidence of a would-be aggressor and allow the commander on the spot a wider number of options to counter an incident.

Mediation and Negotiation

Mediation and negotiation may be helpful in reconciling differences among belligerent parties. They are effective tools in improving relations among belligerent parties and the peace operations force. In many societies, self-esteem and group honor are of great importance. The use of simple face-saving measures to preserve a party's dignity may serve to relax tension and defuse a crisis.

Commanders of PK forces may find themselves in the role of negotiator, mediator, and even arbitrator of a confrontation. If possible, negotiations on matters affecting all parties should be carried out jointly with all belligerent parties present. They should be conducted by specially organized negotiation teams that express neutrality to the belligerent parties.

On occasion, relations among belligerent parties may be so strained that a third party has to act as an intermediary. A negotiator must be firm, fair, and polite if he is to gain and keep the trust of all parties. Negotiators must be tactful, resourceful, objective, impartial, and patient; have a sense of proportion; and be painstakingly attentive to detail. On matters of principle, a negotiator must be insistent without being offensive and must be careful not to pass the confidences of one side to another.

Negotiations are not always successful. Agreements by all belligerent parties may or may not occur. The negotiator must remember to remain impartial and courteous and avoid being used by any belligerent. He might expect some belligerent parties to negotiate in bad faith. They may attempt to twist the issues to prolong negotiations while they continue to violate previously agreed-upon settlements. Negotiations are time-consuming and often frustrating; however, they can prevent unnecessary loss of life and offer the best long-term prospect for a final peaceful settlement.

Population and Resource Control

Control measures, such as roadblocks, cordons, curfews, access control, and checkpoints, may contribute to avoiding the use of force.

Rewards and Penalties

Rewards and penalties such as granting or denying access to key routes used by belligerent parties may shape behavior and cooperation. However, the potential exists for propaganda by the belligerent parties. They may convince the populace that the peace operations force is unfairly denying needed resources.


Belligerent parties may be given specific warnings that continued hostile activities may be met with the use of force.

Other Measures

Restrained use of force consists of physical means not intended to harm individuals, installations, or equipment. Commanders should develop measured responses and train in the restrained use of force for peace operations.

Examples are the use of vehicles to block the passage of persons or vehicles and the removal of unauthorized persons from unit positions. In limited circumstances, commanders may use force that may result in physical harm to individuals, installations, or equipment. When properly authorized, the use of incapacitants such as riot control agents and riot batons may preclude the need to resort to more lethal measures. These means are more suitable for use in PE and are seldom used in PK.


In peace operations, well-crafted ROE can make the difference between success and failure. ROE are directives that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which US forces initiate and/or continue engagement with belligerent forces.

In peace operations, ROE define when and how force may be used. ROE may reflect the law of armed conflict and operational considerations but are principally concerned with restraints on the use of force. ROE are also the primary means by which commanders convey legal, political, diplomatic, and military guidance to the military force.

ROE are developed by military commanders and must consider the direction and strategy of political leaders. This process must balance mission accomplishment with political considerations while ensuring protection of the force. In all cases, restraint remains a principle of peace operations and should guide ROE development, particularly in light of collateral damage, post-conflict objectives, desired end states, and the legitimacy of the operation and authorities involved.


ROE seldom anticipate every situation. Commanders and leaders at all levels must understand the intent of the ROE and act accordingly. The commander responsible for ROE formulation should consider including an intent portion that describes the desired end state of the operation as well as conflict termination considerations. Rehearsing and wargaming ROE in a variety of scenarios will help soldiers and leaders better understand the ROE.


All commanders must instruct their forces carefully concerning ROE and the laws that govern armed conflict. ROE should be included in OPLANs and OPORDs and address all means of combat power. Fire support ROE is as important as individual weapons ROE. The staff judge advocate (SJA) should review all ROE. ROE should be issued in an unclassified form to all personnel, who should adhere to them at all times, notwithstanding noncompliance by opposing forces.

Multinational Interpretation

ROE in multinational operations can create unique challenges. Commanders must be aware that there will most likely be national interpretations of the ROE. Close coordination of ROE with multinational partners may preclude problems.

Varied Circumstances

ROE vary in different operations and sometimes change during peace operations. The ROE must be consistent at all levels of command. Nothing in the ROE should negate a commander's obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action to protect his force. Additionally, the ROE in peace operations may establish guidance for situations such as the search and seizure of inhabitants, the authority of local security patrols, the prevention of black market operations, the surrender of hostile personnel, and the protection of contractor personnel and equipment in support of US operations.


Commanders at all levels need to know how to request changes to ROE. ROE are developed with political considerations in mind and are approved at a high level of authority. However, the requirement to change the ROE may result from immediate tactical emergencies at the local level; introduction of combat forces from a hostile nation; attacks by sophisticated weapon systems, including nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC); or incidents resulting in loss of life. Commanders should anticipate these situations and exercise request channels.


Commanders should be firm and determined when executing ROE in peace operations. If the peace operations force is seen to lack confidence, it may be further challenged, resulting in an unnecessarily high level of response or escalation in the overall level of violence. Commanders should thoroughly plan the manner in which force is to be used and rehearse anticipated actions. Finally, ROE must be impartially applied in PK. In PE, this guideline may not apply fully. Even in PE, however, use of force without prejudice remains important. Appendix D provides sample ROE.


Commanders attempt to accomplish a mission with minimal loss of personnel, equipment, and supplies by integrating force protection considerations into all aspects of operational planning and execution. Force protection consists of operations security (OPSEC), deception, health and morale, safety, and avoidance of fratricide.


In peace operations, OPSEC includes such areas as communications security, neutrality, photography, sites, accommodations and defensive positions, roadblocks, personnel vulnerabilities, personal awareness, security measures, sniper threats, coordination, and evacuation.

Communications Security

Communications security (COMSEC) is as important in peace operations as it is in conventional military operations. Belligerent parties can monitor telephone lines and radios. However, in PK the need to maintain transparency of the force's intentions is a factor when considering COMSEC.


Maintaining neutrality contributes to protecting the force. Manifest neutrality and even-handedness could afford the force a measure of protection. In peace operations, the entire force should safeguard information about the deployment, positions, strengths, and equipment of one side from the other. If one side suspects that the force, either deliberately or inadvertently, is giving information to the other side, it could result in accusations of espionage. One or both parties to the dispute may then become uncooperative and jeopardize the success of the operation, putting the force at risk.


Prohibiting photography of local areas or people might contribute to neutrality. However, this should not impede collection efforts in support of protecting the force.

Sites, Accommodations, and Defensive Positions

Precautions should be taken to protect positions, headquarters, support facilities, and accommodations. These may include obstacles and shelters. Units must also practice alert procedures and develop drills to rapidly occupy positions. A robust engineer force provides support to meet survivability needs. When conducting PE, units should maintain proper camouflage and concealment. Additional information on precautions is provided in FM 5-103, TM 5-585, and FM 90-10.


Military police (MP) forces may establish and maintain roadblocks. If MP forces are unavailable, other forces may assume this responsibility. As a minimum, the area should be highly visible and defensible with an armed overwatch.

Personnel Vulnerabilities

A peace operation force is vulnerable to personnel security risks from local employees and other personnel subject to bribes, threats, or compromise.

Personal Awareness

The single most proactive measure for survivability is individual awareness by soldiers in all circumstances. Soldiers must look for things out of place and patterns preceding aggression. Commanders should ensure soldiers remain alert, do not establish a routine, maintain appearance and bearing, and keep a low profile.

Sniper Threats

In peace operations the sniper is a significant threat. Counters include rehearsed responses, reconnaissance and surveillance, barriers, shields, and screens from observation. ROE should provide specific instructions on how to react to sniper fire, to include restrictions on weapons to be used. Units can use specific weapons, such as sniper rifles, to eliminate a sniper and reduce collateral damage.

Security Measures

Security measures are METT-T-dependent and may include the full range of active and passive measures such as patrolling, reconnaissance and surveillance, and use of reaction forces.


Commanders should coordinate security with local military and civil agencies and charitable organizations whenever possible.


A PK force may need to evacuate if war breaks out or if the host nation withdraws its consent to the mandate. In a UN operation, the UN force headquarters develops a plan to evacuate all PK forces. The evacuation plan should include appropriate routes for ground, sea, or air evacuation. All units should rehearse their evacuation plan and develop contingency plans that cover tasks such as breakout of an encirclement or fighting a delaying action.


During PK, the requirement for transparent operations normally precludes deception measures. However, these measures may be appropriate during PE.


Peace operations often require special consideration of soldier health, welfare, and morale factors. These operations frequently involve deployment to an austere, immature theater with limited life support systems. In addition, peace operations place unique demands, such as periods of possible boredom while manning observation posts or checkpoints, on soldiers. Soldiers must deal with these stresses while under the constant scrutiny of the world press. Commanders must consider these factors when assigning missions and planning rotations of units into and within the theater.


Commanders in peace operations may reduce the chance of mishap by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and staff, conducting a safety program, and seeking advice from local personnel. The safety program should begin with training conducted before deployment and be continuous. Training will include factors that could have an effect on safety, such as the environment, terrain, road conditions and local driving habits, access or possession of live ammunition, unlocated or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment such as tanks and other systems that present special hazards. Safety is also important during off duty and recreational activities. If possible, the safety officer and staff should coordinate with local authorities concerning environmental and health concerns. US force presence should not adversely impact the environment.


Most measures taken to avoid fratricide in peace operations are no different than those taken during combat operations. However, commanders must consider other factors such as local hires or NGO or PVO personnel that may be as much at risk as US forces. Accurate information about the location and activity of both friendly and hostile forces (situational awareness) and an aggressive airspace management plan assist commanders in avoiding fratricide. LNOs increase situational awareness and enhance interoperability. Use of night vision light-intensifier devices aids units in target identification during limited visibility. ROE might prevent the use of some weapon systems and lessen the risk of fratricide. The collateral effects of friendly weapons in urban and restricted terrain can affect fratricide. Soldiers must know the penetration, ricochet, and blast consequences of their own weapons.


The most important training for peace operations remains training for essential combat and basic soldier skills. Leader development in schools will further provide the requisite knowledge, skills, and attitudes required in peace operations. The unique aspects of peace operations should be addressed in predeployment training with the assistance of mobile training teams (MTTs), training support packages (TSPs), and, if time permits, training at combat training centers (CTCs). Commanders should consider sustainment training during mission execution, if possible, and postoperations training. Joint and multinational unit and staff training is also important. See Appendix C for more details concerning training.


In planning for peace operations, the commander must tailor a force suitable for the mission. It should be based on a unit's ability to contribute to achieving national interests and objectives and perceptions of the indigenous population, the international community, and the American public. Commanders should also consider the synergy and enhanced capabilities inherent in joint operations when tailoring the force. Building teamwork early and continually is vital to success when forces are rapidly tailored for mission.

The force must be appropriate to the stated goals of the sponsoring authority and provide sufficient capability to deploy, complete the mission, and protect itself. The perception that employed forces exceed the limits of the mandate weakens legitimacy. Suitability varies based upon the threat, the intensity of operations, the missions to be performed, and changing international perceptions. Commanders should prepare for worst-case situations by planning for the employment of combined arms assets.

Reserve component soldiers and units may be included in the US force under specific authority, usually under a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up. The authority carries with it unique planning requirements. FM 100-17 (1) covers these considerations in detail.

Historical Perspective

Throughout Operation Restore Hope, MP units were in great demand because of their ability to serve as a force multiplier. Marine force (MARFOR) and ARFOR commanders quickly took advantage of the MP's significant firepower, mobility, and communications and used them effectively as a force multiplier conducting security-related missions as one of their combat forces. Doctrinal missions included security of main supply routes (MSRs), military and NGO convoys, critical facilities, and very important persons (VIPs); customs; detention of local civilians suspected of felony crimes against US force or Somali citizens; and criminal investigative division (CID) support as the JTF's executive agency for joint investigations. MPs responded to a significant number of hostile acts taken against US forces, NGOs, and civilians by armed bandits and technicals (see Figure 3-1) and to factional fighting that threatened US forces or relief efforts. They also supported the JTF weapons confiscation policy by conducting recons and gathering information and intelligence (human intelligence [HUMINT]) about the size, location, and capabilities of factions operating throughout the ARFOR and MARFOR AOs. This information included the location of sizeable weapons caches. MPs also had an expanded role in the actual confiscation of weapons by establishing checkpoints and roadblocks along MSRs, within small villages, and within the congested, confined urban environment of Mogadishu. Serving in both a combat and CS role, MPs also participated in a larger, combined arms show-of-force operation (air assault) in the city of Afgooye.

Commanders must recognize the availability and contribution of civilians and contractors as part of the total force. Civilians may participate to provide expertise that is not available through uniformed service members and to make the most effective use of government resources. Support provided by civilians in past conflicts included, but was not limited to, communications, intelligence, contract construction, real estate leasing, water detection, civil engineering technical assistance, and logistics services. Civilians in the nonappropriated fund category provide morale, welfare, and recreation programs and staff the service exchanges.


The unique aspects of peace operations may require individual augmentees and augmentation cells to support unique force-tailoring requirements and personnel shortfalls. Augmentation supports coordination with the media, government agencies, NGOs and PVOs, other multinational forces, and civil-military elements. METT-T considerations drive augmentation. Augmentation requires life support, transportation, and communication. Liaison requirements are extensive in joint and multinational operations. Commanders must provide augmentees with resources and quality of life normally provided to their own soldiers.

Commanders may consider task-organizing small liaison teams to deal with situations that develop with the local population. Teams can free up maneuver elements and facilitate negotiation. Unit ministry, engineers, CA, counterintelligence, linguists, and logistics personnel may be candidates for such teams. Commanders ensure that teams have transportation and communication allocated.

Special negotiation teams may be formed that can move quickly to locations to diffuse or negotiate where confrontations are anticipated or occur. Teams must have linguists and personnel who have authority to negotiate on the behalf of the chain of command.


In tailoring the force, commanders must weigh the appropriateness of using technology based on the nature of the mandate, maintenance requirements, local sensitivities, skills required for operation, and other factors. Technology available from battle laboratory experiments, even in small numbers, can make a big difference. Commanders of operations, however, must decide on its use consistent with mission accomplishment.

Aircraft normally used for transport may conduct air surveillance. Satellites, scout aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, airborne reconnaissance low (ARL), or the joint surveillance and target attack radar system (J-STARS) are other means of air surveillance. Ground surveillance technology such as radar, night vision devices, sensors, and thermal sights may also be useful in peace operations. All such devices may be especially useful in observing and monitoring situations.

Another category of technology with which soldiers may be less familiar is a broad category of instruments that may assist forces in conducting operations in consonance with the principle of restraint and minimal force. Types of weapons are those that could disrupt communications, radar, computers, or other communications or stop belligerent parties without killing or maiming them, weapons that could disrupt or interdict supply routes or make equipment inoperable, or those that could disarm combatants without killing or maiming them. This category requires special consideration of the rules of war or treaties concerning war or humanitarian practices, unintended environmental or personnel effects, availability and state of development, and postconflict activities or requirements.


Combat functions apply in peace operations. Commanders must exercise judgment in applying them to these operations. Some functions may apply differently in peace operations than in war. An example is maneuver in the sense of movement to gain relative advantage over an enemy. In peace operations, maneuver may contribute to achieving situational advantage over a belligerent rather than destruction of an enemy. Intelligence is another example of unique applications. Figure 3-1 is an example of using force protection, coordination, and information dissemination as functions appropriate to the peace operation situation. The following selected combat functions may apply to peace operations.


Maneuver warfare and the applications of direct fires in support of it do not lend themselves to all forms of peace operations, particularly PK. On the other hand, armored forces and attack helicopter assets may, for example, play major roles in preventive deployments and PE and be useful in PK for force protection, deterrence, convoy escort; for personnel transport where threats exist, or as a mobile reserve.

Geographic locations of buffer zones or demilitarized areas may severely restrict maneuver. The force commander may have little latitude in adjusting the zone since it may be the result of political, ethnic, and religious considerations. Conversely, the force commander may have to spread forces thinly to accommodate missions such as checkpoints and observation posts.

Forces conducting PE, particularly operations to separate belligerent parties, may find it necessary to employ certain basic maneuvers in order to accomplish the separation mission. These maneuvers may include attacks to seize key terrain features in a buffer zone. In such instances, the objective is the seizure of terrain, not the destruction of the belligerent force.

Special Operations Forces

Army special operations forces (ARSOF) are a valuable asset when planning peace operations. For example, ARSOF can help prepare the AO through normal SOF activities designed to gain intelligence updates on key and local personnel and facilities, especially in PE. ARSOF can contact local agencies and friendly authorities, establish surveillance over the planned points of entry, or conduct operations to prevent the synchronized defense or counterattack by hostile forces. They can also provide up-to-the-minute weather and intelligence.

A ranger force can support conventional military operations or it may operate independently when conventional forces cannot be used. Ranger forces can typically perform direct-action missions such as strike operations, tactical reconnaissance, and special light infantry operations.

Special Forces. Special Forces (SF) assets deployed rapidly in denied or hostile areas can collect intelligence through area surveillance and reconnaissance. They can provide initial assessments in the areas of engineering, medical, security, and intelligence. With their language and area orientation, they can provide liaison with the local population, multinational forces, nonmilitary agencies, and other military organizations.

SF may assist in training and organizing local security forces. They may also enhance multinational interoperability by cross training with these forces. In humanitarian assistance operations, they can assist in providing and securing relief supplies.

In peace operations, SF may execute precision strikes to destroy certain facilities and military capabilities by employing terminal guidance techniques for precision-guided munitions. SF may also be used to preclude or preempt terrorist activities and to conduct liaison with local militias.

Psychological Operations Forces. PSYOP can play an important role in facilitating cooperation between belligerent parties and peace operation forces. Tactically, PSYOP forces can assist through persuasion rather than intimidation. Through the use of local information programs, such as radio or television newscasts and leaflet distribution, PSYOP elements can ensure the operational objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the target audience.

Civil Affairs Units. CA in peace operations may include activities and functions normally the responsibility of a local government. CA units can assess the needs of civil authorities, act as an interface between civil authorities and the military supporting agency and as liaison to the civil populace, develop population and resource control measures, and coordinate with international support agencies. CA units are regionally oriented and possess cultural and linguistic knowledge of countries in each region. The civilian skills CA units possess allow them to assess and coordinate infrastructure activities. CA units are responsible for establishing and managing camps. The legal status of individuals within the camps is dependent upon the type of operation and the legal mandate establishing it.

Historical Perspective

Soon after peace operations began in the Dominican Republic, the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion deployed with various types of broadcasting and printing facilities. Loudspeaker trucks proved to be very effective in imparting information. Wherever the trucks stopped, large crowds of Dominicans gathered to hear the latest news and receive leaflets and pamphlets. The unit ran a radio station powerful enough to reach into the interior of the island. The US Information Service determined the themes and tightly controlled all the battalion's activities. The combined CA and PSYOP activities were very effective in the Dominican Republic, as indicated by one of the most frequent pieces of graffiti: "Yankee go home take me with you."

Historical Perspective

The 353d CA Command (-) and the 354th CA Brigade were two USAR commands completing their Desert Storm CMO support missions in Saudi Arabia, when they were redeployed in April 1991 to conduct Kurdish relief operations in southeastern Turkey and northern Iraq. An element of the 96th CA Battalion (Airborne) deployed from Fort Bragg, NC, to assist in the Provide Comfort humanitarian relief operation. The 354th CA Brigade HQ, with three companies augmented the 353d CMO Section of the multinational combined staff, established a task force to facilitate transfer of military relief operations to civilian agencies, and assisted in moving the Kurds from the mountains, through temporary transit support sites, to their homes. CA support included provision of medical and water distribution assistance to SF teams in the mountains; establishment, initial operation, and turnover of transit centers to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and support of over 40 civilian humanitarian relief agencies in moving people and supplies to numerous relief sites.

Planners must consider end state and transition strategies when planning, building, and managing camps. They must plan for the assimilation of private relief agencies and NGOs and PVOs early in the process. Funding and budgeting considerations must be resolved early in order to expedite hand-off of facilities and responsibilities to other forces and agencies.

Historical Perspective

On 16 April 1991, the President of the US, authorized by UN resolution 688, expanded Operation Provide Comfort to include multinational forces with the additional mission of establishing temporary refuge camps in northern Iraq. Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort would oversee the building of shelters and distribution of supplies, ensure order, and provide security throughout this area. The provision of security was essential to get the Kurds to move from the mountains back to their homes and transfer the responsibility for them from the military to international agencies. The camps were designed to reflect the cultural realities of the Kurds. They were built around five-person tents, a 66-person tent neighborhood (Zozan); a 1,056-person tent village (Gund); a 2,500-person tent community (Bajeer) and in the center, the community center and administration area.

Military Police

MPs in peace operations can project a force signature that may be more politically acceptable to the international community and the US public. The domestic and international acceptance of MPs as a force focused on security, protection, and assistance provides the commander the use of a highly capable and versatile force without a significantly increased force signature.

While peace operations may detract from a combat unit's primary mission of training soldiers to fight and win in combat, peacetime MP training and operations support many peace operation missions, particularly those that emphasize minimal use of force. As a direct result of their peacetime daily law-and-order missions, MPs and the CID are continually trained in the prudent use of force, crisis management, and operations requiring restrictive ROE. MP and CID are trained and experienced in demonstrating understanding and compassion in dealing with the civilian population. They are also trained to understand how and when to transition from restrictive ROE to lethal force if required or directed.


Fire support assists commanders in the careful balancing of deterrent force with combat power to accomplish the peace operation mission and protect the force. Precision munitions play an important role. Mortars, due to their smaller bursting radius, may reduce the possibility of collateral damage--a critical consideration during peace operations. They may provide illumination rounds as a deterrent demonstration of capability, for observing contested areas, for supporting friendly base security, or for patrolling maneuver forces.

Artillery fires--in particular rockets and rounds with ordnance, though relatively selective and accurate--involve a significantly higher possibility of collateral damage. In addition, unexploded ordnance can pose a safety hazard to the indigenous population and/or provide a local combatant the building blocks of an explosive device. Commanders should be cautious in using artillery fires in general and in selecting an appropriate munition to minimize collateral damage and the threat to both friendly forces and local populations.

Field artillery howitzers and rocket systems provide both a continuous deterrent to hostile action and a destructive force multiplier for the commander. To deal with an indirect fire threat, the force may deploy artillery- and mortar-locating radars for counterfire. Firefinder radars can also document violations of cease-fire agreements and fix responsibility for damage and civilian casualties.

AC-130 aircraft, attack helicopters, and observation/scout helicopters are important target acquisition, deterrent, and attack assets in peace operations. Tactical air (TACAIR) can provide selective firepower, particularly in the employment of precision-guided munitions. Collateral damage and unexploded ordnance are significant planning factors when considering the employment of TACAIR.

Fire support coordination, planning, and clearance demands special arrangements with joint and multinational forces and local authorities. These include communication and language requirements, liaison personnel, and establishment of procedures focused on interoperability. Excellent examples of coordinated fire support arrangements are the NATO standardization agreements (STANAGs). These provide participants with common terminologies and procedures. ROE should provide guidelines for clearance of indirect fires (both lethal and nonlethal).


PE requires forces to be thoroughly trained on passive and active air defense measures. Soldiers must be trained on visual aircraft recognition and ROE due to the possibility of like aircraft being flown by more than one of the forces involved. Air defense considerations are of great importance in PE operations that deny or guarantee movement or enforce sanctions.

Belligerent parties may employ extensive measures such as cover and concealment, hand-held surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and light air defense artillery (ADA) weapons to protect themselves from air attack. Since many targets will be in belligerent-controlled areas, commanders must weigh the potential loss rate of aircraft against the returns that air interdiction missions might produce. However, they should also consider that curtailment of rotary and low-level fixed-wing operations is one of the goals of the belligerent.


A key challenge occurs in battle command. Intuitive skills of commanders, an element of battle command, are especially appropriate to the ambiguities and uncertainties of the peace operations environment discussed in Chapter 1 and in managing the variables of peace operations. Training, situational drills, and constant study and reading of changing patterns sharpens this intuitiveness.

Battle command recognizes the inevitable co-existence of both hierarchical and non-hierarchical organizations, systems, and players in peace operations, both military, interagency, multinational, and NGOs. Digitization and information technology will permit greater situational awareness, empower individual soldiers to act appropriately under varying circumstances, and reduce the probability of fratricide and collateral damage.

Peace operations pose various challenges to signal support functions. First and foremost is the level of complexity and coordination required to effect the maximum use of available signal support. Early deployment of signal planners and use of joint doctrine and TTPs are critical.

Communications systems are difficult to standardize, given the wide range of available commercial and military assets. The integration of multinational and US signal support is extremely important in transition planning and execution of the various dimensions of peace operations. An overall network manager and system interoperability criteria are critical to successful communications.

Incompatibilities among systems, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and doctrine can be expected in multinational operations. These operations require careful consideration of equipment capability and procedural and cultural differences among all coalition forces. Incompatibilities must be overcome to sustain command and unity of effort during joint and multinational operations.

All nations share the electronic spectrum and reserve their right to its unlimited use. Spectrum managers at all echelons must be aware of what equipment is being used in their vicinity to ensure negligible mutual interference. LNOs must facilitate close coordination with friendly local or multinational forces in close proximity.

Commercial communications may be austere. Deploying forces must not depend on local commercial communications. Even when commercial communications are available, the presence of US forces puts a burden on that capability. Signal planners must consider transition and funding of communications functions to local authorities, the UN, or other forces assuming the support mission. Functions left behind for the host nation or multinational forces may overwhelm them unless the transition is gradual and begins several months before the organic signal units departure. In an austere theater, commanders should be prepared to provide media access to communication assets, as long as it does not interfere with critical military operations.


To ensure a mobile, survivable force, both engineer and chemical forces provide essential support during peace operations.

Engineer Forces

Planners consider all available engineer capabilities, to include other services, multinational forces, contractors, and troop units (including reserve components). The latter requires greater reaction time than active component engineers. Planners consider the specific capability and availability of the units when building the force, along with facilities available for leasing and the infrastructure. The joint task force contingency engineer manager (JTFCEM) normally provides staff assistance to the JTF commander, who controls engineer assets. Similar considerations apply to multinational forces.

Planners must consider interoperability to ensure that assets are complementary, if not compatible. Engineer planners also consider personnel or material assets available through contracts, local sources, and private agencies, including the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).

Engineer operations require large amounts of construction materials which may be acquired locally, regionally, and from CONUS. These materials may be obtained through military supply channels or by contract. Engineers identify, prioritize, and requisition required construction material consistent with acquisition regulations. Supply units process the requisition and acquire, receive, store, and transport construction materials. This support may be also be provided through a combination of engineer unit Class IV acquisition and storage by LOGCAP contractor support.

Chemical Units

Commanders must consider the requirement for chemical support of peace operations if evidence exists that belligerent forces have employed agents or have the potential for doing so. In addition, when authorized, riot control agents may be selectively employed as an alternative to deadly force in certain peace operations. A mix of different units (decontamination units, NBC reconnaissance elements, and smoke units) are often necessary to achieve the proper balance of capabilities. Additional capabilities include providing vector control and limited water transfer, spray, and storage. Chemical staff officers may advise on commercial chemical threats as well as on the collection, packaging, storage, disposal, and cleanup of hazardous materials and wastes.


Successful intelligence support during peace operations relies on continuous peacetime information collection and intelligence production. Increased reliance on HUMINT sources may often be necessary. Furthermore, it is necessary to collect information on all parties to the conflict and other peace operations forces as well to understand and appreciate varying perspectives and methods of operation. Special equipment such as night observation devices and thermal imagery devices, as well as special surveillance aircraft, will also be useful in peace operations.

Historical Perspective

Operation Restore Hope demonstrated the usefulness of engineers in operations other than war. Somalia's austere landscape and climate posed challenges similar to or greater than the ones encountered during Operations Desert Shield/Storm, including a harsh desert environment, resupply over great distances limited resources. and a devastated infrastructure.

The deployed engineer force was a joint and multinational effort, building on the engineer capabilities found with each service component and coalition partner. Engineers provided standard maps and imagery products, detected and cleared hundreds of land mines and pieces of unexploded ordnance built base camps for US and coalition forces, and drilled water wells. They constructed and improved over 2,000 kilometers of roads, built and repaired several Bailey bridges, upgraded and maintained airfields. and participated in local civic action projects that helped open schools, orphanages, hospitals, and local water supplies.

Army engineers cooperated fully with and complemented engineer capabilities found within the US Marine Corps, US Navy, and US Air Force. In addition. coalition force engineer efforts were fully coordinated with US and UN goals for the area.

The intelligence needs of the commander involved in peace operations are in some ways more complex than those of the commander conducting combat operations in war. Regardless of the mission, the commander must be prepared for direct attack, either by one of the parties to the deployment agreement or by extremist elements acting independently. Peace operations are often conducted in a joint, and, most probably, a multinational and/or UN operational environment. The commander and his staff must understand and apply the current joint intelligence doctrine in Joint Publication 2-0 (2) to each new peace operations environment. This may be compounded by the intricacies of dealing in an interagency arena where different agencies have different rules. When conducting multinational operations, sharing information with allies may in itself become an issue. In PK, the terms information and intelligence are synonymous. For instance, in PK, there is an information officer in addition to or in lieu of an intelligence officer as in other operations. In PE, the intelligence function is employed with sufficient assets and focus to support necessary combat operations. A joint operations support element (JOSE) or other specially organized intelligence assets may be needed.

Peace operations often require augmentation of the intelligence staff. In particular, the commander-in-chief's (CINC's) staff must recognize that available communications may preclude effective use of the normal channels for requesting and providing intelligence; therefore, commanders must tactically tailor the force to ensure communications, processing capability, and down-links are available for broadcast dissemination of intelligence.

The supporting CINC normally provides detailed analytical support to the deploying commander through split-based operations. This includes anticipating and initiating collection against long lead-time requirements, synthesizing available information on the AOs and orchestrating the collection efforts of existing intelligence organizations. The degree of support needed depends on the size and sophistication of the deploying unit's intelligence staff and should be tailored as the operation develops to ensure seamless intelligence support. The supporting CINC can make a major contribution to the deploying commander simply by ensuring at the outset that intelligence is decompartmented and releasable to multinational units.

Intelligence Analysis in Peace Operations

Success for the intelligence officer in peace operations depends on a thorough understanding of the situation. This understanding often focuses on what were formerly considered nonmilitary topics, such as politics, economics, and demographics. The intelligence officer must consider political objectives that drive military decision making at every level. This means final decisions on military intelligence operations may be made by nonmilitary personnel, such as a UN representative or the senior US State Department official at the scene. Further, the intelligence officer may have to markedly revise his concept of threat, to include multiple belligerent parties, terrorists (possibly from outside the area of conflict), and local nationals nursing a wide range of grievances. In addition, a friendly or neutral force may become hostile because of some real or perceived failure of the US force to treat them fairly. The intelligence officer must know the entire situation and the current status of all the players.


The principal difference between intelligence-preparation-of-the-battlefield (IPB) for conventional battlefield situations and peace operations is the focus and degree of detail required to support the commander's decision making process. Another major difference is the enormous demand for demographic analysis and templates. New information categories begin to emerge for the commander as he directs troops and accomplishes missions in an unfamiliar environment.

Expand the Area of Interest. Analysis should include all military and paramilitary forces and NGOs that may interact with US troops. Intelligence analysts should consider political groups, media, and third nation support to belligerent forces.

Analyze Terrain and Infrastructure. Intelligence analysts consider the legal impact of the mandate, TOR, geographic boundaries, and other limitations upon both peace operation and belligerent forces. They identify existing and traditional infrastructures. In an unfamiliar environment, analysts should assess other features such as small villages, nomadic camp sites, food sources and food distribution points established by civilian relief organizations, water sources (ground or surface or artesian wells), guard shacks and towers, perimeter fences, surveillance cameras or other warning devices, animal grazing sites, religious monuments, cemeteries, local places of worship, hospitals, boat ramps, local gas stations, and telephone exchanges. In essence, they should analyze the environment to the smallest possible detail.

Analyze the Local Area. Analysts consider the population, government, available transportation, demographics, status of utilities, warehouse storage, and so on. The analysis includes housing, the health of the population, hospitals, population distribution, ethnic backgrounds, languages, and religious beliefs; tribe, clan, and subclan loyalties; political loyalties to the national government; loyalties to the de facto government; holiday and religious observances practiced by the local populace; monetary systems and currencies used by the populace; and black-market activities conducted within the AI. Analysts identify the best case and worst case time lines of the operation.

Describe Effects. Analysts consider the impact of demographic and social data on the overall operation. They identify the root causes of the conflict and analyze them from the perspective of all belligerent parties. They ask themselves, "What would have to happen to bring peace to the region? Can belligerent leaders enforce discipline throughout the belligerent parties? How do these factors affect the course of action (COA) of each belligerent? What are belligerent centers of gravity?"

Terrain dictates points of entry and infiltration and exfiltration routes. Commanders may use a terrain analysis to divide the AO, particularly urban areas, into zones of control using group, religion, or established TOR as determining factors. Analysts consider topography, hydrology, and weather from both a current and historical perspective. They consider the effects of weather on mobility, trafficability, and visibility. The environment may also pose threats to the health of both mission and host nation personnel. Analysts should also identify corridors for reserve operations and contingency forces.

Evaluate the Threat. Analysts identify all factions involved in the peace operation. They recognize differences in the types of threats, strategies, modi operandi, and tactics, as well as weapons, equipment, materiel, and personnel. They add personalities to the usual list of order of battle factors; identify leaders, trainers, key staff members; and develop psychological profiles of key personnel. Analysts identify and analyze all threat battlefield operating systems and vulnerabilities.

Determine Threat Courses of Action. This determination culminates analysis. Intelligence analysts determine COAs using the following steps:

Step 1. Template or describe the actions of belligerents that would violate the peace. Initiating hostilities, breaking legal mandates, or disregarding established TOR are examples of violations. Develop course of action models depicting the response of belligerent to violations of the peace.

Step 2. Develop course of action models depicting the reaction of all belligerents to friendly peace operations within the AO and AI.

Step 3. Wargame each COA. Use friendly commanders and staffs to role-play both the friendly and belligerent parties to aid in determining the likelihood of various COA.

Step 4. Analyze the reactions of the local populace to friendly COAs.

Step 5. Analyze the reactions of the host nation government and military to friendly COAs.

Intelligence operators wargame terrorist actions and other activities that could jeopardize the peace or friendly security and where belligerents could avoid claiming responsibility. Given the nature of these types of potential threats to US forces, it may be difficult to obtain much of this information without an interagency approach to the IPB process. The success of peace operations will increasingly depend on the combined efforts of numerous agencies.

Intelligence Collection and Synchronization Planning

Collection of intelligence in peace operations differs somewhat from collection of intelligence in conventional operations. Units should consider the use of the dispersed battlefield collection plan format. For detailed guidance on this format, refer to FM 34-2 (3) In peace operations, belligerent parties may perceive intelligence gathering as a hostile act. Intelligence operations may therefore destroy the trust the parties should have in the peace operations force.

Intelligence Dissemination

LNOs should disseminate intelligence products in standard intelligence report format. LNOs should pass intelligence products to all parties requiring them in joint or multinational operations.

Intelligence for Multinational Peace Operations

In a multinational setting, forces will need to share intelligence information to some degree. This may involve sharing intelligence information with military forces of nations with which we have no intelligence-sharing agreements or sharing intelligence that is not covered by existing agreements. In some cases, we may have existing agreements that discriminate among allies within the multinational force. For example, our standardized exchange systems with NATO nations may create friction where we have NATO and non-NATO partners in a peace operation.

Situations may exist where intelligence should be shared with NGOs outside usual political-military channels. Therefore, these operations require policy and dissemination criteria and authority for each instance. At the outset, intelligence planners should establish a decompartmentation cell--provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Other special intelligence arrangements for multinational operations may include a single director of intelligence and combined intelligence centers.


As noted previously, CSS units may execute primary missions of the force. Regardless, logistics will be a key aspect of any peace operation. The complexity of such operations, especially in a joint and multinational environment where NGOs and PVOs are also involved, will produce unique demands on logistics operators and planners. Rapid force projection from platforms in CONUS or forward-presence bases, extended lines of communication, and potential forcible-entry operations into logistically bare-based areas of operations will require versatile and agile logistics leadership. Chapter 4 provides additional planning considerations.


Peace operations are carried out under the full glare of public scrutiny. Public affairs (PA) personnel support the commander by working to establish the conditions that lead to confidence in the Army and its conduct of peace operations. Because reports of peace operations are widely visible to national and international publics, PA is critical in peace operations. News media reports contribute to the legitimacy of an operation and the achievement of political, diplomatic goals. PA must monitor public perceptions and develop and disseminate clear messages.

PA planners support open, independent reporting and access to units and soldiers. PA personnel pursue a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information that communicates the Army perspective through an expedited flow of complete, accurate, and timely information.

Commanders should ensure early coordination of PA, CA, and PSYOP efforts during the planning process. A continual exchange of information must exist during execution. Although each has a specific audience, information will overlap, making it crucial that messages are not in conflict. All members of the force should understand the following basic PA principles:

  • Identifying, understanding, and fulfilling command information needs is critical to success. The uncertainty, unfamiliar conditions, and visibility of many peace operations requires that the information needs of soldiers be met. Soldiers must receive information specific to the operation through command channels and world, national, and local news. This enhances morale and unit esprit. It eases distractions and reduces the boredom, fear, isolation, uncertainty, rumor, and misinformation inherent in peace operations.

  • Every soldier is a spokesperson. PA guidance should be widely disseminated. Although the commander is normally the unit's official spokesperson, informed junior soldiers, however, are also honest, accurate, forthright, and insightful spokespersons. The degree of media attention focused on a peace operation will lead to soldier-media interaction, and members of the media will seek soldier commentary.

  • The media is an important information channel to the American public. In the high visibility, politically sensitive peace operation environment, public opinion is a critical element. By proactively assisting news media representatives, commanders help them understand the Army role in peace operations and produce stories that foster the confidence of the American public. Nevertheless commanders must balance OPSEC and other operational requirements with these needs.

  • Following the principles of news coverage of DOD operations agreed upon by the media and the military is essential to accomplishing the PA mission. The public has a right to know about Army participation in peace operations, but more importantly, the Army has a responsibility to keep the public informed. Voids in information supplied to the media by the military will be filled with hostile propaganda or media speculation. The extremely political nature of peace operations and the open and independent nature of reporting strongly support the principle of making information readily available within the constraints detailed by the source of authority.


Numerous legal issues may arise because of the unique nature of peace operations. Peace operations may be authorized by the UN, a regional organization, or the NCA. Regardless of who has authorized the peace operation, international law and US domestic laws and policy apply fully. For example, the laws of war and fiscal law and policy apply to US forces participating in the operation.


In PK, the status of the PK force, as well as that of individual PK personnel in the host nation, is controlled by a status of forces agreement (SOFA) or a status of mission agreement (SOMA). In a UN operation, the UN negotiates the SOFA or SOMA. In the case of a non-UN operation, the US will negotiate an agreement with the host nation. In certain situations, the status of US forces may not be defined by a specific international agreement. Such was the case, in Somalia, where a functioning host government that could enter into a SOFA or SOMA did not exist. In typical PE, where the host nation does not necessarily consent to the US presence, a SOFA or SOMA usually is not practical. In such a case, as in Somalia, the US retains total jurisdiction over its forces. See Appendix A for additional information.


Because of the special requirement in peace operations for legitimacy, care must be taken to scrupulously adhere to applicable rules of the law of war. Regardless of the nature of the operation (PK or PE) and the nature of the conflict, US forces will comply with the relevant provisions of FM 27-10 (4) and DA Pamphlet 27-1 (5). In a traditional PK operation, many uses of force may be addressed in the mandate or TOR. In a PE operation, the laws of war may fully apply.


A significant aspect of legal activities in peace operations relates to claims and liability adjudication. In some instances the US may assume this role for the entire UN or multinational force, requiring extensive coordination, liaison, and accurate accounting.


Military commanders cannot spend operations and maintenance Army (OMA) funds on projects beyond the scope of their mission; nor can they authorize the expenditure of funds specifically appropriated for other purposes. They must be aware that well-meaning civil action projects have significant funding limitations. If US forces participate as part of a UN operation, all costs should be captured for future reimbursement from the UN. Commanders should consult with their servicing judge advocate, supporting contracting officer, and comptroller.

Historical Perspective

In Operation Restore Hope, the US was not an occupying power, yet the law of occupation (Fourth Geneva Convention) was used as a model in defining US relationships with the civilian population. This law included obligations owed to the civilian population within the US AOs and rules regarding destruction, seizure, confiscation, and requisition of public and private property. Both the law of occupation and the law regarding the treatment of prisoners of war (Third Geneva Convention) provide useful guidance on proper of the detainees.

1. Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization, 28 October 1992.

2. Intelligence Operations, 30 June 1991 (Test Pub).

3. Collection Management and Synchronization Planning, 8 March 1994.

4. The Law of Land Warefare, July 1956.

5. Treaties Governing Land Warfare, 7 December 1956.

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