CHAPTER 3
Combatting Terrorism
| Combatting Terrorism Kill one, frighten ten thousand. |
| Sun Tzu |
DEFINITION AND ENVIRONMENT
The DOD defines terrorism as the "the unlawful use of--or threatened use of--force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives." Religious and ideological objectives compel political action; thus, it is violence to modify political behavior which is the primary military concern.
Figure 3-1. Political Action through Terrorism.
It is often difficult to distinguish the acts of politically motivated terrorists from violent acts performed by criminals or individuals in the society at large. These acts create similar tactical-level problems for security forces, but normally have no political intent or effect. Some criminal organizations, especially narcotics traffickers, have become powerful enough to have vested political interests. When they pursue these interests by acts of terrorism, they become a concern for the military like any other political terrorist group.
Whether performed by criminals, mentally disturbed individuals, or for clearly political reasons, violence to alter political behavior is the focus of combatting terrorism programs.
The terrorist neither requires nor necessarily seeks popular support. Terrorist operations, organizations, and movements require secrecy. Their activities do not conform to rules of law or warfare. Their victims are frequently noncombatants, or symbolic persons and places, and usually have no role in either causing or correcting the terrorist's grievance. Terrorist methods include hostage taking, hijacking, sabotage, assassination, arson, hoaxes, bombings, and armed attack or threats thereof.
THE THREAT
The Terrorist
Understanding modern terrorism requires an appreciation of the emotional impact that the terrorist act has on the terrorist's target audience, people other than the victims. The audience must know of the act to respond to it; therefore, media coverage is imperative to terrorists wishing to excite public fear or to gain attention for their cause. To a great extent, the terrorist's desire for attention determines his choice of tactics.
The role that the terrorist group perceives itself as playing also determines its choice of tactics and selection of targets. Terrorism can be an element of an insurgency or revolutionary effort when employed with other military and political activities designed to gain autonomy or to supplant the existing political system. Some political traditions which are violence-prone include the practice of terrorism as a standard technique; that is, terrorism becomes accepted along with other forms of political violence as a way to influence political behavior. Finally, terrorism can be a mere gesture used in isolation from any meaningful political effort. In this context, terrorists frequently claim affiliation with some vague cause or obscure political philosophy to give their actions a veil of respectability.
A terrorist group's selection of targets and tactics is also influenced by its governmental affiliation. For some years, security forces categorized terrorist groups according to their operational traditions: national, transnational, and international. Ease of international travel and the growing tendency toward cooperative efforts among terrorist groups have rendered these categories of little use operationally. Today, terrorist groups are distinguished mostly by government affiliation. This helps security planners anticipate their targets and their degree of sophistication in intelligence and weaponry. They are generally categorized as nonstate supported, state supported, or state directed, although networking and mutual support make any categories somewhat arbitrary.
Nonstate supported.
In this category, the terrorist group operates autonomously, receiving no significant support from any government. Italy's Red Brigades and the Basque Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) are examples of such nonstate supported groups.
State supported.
A state supported terrorist group generally operates independently but receives support from one or more governments. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine is an example of a state supported terrorist group.
State directed.
In this category, the terrorist group operates as an agent of a government. It receives intelligence, logistics, and operational support from that government. Libyan "hit teams" targeted against Libyan exiles are an example of state directed terrorist groups.
Terrorist Objectives
Terrorist events can be classified by their immediate objectives. Five types of terrorist objectives are--
- Recognition.
- Provocation.
- Coercion.
- Insurgency support.
- Intimidation.
Recognition.
At the outset of a terrorist campaign, the objective of terrorist acts may be national or international recognition of a cause. The reasons for seeking recognition might also include attracting recruits, obtaining funds, or demonstrating strength.
Groups seeking recognition require events that have a high probability of attracting media attention. Specific incidents may be the hijacking of an aircraft, the kidnaping of prominent people, the seizing of occupied buildings, or other hostage barricade situations. Once they gain attention, the terrorists may demand that political statements be disseminated.
Terrorist groups sometimes use organizational names or labels designed to imply legitimacy or widespread support. For example, a tiny isolated group may use "front," "army," or "brigade" in its name to achieve this effect.
Coercion.
Coercion is the attempt to force a desired behavior by individuals, groups, or governments. This objective calls for a strategy of very selective targeting which may rely on publicly announced bombings, destruction of property and other acts which are initially less violent than the taking of human life. Contemporary examples include the bombing of corporate headquarters and banking facilities with little or no loss of life.
Intimidation.
Intimidation differs from coercion. Intimidation attempts to prevent individuals or groups from acting; coercion attempts to force actions. Terrorists may use intimidation to reduce the effectiveness of security forces by making them afraid to act. Intimidation can discourage competent citizens from seeking or accepting positions within the government. The threat of violence can also keep the general public from taking part in important political activities such as voting. As in the case of coercion, terrorists use a strategy of selective targeting although they may intend the targets to look as though they were chosen indiscriminately.
Provocation.
The specific objective of terrorist acts in this category is to provoke overreaction on the part of government forces. The strategy normally calls for attacking targets symbolic of the government (for example, the police, the military, and other officials). Attacks of this type demonstrate vulnerability to terrorist acts and contribute to a loss of confidence in the government's ability to provide security. But more importantly, if the security forces resort to a heavy-handed response, the resulting oppression can create public sympathy, passive acceptance, or active support for an insurgent or terrorist group.
Insurgency Support.
Terrorism in support of an insurgency is likely to include provocation, intimidation, coercion and the quest for recognition. Terrorism can also aid.an insurgency by causing the government to overextend itself in attempting to protect all possible targets. Other uses of terrorist skills in insurgencies include acquiring funds, coercing recruits, obtaining logistical support, and enforcing internal discipline.
Terrorist Tactics
Terrorist incidents may be classified according to the tactics terrorists use. There are many tactics, but generally each cell favors and specializes in the use of one or two. The tactics establish a distinct, identifying pattern of operation. Generally, techniques used to analyze criminal behavior are also useful in analyzing terrorist behavior. The study of terrorist behavioral patterns can reveal much about a terrorist group. This information is helpful in implementing AT measures and conducting CT operations. A terrorist organization may use any or all of the tactics discussed below.
Assassination.
Assassination is a euphemism for murder. The term generally applies to the killing of prominent persons and symbolic enemies as well as to defectors from the terrorist group.
Arson.
Arson has the advantage of low risk to the perpetrator. It requires only a low level of technical knowledge and is easily disclaimed, if desired.
Bombing.
The improvised explosive device (IED) is the contemporary terrorist's weapon of choice. It is inexpensive to produce and terrorists use it frequently. Due to the various detonation techniques available, the lED poses a low risk to the trained terrorist. Other advantages include its attention-getting capacity and the terrorist's ability to control casualties through time of detonation and placement of the device. In recent years, approximately one-half of all recorded terrorist incidents worldwide used IEDs.
Hijacking.
Hijacking produces a spectacular hostage situation. Although terrorists have hijacked trains, buses, and ships, aircraft offer them greater mobility and worldwide media attention. Terrorists may also use hijacking as a means for escape.
Hostage-taking.
This usually is an overt seizure of one or more people to gain publicity, concessions, or ransom in return for the release of the hostage or hostages. While dramatic, hostage situations are risky for the terrorist in an unfriendly environment. A comparison of the seizure of the Iranian Embassy in London in 1981 with the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979 demonstrates how environment can affect the outcome of hostage situations. In the former incident, a hostile environment, only one terrorist survived; in the latter, a friendly environment, all the hostage-takers survived.
Kidnaping.
While similar to hostage-taking, kidnaping has significant differences. Kidnaping is usually a covert action and the perpetrators may not make themselves known for some time. While hostage-takers seek immediate publicity for their terrorist acts, news media attention to kidnaping is usually less intense since the event may extend over a prolonged period. Because of the time involved, a successful kidnaping requires elaborate planning and logistics, although the risk to the terrorist is less than in a hostage situation.
Maiming.
Maiming creates fear and causes pain, but is not as negative to the terrorist's image as killing a hostage.
Raids.
Armed attacks on facilities usually have one of three purposes: to gain access to radio or television broadcast facilities (to make a public statement); to demonstrate the government's inability to guarantee the security of critical facilities; or to acquire money and materiel (for example, by means of bank or armory robberies).
Seizure.
Seizure usually involves the capture of a building or object that has value for the target audience. Publicity is the principal objective. The risk to the terrorist is high because security forces have time to react to the attack. They may opt to use force to resolve the incident since few or no innocent lives may be at risk.
Sabotage.
The objective in most sabotage incidents is to demonstrate how vulnerable society is to the terrorist's actions. In the more developed countries, utilities, communications, and transportation systems are so interdependent that a serious disruption of one affects all and gains immediate public attention. Sabotage of industrial, commercial, or military facilities is one means of showing the vulnerability of the target while simultaneously making a statement or political or monetary demand.
Hoaxes.
Any terrorist group can successfully employ a hoax. A threat against a person's life causes him and those around him to devote more time and effort to security measures. A bomb threat can close down a commercial building, empty a theater, or disrupt a transportation system at no cost to the terrorist. The longer-term effects of "false alarms" on the security forces are more dangerous than the temporary disruption of the hoax. Repeated threats that do not materialize dull the analytical and operational effectiveness of security personnel.
Use of NBC Weapons.
Although a nuclear device is beyond the reach of all but the most sophisticated state-sponsored terrorist groups, a chemical or biological weapon is not. The technology is simple and the cost per casualty is extremely low. This makes such weapons ideal for those with little or no regard for the consequences of their act. Fear of alienation from peer and support populations probably inhibits their use, but this restraint could disappear as competition for headlines increases. There is a potential for terrorist use of chemical and biological weapons as substitutes for conventional explosives in many situations. The potential for mass destruction and the great fear that most people have of chemical and biological weapons could be attractive to a group wishing to make the world take notice.
Structure and Security.
Terrorist groups develop organizational structures appropriate for the environments in which they operate. Since terrorists usually work in a hostile environment, security is one of their primary concerns. As a result, the organizational structure of terrorist groups is normally cellular. Each cell is relatively isolated. This type of organization protects members of the group. In the event of defection or capture, no one member can identify more than a few others. Some groups may organize multifunctional cells that combine several skills into one tactical unit; others create separate, specialized cells that come together for an operation on an ad hoc basis.
Larger terrorist groups normally have a central command and control element with one or more subordinate elements. Geographical boundaries frequently are the basis for these elements (for example, Italy's Red Brigades). These regional commands direct the actions of operational and support cells in their area of responsibility. Smaller groups may have a single command element that directly controls all cells regardless of their locations.
Terrorist groups are structurally similar to rudimentary military organizations. A few--the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and some factions of the PLO, for example--are disciplined enough to function along clear lines of authority and command. However, in others, group dynamics, egos, and philosophical differences override organizational principles. Because of these internal differences, members may take actions not consistent with their stated objectives. These internal conflicts cause terrorist groups to splinter into new factions. Splintering complicates the security forces' intelligence efforts. The commonly used deception technique of claiming credit for an action in the name of a previously unknown terrorist group adds to the problem.
In general, terrorist organizations, especially those with little or no access to government resources, need a support structure. As shown in Figure 3-2 a typical terrorist organization consists of functionally organized operational members as outlined above, plus two categories of supporters.
Leadership.
Leadership is at the top of the pyramid. It defines policy and directs actions. Leadership is intensely committed and may include charismatic figures. If the group is state supported or directed, the leadership usually includes one or more members who have been trained and educated by the sponsoring state.
The cadre are the most active members, the men and women who carry out the actual attacks and train others. While many of the cadre are deeply committed to the cause, its membership may include "professional" terrorists who are not necessarily ideologically motivated.
Active supporters.
Active supporters are people who do not actually commit the violent acts of terrorism. However, they assist the terrorists by providing money, information, legal and medical services, "safe houses," and forged or stolen documents. Active supporters frequently agree ideologically with some or all of the group's goals, but are ambivalent about the use of violence. There are also some unstable thrill-seekers who join these groups simply to be a part of a forbidden organization. Most terrorist groups recruit cadre from the ranks of their active support element since these people have proven their loyalty and their skills.
Passive supporters.
Passive supporters are more difficult to define and identify. Most of them are sympathetic to the terrorist's cause, but either will not or cannot assume an active role. Some passive supporters are involved by intimidation or blackmail. Passive support may be unwitting; for example, contributions to "charitable" causes or other ruses. The terrorist relies on passive supporters for financial aid, public displays of support, and minor logistical support.
Figure 3-2. Terrorist Organization.
This section discusses US policy toward terrorism, and outlines
the responsibilities of appropriate agencies within the federal
government. It includes a brief review of Army and Air Force
programs to combat terrorism, and principles useful in situations in
which US military personnel help friendly nations to combat
terrorism.
In the past two decades, the US government has developed a
terrorism policy which addresses acts against US citizens, both at
home and abroad. The following statements summarize this policy:
When US citizens are abducted or held captive, the host
government must effect their safe release.
Other policies exist in international agreements, statements
of senior US officials, and the practices of US government
agencies. Treaties concerning aircraft hijacking, measures to
protect diplomats, and denial of sanctuary to terrorists are
included in many international agreements.
Terrorist acts are criminal, whether committed in peacetime or
war. In peacetime, terrorists may be prosecuted for violating the
criminal laws of the country in which they commit their crime.
Terrorists may also be subject to the extraterritorial criminal
jurisdiction of other nations (for example, if the nation
officially regards the murder of one of its citizens anywhere in
the world as a crime punishable by its laws and in its courts).
They also may be subject to "universal" jurisdiction by any
nation for international offenses such as piracy.
If the conflict involved is an insurgency as described in
Common Article Three of the Geneva Conventions, the requirement
for humane treatment does not prevent legal prosecution for the
crimes the terrorist may have committed. If the insurgency has
attained legal status as a belligerency, and individual
insurgents are lawful combatants, then the entire Geneva
Conventions would apply together with international law
applicable to armed conflicts. Doubts about the right of an
individual to receive prisoner of war status must be resolved by
a competent tribunal in accordance with Article Five of the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.
However, terrorist acts committed by lawful combatants may still
be legally prosecuted as war crimes, including "grave breaches"
of the Geneva Conventions.
A commander has the inherent authority and duty to enforce
security measures and to protect persons and property under his
command. Commanders should consult with their legal advisors to
determine the extent of their authority to deal with terrorists.
US agencies involved in combatting terrorism follow a principle
known as the "lead agency concept." Military policies, directives,
and plans for combatting terrorism reflect the lead agency concept
in accordance with federal laws and memoranda of agreements.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) is the lead agency for dealing
with acts of terrorism committed within the US, its territories, and
possessions. Within the DOJ, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) has the lead. The FBI can train police forces of friendly
nations in both antiterrorism and counterterrorism operations. Under
US law, the FBI has authority to apprehend terrorists anywhere in
the world who have committed offenses against US citizens.
In cases involving aircraft in flight, the administrator of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) leads enforcement activities
which affect the safety of persons aboard the craft (49 US Code 1357
(e)). In flight is defined as the period of time beginning after all
external doors of the aircraft are closed following embarkation and
until the moment a door opens for debarkation.
The Department of State is the lead agency for any US response to
terrorist acts against US personnel and facilities in foreign
countries. Under international law, the foreign government on whose
soil the act occurs has the responsibility for dealing with it. The
Department of State coordinates US actions with those of the host
government.
Most DOD agencies are involved in combatting terrorism in the US
and abroad. Individual agencies and the armed services are
responsible for their own antiterrorism programs. The lead agency
relationships do not relieve commanders at all levels from the
responsibility for protecting their force. The commander should
coordinate force protection planning and operations with the
appropriate agency (FBI or Department of State), but responsibility
for protection of the force remains inherently his. In 1981, the DOD
established a counterterrorism JTF with permanent staff and
specialized forces. These forces, which report to the NCA through
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide a flexible range of response
options designed to counter the myriad of terrorist acts. In
addition, SOF and general purpose forces may augment and support the
counterterrorism joint task force (JTF).
This section discusses both general principles which apply to
any national program to combat terrorism and the programs
established by the Army and Air Force to reduce their
vulnerability to terrorist attack.
No two nations or societies are exactly alike; therefore, no
two national programs for combatting terrorism are identical.
This is because a national program expresses the values of the
society and government that creates it. There are, however,
several principles common to most. These concern policy and
organization. In situations other than an internationally
recognized insurgency, for example, the use of conventional
military forces (other than highly specialized counterterrorism
units) in a domestic counterterrorist role can lead to
overreaction and abuse. This would be counterproductive and lend
support to the terrorist's cause.
A government must develop a single, consistent policy; the
national leadership must express it clearly. Statements of
national policy address three audiences:
A second audience, the international community, views the
government's policy as a statement of national resolve and
commitment. It evaluates the policy for consistency with
agreements, treaty commitments, and adherence to national and
international law. To the extent the policy achieves this,
government legitimacy grows while that of the terrorists
diminishes. However, a strong national policy against terrorism
is meaningless without the resolve and the means to implement it.
The international community will respect a nation that is
consistent in both its public and private commitments.
The terrorists are the third audience for national policy. In
general, terrorism is--at this time--a low-risk operation.
Bombings, hijackings, and assassinations offer terrorist groups a
high probability of success and low risk of capture or death.
However, a strong and consistent national program, effectively
executed, can increase the terrorist's risks. It can also
separate the terrorists from the populace, thereby denying them
sanctuary, recruits, funds, and support. The terrorist evaluates
the government's program by comparing its public statements with
the effectiveness of its policies.
A government cannot easily organize and support a new system
whose sole mission is combatting terrorism, due to the expense
and degree of sophistication required. Therefore, it usually
employs existing organizations. Ideally, the government should
organize and train as many personnel as possible to deal
specifically with terrorists.
Terrorists attack a broad range of targets which fall into
many different civil and military jurisdictions. Thus, no single
element of government can fully cope with all aspects of a
nation's terrorist problems. To be successful, it is necessary
for a government to orchestrate the activities of the many
agencies involved. National leaders must actively participate in
this orchestration.
Each society is unique, but certain organizational principles
can apply to any society fighting terrorism. One way to focus the
national effort is to establish an office which deals exclusively
with terrorism. Such an office requires a mechanism for policy
coordination. A council composed of senior personnel from all
government agencies involved in the antiterrorism program could
provide this mechanism. The head of the terrorism office should
chair this council; ideally, he should report directly to the
nation's leader.
The functions of a government's program for combatting terrorism
are similar to those for counterinsurgency. Chief among these
functions are--
Intelligence provides the key to both successful AT and CT
programs. A nation's ability to recognize, analyze, and move
against a terrorist threat depends upon the effectiveness of its
intelligence apparatus. An effective system of information
exchange and control between the police and the military should
provide both organizations with essential current intelligence.
Since modern terrorism is often international in scope,
coordination with foreign intelligence services to help collect
and compile information is imperative. The police normally have
more extensive contact with the general population than the
military. Thus, information concerning terrorist plans,
recruitment, and support structures will normally surface from
police sources earlier than from military sources.
Planners should evaluate local conditions before accepting the
intelligence developed by the police and the host nation's
military sources at face value. In some countries, one or more
security forces have become so politicized or corrupt that the
people perceive them more as a threat than protection.
Information may still be available from such sources, but it
should be suspect. Also, lack of education, training, and
commitment can result in an inept police force which has only
limited value in combatting terrorism.
Security in the context of a national program to combat
terrorism includes both AT and CT. AT programs are the most
difficult to plan and implement because they require active
participation by all agencies and, to varying degrees, the
public. CT, on the other hand, generally involves only
intelligence, police and, on occasion, selected military
personnel. The fundamental elements of an AT program include
awareness and physical security. A state experiencing terrorism
must first assess the threat (Who or what is attacking it? Why?
How? What are they attacking?) Then it must begin information and
education campaigns to encourage the population to adopt
defensive behaviors. Awareness efforts must accommodate the needs
of individuals and groups at greater risk than the society in
general. But such extraordinary efforts must not be allowed to
generate excessive fear in the population.
One of the defensive behaviors the AT campaign encourages is
physical security. This includes efforts to both physically
strengthen and control access to facilities which are likely
terrorist targets. In brief, by developing public awareness and
implementing or enhancing physical security, the government
"hardens" the terrorist's targets. This makes the terrorist's
task more difficult. More importantly, it increases the risk of
injury, capture, or death for the terrorist.
In combatting terrorism, the government coordinates a variety
of policy instruments, both internally and among its allies.
Informational activities are one of the most important
ingredients in a national security strategy. Policy makers should
understand how using informational assets can strengthen the
government's standing in both world and domestic public opinion.
PSYOP, public affairs (PA), and public diplomacy are all
informational activities. Each can play an important role in
combatting terrorism.
When government uses information to persuade, it is a PSYOP
weapon. When it uses information to discuss matters of public
interest, it becomes PA. When the government integrates
information into a comprehensive program involving both
informational and cultural activities supporting a national
strategy, it becomes a part of public diplomacy.
In combatting terrorism, PSYOP can contribute immensely to an
offensive strategy. It can help avoid collateral damage to the
general populace. A well-planned and executed program puts the
terrorist on the defensive psychologically, forcing him into more
predictable behavior patterns. Decision makers should understand
that successful execution of an offensive PSYOP strategy offers
great benefits. PSYOP, integrated with other operations, help
separate the terrorists from their sources of support and
instigate rivalry between different groups.
Terrorists and terrorist organizations promote their cause
through the news media. To counteract this, the government must
preempt the terrorists' exploitation of the media through rapid
and accurate disclosure of their activities and intentions. Only
serious national security and operational requirements should be
allowed to alter this procedure.
Adhering to such a full disclosure policy helps offset terrorist
propaganda. It may help turn public opinion against terrorists by
exposing their cruelty and destructive acts. Close coordination among
PA, PSYOP, intelligence, and operations officials supports this
objective. But, a policy of full disclosure must also avoid the
release or exposure of counterproductive information.
While PA and PSYOP officers work together, they should avoid any
blurring of missions. This blurring, real or perceived, damages the
PA representative's credibility and limits his ability to present the
government's message.
Consistency within the national program and education of the
population and military forces combine to reduce the risk of
terrorism. Unity of effort and legitimacy are key factors in any
program to combat terrorism. But leadership and effective management
are paramount. No amount of training, money, or equipment can
overcome poor judgment or inattention to detail in the struggle
against terrorism.
A well structured antiterrorism program is the foundation of any
effective combatting terrorism effort. The basics of such a program
include the collection and dissemination of timely threat
information, the conduct of information awareness programs, and the
implementation of sound defensive measures. Defensive measures
include preparation and exercise of response forces and procedures.
Because absolute protection against terrorist activities is not
possible, protective plans and procedures are based on assessment of
the threat and an evaluation of friendly vulnerabilities. The
resulting plans should strike a reasonable balance between the
protection desired, the mission requirements, and the availability of
resources.
Within the Army, combatting terrorism is one aspect of force
protection. It therefore falls within the staff responsibility of
operations officers at all levels (for example, Army staff,
installation, and tactical units).
The Army designed its combatting terrorism program to reduce the
vulnerability of installations, units, and personnel during
peacetime, mobilization, and war. AR 525-13 provides the program
responsibilities for combatting terrorism. FM 100-37 provides a more
complete discussion of basic doctrine. The Army's program
concentrates on developing a protective posture in peacetime which
can carry over to war. The Army's approach to combatting terrorism
has two distinct, but not separate, aspects--antiterrorism and
counterterrorism.
Antiterrorism includes all measures that installations; units, and
individuals take to reduce the probability of their falling victim to
a terrorist act. AT includes those defensive measures that reduce the
vulnerability of individuals and property. The extent of these
measures varies based on assessments of the local threat. These
include personnel awareness and knowledge of personal protection
techniques. They also include crime prevention and physical security
programs to "harden" the target, making Army installations and
personnel less appealing as terrorist targets.
FM 100-37 (and also TC 19-16) describe the basis for developing an
installation program. They outline considerations needed in the
planning and execution of an installation's response to the terrorist
threat. The Army and Marine Corps publication, FC 100-37-1/Operational
Handbook 7-14.1, contains guidance for a unit program.
It addresses force protection during predeployment, deployment, and
redeployment. Users of this manual should also consult appropriate
publications describing, personal protective measures, especially
actions and techniques which can reduce the probabilities of the
soldier and his family becoming victims of a terrorist.
Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive measures to
prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. This chapter, however,
addresses only those actions taken to terminate an incident or to
apprehend individuals responsible for a terrorist act. Other
counterterrorism measures--preemption, intervention, or retaliation
with specialized forces operating under direction of the NCA--have
the characteristics of strikes or raids. Those measures are addressed
in Chapter 5.
The Air Force uses a corporate approach to the problem of force
protection. No single agency is given sole responsibility for
development of doctrine, procedures, hardware or training. All
agencies and major commands are responsible for coordinating
individual programs into a unified action. The Air Force inspector
general's office serves as the focal point for the Air Force
long-term antiterrorism program. It has the responsibility to streamline
and enhance physical security, intelligence-gathering and analysis,
education and awareness, procedures, and funding. The goal of the Air
Force antiterrorism program, under the authority of Air Force
Regulation 208-1, is to reduce vulnerability of individuals and
property to the terrorist threat. The Air Force director of plans and
programs, through the Air Force combatting terrorism center, is
responsible for near-term anti-terrorism and all Air Force
counterterrorism activities. The center--
AFR 208-1 contains the basic framework for the Air Force
antiterrorism program. This regulation spells out the
installation commander's responsibilities in planning and
administering the antiterrorism program. Users should consult it
in conjunction with AFR 12517, AFR 125-37 and AFR 355-11.
MEETING THE THREAT
US Organizations
Department of Justice.
Federal Aviation Administration.
Department of State.
Department of Defense.
PROGRAMS
Policy.
The terrorist attempts to undermine popular faith in a government's
ability to protect its citizens. A significant part of the government
policy, therefore, must demonstrate to
its citizens that their government will take action to protect
them. The domestic population must not perceive government
actions as more detrimental to their well-being than the
terrorist acts the government attempts to prevent.
Organization.
Functions of a National Program
Intelligence.
Security.
Information.
Principles of Combatting Terrorism
Antiterrorism.
Counterterrorism.
Air Force Antiterrorism Program
05-23-1996; 15:55:01
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