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Chapter 6


The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation...It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there.

Field Marshall A. C. P. Wavell (1883-1950

Integration is the synchronized transfer of authority over units and forces to a designated component or functional commander for employment in the theater of operations

  6-1. During integration combat-ready units are merged into the operational plan. Consequently, integration planning and coordination must occur early in the force projection process, continuing until force closure. Integration is complete when the receiving commander establishes positive command and control over the arriving unit, usually in the tactical assembly area.
  6-2. There are two prerequisites for unit integration:
  • The unit must become operational and mission-ready. It must be able to move, fight and communicate at nominal levels of capability. Internal command and control must be re-established, and the unit must meet the readiness standard formulated by the tactical commander.
  • The unit must be absorbed into the joint force, be able to communicate, and receive command and control from its higher headquarters.
  6-3. The time required for integration may vary, depending upon the size of the total force, contingency conditions, and amount of predeployment and ongoing planning and coordination. Rapid integration, however, is critical to the success of combat operations, and adequate planning and coordination can reduce integration time.
  6-4. Accurate prediction of the time of unit integration is critical to the commander's ability to operate in accordance with the five basic tenets of Army operations. In order to accomplish this, the JFC and component staffs must be able to build a TPFDD which meets the commander's intent, usually expressed in the unit's CINC's required date or required delivery date. Transportation feasibility is conducted throughout the military decision making process as a means of checking course of action feasibility. Once the TPFDD is executed, the JFC, through subordinate and its links to the ITV system, monitors the TPFDD. Changes are analyzed for their impact on integration of mission essential capabilities and the TPFDD revalidated by the JFC to adjust these changes.
  • Initiative
  • Agility
  • Synchronization
  • Versatility
  • Depth

FM 100-5, Operations

  6-5. Predeployment planning establishes force structure for the contingency, and identifies units that must integrate. Once identified, units establish predeployment liaison and plan for theater integration. Coordination measures, ITV, and force tracking are used to predict the start of force integration, and the time required for its completion. Unit mission readiness criteria are an essential element of integration and must be included in the integration plan. Integration requirements are best defined using end-state analyses based on the JFC's force requirements. The analysis identifies milestones for deploying units.
  6-6. No plan survives first contact with the enemy. Plans must be open and flexible enough to adapt to reality on the ground. Technical problems, natural conditions, land space constraints, and enemy action all conspire to alter the commander's initial plan. The concept of operations should be broad enough to accommodate changes in strategic, operational, and tactical situations as they occur.

Battle command is the art of battle decision making, leading, and motivating soldiers and their organizations into action... battle command represents a refinement and maturation from the old concept of command and control to one that focuses on the exercise of command and considers control as the subordinate means. Battle command is the natural expansion of C2 brought on by changes in the scope, intensity, and tempo of current and future operations.

FM 100-15

  6-7. Battle command is a combination of equipment (mainly communications, but also information management), organizations (unit staff) and procedures (SOP, OPLANs, and so forth). Each command echelon will have its own unique battle command structure, but all battle command systems must be compatible with the theater command.
  6-8. Problems of battle command are exacerbated by the non-linear nature of the future combat environment. As opposed to past operations, with well-defined front lines and areas of responsibility, future Army forces may deploy into fluid, non-contiguous battle spaces. Relative positions of friendly and enemy forces may change on a daily or hourly basis, requiring a high degree of coordination and situational awareness. This applies as much to deployment activities as actual combat operations.
  6-9. Deployment operations are time sensitive; compressed planning timelines and furious activity are the norm. Commanders need timely, accurate information to execute or modify initial plans in response to rapidly changing operational and tactical conditions. Confusion inherent to deployment often results in conflicting guidance, frequent planning changes, and inefficient task execution, all of which delay the build-up of combat power and the force closure.
  6-10. Control measures, such as LOs or movement control teams can reduce confusion by coordinating between integrating units, RSO&I forces, and receiving headquarters. These measures act as guardians of the Commander's Intent and focus effort on force integration. These measures should be established immediately as part of the planning process and be maintained throughout the RSO&I process.


  6-11. The objective of RSO&I operations is force closure, the point at which the JFC determines that adequate, combat-ready force is available to implement the concept of operations. Force closure requires well-defined criteria by which unit commanders can judge readiness.
  6-12. Thus, RSO&I operations must also be particularly flexible regarding force closure. Commander's may accelerate rates of force integration or change the sequence of unit integration.
  6-13. Due to both limitations of strategic lift, and time delays inherent in intercontinental deployments, many decisions made at the beginning of the deployment process are practically irrevocable. Initial deployment plans should be flexible enough to ensure that unit integration is able to meet "real," as opposed to "planned" force closure requirements.
  6-14. Integration flexibility depends on three specific capabilities:
  • Standardized procedures for transfer of authority.
  • Standardized reporting.
  • Nonlinear decision support tools.
  6-15. Appendix N is an example of a unit reporting status used at the NTC.


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