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Principles of APA Operations

APA operations are global in nature, joint in character, and suitable for employment in a variety of situations. As such, they provide an essential element in the conduct of force projection missions outlined in FM 100-5. As part of the Army's pre-positioning capability, APA provides the Army a new warfighting capability. Along with airlift and sealift, it is the third element of the strategic mobility triad. An APA operation may employ one ship in support of a humanitarian assistance mission or all of the APA vessels required to support a campaign plan. Equipment pre-positioned afloat has universal utility for CINCs: It represents critical weapons systems, equipment, and supplies common to all theaters. A mobile force package, it can be repositioned quickly in response to a crisis anywhere in the world.

CONCEPT

APA is the expanded reserve of equipment for an armor brigade, theater-opening CS/CSS units, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks aboard forward deployed pre-positioned afloat ships. APA operations are predicated on the concept of airlifting an Army heavy brigade with logistics support elements into a theater to link up with its equipment and supplies positioned aboard APA ships and subsequently to conduct combat operations. Their purpose is-

• To project a heavy force early in a crisis that is capable of complementing other early- arriving forces.
• To rapidly reinforce a lodgment established by Army early-entry forces and/or by amphibious assault elements, for example, an Army light division or a Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF).
• To protect key objectives.
• To open a port in theater for surging follow-on forces.
• To be prepared to conduct subsequent operations across the range of military operations.

In execution, an operation extends from alert through reconstitution and regeneration of the contingency force and the APA equipment. It involves the organic elements that constitute the APA and supporting forces, which include the US Army Materiel Command (USAMC), local transportation and deployment support agencies, host nation and supported/supporting CINC assets, and other support whose identity depends on mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T.)

CRITICAL INITIATIVES

The Army Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP) was initiated to address the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS), which concluded that the military can only increase its deployability through an expanded investment in sealift and airlift, pre-positioning, and transportation infrastructure. The ASMP Action Plan, published on 2 March 1993, resulted in the Army's developing the capability to provide a crisis response force of up to corps size with the following mobility standards:

• A light or airborne brigade-size force to be inserted into a theater by C+4, with the remainder of that division to close not later than C+12. The force, including its personnel, equipment, and logistical support structure, would be transported largely by air.
• An afloat heavy combat brigade with support to close in the theater and be ready to fight not later than C+15. The APA brigade force would be a 2x2 heavy brigade: two armored and two mechanized battalions plus support. APA also provides theater-opening CS/CSS units and sustainment stocks for the first 30 days of contingency. This force would be organized into force modules tailored to meet the CINC's needs.
• By C+30, two heavy divisions-a mix of mechanized infantry, armored, or air assault forces, depending on the theater commander's priorities, including the logistical support structure-would close in theater. The equipment for the heavy force would transit by sea.
• The remaining force-two divisions and support-would close by C+75.
• Air transport would be the preferred mode of travel for all contingency force personnel.

For this program to be successful, three key mobility initiatives are critical: the acquisition of fast sealift shipping, the creation of an APA capability, and the infrastructure and procedures necessary to rapidly and efficiently deploy forces from their locations through CONUS ports.

The existence of this force projection capability is a deterrent to potential adversaries. APA operations contribute mobility and flexibility to this strategy. Army force projection APA operations and USMC amphibious operations are complementary capabilities; one is not an equivalent substitute for the other. Navy/Marine amphibious ready group operations provide the means for forcible entry expeditionary operations by a MAGTF in addition to providing initial sustainment for continuous operations. Army force projection APA operations permit rapid deployment and employment of an Army heavy brigade and required support into benign ports in the AO, in addition to providing initial sustainment for the deploying contingency forces. The expanded APA program allows employment of an Army heavy brigade and/or corps and echelon above corps (EAC) CS/CSS units in a variety of joint and global roles, to include-

• Augmenting an amphibious deployment or operation.
• Occupying or augmenting an advanced lodgment.
• Establishing both offensive and defensive operations.
• Reinforcing an ally with a credible force prior to hostilities and sustaining relations with allies and coalition partners through routine exercises and operations.
• Establishing a sizeable combat force to enable closure of additional forces and to support the theater commander's campaign.
• Providing a rapid peacetime response in support of military operations other than war (MOOTW).
• Providing economy of force through reduction of strategic airlift requirements.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS

APA allows the early deployment of Army heavy brigade forces, theater-opening CS/CSS forces, port-opening capabilities, and sustainment stocks in order to minimize the initial requirement for strategic lift. The goal is to establish a heavy brigade within the AO as rapidly as possible and for it to be operational within eight days of initiating discharge. To achieve this response capability, APA ships must be positioned so that the deployed force can be rapidly equipped and sustained. The brigade must arrive in the theater of operations and be combat-effective by C+15. Regardless of the mission assigned for subsequent operations, the following conditions are essential to establish APA heavy brigade operations within the C+15 requirement:

• Early intelligence to allow initial planning.
• National Command Authorities' (NCA's) approval for release and use of APA vessels.
• A secure area that allows for arrival and discharge of ships and the joining of personnel and materiel, from initiation of strategic deployment through completion of reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSO&I).
• Strategic airlift available in the time frame required for the operations.
• Discharge forces (composite transportation group [CTG], Military Traffic Management Command [MTMC] port management cell) and materiel handling equipment to support the operation.
• Airfield space for operations and throughput capability to support the intended air lines of communications (LOC).
• A sea port of debarkation (SPOD) that provides deep-draft berthing for multiple-ship discharge and port clearance. The absence of this capability will delay discharge as alternate methods, such as logistics over the shore (LOTS), are employed.
• Steady sea state conditions to discharge the heavy lift pre-positioned ships (HLPS) that contain Army lighterage and port-opening equipment.
• Suitable road network between the SPOD and associated airfields to permit a timely arrival and joining of airlifted units with their sealifted equipment and supplies.

Availability of bulk fuel within the AO.

During Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the HLPS American Cormorant could not be discharged off the coast of Mogadishu due to high seas. Since the entire east coast of Somalia is unprotected-it has no land masses to shelter it from the elements-and weather conditions for the spring season were not expected to improve, the ship was discharged nine days late in a protected harbor in the port of Mombassa, Kenya.

COMPLEXITY

APA operations are complex. The overlap of phases and geographic separation place heavy demands on command elements. Coordination requirements among the various commanders involved are extensive. The magnitude of the operation may require mobilization of reserve component forces.

Comprehensive planning is critical. Conflicting demands of deployment and employment will dictate a dynamic planning process that must remain responsive to the current situation. Development of general-purpose contingency plans must establish clear relationships, identify specific areas of responsibility (AORs), and provide for effective, efficient communications channels. The existence of deliberate plans does not, however, eliminate the requirement for mission analysis and the estimation process. Operational planning must begin with a risk/threat assessment to determine whether APA operations are the appropriate option.

Two other facets of an APA operation increase its complexity. First, due to the remoteness of the deployment area and uncertainty of situations, some features cannot be determined until late in the decision-making process. Second, subsequent operations will have a significant impact on execution planning.

PHASES

Planning, alert, deployment, RSO&I, employment, redeployment, and regeneration/reconstitution of equipment constitute the phases of an APA operation.

Planning

No single formula incorporates the use of an APA heavy brigade into an Army force (ARFOR), joint, or multinational effort; organization depends on METT-T, and specifically the mission, force capabilities, and tactical situation. Deliberate and crisis action planning (CAP) should consider the use of APA as a possible course of action (COA).

Once assigned the APA mission, unit commanders initiate required planning processes. Contingency planning prepares for potential crises and military operations. Execution planning, which begins with receipt of the alert order, converts contingency plans to execution plans as mission requirements become known. Updates and modifications continue until the operation is complete.

Alert

During this phase, units prepare for movement of personnel to aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and loading aboard aircraft. The ARFOR dispatches the survey, liaison and reconnaissance party (SLRP), the off-load preparation party (OPP), and the advance party during this phase.

Deployment

Deployment begins with the departure of the first element of the main body to the APOE or when the APA ships begin transit to a designated SPOD. It ends when the last element of the main body arrives at the aerial port of debarkation (APOD). A critical phase of deployment is the strategic lift, which begins with departure of the first aircraft of the brigade's main body and ends with arrival of the last aircraft at the APOD.

Reception, Staging, Onward
Movement, and Integration

RSO&I is defined as follows:

• Reception is the off-load of personnel and material from strategic or operational transport at a point of debarkation for relocation to designated areas.
• Staging is organizing and preparing for movement of personnel and material at designated areas to incrementally build forces capable of meeting the operational commander's requirements.
• Onward movement is relocating forces capable of meeting the commander's operational requirements to the initial point of mission execution. It may include theater sustainment.
• Integration-in force projection-is the synchronized hand-off of units to an operational commander's force prior to mission execution.

This phase begins with the arrival of the first ship carrying APA equipment or the first aircraft of the main body at the designated SPOD/APOD. It ends when equipment and supplies are discharged and issued to awaiting units; command, control, and communications (C3) are established; and personnel and equipment link up and move forward to the tactical assembly area (TAA). Simultaneous or subsequent joint task force (JTF) tactical operations and movements to those operations are not considered part of the APA operation.

Employment

The heavy brigade closes on and prepares for follow-on operations, which facilitate the landing of follow-on forces. The heavy brigade and, in some instances, light armor forces provide reconnaissance and security and operate beyond the lodgment to gain enemy information and provide early warning.

Redeployment

Joint Pub 1-02 defines redeployment as the transfer of a unit or supplies from one area to another for the purpose of further employment. The objective is to redeploy as rapidly as possible to CONUS, an intermediate staging base, or another theater of operations. In conjunction with this effort, regeneration of combat forces is necessary to ensure readiness to handle other contingencies or operations in other theaters. The supported CINC, when directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), will regenerate the APA equipment within his theater of operations using available assets.

Regeneration/Reconstitution
of Equipment

Regeneration is different in purpose and scope from, and should not be confused with, redeployment. At the strategic level, the Army may require APA reconstitution from other Army war reserve pre-positioned sets (AWRPS) or from equipment left behind in CONUS by units deployed to use AWRPS. Tactically, APA reconstitution is the methodical restoration of APA brigade equipment and supplies to their original strength or properties to attain full operational capability. This process may involve restructuring the types and quantities of equipment and supplies carried on individual ships in a configuration different from that which existed prior to the discharge. The supported CINC should identify a support structure to meet the requirements for retrograde movement of supplies and equipment.

If time permits after in-theater reconstitution of APA equipment, the ships will be taken to a maintenance facility where USAMC and US Army Medical Materiel Agency (USAMMA) personnel will perform required maintenance/replacement. Equipment that cannot be repaired will be exchanged. Upon completion of regeneration/reconstitution, APA ships will be returned to the standard maintenance cycle developed by USAMC and USAMMA. Based on lessons learned from previous maintenance cycles, materiel will be stowed aboard ship in such a configuration that routine surveillance, exercises, and inspections can be performed at sea where feasible. Third Army's AWR-3 Battle Book for each vessel pre-positioned afloat discusses this process in greater detail.

EXECUTION

An APA operation begins with a warning order and deliberate decision to employ the force projection contingency force supported by the APA brigade. This warning order is followed by the issuance of the necessary directives/execute order to the major participants, for example, the supporting and supported CINCs and the CINC, US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Specifically, after receipt of an alert/warning order, the responsible CINC will issue an initiating directive to participating commanders.

After Marine or Army forces have seized and secured a seaport or airfield in the AO, the APA ships will enter the port and discharge. Once discharged, the heavy brigade can move through the marshalling area to the TAA, continue to improve its readiness posture, and prepare to conduct assigned missions. For a port to be considered secure, air superiority must be established in the AO. Furthermore, the port cannot be under direct or indirect fire.

When the joint force commander (JFC)/ARFOR commander is satisfied that the discharge of equipment and supplies is complete, he will report these facts to a higher authority designated in the initiating directive. This higher authority will terminate the APA operation and provide required instructions, to include command arrangements and disposition of forces and APA ships. Movement to forward areas and subsequent operations are separate from the APA operation. APA operations resume after contingency operations and continue through regeneration.

The supported CINC determines who will command and control the ports in the theater of operations. The specific responsibilities and command relationships normally detailed in the Command Arrangement Agreements (CAAs) will be followed. Force structure, command relationships in the operational theater, and some aspects of port management and operation functions vary from one operation to the next and will be METT-T-driven based on each scenario.

OPTIONS

The employment of an Army CTG as the port operator and MTMC as port manager offers a wide range of APA deployment options. These options enhance operational flexibility, improve deployability, reduce ready-to-operate time, and increase force sustainment. They are tailored to the requirements of specific contingency tasks and are reflected in the theater-opening force modules developed for the CINCs. See Appendix B for more information. Potential Army CTG/MTMC deployment options include:

• Theater-Opening Force Module D - Initial port-opening support for small humanitarian missions.
• Theater-Opening Force Module C - Minimum port support operations for major peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.
• Theater-Opening Force Module B - Limited port support operations for lesser regional contingencies.
• Theater-Opening Force Module A - Full port support operations for major regional contingencies.

The materiel on APA ships, which affords CINCs an array of employment options, includes-

• Combat equipment-two armor battalions and two mechanized battalions with required support and 15 days of supply-to comprise a combat force of a heavy brigade that is tailorable to a CINC's needs.
• Port-opening capability.
• Theater-opening CS/CSS unit equipment sets.
• Sustainment supplies for the first 30 days to support early deploying forces of the contingency corps until the sea LOCs are established. Neither the 15- nor 30-day sustainment package contains bulk fuel. Therefore, the JFC must ensure that bulk fuel is provided when the heavy brigade arrives in the theater of operations.

Planning for and using APA heavy brigade equipment assets are critical in that, once employed, this war reserve asset, after termination of employment operations, may not be fully mission-capable for an extended period of time. During that period, additional equipment must be identified for use if required.

To support the APA initially, seven ships from the ready reserve fleet were refurbished. Construction of new large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off (LMSR) ships has begun. These ships are to be delivered and ready for full employment not later than FY 2001. The theater-opening modules are established based on the reception and employment of LMSRs. Combatant commands should choose which theater-opening force module to employ based on the CINC's required delivery date for the force. In a fixed-port environment, Module D can deliver the same force as Module A, but a significantly longer time will be required to do so. Combatant command (COCOM) plans may have to include Module A within the time constraints of theater-opening Force Module D on the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) until the LMSRs are fully fielded. For humanitarian missions only, the linebacker ships could be deployed with the theater-opening Force Module D option, which will provide adequate discharge capability. For more information about the ships employed in the APA fleet, see Appendix C.

SECURITY

Security of the APA ships, strategic airlift resources, tactical aircraft, and areas within and surrounding the SPOD/APOD is crucial and must be considered during all phases of APA operations.