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Military

Chapter 9

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR
(OOTW)

Army doctrine recognizes that OOTW consists of raids, NEO, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and nation assistance. Joint publications in the 3-07 series outline joint OOTW doctrine. Field Manual 100-5, FM 100-19, FM 100-20, and FM 100-23 are the Army's primary doctrinal references for OOTW. Operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where military forces perform actions used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations we usually associate with war.

Although OOTW often occur outside the US, they also include military support to US civil authorities. Military OOTW usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces (as well as the efforts of government agencies and nongovernment organizations) in a complementary fashion.

The US government may apply any combination of national power to achieve national strategic goals whether they are political, economic, informational, or military. In OOTW, military forces typically support or otherwise integrate efforts with diplomatic, economic, and informational agencies or organizations.

When the corps performs OOTW, it will typically use warfighting doctrine found in this and other manuals. The corps commander and his staff must temper doctrine with judgment appropriate for the specific situation. They use METT-T factors during the command estimate process to appropriately task-organize and plan OOTW missions. The corps must stress a unified effort with the other services and with the civil, military, and police agencies of host nations.

Since its founding, the Army has continuously performed missions and tasks not directly related to war. Since the end of the Cold War, American involvement in OOTW has included crisis response in combat situations as well as participation in noncombat activities. Contributions range from engineer well-drilling detachments performing TOE missions in South America to JTFs supporting civil authorities in domestic disaster relief operations.

Operations other than war have also included overseas humanitarian assistance as well as operations of greater risk, such as NEO, in less than benign circumstances. These demands come in addition to the constant requirement to maintain combat readiness in both forward-deployed and CONUS-based units.


CONTENTS

THE CORPS' SUITABILITY FOR OOTW

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR PRINCIPLES

The Objective

Unity of Effort

Legitimacy

Perseverance

Restraint

Security

CORPS MISSIONS IN OOTW

Arms Control

Attacks and Raids

Combatting Terrorism

Disaster Relief

Humanitarian Assistance

Nation Assistance and Support to Counterinsurgency

Peace Operations

Recovery Operations

Shows of Force

Support to Civil Authorities

Support to Counterdrug Operations

OOTW CONSIDERATIONS

Special Operations

Information Operations

Intelligence

Maneuver

Fire Support

Air Defense

Mobility and Survivability

Combat Service Support

Battle Command


Early identification of situations that might require the commitment of corps assets in OOTW missions is essential. Early identification provides additional time to conduct planning and specialized training that METT-T factors and political conditions of specific OOTW missions require. Special operations forces are most suitable for conducting early assessments because of their rapid deployability, interpersonal communications skills, area orientation, and language capabilities.

Doctrine for OOTW emphasizes the overriding requirement to provide security for the force, and the population when appropriate, in the operational area. The threat may be man, nature, or both. Establishing an effective intelligence network to identify situational threats is essential.

For OCONUS operations, corps planning should include the possibility that OOTW forces may become engaged in combat operations. In a parallel planning process within the corps' overall plan for the OOTW mission, the commander and staff should develop CONPLANs that address the need for increased security force protection, possible evacuation, or possible combat operations.

THE CORPS' SUITABILITY FOR OOTW

The operational prerequisite for any response is adaptability. Corps are adaptable because they possess a robust nucleus of combat, CS, and CSS forces with which to accomplish OOTW mission requirements. Since corps are not fixed organizations, the corps headquarters may control assets not habitually associated with the corps' echelon.

The corps headquarters routinely operates with joint and multinational forces. With the corps receiving augmentation from other services and the establishing authority, it can assume an expanded role. For example, it might be a JTF headquarters controlling both joint and multinational forces. The corps headquarters also possesses the organic capability to communicate with higher Army and other agencies as required.

The corps can use many of its operational capabilities, developed for warfighting, in OOTW. These capabilities include a command focus that can operate at both the operational and tactical levels of war. This frees subordinate division headquarters to supervise the tactical operations of their organic units. This also allows the commander to adapt to circumstances that require the corps' main effort to be a CS or CSS operation with combat units in support to provide security.

Corps can conduct split-based operations when required. In addition, when properly supported, corps can operate in either developed or undeveloped theaters under all physical and climatic environments. Finally, a corps' capability to address a variety of threats (rioters, light infantry, and forces of nature) often make it an ideal choice for use in OOTW.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR PRINCIPLES

Many of the time-tested principles that apply to warfare also apply to OOTW. Other considerations that are equally important include--

  • The objective.
  • Unity of effort.
  • Legitimacy.
  • Perseverance.
  • Restraint.
  • Security.

To be successful in OOTW, corps commanders must understand these principles and apply them to their operations. (For more information see JP 3-07, FM 100-20, and FM 100-5. See also Figure 9-1.)

The Objective

In OOTW, as in war, the corps commander ensures that the mission is translated into clearly defined and attainable objectives. Operations other than war do not always have a tight focus (for example, multiple functions may be involved in a single mission). As a result, the corps commander may not receive a clear, succinct mission. However, his mission statement and intent must clearly translate the political or strategic objective into mission-type orders.

In OOTW, the corps' military objective is often a part of national, political, or humanitarian objectives. Therefore, the corps' objective may be a limited one.

Although the corps commander measures success against a stated mission, he must recognize the likelihood of the operation expanding (mission creep). He must guard against a tendency to expand the stated mission in an effort to accomplish more than is appropriate. On the other hand, keeping the political goals and objectives in mind, commanders must understand that the directing authority may expand their goals, objectives, and mission based on perceived successes or setbacks.

Unity of Effort

Unity of effort involves coordination through cooperation and the pursuit of common interests. Unity of command, a principle of war, is essential in any military operation. However, it may not be attainable in OOTW. Often, the environment will be multinational and/or interagency, where a single chain of command does not exist.

In selected OOTW activities, the military will be working for another government agency. Therefore, unity of effort is the practical alternative.

The corps commander must make extraordinary efforts to achieve unity of effort. He must recognize that other national forces may have divergent goals and political objectives.

Consensus building is a primary task and can be aided by understanding all major parties' capabilities and limitations as well as any legal and political requirements and limitations. By establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation, commanders can achieve the unity needed to accomplish a specific mission.

Legitimacy

Civilian and military leaders can best establish legitimacy when all parties understand the political, economic, cultural, and military aspects of the operation. Legitimacy in OOTW primarily involves three areas:

  • Legitimacy of the government or agency exercising authority.
  • Legitimacy for the presence of US forces in an AO.
  • Legitimacy in the execution of law-and-order operations.

The legitimacy of the foreign government the US military is to support may play a vital role in domestic public opinion. Legitimacy will also influence the support the indigenous population will provide. Because corps activities in OOTW support political objectives, commanders must be aware of the impact their operations will have on how its public perceives the host government.

How soldiers conduct themselves when not involved in the operation may affect the population's view of the legitimacy of US operations. In cases where a government does not exist, and to avoid unintended legitimization of individuals or organizations, the corps must use caution.

Information affects both political and military objectives. The corps commander must view information as a means to influence the legitimacy of his operations with both friendly and enemy forces.

Military PSYOP, civil affairs, and public affairs are the corps commander's primary means of communicating to foreign and internal audiences his actions and intentions. PSYOP and CA units are well-suited for both short-term and long-term OOTW missions. The corps commander's cooperation with the media is important--

  • To strengthen the legitimacy of the operation.
  • To promote both foreign and domestic popular support.
  • To provide accurate information to the public.

The American public should view corps involvement in OOTW as legitimate. A corps cannot control this; it obeys the legal orders of the NCA. The corps must act within its means to sustain its legitimacy. The corps' role and conduct must be appropriate to the situation.

When supporting domestic civil authorities, the corps must understand the letter and intent of the laws that govern such support. National guard (NG) units perform state missions at the discretion of their respective state or territorial governor. Regular Army and RC units support domestic civil authorities only under certain conditions. (See FM 100-19.)

Perseverance

The corps should achieve its OOTW objectives as soon as possible. However, the causes of conflict often tend to be persistent and not readily amenable to a near-term solution. Conflict resolution is time-consuming and may require a long-term military commitment. In some situations, conflict may be a semipermanent state. The military's objective will be to lessen the conflict.

Corps elements in OOTW must exercise patience and perseverance to continue the mission for as long as required. In selected operations, such as peacekeeping operations, success may be measured by the ability of the corps to sustain the status quo. If so, the corps' mission is to provide a climate in which other elements of power can work for a solution. Therefore, the corps must be adaptable, patient, and determined for as long as the mission dictates.

Restraint

Once the corps commits to an OOTW mission, it will normally be for a specific, limited purpose in response to an international situation or a domestic emergency. An NCA directive provides the authority for and the limits of military action. Restraints are also found in the mission statement, the TOR, and the ROE (FM 100-20).

Restrictions on types of force, weapons used, and ROE help prevent escalation of the violence in an activity. The commander refines restraints in the mission statement and clearly communicates them to subordinate units. The mission, situation, and laws (domestic and international) shape each operation. The host nation and other countries can also impose restraints.

Military planners normally develop ROE in conjunction with other agencies, services, or national authorities. They must continually review ROE based on the changing situation and update or change them as necessary. The ROE are never substitutes for the commander's inherent responsibility to protect his force. Units and soldiers have the right (duty) to defend themselves.

Security

All operations contain some degree of risk. Therefore, regardless of the mission, commanders must secure their forces. The presence of corps units in any operation around the world will bring about a wide range of actions and reactions. Army commanders must take appropriate measures to ensure hostile factions do not acquire an unexpected advantage.

Commanders and staffs should never believe that nonhostile missions or environments do not contain risk. No matter what the mission, the American soldier outside the US is always a lucrative target for extremist groups (terrorists, criminals, and so on).

Where appropriate, corps units plan for the possibility of combat operations. Seemingly benign situations may possess inherent circumstances that would place US soldiers at risk. Commanders must consider the security challenges inherent in many OOTW missions when planning and executing operations.

The threat in OOTW is not always easily recognizable. Restrictions placed on the corps may limit response options. Force dispersion, diverse activities, and nontraditional tasks soldiers will perform in OOTW make providing force and individual soldier security difficult.

CORPS MISSIONS IN OOTW

The corps will have to execute a broad range of tasks and missions during OOTW (Figure 9-2). Each OOTW will have its own special conditions and requirements. Some will require the fill focus of the corps headquarters and the commitment of nearly all of its assets. However, most OOTW will require only a small portion of the corps assets in a support role. In some instances the corps will be in charge of the operation as a JTF or ARFOR headquarters.

The composition of any corps task organization responding to an OOTW mission will be highly mission-dependent. The levels of combat, CS, and CSS assets required will likewise vary. Such operations will pose a challenge for the corps planning staff.

Corps commanders must synchronize the effects of all available assets at their disposal in order to achieve success. They must maintain a broad perspective as they consider viable alternatives to reach the desired end state. This requires commanders to consider nontraditional roles and activities for assigned and attached forces.

Understanding the similarities and differences in the operational requirements for different OOTW helps commanders establish priorities in actual situations. Some OOTW activities, such as attacks and raids, are combat operations and are conducted as normal warfighting operations, but under constrained circumstances. The following paragraphs discuss specialized corps OOTW missions.

Arms Control

Arms control focuses on promoting strategic military stability. It encompasses any plan, arrangement, or process controlling the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapons systems.

This also extends to C2, logistic support, and intelligence-gathering mechanisms. The corps may provide personnel possessing specific skills and materiel to support verification and inspection teams.

Attacks and Raids

Successful attacks or raids can create situations that permit seizing and maintaining the political initiative. Attacks and raids can also place considerable pressure on governments and groups supporting terrorism.

Commanders and staffs plan and execute attacks and raids to achieve specific objectives other than gaining or holding terrain. Attacks and raids damage or destroy high-value targets or demonstrate US capability and resolve to achieve a favorable result.

Raids are usually small-scale operations involving swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, temporarily seize an objective, or destroy a target, followed by a rapid, preplanned withdrawal. In OOTW, the corps may conduct attacks and raids (outside of an FID scenario), especially if it is also a JTF HQ. In an FID scenario, US commanders will always coordinate lethal and nonlethal attacks by corps maneuver and fire support operating systems with the host nation.

Coordinated attacks usually include air, naval, or special operations forces. Corps involvement in attacks and raids outside of the FID will usually be limited to providing SOF-secure staging and recovery bases, logistics, communications, and other support as required.

Combatting Terrorism

Combatting terrorism has two major components--antiterrorism (defensive) and counterterrorism (offensive). Antiterrorism includes active and passive measures to minimize installation and unit vulnerabilities to terrorist attack. (See JP 3-07.2.) At all times, regardless of their location (for example, home station or when deployed), corps units and personnel practice antiterrorism procedures.

Counterterrorism includes the full range of offensive operations against terrorists or those who support terrorists. The corps rarely conducts counterterrorism operations. However, the corps may have to provide secure base areas, communications, logistic, transportation, specially tailored conventional forces, and other support to SOF and other government agencies engaged in counterterrorism operations.

Disaster Relief

Disaster relief operations promote human welfare and try to reduce the loss of life, pain, suffering, or destruction of property as a result of natural or man-made disasters. The corps, with its subordinate engineer, MP, transportation, medical, and communications commands, may participate in disaster relief operations as part of joint, interagency, and/or multinational teams.

Field Manual 100-19 is the capstone doctrine for Army disaster relief and other domestic support operations. Generally, the corps headquarters executes disaster relief and other domestic support operations by planning and coordinating the actions of subordinate corps units with appropriate local, state, federal, and nongovemment agencies.

Humanitarian Assistance

Humanitarian assistance operations provide a mechanism by which the corps participates as part of a joint, multinational, and/or interagency force to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions (human pain, disease, famine, privation) outside the US. The humanitarian assistance the corps provides is limited in scope and duration. The assistance supplements or complements the efforts of HN civil authorities or agencies that have the primary responsibility for providing assistance.

The corps possesses an ability to rapidly respond to emergencies or disasters under austere conditions. The corps can provide the C3 support necessary to plan and execute the ground portion of any humanitarian assistance operation. It also provides logistic support (medical, field services, transportation, general engineering, and supplies) necessary to relieve the human suffering that results from natural or man-made disasters. The corps may also provide forces to secure an area to allow humanitarian relief efforts of other agencies to proceed. (Operation Restore Hope in Somalia was a humanitarian-assistance operation.)

Nation Assistance and Support to Counterinsurgency

Nation assistance encompasses civil or military assistance actions (other than humanitarian assistance) that the corps performs within that nation's territory during war, conflict, or peacetime. They are usually, but not always, based on mutual agreements between the US and that nation.

Such operations support a host nation's efforts to promote development, ideally through the application of its own resources. The goals of nation assistance are--

  • To promote long-term stability.
  • To develop sound and responsive democratic institutions.
  • To develop supportive infrastructures.
  • To promote strong free-market economies.
  • To provide an environment that allows for orderly political change and economic progress.

Nation-assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, FID, and other Title 10, US Code, DOD programs. All nation-assistance actions are integrated through the US ambassador's country plan. See FM 100-20 for additional information.

Security Assistance

Security assistance provides defense materiel, military training, and defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales to further national policies and objectives. When security assistance is needed to meet urgent operational requirements, the corps may be required to supervise the preparation and transfer of major end items of equipment by subordinate corps units to a foreign nation.

Security assistance operations do not normally impact corps. If they do impact corps, it will normally be through the Security Assistance Training Program (SATP). The two primary subcomponents of this program are the International Military Education and Training Program (IMETP) and the Foreign Military Sales Program (FMSP).

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Insurgences are organized movements aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions a government takes to defeat an insurgency constitute counterinsurgency operations.

Many operations that support governments or insurgent groups are unique intelligence activities and fall under the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The NCA, by exception, can order other US government agencies to participate in these operations in either a lead or a supporting role.

The internal defense and development (IDAD) concept is the basis for American doctrine for counterinsurgency. The IDAD concept integrates military and civilian programs. Military actions provide a level of internal security that permits and supports growth through balanced development.

The IDAD program blends four interdependent fictions (development, neutralization, security, and mobilization) to prevent or eliminate an insurgency. The corps uses its military resources to provide support to a host nation's counterinsurgency operations in the context of FID.

Foreign internal defense is the participation by US civilian and military agencies in any of the four IDAD functions that another government takes to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Corps do not "do" FIDs; the host nation is always the main effort.

Corps support for counterinsurgency normally is limited to training individuals and/or small units in critical skills. Training normally occurs at the corps' home station, but may involve the use of MTTs to provide training in the supported element's native country or in another country.

All corps units involved in nation assistance, especially MTTs, must remember the need to transfer technical skills and democratic attitudes to their HN counterparts. (At the same time they must maintain their own security.) The technical transfer is vital to the continued maintenance and expansion of projects that corps units initiate.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Noncombatant evacuation operations are actions the corps conducts to evacuate endangered US and authorized HN or developing-nation civilian or military personnel. The danger may arise from a hostile environment or a natural disaster. A NEO involves swift, temporary occupancy of an objective; it ends with a preplanned withdrawal. Corps units are to use the minimum amount of force to accomplish the mission.

NEO is normally a joint operation and sometimes involves multinational forces. The corps may actually conduct the operation or provide forces in a support role. (See also FM 90-29.)

Peace Operations

Peace operations encompass three types of predominantly diplomatic activities: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace building. (See JP 3-0.) It also includes two complementary, predominantly military activities: peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

The corps may find itself as a show of force or a preventive deployment in support of preventive diplomacy. The corps' involvement in military-to-military relations, security assistance operations, as well as preventive deployment and shows of force can assist peacemaking efforts.

The corps can support peace building by performing actions we normally associate with postconflict activities. Examples include road repair that corps engineers conduct, the corps' civil affairs element helping to reestablish the HN government, and the corps' participation in the training of defense forces.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)

Peacekeeping operations support diplomatic efforts to establish or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. They are undertaken with the consent of all major belligerents. By design they monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce or cease-fire. They also support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Strict appearance of neutrality, adequate means of self-protection, and the availability of timely/effective support are critical considerations.

Corps may receive the task of conducting PKO over a considerable time period. The reinforced battalion task force provided to the multinational force of observers (MFO) in the Sinai is an example of peacekeeping operations. (See FM 100-23.)

Peace Enforcement Operations (PEO)

Peace enforcement operations are military intervention operations in support of diplomatic efforts to restore peace or to establish conditions for conducting peacekeeping operations. As the name implies, PEO's intent is to halt violence and restore more normal civil activities. They seek to encourage the resumption of political and diplomatic dialogue. They typically occur at the request of an international organization such as the UN or the Organization of American States (OAS).

Unlike PKO, the consent of all the belligerents will not have been obtained. Typically, one or more of the belligerents will not be in favor of the employment of peace enforcement forces. The warring factions may even militarily engage the participating forces upon their entry into the AO.

Corps must deploy sufficient combat power to present a credible threat, protect the force, and conduct the full range of combat operations necessary to restore order and separate the warring factions if necessary. The corps normally conducts these operations in cooperation with other countries and agencies but they may also be unilateral.

Recovery Operations

Recovery operations involve locating, identifying, and extracting friendly, hostile, and/or neutral personnel, sensitive equipment, and/or items critical to US national security. Hostile forces may oppose recovery operations. Therefore recovery operations require detailed preplanning and rehearsals, especially when operations will be in denied areas.

Corps recovery operations are normally overt and resemble offensive operations. (See Chapter 5.) However, they may also occur in friendly areas, particularly when the HN does not have the technical means (for example, medium-lift helicopters) to conduct such operations themselves.

Shows of Force

Shows of force demonstrate American resolve in a situation vital to our national interests or objectives. Shows of force are strategic; demonstrations are operational or tactical.

Both operations force either a government or a commander to politically or militarily react to US initiative. Operations can take the form of multinational training exercises, rehearsals, forward staging of units, or the buildup of forces within an AO.

Corps involvement in shows of force may range in size and scope. They might include a publicized heightened state of alert at home station to a mobilization, predeployment activity, deployment, and unopposed entry of the complete corps.

Corps planning includes the option that deterrence may fail and shows of force units will become engaged in combat operations. Political concerns dominate shows of force as they do for all OOTW. The corps coordinates its operations with the affected host nation.

Support to Civil Authorities

Support to civil authorities operations provide temporary support, under law. They normally occur when an emergency overwhelms the capabilities of civil authorities. Support can be as diverse as--

  • Temporary augmentation of air traffic controllers or postal workers because of strikes.
  • Restoration of law and order in the aftermath of a riot.
  • Protection of life and federal property.
  • Providing relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster.

The corps' roles and responsibilities divide into four broad categories-disaster relief, environmental assistance, community assistance, and law enforcement support. Field Manual 100-19 provides the capstone doctrine for Army domestic support operations. It identifies linkages and relationships with federal, state, local, and other services. Limitations on military forces providing support to civil authorities include, among others, the Posse Comitatus Act.

Support to Counterdrug Operations

Domestic counterdrug operations principally support federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Because of US Code restrictions, the corps does not normally participate in domestic counterdrug operations (although subordinate NG units may participate while under state control).

Another aspect of counterdrug operations involves operations with cooperating foreign governments to interdict the flow of illegal drugs at the source, in transit, and during distribution. Support to foreign host nations includes--

  • Assistance to their forces to destroy drug production facilities.
  • Collaboration with HN armed forces to prevent export of illegal drugs.
  • Nation assistance to help develop economic alternatives to drug production, exportation, and distribution.

American military support of foreign counterdrug operations is normally coordinated by the regional CINC, his special operations command, and the various country military assistance groups. Corps involvement normally is limited to supervising the preparation, deployment, and possible sustainment of small specialized units to meet CINC or SOF operational shortfalls.

Corps support of interdiction efforts may center on monitoring and detecting illegal drugs in transit. It also may involve the integration of the C3I systems of all agencies participating in the interdiction effort by the corps.

OOTW CONSIDERATIONS

Many US government agencies, other than DOD, may participate in OOTW (such as the Department of State (DOS), the Department of Agriculture (DA); the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of Transportation, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)). Because the DOS is a major player in OOTW outside the continental US, the corps commander, if operating as a CJTF, will maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of US diplomatic missions in his area.

American and international nongovernment organizations (NGO) also frequently participate in OOTW missions. The G5/CA staff coordinates these relationships. Examples of US NGO include the American Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund. Examples of international NGO include the International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

International organizations may or may not assume the lead in coordinating actions for other nongovernment agencies. Corps staffs should establish contact with all nongovernment agencies to ensure coordinated efforts.

Liaison with joint, multinational, or government and nongovernment agencies are critically important to OOTW mission success. The corps and its subordinate units will generally need to make an extraordinary effort to exchange liaison at all echelons with diverse organizations. Their actions can help all participating organizations achieve unity of effort.

Civilian organizations, in particular, do not have the communications, data processing, and other equipment to facilitate control to the extent that the corps has. Therefore, the corps may have to provide additional equipment, operators, communications-electronics operating instructions (CEOI), or other support and services to civilian participants.

Just as in war, the corps commander tailors his corps based on OOTW mission requirements. Corps participation might include small units supporting a joint, multinational, or interagency operation. However, the corps might be responsible for the entire mission (possibly as a JTF and/or ARFOR headquarters).

Significant staff augmentation would then be necessary from the Army and other service components and the CINC staff. Whatever the mission and level of participation, the corps task organization for OOTW might be radically different than for normal combat operations because of unique mission requirements. The following discussion highlights some unique OOTW considerations.

Special Operations

PSYOP and CA elements normally support the corps. When an OOTW mission requires the commitment of a corps, just as in war, the corps commander can expect dedicated SOF assets to support his mission as well.

SOF assets perform special reconnaissance, direct action, or other special operations. The support and command relationships between the corps and SOF in an OOTW mission are the same as exist between the corps and SOF in war. (See Chapters 2 and 4 of this manual.)

Information Operations

Use and control of information is as important in OOTW as it is in conventional combat operations. Determining data processing and communications protocols between the numerous agencies (US and other) participating in any OOTW mission is an important task for corps planners and operators. (See FM 100-6 for more information.)

Information-gathering must begin early, before deployment of corps units. The commander may elect to send a task-organized assessment team into the AO to gather information on key issues, or he may establish initial liaison with agencies, HN and multinational forces, and SOF teams operating in the region. Liaison teams deploy as soon as practical.

As the OOTW mission clarifies and the deployment of military forces begins, the demand for information at every level will be intense. The committed force, whatever its size, may need the results of nationally sourced intelligence analysis.

The CJTF will need the benefit of "on the ground" observation, analysis, and recommendations. Every level will want similar information. Decision makers cannot afford to wait for deployments to be complete before getting the necessary information.

Information operations for OOTW are critically important to the overall success of the mission. Special planning areas include influencing the enemy (if there is one), educating and informing the population, supporting media operations, and providing command information.

Intelligence

Operations other than war can involve threats that include large, fully dimensional forces; limited capability forces; natural disasters; or events that are subtle, indirect, and normally, regional. They might develop quickly and may or may not be long-term. Also, OOTW mayor may not involve combat but might have serious implications for safeguarding US interests.

Intelligence assets and operations must be tailored to the often unique demands of OOTW. Greater reliance on intelligence sources, constraints on methods of collection, differing focus and detail of IPB, and shared intelligence all impact intelligence efforts. The nature of OOTW requires that intelligence-gathering and dissemination be fully engaged, flexible, and responsive to the challenges of these missions.

Having the proper mix of raw data-gathering and intelligence analysis can significantly improve the corps' security posture. As soon as practical after an operation is indicated, corps commanders and planners should determine the specific intelligence requirements the corps will need to support the operation.

The corps' intelligence system must adjust to the particular intelligence needs of specific OOTW missions. Both intelligence planners and operators must be flexible and responsive to challenges of specific OOTW missions.

A blurring of intelligence needs across echelons may occur in OOTW. The NCA might need intelligence normally collected by tactical assets; lower echelons could need strategic intelligence products for effective operations.

Intelligence planners must also consider the corps' ability to receive external intelligence support and to store intelligence data. Additional considerations include the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of open-source intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies as intelligence sources.

Sharing Intelligence

Based on operational experience, downgrading and sharing US intelligence with non-DOD US agencies and military or nonmilitary multinational organizations will challenge commanders and their intelligence staff at all levels. Different countries and agencies handle intelligence products differently. For many reasons, corps intelligence elements share intelligence differently depending on the non-DOD intelligence agency involved.

Effective intelligence operations in OOTW require flexibility among organizations and clear guidance on the handling of sensitive classified intelligence. Different security levels and procedures can result in the less than desirable flow of intelligence products and raw data.

Leaders should provide guidance during the planning stages to preclude misunderstanding and unintentional incidents. Providing corps liaison elements to each organization facilitates the rapid flow of intelligence and minimizes the impact of this historical problem.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Operations other than war rely particularly on access to HUMINT. Both US or HN personnel may contribute to the understanding of the population, its culture and needs, and the operational environment.

In OOTW every individual is a potential source of HUMINT. Contacts with HN citizens, government agency personnel and multinational personnel provide HUMINT of value to commanders. The corps must prepare for the collection, analysis, and dissemination of increased amounts of HUMINT.

Low-level tactical matters can be important to the success of any tailored task force dispatched by corps headquarters in response to an OOTW mission. In the HUMINT area, corps planners must actively request language and culturally qualified counterintelligence, translators, and interrogators from all available sources.

Operations other than war missions, as in war, require an IPB. The IPB process remains consistent regardless of the mission, unit, or echelon. The principle difference between IPB for conventional operations and IPB for OOTW is the focus and degree of detail required.

In OOTW, emphasis is on terrain, weather, and sociopolitical issues, as well as on the threat. In some cases, the threat may not be "enemy personnel" but, rather, an underlying condition causing instability. For example, during disaster relief and humanitarian assistance operations, terrain and weather considerations are major concerns. (See JP 3-07.1 and FM 34-130, Chapter 6, for additional information.)

Maneuver

The corps may receive orders to conduct OOTW with little notice. Therefore, commanders should develop and implement training and education programs focusing on joint, multinational, and interagency OOTW for selected individuals and units. Personnel from other US government agencies and nongovemment and international organizations should be invited and funded to participate in these programs when appropriate.

Unit and individual soldier discipline in exercising restraint and an appropriate response are especially critical during OOTW. For example, the discipline and actions of squads and platoons performing humanitarian relief operations are, in many cases, far more visible than in larger combat operations.

Events of only tactical-level consequence in war may have operational or strategic implications in OOTW. Realistic ROE are critical. Commanders must identify ROE early in the operation's planning process.

In OOTW, as in war, the commander seeks to position his force to effectively execute the mission. The corps' power may be based on combat, CS, and CSS forces or on any combination of the three. It makes no difference whether the enemy is insurgents, rioters, or flood waters.

In some OOTW missions, maneuver planning may consist of positioning logistic units to optimize their capabilities to provide service or supplies for relief operations. As mentioned before, the main effort for the corps may be general engineering functions or providing shelter, food, clothing, and medical care and security.

There are many similarities in planning considerations for combat operations and OOTW. However, the battlefield organization may not lend itself to a close, deep, and rear organization. The commander should try to organize corps operations to comply with HN administrative structure (city or county boundaries, local police districts, or with civilian agency boundaries). In many cases, the means of executing close, deep, and rear operations will change.

Information operations may become the primary means of conducting deep operations. Close operations in many OOTW missions may more closely resemble doctrinal rear operations conducted in support of combat operations. Corps planning should also consider the possibility for noncontiguous AOs and split-based operations.

In addition to providing security and law and order for the corps' organic elements, the commander may need to conduct law-and-order missions in OOTW. In many OOTW missions, local government infrastructure will be incapable of providing the necessary security and law and order for itself or its population. This could be for any number of reasons (hurricanes, tornadoes, insurgencies, anarchy, and soon). While military police units are the first considered for law-and-order missions, with minimal training, infantry units may perform extremely well in manning static guard posts, reinforcing police patrols, and crowd control.

Planning considerations include protecting key economic infrastructures, maintaining general law and order, establishing a civil defense effort, and protecting the government infrastructure. When planning for the use of military forces to execute law enforcement operations in CONUS, corps commanders must consider the restrictions that the Posse Comitatus Act places on the military.

Fire Support

In OOTW the corps still plans for the use of fires. These will be both lethal and nonlethal, provided by corps, joint, or multinational assets. The political nature and the need to maintain legitimacy for OOTW missions makes careful mission analysis and precise use of lethal or nonlethal fires essential.

The corps must use lethal fires sparingly in offensive operations. In defensive situations, the corps uses what is necessary to protect the force. Precise planning and delivery of fires allows the commander to preclude unwanted collateral damage and avoid possible political ramifications.

The corps will generally employ fire support coordination measures. For example, it may use restrictive fire control measures to minimize potential damage to important cultural structures or dense population areas.

The corps must ensure it carefully synchronizes both restrictive and permissive fire support coordination measures with a ROE analysis. Nonlethal fires may be the primary means of fire support in many forms of OOTW. The corps can use nonlethal fires to confuse, deceive, delay, disorganize, or locate the opposition.

Air Defense

Air defense operations in OOTW are different from conventional AD operations. The layered AD umbrella that exists for the corps on a conventional battlefield may not exist in an OOTW environment. Early warning radars, multiple weapons systems, EAC air defense command facilities, and offensive counter air operations may not be as readily available.

Rules of engagement in OOTW will probably differ from those of conventional AD operations. For example, the corps will have to develop ad hoc solutions when point defense systems must communicate directly with the theater AD system for sensor support and battle management.

The corps must develop an effective AD system adapted to the conditions of the particular mission's AD circumstances. Because of the proliferation of theater ballistic missiles and low-cost remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and UAVs, AD planning by the corps remains a concern in OOTW.

Mobility and Survivability

Engineering capabilities play a key role in many OOTW missions. Although general engineering is usually associated with OOTW missions, the corps may not be assigned specific general engineering tasks. However, even when this is the case, the corps should anticipate executing some general engineering functions. Field Manual 5-114 provides a detailed description of how engineers support OOTW. Planners should consider--

  • Sustainment of transportation facilities.
  • Sustainment of public utilities.
  • Restoration of services in support of HN or multinational forces (including restoring destroyed or damaged civil-military facilities and public utilities, waterworks, sewage treatment, telephone, transportation, and hydroelectric systems).
  • Countermine operations.
  • Use of LOGCAP to employ local contractors.

The corps commander must also consider survivability operations in OOTW and such active measures as hardening facilities and fortification. Some OOTW may require more emphasis on passive protective measures. The corps should even consider protection from weapons of mass destruction as they proliferate and become more likely to be diverted to terrorist groups. In some circumstances, such as during disasters, the commander may have to protect civilians, as well as military, from chemical and/or biological contamination.

Combat Service Support

Combat service support may be central to the success of many OOTW missions. Until establishing the sustainment base, only limited (in size, scope, and duration) combat, and CS operations associated with the OOTW mission can take place. Logistic requirements may dominate the mission and place major demands on support forces.

Planners consider inventory control management, movement control, and distribution requirements when selecting which logistic operations headquarters is to participate in during the OOTW mission. To meet operational requirements, the corps may have to request or contract various types of supplies and support through other than US government logistics agencies. Commanders may have to divert combat or CS units to perform or supplement available CSS units until sufficient reserve CSS units are mobilized and deployed.

Funding

As a senior headquarters in any OOTW mission, the corps must consider resource management implications. Early determination of a mission's fiscal constraints is vital. A commander's understanding of funding implications of OOTW missions precludes the unauthorized expenditure of funds in violation of regulations or laws.

Understanding is also necessary to conduct any trade-off analyses between funding the OOTW mission and maintaining the corps' training and readiness status. Accurate and complete accounting of all funds is vital to the corps' ability to recoup resources from the agency directing the OOTW mission.

Transportation Services

Most OOTW missions will be force-projection operations of some type. Getting the force to the AO requires the same transportation planning and execution skills as any other force-projection operation. Typically, the numbers and types of available aircraft and ships for deployment and sustainment of the corps force will be limited.

Critical transportation factors include managing the corps' list of accompanying line items and retaining movement control over corps units. The corps should establish mode terminal operations to receive, store (preferably in covered warehouses), load, and distribute equipment, fuel, ammunition, and other materials.

Contracting support is one of the corps logistician's principal tools in accomplishing the mission. Planning should consider resources available in theater, supplies that higher HQ or outside agencies (such as the UN) will provide, and supplies that the corps can contract for, thus avoiding having to transport them into theater. In most OOTW scenarios, contracting support will have to deploy into theater with the corps' initial elements.

Combat Health Support

Combat health support in many OOTW scenarios will greatly expand beyond that usually required to support the corps. Required CHS may include care for civilians and their farm animals as well as US military personnel. The corps medical staff must plan for this eventuality. The success of disaster relief or humanitarian assistance operations may well hinge on the corps's ability to provide medical, dental, veterinary, and preventive health-related services and support.

Personnel Services

Personnel elements are especially important in OOTW because they provide support to commanders and soldiers involved in the operation. For most OOTW scenarios, initial deployment forces in the AO must be able to manage the critical functions of personnel accounting and strength reporting, casualty operations, and postal support.

Elements of the corps' personnel management center will be required to maintain personnel readiness of the deployed force and to synchronize the personnel network. Modular personnel units (PSBs and postal companies) will incrementally deploy to establish the theater data base and to provide personnel support, as the operation and METT-T factors dictate.

The nature of OOTW suggests that most operations will be joint. In the transition to the joint staff, the J1/G1, with assistance from the AG, must help develop the personnel support component of the JTF structure.

Augmentation from EAC personnel staffs and units may be required to ensure integration, task organization, and resourcing of the other services' personnel systems. There must be provisions to account for non-Army military members, civilians, and even HN personnel. Commanders must also consider coordination requirements with national and international agencies, departments, and officials.

Resources Control

In many OOTW missions the corps will need to assist the HN or local governments in maintaining control of key or critical resources. Resources control involves planning and executing operations that help the HN's local government or multinational force in their efforts to maintain positive control over supplies, materiel, terrain, and the population. Maintaining control will preclude these items being used by opposing elements. In civil disaster situations this could mean restoring local governmental infrastructure and protecting vital utility services until the HN force can assume the mission.

Legal Services

The corps enters OOTW missions as a result of political directives or special circumstances with political or social ramifications. Therefore, corps commanders and staff will need a variety of legal services.

Services may range from providing legal interpretations of the mission to providing legal counsel for redress of claims against the US government or of US claims against other countries. Other areas of legal services include--

  • Planning for property and personal grievances under criminal law.
  • Filing and processing claims.
  • Providing legal assistance.
  • Assisting HN governments and military forces regarding terms of status of forces agreements and other international law issues.

Battle Command

Battle command, although fundamentally unchanged, must be adjusted to the varied situations inherent in OOTW. Each OOTW situation is unique. There is no single battle command option that works best for all. Corps commanders and their subordinates must be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet the specific requirements of each situation and to promote unity of effort.

Command Considerations

Operations other than war missions often come with unclear or ad hoc chains of command. The numerous players, not normally in the corps' chain of command, as well as nonstandard task organizations will require adjustments to the corps' C2 architecture. In addition, mission requirements for OOTW require innovative leadership and staffs to develop appropriate COAs. Although the decision-making process for OOTW is the same as for combat operations, the information within the process may vary widely from that of conventional operations.

Some OOTW missions may require the corps to act as a JTF and/or ARFOR headquarters, which will pose significant challenges for the corps commander and his staff. Normally, the corps separates the two functions. However, it may retain both roles in short-duration, low-risk OOTW missions.

During OOTW, the corps will probably conduct interagency operations to a much greater extent than during conventional operations. When the corps HQ is also the ARFOR, it may act as the executive agent for certain activities and the services for the joint force. The degree to which this applies depends on the particular OOTW mission and the service or agencies involved in the mission. Inmost cases, the CINC and the ASCC augment the corps staff with appropriate expertise to act as the JTF or ARFOR headquarters.

The corps normally executes OOTW as contingency operations. As in any contingency operation, the CINC determines the EAC chain of command.

Regardless of how complex the EAC chain of command may be, the corps commander must still establish clear command relationships between corps units. As the CAP process develops, subordinate commanders should participate through a parallel planning process and help the corps staff develop and staff subordinate unit mission statements (and their perceived end states) up the chain of command.

Planning Considerations

Because the OOTW mission may not warrant the complete commitment of the entire corps, the corps HQ may elect to conduct split-based operations. A forward CP can operate in the AO while the rear CP may operate from its CONUS base.

Although the commander must guard against an expansion of corps missions; the corps' task organization must also allow for the possible rapid transition to combat operations or other OOTW missions. Also, the corps force must not overwhelm potentially scarce transportation assets or the austere theater infrastructure.

Operations other than war require corps combat, CS, and CSS units to operate in concert with US and foreign civilian agencies of government, international organizations, and private organizations. Elements of the corps' support command may play major roles.

The corps must be prepared to accept attachment or OPCON of units from many external sources, including other Army organizations, joint forces, and allied or coalition military services. It may assume OPCON of other US or foreign government agencies. The corps must coordinate with and support public or private civilian organizations.

Because of the often short period of time available to plan and conduct force-projection operations for an OOTW mission, logistic planners must develop comprehensive logistic support packages for use in various OOTW scenarios. Planning should consider the needs of the response force, the corps' available resources, resources provided in the theater of operation by other organizations, transportation restrictions, and supplies that will be potentially contracted.

Planning for the transition out of the OOTW mission and the redeployment and demobilization (if required) of corps units should begin as early as possible. Preferably, this is before beginning the OOTW mission.

Military forces may best conduct refugee control, reestablishing civil order and public services, medical assistance, and other activities during the initial stages of an OOTW mission. Some OOTW missions typically begin with significant military involvement, then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the potential for armed violence or environmental threats wane and civil infrastructures and control are reestablished.

The corps' presence and its ability to operate in crisis environments under extreme conditions may give it a prominent role in operations where other agencies are the lead. Corps subordinate units need to work competently in this environment while properly subordinating military efforts to the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting OOTW activities require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of other services, government agencies, and alliance or coalition partners.

Corps doctrine addresses OOTW as an important component of the full range of Army operations. While OOTW do not preclude combat operations, in most cases success will entail use of military capabilities in roles other than traditional combat.

The corps is well-suited to conduct OOTW because its headquarters is capable of the complex management of OOTW. With proper augmentation the corps commander can serve as an ARFOR or JTF commander in OOTW. (See Chapter 4.) The corps controls a wide variety of combat and CSS units. The corps COSCOM contains many of the CSS assets that are essential during OOTW.

Under OOTW conditions, even if assigned the role of a JTF headquarters, the corps still ultimately works for the regional CINC or international force commander. However, the senior DOS official in a country during overseas operations, or the appropriate official in another federal agency during domestic support operations, will direct the overall effort. However, even though that person may have OPCON over corps units, command remains in military channels. If combat arises during overseas operations, the corps may revert to the direct control of the CINC or another appropriate commander (such as the CJTF).

Normal unit training for OOTW focuses on combat-related mission essential tasks, many of which are applicable in OOTW. Once alerted for a mission, units conduct specialized training in accordance with the CJTF's or CINC's directives. This specialized training may require some extended time to complete.



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