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Chapter 2

FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPS OPERATIONS

In combat a corps must be able to simultaneously and continuously execute operations in depth. This requires careful planning and detailed coordination in order for the corps to bring to bear all available resources at decisive times and places on the battlefield.

Commanders must understand force-projection operations, battlefield visualization, the battlefield framework, and the basic capabilities of each battlefield operating system (BOS). Commanders must also understand the complementary and reinforcing effects of combined arms and joint capabilities to apply Army operations doctrine.

FORCE PROJECTION

Future contingencies will most likely occur in regions of the world where the US does not have significant ground forces. Force projection is the demonstrated ability to rapidly alert, mobilize, deploy, employ, sustain, and recover to again operate anywhere in the world. It is the key military element of power projection.

As a member of the joint team, the Army corps is often the organization of choice to deploy from CONUS and/or forward presence locations and to conduct operations associated with lesser regional contingencies or operations that may develop into a major regional contingency.

The corps is ideally suited for force-projection missions. It has the fill extent of C2, combat, CS, and CSS assets with which to assemble an appropriate mix of units to execute any force-projection operation.

Because the corps is not a fixed force, it can be tailored to any contingency worldwide. Therefore, the corps brings tremendous versatility and lethality to a warfighting commander-in-chief's (CINC's) total force. It can execute the full range of land combat operations and OOTW. Also, when properly tailored, it can execute both simultaneously. (See Chapter 3 for details.)

The CINC may assign the corps commander various command responsibilities within a force-projection operation. For example, the corps commander may be the commander of the senior tactical level headquarters in the theater and may be directly subordinate to an Army EAC headquarters. The corps commander may also function as the commander of an operational-level headquarters, such as a JTF, a JFLCC, or an ARFOR headquarters. (See Chapter 4.)

BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION

Battlefield visualization is a key aspect of battle command and is the process whereby the commander develops a clear understanding of his current state, envisions a desired end state and, subsequently, visualizes the sequence of activity that will move his force from its current state to the end state. Once a commander has been assigned an area of operations (AO), he begins to visualize the operation he will conduct before any mental constraints (for example, boundaries, phase lines (PLs), and fire control measures) are emplaced.


CONTENTS

FORCE PROJECTION

BATTLEFIELD VISUALIZATION

BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

Area of Operations (AO)

Area of Interest (AI)

Battle Space

Organizing the Battlefield

BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS (BOS)

Intelligence

Maneuver

Fire Support

Air Defense (AD)

Mobility and Survivability

Combat Service Support (CSS)

Command and Control (C2)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

Special Reconnaissance

Direct Action

Unconventional Warfare (UW)

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

Civil Affairs Operations

PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)


The first aspect in the commander's visualization is gaining an understanding of the current state of his unit and that of the enemy. This includes gaining an awareness of his own and the enemy's status, including combat readiness, logistic status, location, speed of advance, tempo of operations, known vulnerabilities, and probable course of action.

Environmental factors for both the enemy and the friendly force are also included. Environmental factors include terrain and weather as well as human factors such as morale and fatigue. Less tangible influences are cultural, religion, and similar factors.

The second aspect of the commander's vision is his ability to clearly discern a desired end state. This initially involves foreseeing a feasible outcome to the operation that would result in mission success and would leave the unit postured for the next mission.

The third aspect of battlefield visualization is the commander's ability to envision a sequence of actions (an intellectual war game) that would cause his force to arrive at the desired end state. Included in the commander's visualization are the contingencies (branches) and follow-on missions (sequels) his force might encounter.

Ultimately, the commander articulates his battlefield vision to his subordinates and staff through the commander's intent statement. The commander's intent guides the development of the concept of operations.

The ability to visualize a battlefield is an essential leadership attribute. It is learned and attained through training, practice, experience, wisdom, and available battle command technologies. It is critical to accomplishing the mission.

Battlefield visualization is fundamental to establishing a battlefield framework. A battlefield framework for any operation results from, and is a natural extension of, this process.

BATTLEFIELD FRAMEWORK

A battlefield framework helps commanders relate friendly forces to one another and to the enemy in terms of time, space, and purpose. The concept of a battlefield framework is not new, but the proliferation of military and advanced technology and the influence of joint doctrine has caused the battlefield framework to evolve.

The battlefield framework is relevant to any battlefield, including those in OOTW. The following discussion applies primarily to conventional combat operations.

The battlefield framework consists of four interrelated components: area of operations (AO), area of interest (AI), battle space, and a specific battlefield organization. As a result of the battlefield visualization process, the commander can translate his vision into this framework.

The commander mentally establishes an area in which he must focus intelligence-gathering means, This will ensure he is aware of factors that may have a near-term impact on the operation. This is called the area of interest.

The commander next determines the three-dimensional area in which he seeks to dominate the enemy. This volume is referred to as the commander's battle space.

Finally, the commander lends structure to his assigned AO through a specific battlefield organization. This organization includes using boundaries, phase lines, and similar measures.

Figure 2-1 graphically depicts two battlefield components: the AO and the battlefield's organization within an AO. The other two components, battle space and AI, are not shown. They are mental constructs commanders use to form an orderly arrangement of the battlefield in order to gather information and dominate the enemy.

Area of Operations (AO)

A commander is assigned an AO by his higher commander. An AO is a three-dimensional volume prescribed by boundaries on the ground. It also includes the airspace above.

The size of an AO depends on METT-T, but it must be large enough for the commander to accomplish his mission and protect the force. Boundaries may require frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rates of maneuver and the operational environment.

Commanders can use AOs to divide large areas into smaller geographical areas in which tactical-level battles are fought. However, because of technological advances and the capabilities of current battlefield systems, an assigned AO may not necessarily allow the commander to employ his organic, assigned, and supporting assets to their fullest capabilities.

Area of Interest (AI)

The AI is a geographical area from which the commander requires information and intelligence in order to execute successful tactical operations and to plan for future operations. Because staffs need time to process information and to plan or synchronize operations, the tactical commander's AI is usually larger than his battle space and AO.

Normally, the AI includes any threat or characteristic of the battlefield environment that will significantly influence a commander's current or future mission. The AI also includes areas adjacent to the AO (forward, flanks, and rear) in which enemy actions and the environment will affect current and future battles. Each commander determines his own AI.

Battle Space

Battle space is the volume of area in which the commander seeks to dominate the enemy. It is through battlefield visualization that he decides where, when, and how he will dominate the enemy within his battle space.

A commander's battle space expands and contracts in relation to the ability to acquire and engage the enemy with joint or multinational forces. It can change as the commander's vision of the battlefield changes. It is influenced by time, tempo, depth, and synchronization.

A higher commander does not assign battle space. Although battle space is not shown on a map or computer monitor, it usually extends beyond the commander's AO and may overlap with the battle space of other commanders. At the tactical level, the area in which a commander dominates an enemy (his battle space) is normally smaller than his AI.

Key considerations in determining the size of battle space include the depth and resolution of supporting intelligence, the commander's concept for employing both organic and supporting weapons, and the disposition of the opposing force.

Organizing the Battlefield

Areas of operation help commanders quickly prioritize and focus resources and efforts. Commanders organize their battlefield with control measures to assign responsibilities, to coordinate fires and maneuver, and to control other activities.

Commanders consider all aspects of the three-dimensional battle and apply the minimum standard control measures to organize their AOs. They use only those measures necessary to ensure the safety of the force while allowing for the initiative and agility of subordinate commanders.

Battles and engagements are at times linear with deep, close, and rear components. (See Figure 2-2.) Although these components may be noncontiguous, they are not separate and distinct activities. They are synchronized efforts throughout the entire depth of the battlefield.

Three closely related sets of activities--deep, close, and rear--characterize operations within an AO. Commanders fight throughout the depth and breadth of their AO using deep, close, and rear operations simultaneously in a way that will appear to the enemy as one continuous operation.

Simultaneous operations in depth seek to attack the enemy concurrently throughout the depth of the battlefield. They also seek to mass both effects and forces when and where necessary to accomplish the mission.

In executing simultaneous operations in depth, the corps commander strives to paralyze the enemy's ability to act by--

  • Dominating the enemy, either directly or indirectly, through attack or the threat of attack; by conducting fires, electronic warfare, combined arms maneuver; or by a combination of all of these actions throughout three dimensions--horizontal, vertical, and time.
  • Attacking, either directly or indirectly, enemy centers of gravity and critical functions to destroy the cohesion of the enemy plan, such as the ability to generate and sustain combat power.
  • Denying the enemy such sources of combat power as his ability to maneuver or to provide fire support.
  • Seizing, holding, or denying key terrain.
  • Interdicting enemy lines of communications (LOC).
  • Seizing and retaining the initiative while controlling the tempo of operations.

A key aspect of simultaneous operations in depth is tempo. Commanders control their tempo and strive to control the enemy's tempo. Commanders determine the best sequence of operations that will maintain the initiative and achieve a tempo of operations to reach the desired objective. In deciding on the required tempo, commanders consider many factors (the command structure, geography, logistics, public opinion, civilians, enemy reinforcement capabilities).

A changing enemy situation complicates sequencing decisions for operations. Therefore, the sequence that commanders choose should not close future alternatives, but should be flexible enough to accommodate change.

Simultaneous operations in depth directly impact the enemy's cohesion. Units are not restricted to fighting three sequential operations, nor do they conduct operations in depth solely to establish favorable conditions for the close fight.

Deep operations, combined with simultaneous close operations, might be decisive in one operation. In another, deep operations might set the conditions for future decisive close operations. Quickly arriving at decisive operations is the aim.

When executing simultaneous operations in depth, the corps commander establishes procedures to set priorities and to request assets from EAC. He then prioritizes distribution of resources to subordinate units to help them conduct their own operations.

The METT-T factors determine the relationship between assets committed to close, deep, and rear operations. The commander must see the entire AO and react promptly to developments anywhere within it.

Deep Operations

Corps deep operations are directed against enemy forces and functions beyond the close battle. They may be separated from the close battle in time or space or both. The commander can execute deep operations by combining maneuver, fire support, and/or command and control warfare (C2W) supported by intelligence.

By design, deep operations dominate the enemy by--

  • Nullifying his firepower.
  • Disrupting his C2.
  • Disrupting the tempo of his operations.
  • Destroying his forces.
  • Preventing reinforcing maneuver.
  • Destroying his installations and supplies.
  • Breaking his morale.

When conducting simultaneous attacks in depth, the corps employs long-range intelligence-acquisition and targeting assets, including EW and joint assets. The corps uses these to track enemy forces, to complicate their operations, and to determine the effects of corps strikes in depth.

The corps normally conducts deep operations against the enemy's uncommitted forces or resources to prevent him from using them where and when he wants on the battlefield. Goals of deep operations include--

  • Limiting the enemy's freedom of action.
  • Altering the tempo of operations in favor of the corps.
  • Denying the enemy the capability to concentrate his forces.
  • Isolating the close fight.
  • Destroying the enemy's will to fight.

Whether in the offense or defense, deep operations perform one or more of the following functions:

  • Interdicting enemy LOCs.
  • Preventing the enemy's counterattack or his employment of follow-on forces.
  • Destroying units and critical targets.
  • Cutting off routes of withdrawal.
  • Providing the commander with information and intelligence about enemy capabilities in depth.

The systems normally available to the corps for deep operations are ground maneuver units, FA (including rockets, missiles, and cannon artillery), AI, AH units, AALST forces, airborne forces, PSYOP, CA units, and EW assets.

To ensure unity of effort and fully integrated use of capabilities in deep operations, a single organization within the corps must be responsible for synchronization of all aspects according to the commander's guidance. This organization is the deep operations coordination cell (DOCC). (See Chapter 4 for details.)

When planning a deep operation, the targeting methodology is a critical element (Figure 2-3). The decide, detect, deliver, and assess target methodology enables the commander and staff to take the initiative in selecting high-payoff targets (HPTs) before they actually present themselves in the target array.

Each function occurs both simultaneously and sequentially. Although not a separate function, target tracking is inherent throughout the targeting process. The staff must plan target tracking simultaneously with the development of the intelligence collection plan (decide).

Target tracking occurs during the targeting function of detect, and it supports the targeting functions of deliver and assess. The decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting methodology is applicable for air or ground assault as well as for delivery systems such as tactical air, attack helicopters, and electronic attack (EA).

Joint standardized control measures are used in the deep operations coordination process. They are a flexible system of managing ground and air operations. An important control measure for deep operations is the fire support coordination line (FSCL). The FSCL is a line that the appropriate ground commander establishes to ensure coordination of fires and interdiction not under his control but which might directly affect his current tactical operations.

The FSCL is a permissive fire support coordinating measure. When consulting with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders, the appropriate land force commander establishes and adjusts the FSCL within his boundary.

Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. Fire support coordination lines facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating line.

Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, if the attack will not produce adverse effects on or to the rear of the line. The FSCL is not a boundary; the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land force's boundary.

The decision on whereto place, or even whether to use, a FSCL requires careful consideration. All involved in the decision must understand that it is a permissive fire control measure used to expedite fires. It does not delineate AOs. Its greatest utility is in facilitating the attack of time-sensitive targets. (See JP 3-0 and JP 3-03 for in-depth discussions.)

Close Operations

Corps close operations include the battles and engagements of its major maneuver and fire support units together with CS and CSS activities presently supporting them. The corps' close operations usually include the deep, close, and rear operations of its committed divisions, separate maneuver brigades, or cavalry regiments.

Not all activities that are part of close operations necessarily take place near the line of contact (LC). An example would be counterfires directed against enemy artillery supporting enemy forces in contact. Conversely, not all activities taking place near the LC are part of close operations. For example, target acquisition may be seeking to locate deep targets even though intelligence resources may be in the same area where close operations are taking place. (Security operations, such as covering and screening forces, are part of close operations.)

Close fights occur where, when, and against whichever enemy units commanders choose to commit assault formations. Concentrating the effects of combat power in support of ground forces becomes the commander's focus in close battles.

Reconnaissance and security are critical to battles and engagements. In general, reconnaissance and security are two different missions. However, at the tactical level both are closely related. Units conducting reconnaissance provide a degree of security. Units conducting security missions use reconnaissance techniques.

Reconnaissance is the precursor to engagements with the enemy. Reconnaissance actions yield information on the disposition of an enemy's force and intent as well as environmental conditions.

Effective reconnaissance allows the commander to gain and maintain contact with the enemy as well as to direct friendly units into the fight. Reconnaissance units orient their movement on the reconnaissance objective, which is either the enemy or the terrain. Reconnaissance units may have to fight for information, but they usually avoid decisive combat.

Security, on the other hand, protects and conserves the combat power of friendly units. Security is an inherent part of all military operations. At the tactical level, security actions protect the command against surprise attack and hostile air and ground observation. All units conduct security actions while specific units may be tasked to conduct security missions (such as screen, guard, and cover).

Only one unit conducts the main effort. Normally, the commander visualizes the ultimate defeat of the enemy force by his main effort. In this regard, a commander shifts and applies combat power as necessary to reinforce his main effort. Designating a main effort provides the focus that each subordinate and supporting commander uses to link his actions to the action of those around him.

The main effort is the part of a commander's concept that permits initiative but maintains direction and cohesion. Supporting the main effort requires synchronization of combat, CS, and CSS resources.

Reserves give a commander options and flexibility and provide an edge against uncertainty. They exploit successes, gain opportunities, and expedite victories. Commanders can use reserves to weight the main effort to maintain momentum, provide security, and defeat enemy counterattacks. Reserve actions are not solely in response to unforeseen enemy actions.

Close combat is normally required for decisive and lasting effects on the battlefield. It is also the type of combat that places soldiers at greatest risk.

Rear Operations

The corps conducts rear operations to assure freedom of maneuver and the continuity of operations, including sustainment, clear C2 arrangements, and dedicated fire support. The corps must synchronize the rear operations functions of terrain management, security, sustainment, and movements with the corps' close and deep operations, in keeping with the corps commander's concept and intent.

While G3s and S3s are responsible, overall, for terrain management, commanders of rear command posts (CPs) usually position supporting units in rear areas. Once in position, these units become a base (a unit or multiunit position with a definite perimeter) or part of a base cluster (a mission grouping of bases and/or security requirements that lack a clearly defined perimeter).

Rear area operations include security operations to ensure sustainment is not interrupted. Three levels of responses to threat activities serve as guides for planning rear operations. Rather than focusing on the size or type threat, these levels focus on the nature of friendly actions needed to defeat the threat:

  • Level I threats can be defeated by base or base cluster self-defense measures.
  • Level II threats are beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities but can be defeated by response forces, normally MP units with supporting fires.
  • Level III threats necessitate a command decision to commit a corps combined arms tactical combat force (TCF) to defeat them. An MP brigade, properly augmented, may be designated as the TCF.

Continuous reconnaissance and timely intelligence-collection and dissemination are essential for successful rear operations. Based on a thorough intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and CI risk assessments, rear operations planning must include--

  • Base and base cluster self-defense.
  • A response to defeat Level II attacks that exceed base and base defense cluster capabilities.
  • The commitment of a TCF to defeat a Level III threat.

Rear area operations include planning and directing sustainment. Synchronizing these actions with the concept of operations is critical to the success of close and deep operations. Rear operations also ensure that sustainment is not degraded by and does not limit the force commander's freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations.

Movement control includes planning, prioritizing, deconflicting, and executing movement plans, both internal and external (other US forces and host nation) to a unit. Staff G3s and S3s are responsible, overall, for directing the movement of tactical units through or within AOs.

Rear CPs are generally responsible for administrative moves and for prioritizing and deconflicting movements within rear areas as well as planning for sustainment of tactical movements within the division rear.

The commander must give one specific individual normally the deputy corps commander, the responsibility and authority to control all aspects of corps rear operations. His responsibilities include--

  • Command and control of units task-organized for rear operations.
  • Coordinating and synchronizing corps rear operations with close and deep operations in keeping with the commander's intent.
  • Planning, organizing, directing, and coordinating assigned and attached units to accomplish sustainment, terrain management, movement, and security.

NOTE: See Appendix C for a detailed discussion.

BATTLEFIELD OPERATING SYSTEMS (BOS)

Commanders and organizations perform major functions within each level of war in order to successfully execute operations. These major functions are called operating systems. (See TRADOC Pamphlet (PAM) 11-9.)

The first level of war is the national military and theater strategic level. Operating systems at this level include major functions that civil and military organizations and unified, joint, and multinational strategic forces perform in order to successfully execute strategic plans and theater campaigns.

At the operational level, operating systems include the major functions that joint and multinational operational forces perform in order to successfully execute the unified commander's subordinate campaigns and major operations.

At the tactical level, operating systems include major functions the force performs to successfully execute operations (battles and engagements) in order to accomplish the operational commander's objectives.

These functions, occurring on the battlefield, are the BOS. The BOS include intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, CSS, and C2. They provide a structure for integrating and synchronizing critical combat activities on the battlefield.

NOTE: Specific considerations related to corps offensive and defensive operations are in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively.

Intelligence

The corps is the primary echelon that processes and analyzes current intelligence from strategic-, operational-, and tactical-level sources. The corps then disseminates key products to tactical forces.

The corps commander drives the intelligence effort. He steers the focus of the intelligence system by clearly designating his priority intelligence requirements (PIR), targeting guidance, and other intelligence requirements. He ensures that the intelligence BOS is fully employed and synchronized with the maneuver BOS and the fire support BOS (Figure 2-4).

The commander must also realize that intelligence resources are finite and that competing requirements can dissipate the power of intelligence. Therefore, he must prioritize requirements in order to support his intent and concept of operations.

The analysis control element (ACE) is the synergistic focus of military intelligence at the corps level. Under the G2's operational supervision, the ACE focuses the intelligence system on products and services commanders need to plan and execute operations across the battlefield.

The ACE develops and tracks critical targets, performs all-source analysis, manages collection, produces and maintains IPB products, and disseminates combat information and intelligence. Intelligence operations provide information on terrain, weather, and the enemy and how they interact to affect operations.

The topographic engineer company provides the G2 with analyses of the effects of terrain and weather on combat operations. The USAF weather team that supports the corps provides weather data. The staff weather officer (SWO) and his team provide staff weather, forecasting, and observing support to the corps and, with the G2, help interpret the effects of weather on friendly and enemy operations.

Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is the commander's responsibility and helps reduce the uncertainty about the effects of the enemy, weather, and terrain on operations. The IPB provides the framework for identifying what information the intelligence system must collect, analyze, integrate, and present to support situation and target development and decision-making processes. All appropriate staff elements, coordinated by the G2, execute IPB to achieve the commander's stated requirements.

The corps MI brigade directly supports the corps commander and the G2 by providing multidisciplined IEW support to the entire corps. The brigade provides the commander and G2 a robust organic intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination capability. In addition, it provides the linkages to joint and national capabilities. Collectors organic to the corps MI brigade include--

  • The Guardrail Common Sensor (GRCS).
  • The unmanned aerial vehicle-short range (UAV-SR).
  • Long-range surveillance (LRS) units.
  • Counterintelligence and interrogator personnel.

The GRCS is a fixed-wing, airborne-intercept and direction-finding (DF) system capable of providing near-real time target information on enemy communications and radar systems. The UAV-SR has a maximum range of 300 kilometers and provides video or forward-looking infrared (FLIR) imaging for reconnaissance, surveillance, or battle damage assessment (BDA). Long-range surveillance, interrogation, and CI personnel are capable of supporting the corps or reinforcing the capabilities of subordinate commands.

Through a variety of automated processors the corps can process and disseminate intelligence from theater and national sensors. The all-source analysis system (ASAS) is the processing and dissemination backbone. The ASAS is augmented by special-purpose processors and communications, as necessary.

The joint surveillance target attack radar system (J-STARS) ground station module (GSM) receives and analyzes moving-target indicators (MTI). It can receive and exploit imagery from national-level synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imagery.

The modernized imagery exploitation system (MIES) can receive and exploit imagery from national-level sensors in near-real time. It can then disseminate secondary imagery to customers via such systems as TROJAN SPIRIT and the mobile integrated tactical terminal (MITT).

The electronic processing and dissemination system (EPDS) can also receive, process, and disseminate signal intelligence (SIGINT) data from national and theater systems. In addition, through the ADA brigade, the corps can receive airborne warning and control system (AWACS) data.

A mechanism to help the corps pull necessary information from EAC theater or joint and/or national agencies is the corps military intelligence support element (CMISE). Personnel from the theater MI brigade form this element. The CMISE assists the corps' organic intelligence elements.

Through the CMISE the corps can establish and maintain access with EAC intelligence data bases and organizations. The CMISE allows the corps to leverage these resources, and it bridges the gap between EAC intelligence organizations and echelon corps and below users.

Corps electronic warfare involves communications and noncommunications intercept and DF activities and both electronic jamming and electronic deception missions. The MI brigade possesses no organic jamming capability. As such, corps EW planners must rely on subordinate and joint EA systems to execute the corps' EA concept.

Electronic deception missions are integral to the overall deception plan the G3 develops and coordinates. Execution and synchronization of electronic jamming and deception missions require extensive coordination between the G2 and G3.

Intelligence support to corps deep operations seeks to develop information on enemy activities that can affect future corps close operations. This collection effort must support the decide, detect, deliver, and assess process.

Based on the commander's PIR and concept of operations, the overall collection effort must focus on named areas of interest (NAI) and target areas of interest (TAI) to support corps actions such as firing deep artillery missions and launching deep ground maneuvers or air strikes.

Intelligence support to the corps' close operation includes not only the collection of enemy information important to the corps, but also the augmentation of subordinate unit intelligence-collection capabilities. Operational control or attached MI companies, platoons, or teams provide direct support to divisions, the ACR, or separate brigades. Because of their longer collection ranges, aerial surveillance assets are normally retained in general support of the corps to support the main effort or a critical area of the battlefield.

Intelligence objectives in the corps' close operation key on information to help subordinate units conduct successful battles and engagements. Those objectives also key on information necessary to execute corps-level combat activities such as counterattacks, spoiling attacks, reinforcement, and reallocation of resources.

The staff prioritizes the collection effort to focus on NAIs and TAIs, seeking to identify specific enemy formations and activities to trigger corps actions. Intelligence support of the corps' rear operation focus on possible enemy activities that could interfere with the corps' ability to support combat operations.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is usually a major source of this information. Other sources, such as higher, adjacent, and subordinate units, will also provide essential information.

Maneuver

Maneuver includes movement to gain positional advantage over the enemy combined with all fires directed to suppress, neutralize, and destroy the enemy. Maneuver should avoid enemy strengths and create opportunities to bring greater firepower to bear on the enemy.

Corps maneuver elements are its divisions, separate maneuver brigades, the cavalry regiment, and the aviation brigade. Maneuver is most effective when it employs surprise by approaching the enemy from an unanticipated direction.

The objective of maneuver at the corps level can be to--

  • Move to exploit weaknesses or vulnerabilities in enemy dispositions.
  • Move to a position of advantage to bring additional firepower to bear on the enemy.
  • Move to exploit the effects of fires (both lethal and nonlethal) on the enemy.
  • Close with and strike the enemy the decisive blow when preconditions have been met.

Armored and Mechanized Infantry

In the corps' close operation, armored and mechanized infantry maneuver elements close with and destroy enemy forces. Firepower, protection from enemy fire, and the speed of armored units create the shock effect necessary to disrupt or defeat the enemy.

Mechanized infantry has the same mobility as armored forces, but less firepower and protection. Armored and mechanized infantry units are particularly effective in conducting mobile combat against armored and mechanized threats in open terrain.

The corps allocates armored and mechanized maneuver elements based on the overall corps mission along with a consideration of the abilities of these elements to effectively employ their combat systems, given the terrain and expected enemy capabilities and actions.

Armored and mechanized infantry forces can also perform as part of the security operation. They can effectively conduct cover, guard, or screen missions in both the offense and the defense. In addition, armored and mechanized infantry maneuver elements are particularly appropriate for incorporation into the corps' reserve or as a striking force. As such, they can strike the enemy at the critical time and place to throw him off balance and to seize or retain the initiative. The elements can also effectively reinforce critical areas or react to rear area threats involving mechanized and armored forces.

Employing armored and mechanized infantry maneuver elements in the corps' deep operations will almost certainly be complex and involve significant risks. A deep operation will probably require at least a brigade and probably a division-size force to attack well beyond the corps' ability to support it with responsive artillery, attack aviation, and CSS. Therefore, maneuver forces in deep operations will probably require additional resources and augmentation to operate for up to several days.

Although using armored and mechanized infantry maneuver in deep operations is complex and risky, it can, if properly executed, be devastating to the enemy. To place an armored and mechanized maneuver force in the enemy's rear area (where it can destroy such high-value targets (HVTs) as artillery, reserves, follow-on forces, C2 centers, and logistic facilities) can be the stroke that tips the close operation in the corps' favor.

The commander will not normally dedicate armored and mechanized forces to the corps' rear operation until such time as a significant Level III threat develops or is expected to develop. Because fighting in the rear area can divert combat power from the main effort, commanders must carefully weigh the need for such diversions against the possible consequences and prepare to take calculated risks in rear areas.

A consideration that may lessen the risk is to designate the MP brigade, augmented according to METT-T, as the rear area tactical combat force. However, armored and mechanized assets routinely perform this role. In addition, armored and mechanized forces that are part of the corps reserve, or otherwise committed, may have rear operations contingencies.

Light Forces

The commander respect as armored uses light forces, in the same and mechanized forces, in the corps close operation to close with and destroy the enemy. Light forces can effectively perform against a heavy threat in restrictive terrain such as built-up areas, thickly wooded areas, or in mountains. However, they require augmentation with antiarmor weapons, field artillery, CAS, attack helicopters, ADA, and engineers. Commanders should not employ light forces in open terrain against heavy forces.

Light forces are ideal for moving undetected over short distances, such as when establishing an initial security force or when infiltrating an enemy's defensive positions. They are also essential to countering enemy infantry in any terrain, and are particularly effective when ground transportation or helicopter support increases their mobility.

When provided with transportation support and augmented with antiarmor and artillery assets, the corps can employ light maneuver forces to follow and support armored and mechanized forces. For operations in an NBC threat environment, light forces require augmentation by corps NBC reconnaissance and detection assets.

Light forces can be effective in corps deep operations when they are quickly inserted in the enemy's rear using airborne or air assault, or when they allow themselves to be bypassed and remain undetected as the enemy advances. These forces are most effective in small groups in the enemy rear, conducting limited raids, sabotage, harassment, denying key terrain, and providing information.

Light forces are especially suited for opposed entry operations during force projection. These initial forces can either conduct simultaneous operations in depth to accomplish all the objectives of the deployment and entry operation or seize a lodgement area as part of a more encompassing campaign plan.

When rapidly transported to the location of the threat, light forces can be effective in the corps' rear operation. Their ability to fight in restrictive areas, such as in cities and logistic complexes, is of great benefit. Their light antiarmor weapons and helicopter transportability are ideal for countering most rear area threats.

Reconnaissance and Security

Reconnaissance is the precursor to all military operations. It provides information on terrain and the enemy to all commanders and staffs. Reconnaissance may be mounted, dismounted, or aerial and accomplished by either technical or human means (or a combination of both). The commander may task any element assigned to or supporting the corps to perform reconnaissance operations.

Security operations focus on corps forces and facilities and provide reaction time, maneuver space, and protection to the corps. As with reconnaissance , any element assigned or supporting the corps might perform security operations. The three types of security missions are screen, guard, and cover. (See Chapter 6.)

The ACR is especially effective at conducting corps reconnaissance and security operations. It can find the enemy, develop the situation, and conduct combat operations similar to an armored and/or mechanized maneuver brigade. Its organic aviation, as well as other CS and CSS, make the regiment an independent, brigade-size force, ideal for covering force and security operations as well as a potent antiarmor counterattack force.

The light cavalry regiment (LCR) is capable of rapidly deploying by strategic airlift to conduct operations in support of force projection. The regiment can be tailored or task-organized, based on METT-T, and can provide incremental force packages to support a deploying corps during the initial stages of force-projection operations. It can also provide task-organized squadrons for employment by light divisions.

The commander can use the ACR in an economy of force role, but it may require infantry augmentation to conduct combat in restrictive terrain. The ACR is equipped and trained to operate over a significantly greater geographic area than are other brigade-size maneuver elements. The LCR can also attack, defend, and delay in secondary areas to allow the corps commander to concentrate combat forces elsewhere.

The commander can use the ACR with an armored and/or mechanized division to form an extremely potent deep attack force for the corps. While limited as a deep attack force, the LCR can be used to direct and control deep fires.

Both the ACR and LCR can perform against an armored or mechanized rear threat. They also have the mobility to react quickly to air landings. However, their lack of infantry limits their effectiveness in close terrain or urban areas.

Aviation

Corps aviation elements support the close operation by conducting combat, CS, and CSS functions in combined arms operations. During combat operations, the aviation brigade performs attack, reconnaissance and security, AASLT, air combat, CAS, and C2 missions.

When used as a maneuver element, aviation must be employed as a combined arms force. As such, it requires augmentation in the form of intelligence, fire support, engineer support, and so on.

Aviation elements conduct CS operations by providing fire support, target acquisition, and aerial adjustment of indirect fires, by conducting air movement operations, and by emplacing scatterable mines. Aviation units can conduct CSS operations through the air movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies.

Attack helicopter units provide the corps with an extremely mobile combat force capable of engaging enemy armored vehicles during both day and night operations. These units are normally under corps control to be employed at the key time and place to support the corps' scheme of maneuver. They are most effective when they can engage enemy formations--

  • While moving on roads or in open terrain.
  • During the hours of darkness.
  • With CAS and artillery during joint air attack team (JAAT) operations.
  • When they are already engaged with friendly ground forces.

Commanders do not employ attack helicopter units pure (without fire support) and not normally in less than a battalion-size force. They may be under the OPCON of a committed division. This is one method the corps has of weighting the main effort or reinforcing a critical sector.

The corps may retain control of aviation elements in certain cases, such as when the corps controls the covering force in the defense or when the corps conducts flank or advanced guard operations in offensive operations. Attack aviation units must always be integrated into a combined arms team or be augmented to form a combined arms team.

Combat support operations in close operations may include--

  • Providing assault helicopter support to infantry conducting air assaults to seize key terrain or facilities.
  • Providing mobility to light artillery.
  • Providing aerial communications platforms or relocating signal nodes.
  • Emplacing scatterable mines to block enemy penetrations, turn enemy formations, or protect the flanks of corps counterattacks.
  • Supporting critical C2 activities.

Combat service support tasks in corps close operations involve the airlifting of critical materiel and personnel needed to support the corps battle. This includes airlift support for--

  • Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS).
  • Movement of troops and personnel.
  • Resupply.
  • Movement of critical high-priority Class IX supplies.
  • Retrograde of reparable items.
  • Pre-positioning of fuel and ammunition.
  • Movement of maintenance contact teams.
  • Low-density, high-cost munitions when time, distance, situation, or the condition of roads inhibit ground transportation.

Airlift should be part of the distribution system and not used just for emergency or immediate movements. The G3 should allocate airlift assets to support CSS activities. If higher priority missions need these assets, they can be withdrawn.

Appropriate corps staff elements must estimate effective and timely procedures for the joint planning and coordination of Army aviation operations. The focus of Army aviation in deep, close, and rear operations requires continuous dialogue to synchronize joint and multinational warfighting capabilities.

Joint planning and coordination are required to minimize conflicts, duplication of effort, and fratricide. Aviation operational planning considerations include, but are not limited to, the following areas:

  • Thorough IPB (terrain analysis, route engagement area (EA), battle position selection).
  • Intelligence (reconnaissance, target acquisition, mission planning, execution).
  • Command and control procedures (forward/rearward passage of lines, battle handover, FLOT penetration, control measures required, communications support).
  • Fire support.
  • Airspace deconfliction.
  • Sustainment requirements (Classes III and V, recovery procedures, transportation, reconstitution.
  • Joint synchronization (CAS, J-SEAD).
  • Engineer support (pick-up zone (PZ), landing zone (LZ), FARP preparation).

In deep operations, the mobility and firepower of attack helicopters is most effective when concentrated against enemy flanks or against armored and artillery units moving in the area beyond the FLOT. The corps may use its attack helicopters to destroy enemy formations in depth that could possibly disrupt or unhinge the close operation within the next 72 hours. These assets are particularly well-suited for night operations.

The degree of sophistication and the aggressiveness of enemy AD systems are major factors when conducting deep aviation operations. The operation's depth and duration are also critical.

In all cases, planning for corps aviation deep operations must be thorough and comprehensive. The specific threat AD environment the corps commander faces will dictate the relative importance of each of the planning considerations.

To ensure success in a high-threat AD environment, corps deep aviation operations must be fully supported by elements of all the BOS. Long distances traversed over hostile territory will demand heavy emphasis on J-SEAD.

Commanders must carefully synchronize the use of cannon artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS), and Army tactical missile systems (ATACMS) to suppress and destroy enemy forces along the route or in the target area. The commander must also plan to use USAF electronic warfare capabilities as part of a deep attack package.

In a more permissive AD environment, or when available reaction time limits planning time for a joint operation, the corps commander may elect to conduct a deep operation with his own attack and CS assets.

Contingency planning facilitated by predictive, timely intelligence will allow the staff to prepare force packages in accordance with the commander's intent. This will allow a quick reaction to an execution fragmentary order (FRAGO) that can set the operation in motion in minutes, rather than hours.

The corps may also use its assault and medium helicopters to conduct air assault of infantry troops in a deep operation or artillery raid. Such operations could include raids into the enemy's rear area or the seizing of critical terrain or facilities in advance of the corps' attack, or attacks by fire using light artillery placed temporarily behind enemy lines. Deep air assaults will need the same types of protection measures as for deep attack operations.

The use of aviation resources in corps deep operations will almost always result insignificant risk. The commander must carefully weigh this risk against the expected results and their impact on the total corps battle.

A successfully conducted deep operation could be decisive to the corps battle. Because of its unique ability to move quickly over a wide area and to respond quickly during both day and night, the aviation brigade is well-suited for conducting corps rear operations.

Timely receipt of intelligence data presents the opportunity for attack helicopter elements to engage enemy air assault formations before or during insertion. In addition, attack helicopters may be the most responsive means to deal with enemy armored formations in the rear area. The brigade's assault helicopters provide a rapid and effective means of moving ground combat troops to engage threats in the corps rear area.

Fire Support

Fire support at corps level is the collective and coordinated use of FA, EA, Army aviation, USAF, and, when available, USMC and USN air assets in support of the corps battle. Where available, naval surface fire support also supports corps operations. (See Appendix A for planning factors.)

Using Army aviation assets in a fire support role presents unique planning and control considerations. Coordination is required between the aviation brigade and the corps artillery. This coordination normally occurs in the fire support cell or in the DOCC of the main CP.

The commander employs fire support means throughout the depth of the battlefield to complement his scheme of maneuver. Fire support is most effective when its effects are massed.

The commander uses fire support to delay, disrupt, or limit the enemy by destroying, neutralizing, and suppressing enemy weapons, formations, and facilities. Effective integration of fire support into the combined arms operation is a decisive factor in the corps battle.

The corps artillery commander is the corps fire sup port coordinator (FSCOORD). He is responsible for--

  • Recommending fire support priorities.
  • Advising the corps commander on the best use of available fire support resources.
  • Developing the tire support plan.
  • Implementing the approved fire support plan.

The FSCOORD also ensures that--

  • Fires support the corps commander's battle plan, including weighting the main effort.
  • All aspects of the corps battle receive fire support.
  • All fire support means are fully synchronized.
  • The fire support effort is sustained throughout the battle.

(See FM 6-20-30 for additional information on fire support of corps operations.)

Field Artillery (FA)

In the close operation the corps will use much of its field artillery to augment the fires of committed divisions and separate maneuver brigades. Normally, each committed division will receive an FA brigade of from three to five cannon or rocket battalions.

Field artillery units will receive tactical missions in support of divisions and other maneuver elements. Reinforcing (R) or general support-reinforcing (GS-R) to division artillery are examples of such missions.

In addition to these artillery battalions, the artillery brigade headquarters, if attached, gives the division an additional artillery headquarters. This facilitates artillery C2, especially when the division is responsible for a large area.

The corps normally retains some field artillery under its own control for use in a counterfire role during close operations and in execution of corps deep operations. Use of corps-controlled artillery in the close operation could include--

  • Counterfires to suppress enemy artillery.
  • Creating weak points or gaps in enemy defenses.
  • Support of JAAT operations.
  • Blunting enemy penetrations or counterattacks.
  • Protecting the flanks of a corps counterattack or spoiling attack.
  • Suppression of enemy air defenses.

Field artillery will support the corps' deep operation by attacking enemy weapons, formations, supplies, and facilities that are capable of influencing the close operation. Because of the vast array of possible targets in the enemy's rear area, it may be impossible to effectively attack all of them. Therefore, it is important that each target attacked represents the best possible payoff in terms of its relationship to the overall success of the corps battle.

The corps normally retains control of all of its surface-to-surface missiles and some of its multiple-rocket fires rather than allocating them to subordinate maneuver units. However, higher echelons may impose controls over the corps' longer range fire support systems, including the use of corps systems to conduct operational fires or in support of air interdiction.

Field artillery support of the corps' rear operation must include at least on-order missions to provide fire support to the units engaged with Level II or III threats. It may also include pre-positioning some artillery units in the corps' rear that are solely committed to supporting the corps' rear operation.

Electronic Attack (EA)

Electronic attack is one of the three components of electronic warfare (EW). The other two components are electronic warfare support (ES) and electronic protection (EP). Electronic attack uses electromagnetic energy to attack an enemy's combat capability. It combines nondestructive actions to degrade or neutralize targets. Such actions might include electromagnetic jamming and/or deception and directed-energy (DE) devices. They might also include the use of the destructive capabilities of antiradiation missiles (ARMs) and DE weapons systems.

The corps possesses no organic jamming capability. As such, corps EW planners must rely on subordinate and joint EA systems to carry out the corps EA concept. (A J-SEAD operation using USAF and subordinate division EA systems is one example.) In addition, coordination of EA operations with multinational forces may be necessary. (See JP 3-51 for specific procedures.)

Electronic attack in support of the corps close operation involves jamming key enemy C2, fire support, intelligence, communications, and target acquisition systems. Jamming should occur during critical stages of the battle when degradation and disruption will be of the most benefit to the corps. Examples of electronic jamming in the corps close operation include--

  • Disrupting enemy counterattack forces.
  • Disrupting enemy command and fire support communications during corps counterattacks or spoiling attacks.
  • Disrupting enemy command nets as the corps covering force withdraws through the main battle area (MBA).
  • Disrupting enemy ADA communications and target acquisition as part of J-SEAD.

Electronic jamming in support of the corps' deep operation will be limited to critical times and places on the battlefield, as in the close operation. Examples of electronic jamming in the corps' deep operation include--

  • Disrupting enemy ADA during attack helicopter or air interdiction of a corps deep target.
  • Suppressing enemy air defenses during airborne, air assault, or air extraction operations.
  • Disrupting enemy C2 nets during deep maneuver operations.

Electronic jamming in support of the corps rear operation is limited. One example would be the use of jammers to mask critical corps communications from interception and/or location by the enemy.

Air Support

To achieve the necessary degree of joint coordination, the Army and Air Force provide qualified personnel to work with each others' C2 organizations. The Army provides a liaison element, the BCE. The BCE works with the supporting USAF air operations center (AOC) on the ground. The BCE works with the tactical air control center (TACC) when afloat, if a naval officer is the JFACC. The supporting USAF provides an air support operations center (ASOC). The AF also provides liaison elements, called tactical air control parties (TACP), to work with each of the corps.

The BCE understands each corps commander's priorities and guidance and possesses the necessary knowledge of the battlefield situation. It processes each corps' requests for air support, monitors and interprets the land battle situation, and exchanges current intelligence through face-to-face coordination with elements of the AOC. (See Chapter 4 for details.)

Air support of the corps close operation occurs primarily through CAS by USAF, USMC, and USN aircraft. Close air support is defined as air attacks against hostile surface targets in close proximity to friendly forces that require detailed integration with fire and movement of supported ground forces.

Although the corps has control over some of the available CAS sorties, most sorties fall under the control of maneuver units for incorporation into their fire support planning. Shifting CAS sorties from one maneuver unit to another may become necessary to maximize their effect.

The combination of CAS with attack helicopters and artillery can produce a highly effective JAAT. The corps requires support from the USAF with intelligence collection, jamming, and deception to support close operations with airborne standoff systems.

Airlift may also be a part of the air support of the corps' close operation. Airlift may involve the airdrop, extraction, or air-landing of ground forces and supplies when supporting the corps battle or when evacuating casualties.

Air support of the corps' deep operation can include reconnaissance and surveillance, AI, EW, and airlift missions. It may also provide CAS in support of a deep maneuver force.

The USAF or USN aviation conduct air reconnaissance and surveillance operations, which the corps requests, to provide current information on specific targets. Air reconnaissance and surveillance uses visual and/or recording sensors to gain information on the disposition, composition, location, activities, and movements of enemy forces as well as his LOC and logistic activities. This can be an important part of the detection step of the decide, detect, deliver, and assess targeting process.

Air interdiction operations destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before he can effectively use it against friendly forces. Air interdiction occurs at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. Accurate and effective attack of targets tensor even hundreds of kilometers into the enemy's rear can have a decisive effect on the corp's battle.

The higher commander may distribute AI assets to the corps commander. Normally, however, the corps commander may only nominate targets for the air commander to attack.

The execution of AI is the responsibility of the air commander alone. Air interdiction in support of the Army commander disrupts the continuity of the enemy's operations. Objectives may include--

  • Reducing the enemy's capability to employ follow-on forces.
  • Preventing the enemy from countering friendly maneuver.
  • Reducing the enemy's ability to resupply his committed forces.

Although it is possible to nominate AI targets by specific unit, time, and place of attack, it is generally more effective to describe to the air commander the desired results or objectives. This use of mission-type targets allows the air commander greater flexibility in planning and executing the attack. However, commanders can recommend or request specific munitions against a target particularly vulnerable to that munition. An example of a mission-type target is, "Delay the 20th tank division east of the Orange River until 271800ZOCT__."

The corps' AI targeting process does not stop with nomination of the targets or mission-type requests. Refinement of target intelligence is continuous from the time the target nomination is made, to when the target is detected and tracked, and until it is finally attacked.

The staff must plan intelligence to support the BDA. The corps and USAF must share close and continuous intelligence, particularly for targets that have limited dwell time or cannot be accurately located until just prior to attack.

The corps requires intelligence and EW support from the USAF for deep operations. The USAF's multiple systems enhance the corps' operations whether those operations are deep fires or deep maneuver by ground forces or Army aviation.

Army aviation's deep maneuver will receive--

  • Electronic warfare support from the USAF.
  • Combat air patrol operations support.
  • Support from airborne standoff platforms for communications between the helicopter attack force and its parent unit or the corps' main CP.

Airlift may also support the corps' deep operation by transporting an airborne element deep into the enemy's rear or by conducting aerial resupply of a deep maneuver force. Air support of the corps' rear operation may involve airlifting critical supplies or augmentation units and conducting the counter air campaign against enemy air attack. While CAS is not usually distributed to units in the corps' rear, it may be diverted from other missions to help counter a Level II or III threat.

Weapons of Mass Destruction

Nuclear Weapons. The potential for nuclear warfare demands unique considerations for corps operations. Commanders must understand the environment the nuclear battlefield creates. They must factor battlefield nuclear warfare and nuclear target nomination into the design and conduct of operational and tactical plans. The effects of nuclear weapons can--

  • Alter the balance between maneuver and firepower.
  • Change the battle tempo and the courses of campaigns and battles.
  • Hamper communications and diminish the effectiveness of centralized C2.
  • Create a more lethal battlefield environment that would strain support operations.

Political and strategic objectives rather than tactical effects will likely guide the employment of nuclear weapons. Not in all circumstances, but in some, the corps may be involved in planning the use of nuclear weapons. In such situations, the corps will nominate nuclear weapons targets to achieve operational and tactical objectives that support the campaign plan. The corps could use nuclear weapons to--

  • Create a window for future offensive action.
  • Destroy, slow, or reduce reinforcing forces.

Create the time and space for maneuver against attacking echelons.

  • Destroy high-payoff targets.
  • Force dispersal of enemy units.

The corps' plan that supports the nuclear planning of higher headquarters is called a nuclear option. An option is the basic element for providing nuclear support. It is a discrete grouping of nuclear targets.

Operational-level and corps commanders formally recommend nuclear targets as part of an option. It has specific yields and is planned for a specific geographic area, during a short time, and for a specific purpose.

Planning an option begins with mission receipt. There are four phases in nuclear-option planning:

1. Prewartime contingency planning, which is based on the type of operation and attendant constraints.

2. Wartime planning, which supplements peace-time planning-and is based on controls and constraintsfrom higher headquarters, terrain, and actual threat intelligence.

3. Refinements to wartime planning, which meet changing situations and are used to update an option and are based on the latest threat intelligence.

4. Refinements to approved options, which are based on the situation just prior to target nomination.

Corps planners develop each option in concert with the campaign plan and transmit it to higher headquarters for approval. Throughout the process each option is treated as a single entity.

Only the President, as a member of the National Command Authorities (NCA), can authorize the use (release) of US nuclear weapons. The NCA grants release through the US military chain of command to the combatant commander.

A corps commander will not be involved in receiving release messages. He should, however, receive operational messages alerting him to the requirements for nuclear nominations. If the corps commander feels release of nuclear weapons is feasible, he may ask the CINC to request release.

The corps also receives strike warnings (STRIKWARN) from higher headquarters. The corps uses formal STRIKWARN procedures to warn lower and adjacent units. (Refer to FM 100-30 for details.)

Nuclear Mitigation Techniques. Mitigation techniques fall into three categories: actions before an attack, actions during an attack, and actions after an attack. Actions before an attack include long-range planning, training, and maintenance. Actions during an attack include all protective measures taken to mitigate the effects of a nuclear detonation. Actions after an attack include recovery from the effects and resumption of operations in a nuclear environment.

Biological Weapons. The US has renounced the use of biological weapons. Biological warfare is the intentional use, by an enemy, of biological agents or toxins to cause death and disease among personnel, animals, and plants. More rarely, it can be used to deteriorate materiel. Germs can be delivered directly, such as by artillery or aircraft spray, or indirectly through a vector, such as a flea or tick. Toxins act in the field much like chemical agents. (See FM 3-100 for more information.)

Chemical. The US has renounced the use of chemical weapons. Chemical agents come in varied forms: gas, liquid, or aerosol. They can be delivered by mines, artillery, rockets, bombs, or aircraft spray. Commanders must consider how enemy chemical agent effects may alter their operations. (See FM 3-100 for more information.)

Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (J-SEAD)

The ASOC provides the necessary interface with the USAF to plan, request, and coordinate J-SEAD operations in support of the corps. Elements of the corps play an important role in J-SEAD. The corps plans and conducts localized suppression to protect aircraft that must penetrate the FLOT and maneuver in the enemy's rear area.

Subordinate maneuver units conduct J-SEAD in the corps close operation in support of their own CAS and attack helicopter operations. The corps participates in J-SEAD when corps-level operations require it or when the higher headquarters directs. This could be the case during a corps-level attack helicopter operation, an air assault, or an airborne operation.

J-SEAD at corps level could involve--

  • Corps artillery, to fire on enemy air defenses.
  • Observation helicopters, to visually locate and adjust fires.
  • Corps EW elements, to locate enemy AD radars and communications and to jam communications.

Combat air participation may involve--

  • Air reconnaissance and surveillance to locate the enemy.
  • Airborne jamming.
  • Aircraft to attack enemy AD units.

J-SEAD in corps deep operations supports deep attack helicopter, AASLT, and airborne operations. It also helps protect aircraft conducting AI.

The first step of a successful deep air strike may have to be an early and aggressive J-SEAD. Many of the same resources will participate in close JSEAD, with combat air probably playing a greater role because of the extended ranges.

A probable Level III threat to a corps rear area might consist of either an airborne or heliborne assault with accompanying ADA systems. Commanders must consider J-SEAD when responding to this threat.

Air Defense (AD)

Air defense includes all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack or surveillance by hostile aerial platforms to preserve combat power and maintain friendly freedom of action. The Army uses offensive operations, defensive operations, and passive countermeasures to accomplish its objectives. Air defense operations include a careful, thorough IPB and the use of--

  • Maneuver forces and SOF.
  • Air defense artillery fires.
  • Air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.
  • Combat aircraft (Army and other joint forces).
  • Indirect fires.
  • Jamming.

Passive defense operations reduce force vulnerability, minimize the effects of attack on the tempo of operations, and promote rapid recovery and reconstitution of the force after an attack. Passive defense measures include, but are not limited to--

  • Tactical warning.
  • Nuclear, biological, and chemical warning.
  • Operations security measures.
  • Hardening.
  • Redundancy and robustness.
  • Dispersal.
  • Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense.

The corps must integrate air defense vertically and horizontally throughout the depth of the battlefield in all offensive, defensive, and special operations.

Within a given theater of operations, a single commander is responsible for theater air defense. This commander is usually a USAF officer, but he can be from any service. He is the area air defense commander (AADC) who is normally the JFACC within the theater. In large theaters, the AADC may have subordinate regional AD commanders.

The appropriate area or regional AD commander establishes procedures that regulate the corps' AD engagements. All Army weapons systems that engage enemy air forces operate under AD rules and procedures (for example, hostile criteria and weapons control statuses) that an area or region AD commander establishes.

Air defense operations should focus on the major threats to the force. The counter air efforts of the joint and combined arms team can include destroying aircraft in the air or on the ground and countering theater ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition (RISTA) platforms.

Commanders must carefully weigh participation in counter air operations by members of the joint and combined arms teams against their capabilities, effectiveness, and impact on other battlefield functions.

The combined effects of the USAF's counter air capabilities and the corps' ADA brigade are the corps commander's primary AD resources. The corps commander's mission to provide AD resources to his forces is no different than his mission to provide maneuver and fire support resources. He must ensure that his forces at all levels have adequate air defense. He must thicken and bolster those defenses when necessary.

Whether overmatching the corps' main effort with medium-range missiles or augmenting a subordinate division's organic air defense with additional ADA systems, the ADA brigade's key to successful AD operations lies with the ADA commander having a clear vision of the corps commander's intent. He can then adequately support the corps' close, deep, and rear operations.

Joint and combined arms forces conduct ADA brigade operations in support of close operations. They focus on protecting engaged forces and constituted reserves. They apply protection according to the commander's concept of operations and weight it to support the main effort. The ADA brigade also plays a major role in protecting the force from tactical ballistic missiles.

Corps ADA units may perform command or support relationships based on METT-T to augment organic division AD units. They weight the corps' main effort or provide additional protection to a critical area.

The corps keeps significant ADA under its own control in support of the corps operation. Battalions and batteries under corps control conduct specific missions based on the commander's AD priorities. Corps ADA support of deep operations includes--

  • The nomination of counter air targets for attack by Army or joint assets.
  • Theater missile defense operations to protect friendly forces.
  • Denying the use of airspace to the enemy.

Air defense operations in rear operations focus on protecting essential rear area functions. Providing broad area coverage in both the tactical and operational rear areas is the fundamental method of accomplishing the goals of air defense in the rear operations area. The force weights this coverage to provide protection to the facilities and assets the commander identifies as most critical to his concept of operations. Medium- and long-range air defense systems and joint air component forces provide a significant portion of the required protection.

The ADA commander has two roles. He is the commander of his ADA forces, and he is the air defense coordinator (ADCOORD) at that level. The ADA commander is the proponent for the air defense BOS at his echelon. He integrates all Army AD actions and has total responsibility for AD planning at the tactical level. This includes recommending AD missions for other members of the combined arms team.

The ADA commander ensures that organic, assigned, and supporting ADA units accomplish the tactical-level ADA objectives in support of the corps commander's concept of operations. The corps ADA brigade commander develops the AD plan for corps ADA units. Air defense artillery commanders plan and direct all active and passive defensive counter air (DCA) tasks for their units.

As ADCOORD, the ADA commander and his representatives in the corps main CP are responsible for AD planning. The ADCOORD is an integral member of the corps commander's staff planning process. To develop offensive counter air (OCA) and DCA priorities for recommendation, the ADCOORD, with input from the G2, assesses the air threat and the commander's intent.

The FSCOORD, with the ADCOORD, integrates OCA priorities into the force's targeting process. The ADCOORD recommends active, passive, and other combined arms AD measures in the AD estimate. After approval and staff coordination, the ADCOORD develops the AD annex to the corps plan.

The ADCOORD coordinates with ADA elements at higher and lower echelons as well as with adjacent units. Coordination ensures vertical and horizontal integration of AD coverage throughout the battlefield. For example, the corps ADCOORD integrates corps ADA with theater, division, and adjacent corps ADA forces. This includes integration with joint counter air participants. The division ADCOORD ensures his AD plan interfaces with the corps and adjacent division AD plans. (See FM 44-100 for more information.)

Mobility and Survivability

The corps engineer brigade is the major contributing force to the mobility and survivability operating system at the corps level. Military police contribute to mobility by conducting BCC and area damage control (ADC). Chemical reconnaissance, decontamination, and smoke elements also contribute to survivability.

Engineers enhance the effectiveness of maneuver units by providing--

  • Mobility support.
  • Degrading the enemy's ability to move on the battlefield.
  • Providing protective emplacements and structures.
  • Performing general construction and maintenance on roads, airfields, and structures.
  • Providing topographic support.

The topographic company provides the corps G2 with terrain products that assist in the IPB process. Topographic engineers also provide survey support to units organic to and subordinate to the corps. They work closely with the corps artillery survey planning and coordination element (SPCE) to ensure that target acquisition and collection assets are on common grid with the delivery assets to effectively respond to high-payoff targets.

Engineer support for the corps' close operation consists primarily of reinforcing division and separate maneuver brigade engineers. The factors of METT-T determine the amount of reinforcement to each division, which could range from an engineer battalion to an engineer group.

Other contributing engineer units having special capabilities may include engineer bridge companies and engineer equipment companies. Corps engineers will also work in division areas on a task or area basis.

The focus of engineer support for mobility in the corps' close operation is on the movement of large tactical units. The corps G3 designates routes for ground forces well in advance of their intended use so engineers can upgrade them as necessary and keep them open.

Corps engineers emplace tactical float bridges and fixed bridges. Engineers also provide combat engineer support to corps aviation units for their tactical deployment. Bridge companies can also off-load their bridges so they can be used as transportation assets.

Countermobility supports close operations by restricting enemy movement with the least effect on friendly maneuver. Engineers add space and time to the battle by restricting the enemy's ability to maneuver large formations. The aggregate effect of obstacles at the corps level supports the maneuver of its division and brigade-size forces while degrading the enemy's ability to maneuver.

Corps obstacle planning primarily centers on obstacle control. The corps develops obstacle restrictions to ensure that division obstacles do not interfere with the corps' scheme of maneuver and future operations. The corps also provides obstacle emplacement authority to ACRs and separate brigades using obstacle zones. Divisions may not place obstacles within restricted areas without the corps' approval.

The corps engineer provides advice on the employment of all scatterable mines in the corps area in support of the commander's concept for obstacle employment. The use of scatterable mines gives the corps the ability to quickly place an obstacle in the face of an enemy to turn, fix, block, or disrupt his advance or withdrawal. Also, by carefully monitoring and controlling emplacement and self-destruct times, the corps can rapidly attack through a recently created gap in the friendly obstacle system.

The corps commander is the approval authority for the employment of all scatterable mines in the corps area. He may delegate the authority to employ long self-destruct mines down to division and, with the corps' concurrence, the division can delegate it down to brigade level. He may delegate the authority to employ short self-destruct mines down as far as battalion level. The use of these mines must be well-coordinated so that a lower echelon does not inadvertently place an obstacle in the path of a future corps operation.

Engineer survivability support of the corps' close operation consists of aiding corps units in their survivability operations. Units dig in, according to the corps commander's priority, directing typical high-priority efforts toward corps artillery, ADA, aviation, and key C2 facilities.

Engineers support deep operations in the same manner as for the close fight, but their focus is to keep open ground routes, drop zones (DZs), LZs, and other means of access deep forces need to sustain the fight. This requires rapid clearing of remotely emplaced mines and repair of critical damage. Engineers support the force's countermobility efforts by terrain analysis, countermobility target nomination and advice, and by coordinating all countermobility systems into the deep operation's countermobility plan.

Engineers assist rear operations with terrain analysis and countermobility planning. They install synchronized obstacles to block critical avenues and to deny facilities. They plan and execute situational obstacles, when necessary, to block and isolate threat forces operating in the rear. When time and resources permit, corps engineers perform survivability work in support of the corps' rear operation. This work may involve digging in critical CSS facilities.

General engineering support of the corps' rear operation keeps LOCS open and in good repair. Corps engineers build, maintain, and repair roads and airfields. As time permits, they replace tactical bridges with more permanent fixed bridges. They coordinate with higher echelons and HN agencies to keep railroads, waterways, and transportation nodes in operation.

Combat engineer units have the mission to fight as infantry when committed by the corps commander. In planning to combat a Level II threat in the corps rear, engineer units may provide the commander with an option as a response force. The commander must carefully weigh use of engineers as infantry against the associated loss of effective engineer support.

A commander reorganizing an engineer battalion as infantry must be cognizant of weapons system and protection limitations of engineer units. He must also consider augmentation with mortars, antitank (AT) systems, fire support teams, communications, and so on.

In war and OOTW environmental issues are a major concern of the Army. With emerging new laws and regulations, they will continue to have a growing impact on Army operations. Federal, state, local, and HN governments have laws and regulations to protect human health and natural and cultural resources from environmental degradation.

Unit leaders must understand the laws and know what actions to take. They must also ensure that unit personnel have the proper training and that they comply with all requirements. (See FM 5-100-15 for a detailed discussion.)

Combat Service Support (CSS)

Combat service support of corps operations consists of manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his systems. The corps must totally integrate these CSS functions into the planning and conduct of operations to provide the commander a combat multiplier with which he can weight the battle. The commander and his staff must synchronize CSS operations with all other operating systems to provide effective, continuous support when and where necessary.

The finance group, personnel group, and the COSCOM are responsible for providing CSS to the corps. Within the COSCOM are--

  • The functional control centers (such as the MMC and the MCC).
  • The medical brigade.
  • The transportation group (if there are three or more functional transportation battalions).
  • Corps support groups (CSGs), including multifunctional corps support battalions (CSBs).

The COSCOM supports corps units whether they are operating in the division area or corps rear area. It provides a CSB from the CSG forward to provide direct support to corps units operating in the division area. It also provides liaison officers (LNOs) to work with the division support command (DISCOM) and the corps units operating in the division area. The CSG usually assigns LOs who normally collocate with DISCOM headquarters.

The nearest medical treatment facility (MTF) provides medical support for corps units operating in the division area without regard for unit affiliation. The task-organized corps support battalion provides other logistic support tailored to provide supply, services, and maintenance. This element will have attached to it all of the logistic units needed to support corps units as well as the divisions.

In the corps rear area, ammunition and petroleum battalions support divisions with GS ammunition and bulk fuel. The habitual support relationship between corps GS units and corps transportation units ensures timely distribution of ammunition and petroleum to the divisions.

The CSGs will provide supply, services, and DS maintenance to units within their geographic area of responsibility, with one CSG per committed division sector and one supporting the corps rear. The COSCOM's transportation group provides corps-wide transportation.

Nondivisional DS units receive their support (less Class VIII) from functional GS units. Aircraft maintenance units support corps aviation assets. Establishing and maintaining adequate LOC is necessary because of--

  • The large volume of supplies and materiel required to sustain the corps.
  • The number of casualties requiring movement for more definitive medical treatment.
  • Movement of mail and replacement personnel.
  • Reparable equipment requiring evacuation.

Air Force support to the corps' logistic operations includes air movement of Class IX repair parts via air LOC (ALOC); movement of high priority, low-density Class V products; and movement of Class III supplies as requested by the corps. (See FM 100-10 and FM 100-16 for discussions of CSS linkages into the corps from higher supporting echelons.)

Host-nation support may provide much of the corps' required logistic support. Organized units or a contractor from the HN civilian sector can provide HN support. The logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) can also augment HN support. Civilian contractor support, either US, HN, or other country, can be provided to either the host nation or directly to the US. LOGCAP is designed primarily for use where no multilateral or bilateral agreements or treaties exist.

In addition to supporting the corps, the COSCOM may need to provide specified support to either a joint or multinational force, normally when the corps is the senior Army command in the theater of operations. The types of support that COSCOM can provide are fuel, food, water, common ammunition items, field services support, transportation, and combat health support.

Manning, arming, fueling, fixing, moving, and sustaining the soldier and his systems are logistics functions necessary to preserve the fighting strength of divisional and nondivisional units. Close operations are the largest consumer of supplies (especially fuel and ammunition) and producer of casualties and damaged equipment and weapons systems.

The key to success in sustaining the close operation is prior planning. Forward pre-positioning of supplies and CSS units, including medical treatment units, the selection of adequate supply routes and alternates, and measures to protect CSS resources, is critical.

Air Force and Army assets can provide aerial delivery of critical supplies by airdrop, container delivery system (CDS), low-altitude parachute-extraction system (LAPES), or airlanding as well as air evacuation of wounded, on request to support close operations. They must provide continuous, adequate support to forces in the close fight while conserving assets and planning for future operations.

Deep operations may involve providing CSS to a ground force before its organic CSS units link up with it or before the ground force returns to an area that is not subject to interdiction of the LOC. If the corps must provide CSS to the force, arming, fueling, fixing, and providing medical support are major concerns.

The most critical aspect of providing support is to maintain a secure LOC, either air or ground, to ensure the force receives timely and responsive support. Air Force and Army delivery of critical supplies to forces conducting deep operations enhances those operations and helps maintain their tempo. Positioning support units forward may reduce response time.

In most cases, support of deep operations involves the sustainment of aviation and artillery assets. The support of these assets normally will not involve the forward movement of additional corps logistic assets. Corps logistic units routinely operate in the division area to provide support to corps units operating there.

Sustainment of corps rear operations includes the support of CS and CSS units in the corps rear, maneuver units transiting through or temporarily located in the corps rear, and units conducting tactical operations in the corps rear area. Of greater importance may be the potential for disruption of CSS of close and deep operations.

The corps must plan for the protection of key sustainment facilities and the LOCS identified to support committed maneuver units. The commander must position CSS units with redundancy and flexibility in mind and must prepare to relocate units should the tactical situation dictate. Airfields in the corps rear area will allow the delivery of ALOC supplies and replacement personnel as well as provide for evacuating the wounded and noncombatants from the AO.

As with the other operating systems, force-projection operations may require a CSS structure to allow selected logistic management functions to be accomplished from CONUS or from a forward-presence location. By deploying only those functional capabilities absolutely necessary, the corps can use split-based operations as a means of providing CSS to the force.

The deployed CSS cell consists of personnel and equipment in modular components that provide a conduit for electronic transmission of logistic data and message and voice communications traffic. The rear CSS cell continues to support the stay-behind force while concurrently interfacing with deployed cells to provide the required support forward. Split-based operations apply to all logistic functions. Planners assess the capabilities and assets available in the theater and determine how to supplement them without unnecessary duplication.

Command and Control (C2)

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions occur through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures a commander employs in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces in the accomplishment of the mission. (See Chapter 4 for a detailed discussion.)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF)

Corps operations impact and are influenced by SOF actions. Within the corps G3 there is a special operations coordinator (SOCOORD) element, This functional staff cell exists to advise and integrate SOF capabilities by coordinating with SOF elements. Joint Publication 3-05 contains more information regarding this cell's structure and functions.

When the corps headquarters acts as JTF HQ, it generally includes a joint special operations task force (JSOTF) in lieu of a special operations command (SOC). The JSOTF coordinates all SOF, less PSYOP, within the joint operations area (JOA). A joint psychological operations task force normally coordinates and supports the PSYOP campaign plan throughout the JOA. (See JP 3-05 and JP 3-53 for details.)

When working for a JFLCC or a numbered army commander, the corps uses its organic SOCOORD element to stay advised of and to interface with SOF. The corps submits its special operations target and mission requests to the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB).

The SOCOORD simultaneously conducts informal coordination with the special operations command and control element (SOCCE). If the corps' AO encompasses a special forces operating area, a SOCCE may be under the corps' tactical control. This SOCCE serves as a battle command element and operates a tactical operations center (TOC).

Special Reconnaissance

Special reconnaissance operations are reconnaissance and surveillance actions that SOFs conduct to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and poststrike reconnaissance.

Corps commanders have long-range surveillance units (LRSU) to perform similar reconnaissance missions within the corps' area of deep operations. As such, coordination is necessary to avoid redundant coverage.

Direct Action

Special forces (SF) and ranger units, supported by USAF SOF and Army special operations aviation, conduct direct-action operations in enemy-held, hostile, or politically sensitive territory. These operations are normally limited in scope and duration, but may include longer term stay-behind operations.

Direct-action operations are designed to degrade the enemy's C2, destroy his critical assets, develop desired psychological effects, and preempt enemy operations. They typically involve the attack of critical targets, the interdiction of critical LOC or other target systems, or the abduction or rescue/recovery of selected personnel or sensitive items of materiel.

Direct-action operations are appropriate when the mission requires unconventional warfare (UW) tactics and techniques, area orientation, and language qualification of a special forces element. Ranger direct-action operations (also known as strike operations) favor the use of conventional tactics (raids and ambushes) and specialized techniques by ranger units in platoon, company, battalion, or multiple-battalion strength.

On occasion, direct-action operations may require a mix of rangers and other SOF. In a mix, the SOF serves as an advance party for an operation requiring ranger combat power or rangers providing security for a "surgical" SOF operation.

Unconventional Warfare (UW)

When friendly resistance movements exist in enemy-held, hostile, or politically sensitive territory, SF elements may infiltrate to provide advice, training, and support. The intent of SF UW operations is to develop and sustain these movements and synchronize their activities with conventional military operations.

Properly synchronized UW operations can extend the depth of the battlefield well beyond the corps AO, complement corps close and deep operations, and provide the corps commander with the windows of opportunity he needs to seize the initiative through offensive action.

Unconventional warfare operations normally occur beyond the corps AO, and the theater SOC coordinates and integrates UW operations at EAC. When the battle space of an advancing corps includes a special forces operational area (SFOA), a SOCCE collocates with the corps CP to ensure that all UW operations are closely synchronized with corps operations and to assist the corps staff in planning the linkup between conventional and guerrilla forces.

When OPCON of guerrilla forces passes to the corps commander, he becomes responsible for integrating them into his close operations. He normally exercises TACON through the SOCCE collocated with his command post. The collocated SF commander advises the corps commander of the capabilities and limitations of the specific guerrilla forces under his control.

After linkup, guerrilla forces normally revert to HN control. These forces may demobilize, or they may reorganize as conventional light infantry and be made available to the corps for use in economy of force missions commensurate with guerrilla training and equipment. Possible missions include rear area security of critical installations and LOC choke points and employment as a TCF on the flanks or in the rear area.

Foreign Internal Defense (FID)

Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Therefore, FID is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities, always with the primary intent of helping the legitimate host government address internal threats and their underlying causes.

United States forces are not normally committed to combat foreign insurgents. Therefore, FID usually consists of indirect assistance, participation in combined exercises and training programs, or limited direct assistance without US participation in combat operations.

The primary role of SOF in this US government interagency activity is to train, advise, and otherwise assist HN military and paramilitary forces. The goal is to help the host nation to unilaterally assume the responsibility of eliminating internal instability. The FID may require that SOF participate in the following types of activities:

  • Advisory and assistance activities that develop and support the HN military, paramilitary, and internal security organization.
  • Intelligence activities that support other FID programs.
  • Civil-military operations that isolate the insurgent and exploit its vulnerabilities, including the inability to satisfy essential needs of the indigenous population.
  • Tactical operations that focus on neutralizing and destroying the insurgent threat.

Psychological Operations (PSYOP)

The mission of PSYOP forces is to plan, conduct, and support PSYOP at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They maintain special relationships with designated defense organizations and civilian government agencies (Department of State, US Information Agency, and the US Agency for International Development, among others).

PSYOP staffs and commanders support the corps commander by reviewing, planning, and coordinating military PSYOP activities that impact operational and tactical areas. (See FM 33-1 and JP 3-53 for details.)

A tactical PSYOP battalion normally supports each committed corps and provides a corps PSYOP support element under the G3's OPCON. Tactical PSYOP influences the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of specified foreign civilian and military targets within the corps commander's AO to achieve immediate and short-term objectives. PSYOP is an effective combat multiplier that commanders should maximize and fully integrate into corps operations.

The corps commander is responsible for monitoring PSYOP programs in support of US national goals and objectives in the corps' AO. A PSYOP program includes products, actions, or a combination of both, designed to produce a desired behavior in a specific target audience. A series of PSYOP programs form the PSYOP campaign that supports the senior commander's overall goals.

The theater CINC must approve any PSYOP actions the corps takes to target specific audiences. The approval process differs slightly during war and OOTW. In either case, the theater CINC may delegate authority for specific portions or products of the PSYOP campaign to a JTF or PSYOP POTF commander. The corps coordinates the approval and dissemination of all PSYOP in the theater with the unified command J3 and remains the responsibility of the CINC.

PSYOP units develop and disseminate propaganda designed to lower the morale and combat efficiency and to fragment the loyalty of enemy forces throughout the AO. They design propaganda to build support among the civil population for friendly combat operations and to reduce or neutralize civil support of enemy combat operations. They counter enemy propaganda aimed at undermining friendly deep operations.

At the corps level, the tactical PSYOP battalion supporting the corps can only disseminate and make recommendations on propaganda. Production is the responsibility of PSYOP units at EAC.

PSYOP units may persuade isolated and bypassed enemy forces to surrender, thus freeing friendly combat forces to continue the attack. PSYOP print and broadcast capabilities can facilitate CA and MP efforts to reduce civil interference with military operations through refugee control and information programs.

PSYOP units cooperate with CA and MP unit operations designed to control the local population and refugees, with the intent of facilitating military operations and obtaining the willing cooperation of the inhabitants. Their efforts may include reorienting and educating the civil population in liberated or occupied territory, providing information on the military situation, and limiting the psychological effects of enemy deep operations in the friendly rear area. Specialized PSYOP units can also support corps EPW camps by helping to control EPWs and collecting intelligence.

PSYOP units have some unique requirements that often can only be supported from outside the normal support channels. These requirements include massive amounts of paper and maintenance of specialized heavy print equipment. To meet these requirements, the corps coordinates support through the Theater Army Special Operations Support Command (TASOSC). PSYOP units have no organic air assets. Air dissemination of leaflets and loudspeaker broadcasts require that the tactical commander allocate air assets to support PSYOP missions.

Because of PSYOP's extreme sensitivity, employing this asset requires care. Target audiences, themes, campaigns, and objectives normally require approval at the CINC level or higher. PSYOP is generally not employed against allied or friendly civilians or military.

Tactical PSYOP units are not normally assigned in support of allied or friendly civilians or military. Tactical PSYOP units can assist the host nation in providing information to its civilian or military population. Training teams can also help allies develop tactical PSYOP capabilities.

Civil Affairs Operations

The CA mission is to support the military commander's relationship with governmental and nongovernmental agencies, other services, forces from other nations, and international agencies. Civil affairs personnel meet with civil authorities and the civilian population, promote mission legitimacy, and enhance the military effectiveness of the force's mission.

Civil affairs units, like PSYOP units, routinely work at the tactical level and are normally assigned at corps and division level. The corps almost always operates in areas of the world where the impact of military operations on the civil population is a significant consideration.

The CA unit most often designated to support a corps is a CA brigade. The brigade consists of organic language teams, functional specialty teams, and tactical planning teams.

From these teams is formed the civil-military cell (CMC). The CMC, usually in the corps rear CP, is manned by both assigned G5 section personnel and supporting personnel.

The CMC assists the G5 in preparing and maintaining the CA estimate, annex, and periodic report as well as numerous overlays and data that the corps tactical operations center (CTOC) cells use. Such data depict locations of foreign nation resources, key public facilities and monuments, and cultural and/or religious shrines that should be protected.

The CMC also provides the G5 with CMO input to corps orders. It also recommends and prepares CA force-allocation changes. In peacetime, the CMC provides support to the G5 in planning and coordinating the preparation of CA annexes to corps operations plans (OPLANs) and contingency plans. The CMC also helps coordinate exercise activities.

The CA brigade provides CA functional expertise to man the corps civil-military operation center (CMOC). The corps CMOC, under the G5's staff supervision, assists the corps commander and staff. The CMOC serves as the primary interface between the corps and--

  • Local civilian populations.
  • Humanitarian organizations.
  • Nongovernmental organizations (NGO).
  • Private voluntary organizations, UN, and other international agencies.
  • Multinational military forces.
  • Foreign nation authorities.
  • Other US government agencies.

When the CMOC receives requests for assistance from these various agencies, it-passes them to the CMC for staff action by the G5.

The commander's mission analyses determines the CMOC's location. However, it should be accessible to the various organizations with which it coordinates.

At the tactical level, CA units facilitate CMO by providing interface between US military forces and HN or foreign authorities or military forces. Civil affairs units help the commander develop COAs that minimize the likelihood and/or effects of civil interference with military operations. They locate and identify significant arts, monuments, and archives throughout the corps area, and they prepare plans and directives to safeguard these cultural properties. They also review plans and operations with respect to applicable laws and agreements and help the commander, as required, to meet his moral and legal obligations.

Civil affairs units locate and identify population centers in the corps AI, and they anticipate population movements that will occur in response to future combat operations. Civil affairs units cooperate with local authorities, MPs, and PSYOP units to plan the movement of displaced local civilians and to minimize interference with close combat operations. The unit's efforts focus on control of dislocated civilians and evacuation of noncombatants from the battle area. During retrograde operations, CA units identify and locate local resources and facilities the force must evacuate or destroy to avoid their use by the enemy.

Civil affairs units identify, locate, and assist in the acquisition of local resources, facilities, and support that the corps requires to accomplish its mission. They coordinate and administer HN support agreements and other forms of foreign nation support. They assist rear area commanders with the control and movement of dislocated civilians through the corps area, the coordination of rear operations plans with local authorities, and the establishment of civil-military relations with existing local civil authorities and agencies.

In enemy territory, or in friendly territory where there is a weak or ineffective civil government, CA units may, at the direction of the NCA, establish a temporary civil administration until existing political, economic, and social conditions stabilize.

The corps G5 must see that CMO are thoroughly integrated into all corps operations. The corps commander will decide after his mission analysis where to place his civil-military cell.

There are operations where CMO will be central to the corps' mission and the G5 will be close to plans, intelligence, and current operations. For example, in extreme situations, it may be necessary for the military to execute some of the functions the US country team normally performs. Higher intensity combat operations may not require the G5 to be immediately present. The G5 needs to be where he can coordinate all CMO and still be appropriately responsive to the commander's guidance and the commander's staff's need for integration.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA)

The PA mission is to fulfill the military's obligation to keep the American people and the members of the armed forces informed and to help establish the conditions that lead to confidence in America's armed forces and their conduct of operations in peace, conflict, and war.

Corps commanders conduct PA operations that can affect strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Such operations require special relationships with joint, combined, interagency, and nongovernmental organizations at various levels.

The commander employs and adjusts PA activities to inform the American public and his force as well as to effectively communicate the policies, resolve, and actions through US and international news media. The staff must coordinate public affairs PSYOP through the planning process and continually exchange information during current operations.

Although PA, CA, and PSYOP each have discrete audiences with tailored messages, there is a growing information overlap between their audiences. The credibility of all three is lost if their messages contradict one another.



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