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Appendix C

REAR OPERATIONS

The main CP synchronizes the corps' rear operations with close and deep operations. The rear CP's staff must thoroughly plan and integrate each of the rear operations functional areas (terrain management, security, sustainment, movements) into a comprehensive rear operations concept that supports the commander's concept and intent. The corps must be able to conduct the full spectrum of rear operations in conventional and NBC environments.

As with close and deep operations, deception is an integral part of all rear operations planning. The rear operations deception effort must integrate joint, combined, and HN assets and support the overall corps deception plan.

NOTE: This appendix implements STANAG 2079.

REAR COMMAND

The G3 task-organizes the rear command to support rear operations. Annex A of the corps' OPLAN lists units with specific rear operations functions under the rear command. The rear operations commander is then able to employ resources in accordance with METT-T factors.

Subordinate units also establish liaison relationships with the rear CP. Numerous units operating in the rear are not assigned to the rear command, but do come under the rear command's control for security operations and terrain management.

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

The corps G3 is the overall corps terrain manager. He positions some units, such as the corps reserve and the aviation brigade, in the corps' rear area. The rear CP operations cell, with the G3, is responsible for positioning the remainder of the units (including EAC, joint, and HN assets) in the rear area.

The operations cell, with the CSS cell, positions units based on the corps' mission, concept of operations, and commander's intent. Combat support units with a higher level of combat capability (MPs and engineers) normally position where they can control key terrain or improve the defensive capability of key bases and base clusters within the corps area. Other factors affecting unit positioning include current rear area IPB, the subordinate units' mission requirements, and considerations of the unit being positioned.

The rear IPB, analysis of METT-T factors, and the commander's risk assessment dictate whether units are to disperse throughout the corps rear to enhance survivability or group together in mutual support. Another consideration in placement should be the requirement for joint air base defense, which Air Force security police and MPs usually conduct.

A key terrain management decision is the positioning of corps support groups. These groups are employed both in support of committed divisions and in area support of the corps.

The rear CP, through subordinate RAOCs, positions CSGs within the rear area based on the factors mentioned above, consideration of the corps' deception plan, and the recommendation of the COSCOM commander. Support groups desiring to position subordinate units within division rear areas must coordinate directly with responsible division rear CPs. (See FM 71-100 for further discussion.)

Another key terrain management decision is the positioning of units being reconstituted. Since these units may be committed before the planned reconstitution is complete, the rear CP, with the G3, positions these units where the force can best achieve the reconstitution effort and where the units, or portions thereof (for example, redundant fire support assets), can be employed in support of rear and/or close operations if necessary.


CONTENTS

REAR COMMAND

TERRAIN MANAGEMENT

SECURITY

Intelligence

Base and Base Cluster Self-Defense

Response Force Operations

Fire Support

Air Base Defense

SUSTAINMENT

MOVEMENTS

Tactical Movements

Administrative Movements


Once positioned, the responsible RAOC designates the units in the corps' rear area as either bases (unit or multiunit positions with definite perimeters) or base clusters (groupings of bases based on mission and/or security requirements lacking a clearly defined perimeter). The responsible RAOC designates a commander for each base and base cluster. Base and base cluster commanders are responsible for positioning units within their respective areas of responsibility.

Bases and base clusters fall under the corps rear CP's OPCON and its subordinate RAOCs for rear operations. Normal unit mission guidance and prioritization remains the responsibility of unit parent commands. The corps MP brigade, not the RAOC, determines mission taskings for an MP battalion operating within a RAOC area of responsibility.

Hospitals and other medical units in the rear area must be incorporated into a base cluster tasked with providing the medical unit with security. In addition, the threat to medical units must not be aggravated by positioning them near possible enemy target priorities (such as nuclear storage facilities, Class V supply points, and so on).

Based on the tactical situation or direction from the G3, the rear operations cell, with the CSS cell, directs the repositioning of units within the corps' rear area. The appropriate RAOCs accomplish repositioning. When required, such directed relocations should be coordinated with the affected unit's higher headquarters to ensure continuity of mission accomplishment.

Units entering or desiring to relocate within the corps' rear area must coordinate with the rear operations cell and affected RAOCs to ensure that their desired locations do not conflict with current or projected rear operations positioning or movement priorities. Conflicts that the rear CP cannot resolve are referred to the rear operations commander for resolution. Further, the operations cell, through the G5, must coordinate with HN authorities to ensure that corps and HN facility and/or unit positioning are not in conflict and are integrated in the overall concept of operations.

SECURITY

The corps conducts rear security operations (in NATO, rear area security) to assure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. The operations cell and subordinate RAOCs plan and execute rear security operations based on guidance from the rear operations commander.

Corps rear security operations must display the same initiative, agility, versatility, depth, and synchronization required for close and deep operations. They must support the overall corps deception plan and may also include rear operations deception efforts. The four components of corps rear security operations (intelligence, base and base cluster self-defense, response operations, and combined-arms TCF operations) form the framework on which rear security operations are based.

Intelligence

The IPB is a continuous, integrated, and comprehensive analysis of the effects of enemy capabilities, terrain, and weather on the operation, overtime. The IPB should extend throughout the entire area of interest (including forward, rear, and adjacent areas) focusing primarily on specific units and/or NAI that the commander designates.

The intelligence section of the rear CP is the interface with the intelligence system. As such, this section needs a direct link into the ACE at the corps' main CP. This link allows information to pass in both directions in a timely manner.

The RAOC receives IPB products from the main CP. These products should be the same as those for maneuver elements. They should include the intelligence estimate, with event and decision support templates, that include avenues of approach and the mobility corridors for the entire area.

If properly constructed, the IPB will contain the information necessary to do the detailed intelligence planning for rear operations. Items of consideration with regard to the rear area include--

  • Enemy avenues of approach through the entire area.

  • Most likely air avenues of approach.
  • Likely priority activities and targets for threat forces.
  • Named areas of interest relating to activities in the enemy's rear area that would indicate preparations for an AASLT or airborne operation.
  • The most likely and most dangerous enemy threat actions.
  • The battlefield conditions under which the threat is most likely to initiate a Level III operation in the rear area.

The RAOC then collates IPB products from the intelligence cell at the corps' main CP with raw data that units provide. Data include information that units gather when in or moving through the corps' rear area (for example, MPs performing BCC and area security missions; bases and base clusters; and convoys).

The RAOC then develops its own support IPB, adding NAIs and information requirements, possible or potential LZs and DZs, and other related information. The RAOC passes the additional information requirements to the ACE.

The staff disseminates this IPB, along with information on the current enemy situation, through subordinate RAOCs to all units in the corps' rear area. This intelligence forms the basis for planning and conducting the other three components of rear security operations. (See FM 34-130 and FM 34-7 for further discussion.)

Other intelligence support available for rear operations includes counterintelligence. Counterintelligence analysts assist the rear CP in developing lists for high-value targets the force should protect. Analysts can also provide liaison teams to work with local police and civilian and MI agencies. This liaison is critical in neutralizing Level I threats.

The operations cell is responsible for force protection. All intelligence assets available to the corps help minimize the enemy's ability to attack the rear area. Counterintelligence personnel can also help collect and evaluate data from their sources and interface with HN agencies to complement their own efforts. Electronic protection, as an element of EW, further enhances force-protection efforts.

Force protection in the rear area should also focus on gathering and disseminating early warning information regarding threat air activities. This information is critical to subordinate RAOCs, response forces, and the TCF. It allows them to anticipate threat airborne or AALST insertions in the rear area. It is also critical to bases and base clusters so they may adjust their level of security based on the assessed threat. The rear operations cell collects early warning information from several sources:

  • The A2C2 element at the main and TCF CPs.
  • Air defense artillery units in the corps' rear area.
  • The USAF's TACP.
  • The airlift LNO at the corps' rear CP.
  • Other USAF control teams that may be operating in the corps rear.

A two-way sharing of early warning information is critical to defense of joint assets. Once warning is received, the operations cell immediately notifies the TCF and subordinate RAOCs who pass the information to response forces and bases and base clusters.

Base and Base Cluster Self-Defense

Each base and base cluster commander must develop a defense plan to detect, defeat, and minimize the effects of Level I and limited Level II threat attacks on his base or base cluster (including NBC attacks). Each commander bases his defense plan on--

  • The IPB, which the corps' rear CP provides.
  • His own IPB.
  • The current intelligence situation.
  • The CI risk assessment.
  • The analysis of his unit's mission requirements.

Preparation of the defense plan may include a need for engineer support. Engineer operations in support of rear operations include area and point denial, MSR maintenance, and area damage control. To maximize unit mission accomplishment, defense plans must be flexible and allow for differing degrees of security based on the probability of threat activity.

Defense plans should, as a minimum, address the following critical considerations:

  • Clear delineation of defense C2.
  • Assignment of defensive sectors of responsibility for subordinate units.
  • Integration of all available weapons into the defense plan.
  • Identification of unit reaction forces to bolster the defense during an attack.
  • Use of listening posts (LPs) and/or observation posts (OPs).
  • Air, ground, and NBC attack alarm systems.
  • Obstacle planning.
  • Use of smoke (if available).
  • Area damage control, addressing both damage prevention and repair.
  • Integration of HN response plans and units.
  • Internal AD measures.
  • Fire support planning, including the JAAT (if available).
  • Request procedures for response and tactical combat forces.
  • Area warning and reporting system.

Commanders provide defense plans--

  • To the RAOC exercising OPCON of the base or base cluster.
  • To MPs providing area security and/or BCC in the vicinity of the base or base cluster.
  • To forces (normally MPs) that are to respond to attacks on the base or base cluster beyond its self-defense capability.

The RAOC consolidates defense plans and provides appropriate data to the rear operations cell for integration into the overall corps rear fire support plan. To maximize mutual support and to prevent fratricide, the RAOC coordinates defense plans with adjacent bases and base clusters as well as those of joint, multinational, and HN forces.

Separate base and base cluster commanders establish operations centers capable of maintaining 24-hour communications with the respective RAOC for intelligence, tactical information, and direction and with their parent organization for unit mission guidance. In addition, base and base cluster commanders establish communications with and direct the defensive operations of other units occupying terrain within their base or base cluster.

Response Force Operations

The operations cell designates forces (normally MPs) to respond to bases or base clusters under attack by Level II threat forces. Once designated, response forces must--

  • Coordinate with supported RAOCs and bases or base clusters to conduct a joint IPB.
  • Review base and base cluster self-defense plans.
  • Exchange SOI information.
  • Identify response force contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities.

Since an objective of response operations is to eliminate a threat without requiring premature commitment of the TCF, response forces integrate available FA, Army aviation, JAAT, and CAS fire support into their plans. With the main CP fire support cell, the operations cell establishes procedures by which response forces can call for fire support.

Because the purpose of response force operations is to help bases or base clusters return to mission accomplishment rather than diverting sustainment resources to self-defense, forces must focus on timely response to make 'the enemy disengage from the attack. Response forces integrate available fire support into their efforts to force the enemy to break off the attack. The response force then fixes and destroys the rear threat using close combat techniques and by applying artillery, Army aviation, JAAT, and/or CAS, as available.

The corps commander's concept and intent, the rear IPB, and the rear operations commander's established protection priorities drive response force planning. Response forces incorporate this information into their own IPB and, with the rear CP operations cell and affected RAOCs, position themselves where they can best--

  • Detect major enemy incursions (for example, DZs and LZs).
  • Interdict enemy forces en route to key corps facilities.
  • Respond to priority facilities in the corps' rear.

Corps MPs are normally assigned as the corps' rear response force. The size of the response force is based on the current rear IPB and the rear operations commander's risk assessment. Mission requirements normally exceed the capability of available MP assets. Therefore, the rear operations commander will either have to--

  • Set priorities for corps MPs and accept risks in those areas having a lesser priority.
  • Augment MPs with additional fires and/or with combat multipliers to enhance their response ability.
  • Assign the response mission to another unit under his control.

Should response forces encounter or engage enemy forces beyond their ability to defeat, they are to immediately notify the appropriate RAOC and maintain contact with the enemy force to delay and/or disrupt the enemy until the TCF is committed.

Tactical Combat Force Operations

As part of the corps' overall organization for combat, the G3 designates a TCF capable of defeating Level III forces that may attempt to operate in the corps' rear area. In addition, the G3 develops contingency plans for the commitment of a TCF to support subordinate division responses to Level III attacks within division rear areas, The overall corps IPB, analysis of METT-T factors, and the corps commander's risk assessment dictate whether a TCF is dedicated to rear operations or given a be-prepared rear operations mission.

Once committed, the TCF becomes OPCON to the rear operations commander. The TCF is normally a composite force, comprising ground maneuver, Army aviation, and FA units under the command and control of the senior maneuver unit headquarters. The actual size of the TCF depends on IPB and METT-T factors and the degree of risk the commander is willing to accept.

Once designated, the TCF establishes liaison with the rear CP. The rear CP operations cell provides the TCF with--

  • The current rear IPB.
  • Friendly unit dispositions.
  • Defense plans.
  • Priorities for protection.
  • The rear operations commander's concept of operations and intent.
  • The fire support plan.

Based on this information, the TCF conducts its own IPB, develops its concept of operations, and forwards it to the rear operations cell for coordination and approval.

Once committed to rear operations, the TCF organizes its forces for combat and positions them where they can best counter likely enemy Level III operations. The TCF focuses on likely threat targets critical to the corps, ground and air avenues of approach, DZs, and LZs. The TCF positions its supporting field artillery where it can best range likely threat targets and where it can interdict enemy forces en route to probable targets in the corps rear area.

The TCF conducts direct coordination with corps MP or other response forces regarding the exchange of reconnaissance information, battle handoff procedures, and contingency plans for TCF operations. The operations cell assigns specific reconnaissance responsibilities to both the response force and the TCF to preclude duplication of efforts.

Commitment of a TCF to perform rear operations under the rear operations commander's OPCON is a decision the corps commander makes. Once committed, the TCF is normally the sole combat force in the corps designated to perform combat operations against Level III threats.

Premature commitment of the TCF against a specific threat could rob the rear operations commander of the flexibility and initiative he requires to counter the overall enemy threat to the corps' rear. Therefore, the TCF is not normally committed until the rear operations commander determines that both base and base cluster defense forces and/or response forces are unable to counter the threat, and the enemy poses such a risk to the corps that commitment of the TCF is a necessity.

Once the rear operations commander decides to commit the TCF, the operations cell designates an AO for the TCF. All units within the designated TCF area of operations become OPCON to the TCF for rear security operations until the threat is eliminated.

The operations cell establishes control measures, as necessary, to ensure TCF unity of command within its area of operations. The operations cell coordinates with the CSS cell to ensure that movements in the corps rear area do not impede TCF operations. If the tactical situation so warrants, the operations cell requests the corps G3 to divert additional combat power to support the TCF.

Based on the likelihood of the threat conducting multiple Level III operations within the corps area, the operations cell may recommend to the G3 that he designate an additional TCF from within the corps' resources or that he request additional combat forces from the next higher command. In any case, the operations cell must continue to plan for additional TCF operations within the corps' rear area until such time that the TCF eliminates the current threat and the TCF is prepared to respond to additional Level III threats.

While the operations cell establishes priorities and procedures, subordinate RAOCs coordinate the handover of combat responsibility from response forces to the TCF. Depending on the situation, the operations cell may task response forces to conduct a rearward passage of lines through a stationary TCF, support a forward passage of the TCF, or establish blocking positions while the TCF attacks the enemy from the flanks. Based on the TCF commander's recommendation, the operations cell decides whether response forces may remain OPCON to the TCF or be released from OPCON to allow them to resume other priority missions.

While the operations cell coordinates with the corps FSCOORD for fire support for response forces, the TCF, if already under the rear operations commander's OPCON, may also be tasked by the rear operations cell to coordinate fire support provided to response forces in contact with Level II threat forces. Such fire support is not normally provided to units countering Level I threat forces. If tasked to coordinate and/or provide fire support to Level II operations, the TCF will receive priority of fires, fire support control measures, and guidance regarding who can call for and adjust fires (normally limited to response forces to prevent fratricide).

Fire Support

The operations cell, with the FSCOORD, is responsible for the overall planning of rear area fire support. The FSCOORD considers all available fire support systems, including those of units reconstituting, transiting, or temporarily located in the corps rear area, when planning support of rear operations.

The operations cell collates base, base cluster, and response force fire support plans it receives from subordinate RAOCs and coordinates the composite rear operations fire support plan with both the corps FSCOORD and the TCF. The operations cell, and/or the respective RAOC, reviews requests for CAS either from response forces or the TCF and forwards them to the main CP.

Should the TCF with its supporting FA be committed to a Level III threat operation, the operations cell coordinates with the FSCOORD for on-order fires to assist bases and base clusters and/or response forces in countering other Level II or III threat incursions.

Air Base Defense

Air Force bases in the corps' rear area are critical facilities that planners must include in the overall corps rear operations plan. As with any commander of a base in the corps rear, the air base commander is responsible for self-defense against Level I threats.

Should an air base receive a Level II attack, response forces (normally MPs) may become OPCON to the air base commander until the threat is defeated. As with Level III threat response planning throughout the corps rear, a TCF is designated to defeat Level III threat attacks on air bases.

With the affected air base commander, the rear operations commander designates a TCF area of operations and places all external base defense forces in the AO under the OPCON of the TCF until the threat is defeated. The commander of the air base may need to retain control of sufficient assets to maintain security of critical resources. The rear operations commander, the commander of the air base, and the TCF commander must closely coordinate such requirements. (See FM 19-1 and FM 90-30 for further discussion.)

SUSTAINMENT

The CSS cell of the rear CP plans and directs sustainment operations within the corps. Synchronization of sustainment with the corps commander's concept of operations and intent and with the corps' deception plan is critical for the success of close, deep, and rear operations. Critical sustainment functions that the CSS cell of the rear CP accomplishes include--

  • Analyzing the commander's concept and intent and developing an integrated sustainment plan.
  • Recommending the positioning of CSS units to the operations cell where they can best support the command.
  • Identifying to the operations cell critical CSS facilities and movements that require priority protection.
  • Developing a CSS support plan and coordinating CSS support for units in the corps' rear area.
  • Monitoring the status of sustainment operations within the corps.

Positioning CSS units requires a thorough knowledge of the current IPB and the corps commander's concept and intent. While CSS units normally position close to MSRs to facilitate timely support, they should not position along likely threat avenues of approach or near likely threat LZs or DZs.

Combat service support units position in depth to minimize the effect of threat attacks on the overall sustainment effort. The CSS cell must anticipate, plan, and coordinate the relocation of CSS units in the rear area should the tactical situation so dictate or should the corps commander adjust his concept of operations.

COSCOM executes the CSS cell's sustainment plan and recommends the location of CSGs to the operations cell. It directs subordinate units, monitors their ability to provide support, and makes rear operations recommendations to the rear CP.

The CSS cell, through the G5, also coordinates with HN authorities for support of corps rear operations. It identifies HN capabilities and negotiates with HN authorities to ensure HN support is provided in accordance with existing agreements. Further, it coordinates with the host nation to ensure that HN activities do not interfere with corps sustainment operations.

MOVEMENTS

Tactical and administrative movements within the rear area are critical to close, deep, and rear operations. Often, movements within the corps' area are an integral part of the corps' deception plan. Movement control includes planning, coordinating, and executing movements both internal to the corps and external (other US forces and the host nation) to the corps.

The corps conducts movement planning both within US channels at the cows' rear CP and with HN movement planners. In addition to planning and controlling movements of US forces, the CSS cell coordinates with the corps provost marshal and appropriate HN authorities to establish adequate US straggler and HN population control measures.

Tactical Movements

The G3 at the main CP, with the rear CP, directs the movement of tactical units through or within the corps rear area, with the exception of TCF movements once the TCF is committed in the corps' rear area. The rear CP helps plan and control movements within the rear area.

The G3 establishes priorities and designates routes or zones for tactical movements. The rear CP ensures that administrative moves do not conflict with tactical moves (CSS cell), designates alternate routes for administrative movements (CSS cell), and plans for sustainment of tactical movements within the corps' rear (operations and CSS cells). The MCC helps plan, coordinate, and support all tactical moves traversing the corps' rear area.

The operations cell plans the tactical movement of the corps TCF in consonance with the TCF's concept of operations. The operations cell coordinates the rerouting of CSS movements with the CSS cell during the movements of the TCF. The cell must also coordinate rerouting off CSS movements around areas designated as TCF areas of operations.

Should the corps' TCF be tasked to combat a Level III threat in a division rear area, the division gains OPCON of the TCF and plans its movement within the division area. Should the corps commit its reserve through the division rear area, the division rear CP operations cell supports the corps movement by ensuring division CSS movements are rerouted so as not to conflict with the corps' tactical movement. (See FM 71-100 for further discussion.)

Administrative Movements

The CSS cell designates MSRs within the corps' rear area and from the corps' rear area to forward-positioned major corps-controlled forces (for example, a corps-controlled covering force). Main supply routes are established between CSGs, from CSGs to supported divisions, and laterally to support the rapid shifting of sustainment and other forces through the corps' rear area.

The corps' CSS cell coordinates with division CSS cells to ensure that designated corps MSRs support division sustainment operations. The CSS cell plans alternate MSRs and identifies critical points that require either positive control or special security considerations. The cell passes this information to the operations cell for coordination with the corps provost marshal and engineer who ensure the development of ADC contingency plans should threat forces interdict MSRs.

The CSS cell establishes priorities for administrative movements along corps MSRs. Movement priorities reflect careful consideration for both sustainment and deception planning requirements in support of the overall corps concept of operations. They are passed through the operations cell to the corps provost marshal who develops a plan to ensure the enforcement of movement priorities.



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