CHAPTER 7
REAR OPERATIONS
REAR OPERATIONS OBJECTIVE
The objective of rear operations is to ensure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations through sustainment. Conduct rear operations by using the basic tenets of AirLand Battle. These tenets are initiative, depth, agility, and synchronization.
Initiative. Aggressively denies the enemy landing areas, restricts access to critical bases, and ensures continuous logistic support.
Depth. Ensures a distribution of support so that close and deep operations are not dependent on only one facility to continue the fight. This includes plans for alternate support and being prepared to shift support without interruption.
Agility. Anticipates and reacts to any rear threat by planning for and moving the necessary forces to meet and defeat the threat. This is done throughout the width and depth of the rear area.
Synchronization. Sustains CS and CSS forward support and coordinates combat assets simultaneously. This will neutralize the rear threat without degradation of forward support.
In addition to the basic tenets of AirLand Battle, rear operations consist of the major functional areas of security, terrain management, sustainment, and movement.
Water support for rear operations includes the following:
- Combat, CS, and CSS units located in the rear.
- Maneuver units passing through or temporarily located in the rear.
- Units conducting tactical operations in the rear area.
Threat forces will seize the potential for disruption of water support of close and deep operations. Plans must be made for the protection of key water facilities and the LOC identified to support committed maneuver units. Water teams and water supply units must be positioned to provide redundancy and flexibility and must be prepared to move should the tactical situation so dictate. Airfields in the rear area will be used to deliver ALOC water supplies.
THREAT LEVELS
Use three levels of responses to threat activities to serve as a guide for planning rear operations. Rather than focusing on the size or type threat, these levels focus on the nature of friendly actions needed to defeat the threat. The three levels of threat are described below:
Level I threats. Defeat these threats by base or base cluster self-defense measures. Examples of what a level I threat may involve are:
- Enemy-controlled agent activities.
- Sabotage by enemy sympathizers.
- Terrorist activities.
Level II threats. These threats are beyond base or base cluster self-defense capabilities. Defeat these threats by response forces, normally MP with supporting fires. Examples of what a level II threat my involve are:
- Diversion and sabotage operations conducted by unconventional forces.
- Raid, ambush, and reconnaissance operations conducted by small combat units.
- Special or unconventional warfare missions.
Level III threats. Force the command decision to commit a combined arms TCF to defeat them. Examples of what a level III threat may involve are:
- Heliborne operations.
- Airborne operations.
- Amphibious operations.
- Ground forces deliberate operations.
- Infiltration operations.
These threat activities will not necessarily occur in a specific order, nor is there a necessary interrelationship between threat levels. Units may face one or more threat-level activities at one time. Some level I and II threat activities will likely begin well ahead of general hostilities.
Based on a thorough IPB, rear operations planning must include the following:
- Base and base c1uster self-defense.
- Response to defeat level II attack which exceeds base and base cluster defense capabilities.
- Commitment of a TCF to defeat a level III threat.
REAR CP
The theater, corps, and division commanders will exercise command and control through the ATCCS from three command posts and a command group. The command posts consist of a TAC CP, a main CP, and a rear CP. The rear CP conducts rear operations. This function entails command and control of rear security operations, terrain management in the rear area, sustainment, control of administrative moves, and other associated functions. The rear CP is organized into three cells (CP headquarters cell, operations cell, and CSS cell). Each cell is functionally organized, but interacts with the others.
The CP headquarters cell consists of the rear operations commander and his supporting staff. This cell coordinates and synchronizes activities of the operations and CSS cells of the rear CP. It also provides guidance to the staff of the rear CP and analyzes the situation for its impact on current and future operations.
The operations cell's primary functions include the following:
- Planning and controlling rear security operations.
- Terrain management of the rear area.
- Synchronizing combat, CS, and CSS in support of rear security operations.
It maintains the current situation by monitoring the close and deep operations through communication with the TAC and main CPs. It also completes and continually updates the IPB of the rear area.
The CSS cell's primary functions are to collect, analyze, and provide CSS information for the sustainment of close, deep, and rear operations and plan and control administrative moves. The CSS cell must maintain the personnel and logistic status. It must also control personnel and logistics operations to provide required information to the CSS cell at the main CP. The major functions of the CSS cell are:
- To collect, analyze, and provide CSS situation information.
- To control personnel, finance, and logistics operations.
- To recommend the positioning of CSS units in the rear area to best support the overall operations.
- To identify key CSS units and activities which require priority protection.
- To plan and control administrative moves.
- To designate MSRs and alternate MSRs.
- To establish priorities for administrative moves.
- To coordinate and reroute administrative moves so as not to conflict with tactical moves.
- To assist in the planning and control of tactical moves in the rear area.
- To monitor incoming augmentation units.
- To maintain CA status and control CA operations.
- To coordinate public affairs support.
- To coordinate HN or LOGCAP support.
- To support reconstitution efforts as directed.
- To coordinate a tactical airlift.
The RTOC plans and coordinates rear security for the TA. The RTOCs organization size depends on the echelon HQ it supports. Although RTOCs are organized and staffed differently at each echelon, planning functions are basic in each level. These functions include: security, terrain management, movement, operations, intelligence, fire support, and logistics.
Due to the vast expanse of a typical corps rear area, the corps rear CP executes rear operations through subordinate RAOCs. Area RAOCs execute rear operations functions in AOR assigned to them by the corps rear CP. These AOR and HQ locations normally coincide with corps support groups and, when possible, MP battalions. RAOCs normally collocate with corps support groups for life support, local security, and ease of coordination.
The corps rear CP normally provides liaison to adjacent corps rear CPs. TAACOM ASGs supporting the corps, the main CP, and HN organizations has the responsibility to provide security to the rear of the corps rear boundary.
DIVISION REAR OPERATIONS
The ADC-S is normally the rear operations officer. The ADC-S commands and controls the planning and execution of division rear operations. The ADC-S exercises his rear operations responsibilities through the division rear CP and the DISCOM CP. Both are normally collocated for life support, local security, and ease of coordination.
The rear CP synchronizes the rear operations function of terrain management, security, sustainment, and movements with the divisions close and deep operations. This is performed with the division commander's concept and intent in mind.
Terrain Management
While the division G3 is the overall division terrain manager, the DISCOM commander is responsible for the DSA and the FSB commander for his BSA. The rear CP positions units in the division rear area which have not been positioned by the G3 to support current or future operations. The rear CP positions units based on the corps and division mission, concept of operation, current rear area IPB, and the mission requirements of the unit being positioned. Water elements entering or desiring to move within the DSA must coordinate with the RTOC. This will ensure that their proposed locations do not conflict with current or projected operations, rear CP positioning, or move priorities. Those entering the BSA must coordinate their terrain requirements with the FSB S2 and S3.
Base and base cluster commanders are responsible for positioning water elements in their respective AOR. Bases and base clusters fall under the control of the division rear CP for positioning, security, and movement within the division rear area.
The rear CP, through the division G5, must coordinate with HN authorities. This will ensure that positioning of division and HN water facilities are not in conflict and are integrated into the concept of operation.
Movement Control
Movement control includes the planning, prioritizing, synchronization, and execution of movement plans. The ADC-S is responsible for prioritizing and synchronizing moves within the division rear area and planning for security and sustainment of tactical moves within the division rear.
The ADC-S identifies critical points along MSRs to the G4. The G4 is responsible for designating MSRs in the division and for coordinating with corps for MSRs to support corps sustainment. The ADC-S then coordinates with the division provost marshal and the ADE for security, ADC, and MSR maintenance.
The G3 establishes priorities for moves along division MSRs based on the overall sustainment priorities in support of the operation. The G3 passes move priorities to the division provost marshal who enforces them.
Synchronization of Sustainment
The CSS cell of the rear CP plans and directs sustainment operations in the division. The rear operations functions ensure that sustainment is not degraded and does not limit the division commander's freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. When possible, logistics facilities are dispersed to reduce the effect of threat attacks. The CSS cell must expect, plan, and coordinate the movement of logistics units in the rear area in response to changing situations.
The DISCOM executes the sustainment plan. It recommends the location of the DSA and also positions units in the DSA. The DISCOM directs subordinate units, monitors their ability to provide support, and makes sustainment recommendations to the rear CP. The division rear CP coordinates with the G5 for HN water support for sustainment operations in the division rear area.
Security
The rear CP operations cell plans and executes rear security operations based on guidance of the ADC-S. The following components of rear area security form the framework of rear security operations. These components include: intelligence, base and base cluster self-defense, response operations, and combined arms TCF operations.
Intelligence cell. The operations cell in the rear CP is responsible for the rear area IPB. The rear operations cell collates IPB products produced by the intelligence cell at the division main CP and combat information provided by units passing through the division rear area. It then produces a predictive intelligence estimate, identifying likely threat targets and intentions. This estimate, along with information on the current threat situation, is issued to all units in the division rear area. It also forms the basis for planning and conducting the other three components of rear security operations.
Base and base cluster self-defense. Each base and base cluster commander must develop a defense plan. They design the plan to detect, defeat, and reduce the effects of level I and II threat attacks on his base or base cluster. They base this plan on the IPB provided by the division rear CP, his own IPB, the current intelligence situation, and an analysis of this units mission requirements. To increase unit mission accomplishment, defense plans must be flexible and allow for differing degrees of security based on the probability of threat activities. Defense plans should address the following:
- Defense command and control.
- Detection of threat forces through the use of OPs, LPs, and patrols.
- Assignment of defense sectors of responsibility for subordinates.
- Integration of available weapons into the defense.
- Identification of unit response forces to boost the defense during an attack.
- Air, ground, and NBC attack alarm systems obstacle planning.
- ADC.
- Internal air defense measure.
- Fire support planning.
Response force operations. The rear operations cell will designate forces to respond to bases or base clusters under attack by level II threat forces. Once designated, response forces must coordinate with supported bases or base clusters to perform the following:
- Conduct a joint IPB.
- Review base or base cluster self-defense plans.
- Exchange SOI.
- Identify response force contingency plans (to include checkpoints and fire control measures) to counter likely threat activities.
The purpose of response force operations is to help bases or base clusters return to mission accomplishment rather than devote sustainment resources to self-defense or limited tactical operations. Once the threat has been forced to break off its attack, the response force should fix and destroy it by using close combat techniques. It can apply artillery and close air support, as available.
TCF operations. As part of the division's overall task organization, the G3 will designate a TCF to stop and defeat level III threat forces which may attempt to operate in the division rear area. The TCF is normally a task-organized, battalion-sized combined arms force. This force consists of ground maneuver, attack helicopter, and DS field artillery units under the command and control of the designated TCF HQ. When designated, but not immediately committed, the TCF commander coordinates with the ADC-S and division rear operations cell. They then develop multiple contingency plans for the future employment of the TCF in the division rear area.
DIVISION OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The primary purpose for conducting rear operations in offensive operations is to keep the division's freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. During the attack, position water elements as far forward as possible to sustain the attacking units. Water elements must expect critical requirements and prepare push packages to sustain the momentum of the attack. The division rear CP and the DISCOM monitor the progress of attacking brigades. They also redirect the priority of CS and CSS to support changes to the division main effort. Consider using captured enemy water supplies to augment existing division stocks.
The FSB or FAST, with attached water elements from the MSB, will normally closely follow the attacking brigades where they can support without interfering with maneuver units. The rest of the DISCOM is positioned to best support the FSB or FAST and weigh the main effort. The DISCOM will displace forward, as required, to shorten the supply lines as the tactical situation dictates. In the event of rapidly advancing division attacks, rear DISCOM water elements will support by bounds or support on the move. DISCOM water elements establish dry water points in forward assembly areas to help and maintain the momentum of the attack.
The division plans and conducts rear defensive operations to assure freedom of maneuver and to sustain its operations. Do not allow operations in the rear to divert forces from the main effort. The division has the responsibility for securing the rear area from level III threats from the forward brigade rear boundary to the division rear boundary.
The G4 and the DISCOM commander must understand the intent of the division and corps commanders to develop a support plan to sustain the defense. Knowing the intent and concept of operation allows them to expect water requirements. The G4 develops a concept of support and recommends priorities for support to the division commander. In coordination with the DISCOM commander, the G4 recommends placing specific water capability in the CSS forward organizations in support of the division defensive plan. The task organization of the brigade's DS FSB or FAST is tailored by the DISCOM commander. This is done to meet specific needs of units operating within the maneuver brigade's AO. The DISCOM must look beyond the defense to expect water support requirements as the division transitions to the offense.
Key differences between planning and conducting defense rear operations to other division operations include:
- The ability to take greater advantage of existing water facilities. These facilities include water treatment plants, storage tanks, and fixed distribution systems.
- The defender's lack of initiative must be offset through detailed planning and coordination of all water activities and requirements through the rear CP and the DISCOM. ADC water requirements require the prioritization and establishment of specific responsibilities. This will ensure continuous water support and the immediate restoring of operations.
Corps rear operations are those activities from the corps rear boundary forward to the rear boundaries of committed maneuver units. Conduct these activities to assure the corps freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations, including sustainment and command and control. The corps must synchronize the rear operations function of terrain management, security, sustainment, and movements with the corps close and deep operations. This is done with the corps commander's concept and intent in mind. Plan and integrate each of the rear operations functional areas (terrain management, security, sustainment, and movements) into a comprehensive rear operations concept. This concept, accomplished by the rear CP, supports the corps commander's concept and intent.
COSCOM supports corps units, whether they are operating in the division area or corps rear area. To provide responsive water support, the COSCOM will provide a logistics task force to provide DS water to corps units operating in the division area. The QM Supply Company (TOE 42-447), with its organic water production, storage, issue and limited distribution capability, has that responsibility. The COSCOM will also provide LOs to work with the DISCOM and the corps units operating in the division area. LOs are usually assigned from the CSG and will normally collocate with the HQ of the DISCOM and FSB.
Water support for the corps rear operations includes the following:
- Water support to CS and CSS units located in the corps rear.
- Maneuver units passing through or temporarily located in the corps rear.
- Units conducting tactical operations in the corps rear area.
Of greater importance may be the potential for disruption of water support of the close and deep operations. In arid environments the corps must plan for the protection of key water facilities and the LOC identified to support committed maneuver units. Water units must be positioned to provide redundancy and flexibility. Water units must also be prepared to move should the tactical situation so dictate. Airfields in the corps rear area will be used to deliver ALOC water supplies.
Terrain Management
The corps G3 is the overall corps terrain manager. The rear CP operations cell is responsible for positioning water units in the corps rear area in coordination with the G3. The operations cell, in coordination with the CSS cell, positions water units based on the corps mission, concept of operation, and commander's intent. Other factors affecting positioning of water units or teams include the following:
- Current rear area IPB.
- Subordinate units mission requirements.
- Considerations of the water unit or teams being positioned.
Terrain management involves the positioning of units. The rear IPB, analysis of METT-T, and the commander's risk assessment, dictate whether water elements are dispersed throughout the corps rear. This will enhance their survivability or grouped together in mutual support. Based on the above factors, the corps deception plan consideration, and the COSCOM commander's recommendation, the rear CP (through subordinate RAOCs) position water units or teams in the corps rear area. Corps support groups desiring to position subordinate water elements in division rear areas must coordinate directly with responsible division rear CPs and DISCOM or FSB S2 and S3 as necessary.
The responsible RAOC assigns the positioned water units or teams located in the corps rear. They are assigned to either bases (unit or multi-unit positions with definite perimeters) or base clusters (grouping of bases, based on mission or security requirements lacking a clearly defined perimeter). The responsible RAOC designates a commander for each base and base cluster. Base and base cluster commanders are responsible for positioning water units in their respective AOR. Bases and base clusters fall under the OPCON of the corps rear CP and its subordinate RAOCs for rear operations. Normal water mission guidance and prioritization remains the responsibility of water activity's parent commands.
Based on the tactical situation or direction from the G3, the rear operations cell, in coordination with the CSS cell, directs the repositioning of water units in the corps rear area. The appropriate RAOC accomplishes the repositioning. When required, coordinate such directed relocations with the affected water activity's higher HQ to ensure continuity of mission accomplishment.
Water units or teams entering or desiring to move within the corps rear must coordinate with the operations cell and affected RAOCs. This will ensure that their desired locations do not conflict with or projected rear operations positioning or move priorities. Refer unresolved conflicts, by the rear CP, to the rear operations commander for resolution.
The operations cell, through the G5, must coordinate with HN authorities. This will ensure that corps and HN water facility and water unit positioning do not conflict and are integrated in the overall concept of operation.
Security
The corps conducts rear security operations to assure freedom of maneuver and continuity of operations. The operations cell and subordinated RAOCs plan and execute rear security operations based on guidance from the rear operations commander. They must support the overall corps deception plan which may also include rear operations deception efforts. The four components of corps rear security operations are: intelligence, base and base cluster self-defense, response operations, and combined arms TCF force operations. These components form the frame work for rear security operations.
Intelligence cell. The operations cell is responsible for the rear area IPB. The corps area of interest for rear operations planning extends forward to the rear boundaries of committed brigades within committed divisions. The operations cell collates IPB products. These products are produced by the intelligence cell at the corps main CP and raw data provided by units in or passing through the corps rear area. They also produce an intelligence estimate, identifying likely enemy targets and intentions. This estimate, along with information on the current enemy situation, is issued through subordinate RAOCs to all units in the corps rear area. It also forms the basis for planning and conducting the other three components of rear security operations.
Base and base cluster self-defense. Water supply battalion commanders may be designated as base or base cluster commanders. Each base and base cluster commander must develop a defense plan based on the IPB provided by the corps rear CP, his own IPB, the current intelligence situation, and the analysis of his units mission requirements. The plan must be designed to detect, defeat, and reduce the effects of level I and limited level II threat attacks (to include chemical attacks) on the commander's base or base cluster. To increase unit mission accomplishment, defense plans must be flexible and allow for differing degrees of security based on the probability of threat activity.
Response force operations. The operations cell will designate forces, normally MP, to respond to bases or base clusters under attack by level II threat forces. Once designated, response forces must coordinate with supported RAOCs and bases or base clusters. They will conduct a joint IPB, review base and base cluster self-defense plans, exchange CEOI information, and identify response force contingency plans to counter likely enemy activities. This will also include rallying points and fire control measures. The purpose of response force operations is to help bases or base clusters to return to mission accomplishment rather than diverting sustainment resources to self-defense. Another objective of response force operations is to remove a threat without requiring premature commitment of the TCF.
TCF operations. As part of the corps overall organization for combat, the G3 designates a TCF capable of defeating level III forces which may attempt to operate in the corps rear area. The G3 also develops contingency plans for the commitment of a TCF to support subordinate division responses to level III attacks in division rear areas. Commitment of TCF to perform rear operations under the OPCON of the rear operations commander is a decision made by the corps commander. The operations cell of the rear CP designates an AO for the TCF. The operations cell also establishes priorities and procedures. However, subordinate RAOCs must coordinate the handover of combat responsibility from response forces to the TCF.
Sustainment
The CSS cell of the rear CP plans and directs water support operations in the corps. Synchronization of water support, in keeping with the corps deception plan, is critical for the success of close, deep, and rear operations. This is performed with the corps commanders concept of operation and intent, Critical water support functions accomplished by the CSS cell of the rear CP include:
- Analyzing the commander's concept and intent and developing an integrated water support plan.
- Recommending the positioning of water units to the operations cell where they can best support the command.
- Identifying to the operations cell those critical water facilities and moves which require priority protection.
- Developing a water support plan and coordinating CSS support for units in the corps rear area.
- Monitoring the status of water operations in the corps.
Positioning of water units requires a thorough knowledge of the current IPB and the corps commander's concept and intent. Water units are normally positioned close to MSRs to help timely support. Do not position them along likely threat avenues of approach or near likel y threat LZs or DZs. Position water units in depth to reduce the effect of threat attacks on the overall sustainment effort. The CSS cell must expect, plan, and coordinate the relocation of water units in the rear area. This is in case that the tactical situation so dictate or the adjustment of the corps commander's concept of operation.
COSCOM executes the CSS cell's water support plan. The COSCOM recommends the location of water units to the operations cell. It directs water units, monitors their ability to provide water support, and makes rear operations recommendation to the rear CP.
The CSS cell coordinates with HN authorities for water support of corps rear operations. It identifies HN capabilities and negotiates with HN authorities to ensure water support is provided according to existing agreements. It also coordinates with the HN to ensure the HN water activities do not interfere with corps sustainment operations.
Movement
Tactical and nontactical movements of water units within the rear area may be critical to close, deep, and rear operations. In arid environments, movement of water units within the corps area is an integral part of the corps deception plan. Movement control includes the planning, coordination, and execution of movements both internal to the corps and those external (other US forces and HN) to the corps.
Tactical movement. The G3 establishes priorities and designates routes or zones for these tactical moves. The rear CP is responsible for ensuring the following:
- Nontactical moves do not conflict with tactical moves (CSS cell).
- Designating alternate routes for nontactical moves (CSS cell).
- Planning for sustainment of tactical moves within the corps rear (operations and CSS cell).
The MCC will provide assistance in planning, coordinating, and supporting all tactical moves crossing the corps rear area.
The operations cell plans the tactical move of the corps TCF in keeping with the TCFs concept of operation. It is responsible for coordinating the rerouting of water movements with the CSS cell during the movements of the TCF. It must also coordinate for rerouting water movements around areas designated as TCF AO.
Should the corps TCF be tasked to combat a level III threat in a division rear area, the division gains OPCON of the TCF and plans its movement within the division area. Should corps commit its reserve through the division rear area, the division rear CP operations cell supports the corps movement. The operations cell ensures division water movements are rerouted so as not to conflict with the corps tactical movement.
Nontactical movement. The CSS cell designates MSRs in the corps rear area and from the corps rear to forward positioned major corps-controlled forces. MSRs are established between corps support groups, from corps support groups to supported divisions, and laterally to support the rapid shifting of water support and other sustainment forces through the corps rear. The corps CSS cell coordinates with division CSS cells to ensure that designated corps MSRs support division water operations. The CSS cell plans alternate MSRs and identifies critical points which require either positive control or special security considerations. Pass this information to the operations cell for coordination with the corps provost marshal and to the corps engineer. The corps engineer ensures that ADC contingency plans are developed should MSRs forces.
The CSS cell establishes water movements along priorities reflect both the be interdicted by threat priorities for nontactical corps MSRs. Movement water support priorities in support of the overall corps concept of operations and the deception plan. They are passed through the operations cell to the corps provost marshal who develops a plan to ensure movement priorities are enforced.
CORPS OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The fluidity and quick tempo of corps offensive operations pose challenges to corps rear operations planning. The forward movement of units and the water support they need are critical if the corps is to maintain the initiative necessary for successful offensive operations. In arid environments the corps must keep the LOC open to ensure enough water support to its attacking maneuver units. Prepare the LOC to detect and defeat enemy forces which intend to interrupt the corps rear operations efforts.
CORPS DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
Regardless of whether the mission requires the retention of terrain or focuses on destruction of the enemy force, the corps rear operations must retain freedom of action for the corps in the rear area. Rear operations begin before the enemy closes with the corps and continues throughout the entire battle. Water support to ground maneuver operation requires that water units be near maneuver forces. In arid environments careful consideration of water support required during defensive operations often requires a change in the controlled supply rate and pre-positions of water. The duration of the operation, follow-on missions, and possible linkup all affect the water support organization and execution. Corps augmentation in arid regions is a critical sustainment action.
Only those water assets immediately essential to the operation should be positioned forward. They may be withdrawn when no longer required or the risk of their loss becomes unacceptably high. Water support for a covering force with a defend mission requires the pre-positioning of supplies. A delay mission requires the allocation of more time for more water to be pre-positioned at additional delay positions to support the planned operation.
Water support of combat in the MBA will normally generate the largest water requirement. In a protracted defense, the ability of the corps to sustain its forces will greatly influence the outcome of the battle. The MBA defense will require a mix of forward deployed and echeloned water units to allow for their orderly withdrawal or advance. CSS efforts must stress adequate supply of water as far forward as possible.
The following planning consideration and operational techniques improve the water support provided to a defending unit.
- Push packages of water are dispatched from rear areas on a scheduled basis so that interruption in communication do not disrupt the flow of supplies.
- Water resupply during periods of limited visibility reduces changes of enemy interference. Resupply vehicles infiltrate forward to reduce changes of detection.
- Water units are echeloned in depth throughout the defensive area. When a forward water unit is required to displace to the rear, it normally displaces in echelon so limited water support can still be provided. However, if the entire water unit displaces at one time, another water unit picks up the workload until the displacing unit is again operational.
THEATER REAR OPERATIONS
The TA commander is responsible for water support to all US Army forces in a theater. He is also responsible for all rear operations functions. Normally, the TA commander divides the theater into a combat zone and a COMMZ. The boundary is defined primarily to assign territorial responsibilities to land operations and support echelons. The boundary normally coincides with the rear boundaries of the largest forward tactical formations (corps). The boundaries of both may change as the theater campaign progresses. Using the COMMZ configuration, the TA commander may subdivide his AOR into TAACOMs which may be further subdivided into ASGs. TAACOM commanders plan and coordinate rear security operations where ASG commanders execute such operations.
The RTOC plans and coordinates rear security for the TAACOM and ASG commander. RTOCs coordinate terrain management and monitor movement and sustainment efforts so they correlate with the overall rear security operation. The RTOC staff coordinates with base commanders from other services and HN forces to develop an overall scheme of defense for the TA rear area.
The concept of base defense is built on the mutual support and integration of all rear area defense plans and units. This concept is to defeat enemy attacks in the COMMZ with the least force required. Bases generally have a defined perimeter and established access controls. They include assets such as water supply points, and water purification, storage, and distribution elements. Bases are the basic building blocks upon which commanders plan and conduct rear security operations. Each base establishes a BDOC. For rear security planning and execution, the base commander communicates directly with the ASG RTOC responsible for the area if the base is independent of other bases. If it is part of a base cluster, the base commander communicates with the BCOC.
Base clusters are composed of a number of bases grouped in the same geographic area to enhance the support mission and collective security. Each cluster is unique and has a variety of characteristics that are dependent on location, mission, and relative importance. For example, the port security and harbor defense group, where the ROWPU barge is located, will function as a base cluster. This is due to its unique mission and interface with the ASG RTOC in the harbor area.
Base clusters generally have no defined perimeter or access controls; however, they are aligned with HN government and national boundaries when possible. The senior commander with an adequate staff to establish and operate the BCOC usually becomes the base cluster commander. Typically, the majority of bases in the rear area are integrated into base cluster configurations. This will reduce the span of control of the RTOCs, to help HN interface, and to focus the major rear security responsibilities on the base cluster commander. Large bases may constitute base clusters in and of themselves and will exercise all coordination and support responsibilities. This could be the case for the water supply battalion in arid environments.
All bases or base clusters in the COMMZ will perform similar roles in defense of their resources. The BDOC and BCOC will vary in size, structure, and capability, depending on which assets the commander can divert to create these organizations. The BDOC and BCOC are configured by the base or base cluster commander to function as the command and control cell. From this cell, the commander prepares for and conducts his segment of rear security operations.
BDOC
The base commander is responsible for establishing defense plans for the base. To accomplish this, he creates a BDOC from available base assets. The BDOC is the tactical operations center for the base and the focal point for base rear security operations. This command and control element frees the senior unit staff for its primary mission. Elements of the senior commander's HQ (if it is a water battalion) or elements from water elements as tenants may make up the BDOC. If the base is independent of other bases, the base commander communicates directly with the ASG RTOC for security planning and execution.
Water elements as tenants at a base should provide a suitable share of the staff required to establish a functional command and control cell. This cell should be capable of addressing all requirements, to include water. Its mission is to plan, direct, coordinate, integrate, and control all base defense efforts; water support being only one. The BDOC must accomplish the following critical functions: operations (planning and execution), intelligence (gathering and analysis), and communication.
Operations section. The operations section is mainly concerned with planning and coordinating current and future operations. It is responsible for preparing and implementing base defensive plans. It also serves as the central point of contact for coordination with the ASG RTOC, other BDOCs and BCOCs, MP forces, HNS, and ADC teams. Larger bases or base clusters which occupy critical sites (coastal or shore side purification operations) or perform sensitive missions (water storage sites in arid environments) may receive permanent liaison teams. These teams will assist in coordinating defensive efforts.
The operations section maintains defensive status boards, develops response force plans, recommends MOPP levels, and prepares overlays, fire support plans, and requests. The operations cell requests combat response forces from the ASG RTOC when threat forces exceed the capability of base initial response forces. It is the interface for the TCF commanders and the base during level II and III operations. Also, the operations section plans training and rehearsals for defense forces.
Intelligence cell. Depending on the size of the BDOC, the intelligence cell may or may not be an entity distinct from the operations section. The intelligence cell functions as the channel through which the base commander receives and transmits intelligence information concerning his AO. The cell develops information by exploiting all indigenous sources. These include: area security MP patrols, convoys, adjacent bases, RTOC intelligence communications, and TA and TAACOM sources.
The intelligence cell serves as a focal point for the rear area NBC contamination control effort. The bases distance to civil population centers, transportation routes, communication links, and HN water purification and distribution networks enables base intelligence assets to provide the echelon RTOC with early warning and real-time assessment of local NBC conditions. This assessment enables the RTOCs to discern potential problem areas and develop the proper response to reduce the impact of threat NBC operations in the COMMZ.
Communications system. Communications assets must closely link all rear area activities. A secure and robust high-efficiency communications system between BDOC, BCOC, RTOC, and base defense elements is critical. Automated battlefield communication systems that include intercommunication and intracommunication 1inks are essential to base defense operations. Communications interface capability between response forces from HN or US assets is critical to a coordinated response.
BCOC
The base cluster commander establishes the BCOC from organic and tenant unit assets. The BCOC differs from the BDOC mainly in size and depth of organization and generally parallels that of the echelon operations center. Due to the size and available resources, BCOCs are more likely to have distinct and separate operational elements. These elements will provide command and control planning, intelligence, and communication functions in support of defensive operations.
Operations section. The operations section is the planning and execution center of the base cluster. It reviews, coordinates, and ensures the necessary links between individual base defense plans in its cluster. The BCOC is the clearinghouse for subordinate BDOC requests for support. These requests include ADC, HNS, response force augmentation, fire support, NBC and smoke, and other requests. Since water is essential for ADC (firefighting), NBC (decontamination), and minimal sustainment, the operations center arid BCOC representatives must provide water requirements for rear operations to the water support element. They will also provide operational and planning assistance to subordinate bases to develop their defense plans. The BCOC operations section develops, coordinates, and issues plans which subordinate commanders use to coordinate base and base cluster defense efforts with initial MP (response forces) and a TCF when necessary. The operations cell may also include HN representation from the civil-military infrastructure.
Intelligence cell and communications system. Responsibilities of intelligence cells and structure of communication systems are like those in the BDOC.
Base defense forces, response forces, or TCFs conduct rear security operations. Response units are usually MP or other assigned units found in the COMMZ. They may also include other available elements such as newly arrived or reconstituting units. They may also be HN assets. If the HN is viable, it retains responsibility for the response force and TCF operations.
Theater operational reserve forces may be located in the COMMZ and could possibly be used to counter large enemy incursions. Therefore, the Army component commander must have the flexibility to move and position reserves and reinforcements as necessary. The HQ of the TA commander, subordinate TAACOMs, and ASGs must maintain close coordination.
The ASG commander is responsible for rear security operations in his assigned area. He conducts detailed IPB of the area and prioritizes resources and measures to protect key assets, such as water purification, storage, and distribution. The prioritization is keyed to base assessments conducted by subordinate commanders, commanders of other services, and HN water installations or facilities. The ASG commander continuously reviews provisions for the employment of water assets to augment assigned forces on an emergency basis. He must have definite communication links established with TA, corps rear CP, corps support command, or corps RAOCs. Links must also be established with other service components and with allied organizations, installations, and assets located in the ASGs AOR.
THEATER FUNCTIONAL AREAS
Three other rear operations functional areas, besides security, are critical to the success of the theater water support plan of the rear security mission. These areas include: terrain management, sustainment, and movements. ASG command and control responsibilities and how they relate to water support in rear security operations are described below.
Terrain Management
The effective management of terrain, organizations, and facilities in the ASGs AO is critical to successful water support in rear security operations. Terrain management involves two functions. The first function is the positioning of water units. This is the process of assigning water units to a specific area or command. This function is an operations responsibility and is handled through the G3, DCSOPS, and SPO channels from TA to ASG levels of command. The second function is the stationing of water units. This is the process of assigning water units to specific facilities. This is normally the responsibility of the engineers at each level of command. RTOCs coordinate with operations and engineer staffs at every command level to ensure security implications of terrain management are addressed. They also coordinate with HN and with bases and base clusters to advise them on this subject.
Sustainment
TAACOMs and ASGs conduct sustainment operations as outlined in FM 63-4. Some specific sustainment missions conducted by TAACOMs and ASGs areas follows:
- Provide water support to units passing through or located in their assigned areas.
- Supporting the corps with GS water supply and backup DS water supply in arid environments.
- Supporting other forces and activities with water in the COMMZ when directed by the TA commander.
The TAACOM and ASG RTOCs monitor these water sustainment operations and advise their respective commanders on security implications resulting from sustainment efforts.
Movements
The TRANSCOM has responsibility for all TA movement operations. It is the principal Army transportation HQ in the theater and, although located in the COMMZ, provides theater wide transportation services. The TRANSCOM is functionally organized and may include motor transport, terminal, rail, and transportation aviation units which provide the capability to accomplish the theater transportation mission. While the TRANSCOM and its subordinate units command the transportation operating units in the COMMZ, the movement control agency is responsible for tasking of the overall transportation effort. While the water supply battalion has its own organic transportation assets, missions may require the use of TRANSCOM assets to accomplish water distribution in arid environments.
The ASG RTOC monitors water unit locations and relocation through coordination with the TAACOM staff, the MCC, HN interface elements, and adjacent, supporting: and subordinate commands. The RTOC uses the information to combine static and moving water assets into the ASGs rear security support plans. The RTOC also uses all available assets such as vehicle drivers to enhance its capability to gather information, provide early warning, and transmit information.
HNS
The ASG also coordinates with HN authorities for water support of rear security operations in the area. It identifies HN water capabilities and negotiates with HN authorities to ensure water support is provided according to existing agreements. The ASG also coordinates with the HN to ensure that HN water activities do not interfere with US sustainment operations.
ADC measures are taken before, during, and after hostile action or natural disasters. These measures will help to reduce the probability of damage, to reduce its effects, and to aid in the continuation or reestablishment of normal operations. The TA commander is responsible for ADC in the COMMZ and established overall priorities. The TAACOM commanders and ASG commanders are responsible for planning ADC operations which employ water assets in their areas. They plan ADC operations through their respective RTOCs. Plans identify expected water requirements for ADC which exceed capabilities and the relative priorities of those ADC missions.
Base and base cluster commanders in the COMMZ coordinate requirements for ADC with the TA commander. Base and base cluster commanders establish priorities for ADC missions as part of their planning process. All units are responsible for providing integral ADC in their bases to the extent of their resources and capabilities.
The TAACOM RTOC, ASG RTOC, and base or base cluster commanders are responsible for ADC measures in the COMMZ. ADC measures to be taken before, during, and after the incident are listed in figure 7-1.
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