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Military

CHAPTER 7

Threat and NBC Operations

Section I
THREAT ON THE BATTLEFIELD

WATER OPERATIONS AND THE THREAT

In World War II, the United States field Army provided potable water to the troops under most battlefield conditions. Generally, this involved clarification and disinfection of fresh water supplies and desalination of seawater supplies. In very few instances was the Army called upon to deal with raw water contaminated with unusual, extremely toxic materials. However, the situation has changed radically. Recognizing that a future war could involve the use of NBC weapons, the contamination of field water supplies with lethal NBC agents must be regarded as a distinct possibility. Water units must be prepared to continue operations in an environment filled with chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. Naturally, these hazards complicate operations far beyond problems posed by the primary effects of NBC weapons. Therefore, it is necessary to defend against NBC attacks. It is also necessary to use NBC defense personnel and equipment to reduce NBC hazards.

The size of the battlefield will strain the resources of water units conducting reconnaissance and decontamination. Over a period of time, numerous areas could be contaminated with NBC agents. Extensive NBC reconnaissance as well as extensive reporting, recording, and dissemination of NBC hazard information will be necessary.

NBC reconnaissance gives units a choice. They can avoid contamination or operate in it. Hasty equipment decontamination limits the spread of contamination and makes future decontamination easier. The capabilities for reconnaissance and decontamination must be maintained.

Base NBC defense plans on enemy capabilities/doctrine and intelligence estimates. The use of persistent nerve agents will be the most immediate concern and will strain reconnaissance and decontamination units the most. If a variety of NBC weapons are employed, forces engaged on the battlefield may become more concerned with survival rather than with continuing operations. Sustained use rather than initial use will present the greatest strain on support supply systems.

Enemy use of NBC weapons places excessive demands on the supply system for water. Water support elements do not maintain contingency stocks of water to accommodate the demands of an NBC environment. Time may not allow for deliberate decontamination operations. Therefore, you may have to operate equipment while it is still contaminated. The combat service support system may be strained to supply sufficient quantities of all critical commodities, including water. Individual and unit endurance will no doubt be keys to successful mission completion.

THE NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT

With the advance of nuclear technology, a number of potential adversaries are now able to employ nuclear weapons. The US Army must be prepared to fight and win when nuclear weapons are used. In addition to blast effects, thermal and nuclear radiation pose significant hazards that must be reduced in order to win the AirLand Battle. Equipment will be crushed, dragged, and tumbled by blast. Dirt and dust accompanying the blast wave will obscure optical-sighting devices and unaided vision. The blast effect can also restrict movement by blowing down trees and buildings. Personnel can suffer internal injury from blast overpressure and nuclear radiation. They can suffer external injury from flying debris and burns from thermal radiation. In addition, electromagnetic energy, generated by nuclear weapons, can temporarily black out radio communications and permanently damage electronic equipment.

THREAT NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

During nonnuclear combat, fire plans of threat divisions and high echelons include plans for nuclear strikes. In addition to large caliber artillery weapons capable of firing nuclear ammunition, threat forces stock nuclear warheads for surface-to-surface missiles. They also have frontline air squadrons specifically designated for the ground support role. In nuclear warfare, mass nuclear strikes are carefully planned for breakthrough, deliberate attack, and river-crossing operations. In meeting engagements and exploitations, some nuclear delivery systems are kept in a high state of readiness to fire on targets of opportunity.

THE BIOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT

Biological weapons are used in military operations to cause disease among soldiers, animals, and plants. Although these agents act on different targets and produce varying effects, the ultimate aim of biological agents is to reduce fighting ability. Potential antipersonnel biological agents are made up of living microorganisms such as fungi, bacteria, rickettsias, and viruses. These biological agents affect the body much like diseases such as typhoid or influenza. But effects may vary from minor incapacitation (common cold) to prolonged illness that results in death (plague). Biological agents can cover an area larger than all other weapons. Large quantities of food, water, equipment, and supplies can be contaminated by a single biological attack.

THREAT BIOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Threat forces have the technical capability to produce, store, and deliver biological weapons. Threat scientific and technical literature contains many articles that may have originated from either a biological weapons program or a public health project. Threat forces have a vigorous program for investigating BW pathogens and for guarding against them. Such research could quickly lead to the production of BW agents for offensive use. Threat dissemination of biological agents could be accomplished by aircraft spray, aerosol bombs and generators, missiles, infected animals, insect vectors, vials, capsules, or hand dispensers. The selection of a biological agent depends on the target, nature of the operation, climate, and weather. Biological agents may be released in theater reserve forces, marshaling areas, supply depots, water tank farms/hose lines, and deep rear area installations to impede the support of frontline troops.

THE CHEMICAL ENVIRONMENT

Chemical weapons kill or incapacitate personnel. Equipment and facilities are not usually damaged by chemical attack. However, contamination from persistent chemicals ultimately reduces the effectiveness of equipment and facilities because operating personnel must wear protective gear.

In a chemical environment, the standard combat uniform is the chemical overgarment with protective gloves, mask, hood, and overboots. Based on the immediate chemical threat, unit commanders determine what level of MOPP or what degree of chemical readiness to implement. Masks must be worn to protect against nonpersistent agents. Therefore, NBC intelligence is a critical factor in preparing to fight in a chemical environment. Early warning of chemical attacks gives commanders flexibility in determining the MOPP.

Commanders must weigh NBC defensive readiness against their capability to accomplish the mission. Soldiers working and fighting in protective clothing and masks tire quickly. Heat exhaustion casualties increase. More time is required to get the job done if resources remain constant. But, troops in an area contaminated by persistent chemical strikes can continue to work and fight because they are protected from the lethal or incapacitating effects of chemical agents. Time-consuming decontamination, however, is required before reducing or canceling protective measures.

THREAT CHEMICAL OPERATIONS

Threat forces produce and stockpile lethal persistent and nonpersistent chemical agents to include nerve, blood, and blister agents. Nerve agents are the most serious threat. However, the use of large amounts of blood and blister agents could also change the course of battle.

Chemical weapons are routinely included in threat fire plans. Chemical-capable weapon systems are assigned chemical targets. These systems include mortars, multiple rocket launchers, field artillery cannons and rockets, and aircraft. Nonpersistent agents are normally used against troop concentrations along avenues of approach and against forces in contact with threat units. Persistent agents are normally used to seal the exposed flanks of attacking echelons and to disrupt combat support and service support functions in rear areas.

Employment priorities for chemical agents in both offense and defense are the same as those for nuclear weapons. However, chemicals play a different role than nuclear weapons in that they do not destroy equipment. Threat chemical weapons are primarily used to force the enemy to wear protective gear, restrict the enemy's capability to maneuver and concentrate forces, and contaminate the enemy's combat support and combat service support systems.

Section II
DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS

NBC DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS

If NBC weapons are used, many units and large amounts of terrain can become contaminated in a short period of time. Survival in this environment depends on two things. One is quick identification of contaminated areas and units. The other is the ability of the individual soldier to protect himself against NBC contamination until some form of decontamination is possible. Water purification personnel will conduct tests for chemical and radioactive contamination. The frequency of tests is related to the MOPP conditions as shown in Table 7-1.

When CB warfare is expected, soldiers should wear protective overgarments as their standard combat uniform. Unit leaders determine the appropriate degree of individual protection. Soldiers contaminated by CB agents perform basic skill skin and personal equipment decontamination using individual decontamination kits. NBC decontamination units conduct deliberate equipment decontamination when the tactical situation permits.

Operators decontaminate selected areas of their equipment by spraying with a decontaminant. To do this, they use portable decontamination equipment or field expedients. NBC decontamination units help to conduct hasty decontamination of large items of equipment when the time and situation permit. Deliberate decontamination operations are then easier at a later time.

RADIOLOGICAL CONTAMINATION

Units exposed to initial radiation must first identify the intensity (dose rate) of residual or induced radiation using radiacmeters. Then, they send NBC-4 contamination and radiation dose status reports through command channels. Commanders identify units that exceed the operational exposure guidance. They decide whether to withdraw these units and conduct decontamination operations or to continue with the mission.

Soldiers contaminated by radioactive dust or debris perform basic skill decontamination by brushing, wiping, and shaking their bodies and gear. As the mission permits, they further reduce radiation exposure by occupying armored vehicles, bunkers, or foxholes.

Highly contaminated vehicles and major weapons systems that pose a hazard are hastily decontaminated. This procedure limits the spread of contamination to other areas and reduces radiation hazards. Early decontamination is necessary to cut down on the cumulative effects of radiation. Without quick decontamination, small but frequent exposure to radiation may significantly reduce combat power when it is needed the most.

TYPES OF DECONTAMINATION

There are three types of decontamination. Basic soldier skill decontamination is done to remove and neutralize chemical contaminants from the body. It must be performed within one minute after contamination in order for the individual to survive. Basic skills decontamination also includes personal wipedown of individual equipment and spraydown of equipment operated by the soldier. Hasty decontamination removes gross amounts of NBC contaminants from combat vehicles and major items of equipment. Contaminated personnel remove chemical and biological contaminants using personal decontamination kits and portable decontamination apparatuses assigned to vehicles. Remove radiological contamination by brushing, sweeping, or shaking away dust and debris. Specialized decontamination units conduct complete decontamination so that troops do not have to wear complete NBC protective equipment. In other words, it reduces the NBC contamination hazard to a level which allows soldiers to operate at a lower MOPP. This, of course, lessens heat stress and equipment operational difficulties caused by the wearing of protective clothing. Since decontamination units do not have enough people and equipment to support all units, help is required from supported units.

DECONTAMINATION EQUIPMENT

Water is the most critical item and the major constraint in accomplishing decontamination operations. Pump units at decontamination sites use large amounts of water. For example, a pump used for equipment decontamination uses about 50 gallons of water per minute. Even the M17 lightweight power-driven decontaminating apparatus uses approximately 23 gallons of water per minute. Decontamination units use truck-mounted, power-driven decontamination apparatuses to conduct equipment decontamination operations. They also use standard water pumps with high-pressure nozzles. Therefore, NBC reconnaissance units try to select decontamination sites near plentiful water sources such as lakes, ponds, streams, and dams. When large amounts of water are not available, decontamination unit leaders use collapsible water storage tanks to set up decontamination points. They resupply these points with SMFTs. Use portable pumps to fill storage tanks and decontamination trucks quickly. In addition, use these pumps to rinse decontaminants from equipment. Potable water is not required for decontamination operations; however, potable water may have to be used if nonpotable water is not readily available, or the nonpotable water is contaminated.

Section III
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS IN NBC OPERATIONS

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS

Surroundings that have a major influence on conduct of military operations are--

  • Mountains.
  • Jungles.
  • Deserts.
  • Cold weather regions.
  • Urbanized areas.
  • Nighttime.

Each of these situations has a different influence on NBC reconnaissance and decontamination operations.

MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS

Excluding the extremely high, alpine-type mountains, most mountain systems are characterized by--

  • Heavy woods or jungle.
  • Compartments and ridge systems.
  • Limited routes of communication, usually of poor quality.
  • Highly variable weather conditions.

Water elements may operate in direct support of brigade-sized units. Since mountain operations are decentralized, water elements usually operate independently or semi-independently of their parent units. You may need additional water-carrying equipment, such as the FAWPSS, to support these operations.

Chemical and biological decontamination is easier to handle in mountain operations. Changing weather conditions and constant winds promote natural decontamination at a much faster rate than in flat or rolling terrain. Nonpersistent chemical agents concentrate on low terrain, and radiation concentrates on prominent terrain features where radiological hotspots are produced by fallout.

JUNGLE OPERATIONS

The jungles of Asia, Africa, and the western hemisphere are potential battlefields. Jungle terrain is characterized by--

  • Heavy vegetation, varying from rain forest to savanna.
  • Constant high temperatures.
  • Heavy rainfall during certain seasons.
  • Constant high humidity.

As in mountain operations, decentralize jungle operations as much as possible. Place water elements in direct support of battalion task forces. Requirements for water increase in a jungle environment. Soldiers are unable to wear protective clothing for long periods of time. Heat stress is a major factor. Therefore, many MOPP levels and associated equipment decontamination operations are necessary to reduce heat load and to operate equipment without sustaining NBC casualties. Schedule reduction in MOPP at brief intervals since chemical agents are more persistent and effective in jungle conditions.

Because of these things, it is extremely difficult to maintain water operations. Solid decontaminants, such as STB, tend to cake and decompose at a faster rate than in temperate climates. Although caking of the decontaminant does not affect the usefulness of the compound, decomposition eventually makes it ineffective. Operation of water purification equipment requiring full NBC protection may call for relatively short periods of operation, followed by relatively long periods of rest due to heat. Relocation of a water element may require support of a small security force to assist in the event of ambush. Water points are lucrative targets under normal conditions, but water points operating in jungle combat are even more vulnerable to enemy attacks.

DESERT OPERATIONS

Deserts are semiarid and arid regions containing a variety of soils in varying relief. Desert regions are characterized by--

  • Extreme temperature ranges, varying between 30°F and 130°F over a 24-hour period.
  • Changing visibility conditions.
  • Long periods of drought, interrupted by sudden rains that bring flash floods.
  • Shortages of suitable ground water.
  • Large areas for excellent movement, spersed by ravines, bogs, and sand seas.
  • An absence of pronounced terrain features.

The principal problem facing water units in desert operations is lack of water. Although water units normally operate as far forward as possible, available water supplies may force water support units to operate further to the rear than normal.

Camouflage is another problem in desert operations. Lack of vegetation requires extensive use of camouflage nets, patterns, and mud paintings and covering of reflective surfaces to conceal the water support operations.

Heat stress is also a critical problem for soldiers working in desert environments under complete NBC protection. Operation of water points in daytime temperatures means short periods of work followed by long periods of rest. Operations at night, to avoid heat stress, create light discipline problems which may be unacceptable, considering how easy it is to see in desert regions. To conserve water in desert combat, place greater reliance on decontamination using DS2 rather than STB slurry. Therefore, increase your resupply rates.

COLD WEATHER OPERATIONS

Northern regions, including the Arctic and subarctic, comprise about 45 percent of the North American continent and 65 percent of the Eurasian land mass. Northern regions are characterized by--

  • Extreme cold and deep snow during winter months.
  • Spring breakup, resulting in poor movement.
  • Whiteout and grayout which cause loss of depth perception, making flying, driving, and skiing hazardous.
  • Ice fog in which clouds of ice crystals cover troops, vehicles, bivouac areas, and permanent facilities, marking their location.

When temperatures go below 32°F, water equipment is difficult to operate and maintain. Constant winterizing and use of heaters are required to prevent freezing. Pump ground water in winter from beneath an ice layer. To prevent freezing, it may be necessary to preheat the water during loading and keep it heated until it is used. In addition, purification/disinfection chemicals will not be as effective when the temperature drops below 32°F. At this point, chlorine takes much longer to be effective. Toxic chemicals also react differently at extremely low temperatures. Nonpersistent agents become persistent and persistent agents become more persistent.

Munitions containing normally persistent agents become very persistent at low temperatures. If a soldier gets a solid agent on his clothing, he will probably not detect it since it has no effect in solid form, However, if the temperature warms or if a contaminated soldier enters a heated area, the agent becomes dangerous. Because of this, it may be necessary to set up a station to warm soldiers sufficiently to detect the presence of a solid agent. Isolate the solid agent before the soldier reaches the area where he unmasks or where others are unmasking. You will need additional soldiers and equipment for this step. In cold weather operations, give decontamination and detection efforts priority to heated support facilities.

All water analysis is affected adversely by extreme cold. Electronic instruments, such as radiacmeter and automatic chemical agent alarms, become less dependable and may even fail. Chemical detection and identification kits cannot detect solid agents. It may be necessary to take soil, snow, or vegetation samples from suspicious areas and warm them to detect and identify chemical vapors.

URBANIZED AREA OPERATIONS

Urbanized areas will have a significant effect on military operations in the future. Today, it is difficult to avoid built-up areas, particularly in Western Europe. Urbanized terrain is characterized by--

  • Villages (population of 1,000 or less).
  • Towns and small cities which are not part of a large urban complex (population in excess of 1,000 but less than 100,000).
  • Strip areas which connect villages and towns along roads and valleys.
  • Large cities with associated urban sprawl (population in excess of 100,000 and covering 100 or more square miles).

Water support operations are easy to support in urbanized terrain. Water sources for decontamination operations are virtually assured in built-up areas. Simplify security by limiting observation and improving fields of fire. However, water elements do face one potential problem. Chemical agents tend to act differently in built-up areas. Low-lying areas tend to collect residual chemical contamination. Some nonpersistent agents become relatively persistent when they enter buildings or rubble. Water units must pay particular attention to avoid contaminated areas and mark them whenever possible. When buildings are contaminated with persistent chemical agents, their value for cover, concealment, and shelter is reduced. Wood and concrete tend to absorb liquid agents and may give off toxic vapors for days or weeks. Chemical decontamination of a building requires large quantities of decontaminants and considerable effort. Reduce building contamination by covering contaminated areas with plastic sheets, STB slurry, sodium silicate (water glass), or some substance that covers or absorbs the agent. Streets and sidewalks also absorb liquid agents, then give off toxic vapors when heated by the sun. It may be necessary to decontaminate such surfaces several times to reduce toxic hazards to soldiers occupying the area.

Biological agents may remain viable for long periods in built-up areas. Soldiers should not occupy structures that are contaminated with biological agents. Decontamination of biologically contaminated structures is beyond the ability of water units. If it is necessary to occupy a biologically contaminated area, burn the buildings and their contents. Soldiers should remain upwind of the fire. Otherwise they should remain masked.

Section IV
NBC AND FIELD WATER SUPPLY

NBC THREAT

Contamination of field water supplies with lethal NBC agents must be regarded as a distinct possibility. In order to decontaminate such water properly, it is essential to fully examine the nature of the NBC contamination threat.

NUCLEAR CONTAMINANTS

When a nuclear weapon detonates, several devastating events take place: formation of fission products, production of radiation, generation of EMP, development of neutron particles, creation of thermal radiation, and blast. These events usually take place successively over a very short period of time. Although all of these phenomena pose a threat to a quartermaster water supply point, this manual will discuss contamination resulting from a nuclear blast.

Nuclear Contamination of Water

This takes place primarily as a result of fallout. Fission product contamination from overland explosions generally occurs as downwind fallout. The particle size is in the range 1 micron to 7 millimeters. The fallout is usually insoluble in water. The little that dissolves is usually quickly absorbed on clay or other suspended material in the water. A possible exception to the insolubility of land fallout might be that resulting from a nuclear detonation over a salt dome. The fallout could be soluble salt particles rather than insoluble silicates. Another exception to the fallout insolubility rule could be the fallout resulting from the detonation of a nuclear weapon over, on, or submerged in a large body of water.

MPC in Water

All available evidence indicates that ingestion of any quantity of radioactive material is harmful. However, complete abstinence is not possible since small amounts of radioactivity exist everywhere. The short- and long-term MPCs are designed to control the amount of radioactive substances taken into the body by drinking water.

During normal peacetime conditions, the US Army abides by peacetime nuclear standards established by the EPA. The Army in the field is subject to the MPCs established in TB MED 577 (Table 7-2). The decontamination factor of the ROWPU is 99 percent.

In regard to fission products, fresh fission products are much less hazardous than old fission products (curie for curie). Taking this into consideration, it is apparent that the MPC for fission products should be a function of time. Older fission products have a lower MPC. A logical approach to this situation is the establishment of a curve in which the MPC decreases at the same rate as the fission production. This has been done in Figure 7-1, where two curves are shown. One curve is for the consumption of 5 liters of water per day. The other is for the consumption of 20 liters of water per day (as in hot, arid regions).

Detection of Nuclear Contamination

In order to enforce the MPCs of TB MED 577, the field Army must be able to determine the concentration of radioactive material in water. The radiation meter used for this purpose would also be available for other essential purposes such as measuring the level of area contamination and checking for hot spots in the water purification equipment (such as the multimedia filter and the cartridge filter of the ROWPU units). Both these functions would be necessary to lower radiation exposure to the operators.

The radiation meter of choice, the AN/PDR-27 Radiacmeter, is a portable, watertight, partially transistorized instrument designed for field use (Figure 7-2).

The AN/PDR-27 has four ranges of sensitivity: 0 to 500 mr/h, 0 to 50 mr/h, 0 to 5 mr/h, and 0 to 0.5 mr/h. You can select any of the four ranges by a switch on the AN/PDR-27 panel. The two higher (less sensitive) ranges use the smaller of the two G-M probes. The two lower (more sensitive) ranges use the larger probe. Both probes measure gamma rays. When the beta shield is opened or removed from the larger probe, you can detect beta rays.

In order to monitor water, the detector probe of the AN/PDR-27 is protected with a rubber sheath and inserted into the water under test. The meter reading, in mr/h, is proportional to the concentration of mixed fission products in water in microcuries per liter. The water source, being present in bulk, shields outmost of the extraneous radiation, if any were present. However, in an area of very high background radiation, this method would have limitation. The exact procedure is as follows:

  • Remove the beta shield from the large (sensitive) detector probe, and then cover the entire probe with a thin rubber sheath to protect it from the water.
  • Turn the range switch to the battery condition position. The meter should read to the right of the halfway mark. If not, replace the batteries.
  • Turn the range switch to the 0 to 5 mr/h range.
  • Insert the protected probe into the water to be measured.
  • Read the AN/PDR-27 meter scale in mr/h.
  • Refer to conversion chart (Figure 7-3) to convert from mr/h to uCi/l.

TB MED 577

This bulletin states that "water is suitable for drinking if personnel can occupy the area around the water source for a week or less." This concept has several operational problems for the water treatment specialist. It is entirely possible to have heavy radiological contamination upstream, resulting in a contaminated river flowing through a relatively uncontaminated area. Water source standards are given in TB MED 577. New drinking water standards have been established jointly by the Army Surgeon General and the Quartermaster Corps. Source water standards for the ROWPU are greater than 100,000 pCi/l. Drinking water standards are established for short- and long-term at 5 and 15 liters consumption per day. Since the ROWPU removes 99 percent of all NBC contamination, the source water standard results in product water having a residual nuclear contamination level of greater than 1,000 pCi/l, much less than the short- or long-term standard for drinking water. However, testing of product water is still required to assure proper operation of purification equipment.

Supply Side Nuclear Water Monitoring

In attempting to implement the short- and long-term drinking water standard, it is apparent that product water cannot be checked accurately with the usual AN/PDR-27 nuclear water monitoring procedure. The reason is that the AN/PDR-27 is designed to read radiation in milliroentgens per hour and is not sensitive to the much lower readings required for product water (microcuries). In response to the problem, an alternative procedure is suggested. Work backwards from the product water. Establish how high a mixed fission product concentration in the raw water the ROWPU can effectively remove and then monitor for that level in the raw water. This procedure is known as supply side nuclear water monitoring. The advantage of this method is that the much higher concentration of radiation in the raw water is measurable by means of the AN/PDR-27 using the supply side nuclear water monitoring procedure. However, for this method to be feasible, the decontamination capability of the water purification unit must be known.

AN/PDR-27 Nuclear Water Monitoring Procedure

This monitoring procedure is sensitive enough to check the concentration of contamination in the raw water. Since we know the ROWPU is capable of removing 99 percent of the nuclear contamination, we can use the supply side monitoring procedure to determine whether decontamination is effective. For example, to meet the short-term standard of 3 uCi/l at 15 L/d consumption, the raw water can be checked to see whether the level is below 300 microcuries per liter, anticipating that 99 percent of the nuclear contamination will be removed by the RO and monobed ion exchange step, thus bringing the nuclear contamination in the product water to or below the 3 uCi/l standard. Therefore, if the raw water has above 300 uCi/l (or 30 mr/h) nuclear contamination, it cannot be adequately purified by the ROWPU to the safe drinking water standard.

BIOLOGICAL CONTAMINANTS

Biological operations is the employment of biological agents to produce casualties in man or animals and damage to plants or materiel or defense against such employment. The US policy on biological agents (including toxins) is stated in FM 3-100. In summary, the United States: "(1) renounces the use of all methods of biological warfare and (2) confines military programs for biological research to defensive measures, such as immunization, prophylaxis, therapy, and sanitation." Although the true potential of BW is untested, the devastating effects of naturally occurring diseases are well known. It is a historical fact that, in most wars, more soldiers have lost their lives due to germ-related diseases than to direct enemy action. Figure 7-4 presents the percent of hospital admissions due to disease in three wars (World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam) in which the United States participated. BW agents are classified into three general groups:

  • Antipersonnel.
  • Antianimal.
  • Anticrop.

The antipersonnel group is further classified into:

  • Bacteria.
  • Fungi.
  • Protozoa.
  • Rickettsiae.
  • Viruses.

Microorganisms

The microorganisms represented by the above group are responsible for over 160 cataloged diseases. See examples in Table 7-3.

Any pathogenic microorganism can be used as a BW agent. However, practical considerations such as ease of production, shelf life, infective dose, and incubation period restrict the list.

US Army Quartermaster Corps water purification equipment is designed to remove, inactivate, or destroy microorganisms in water. In general, this equipment is geared to handle water contaminated with biological agents. However, difficulty could arise in destroying microorganisms resistant to chlorine and other disinfectants and removed in part only by mechanical methods such as coagulation or filtration. These microorganisms are classified as microbiological spores, encapsulated cells, chlorine-resistant viruses, microorganisms protected by fecal matter or culture medium, deliberately bred chlorine-resistant microorganisms, microencapsulated cells, and new germs generated by bioengineering,

Toxins

Another important group of materials classified as BW agents is the toxins. Toxins are poisonous metabolizes secreted by certain bacteria and fungi. Some prominent bacterial toxins are:

  • Clostridium Botulinum Toxin.
  • Diphtheria Toxin.
  • Gonyaulax Catenella Toxin.
  • Staphylococcus Enterotoxin.
  • Tetanus Toxin.

Mycotoxins

Mycotoxins are derived from fungi. Mycotoxins (and other metabolizes) are secreted by the various species and varieties of fungi. Mycotoxins are classified into nine main classes:

  • Aflatoxins.
  • Citrinins.
  • Cytochalasins.
  • Ochratoxins.
  • Patulins.
  • Sterigmatocystins.
  • Tremorgens.
  • Trichothecenes.
  • Zearalenones.

The trichothecenes are one of the principal classes of mycotoxins. They are chemically stable and resistant to oxidants including chlorine.

Although the symptoms of mycotoxicosis vary somewhat depending upon the exact mycotoxin involved, the standard pattern for both man and animal is shown below:

  • Gastrointestnal disturbances involve vomiting, diarrhea, and hemorrhage in mucosal epithelia or stomach and intestine.
  • Circulatory problems involve excessively rapid heart beat, decrease of circulating white blood cells and platelets, and meningeal hemorrhage in the brain.
  • Skin tissue involves hemorrhage, edema, and necrosis.
  • Various nervous system dysfunctions result.
  • Death occurs.

Mycotoxins can pose a threat to man as inhaled dust, a food contaminant, or even a vesicant to the skin. In addition, mycotoxins could pose a serious contamination threat to water supplies. Man's exact toxic limits of ingested contaminated water are unknown. This is due, in part, to the difficulty animal is shown below: of conducting accurate quantitative analyses.

Regarding the contamination threat, there is also the matter of water solubility having a direct bearing on water contaminability and decontaminability. Remove insoluble mycotoxins by a simple clarification step. Soluble mycotoxins could require that the water be desalinated or perhaps subjected to some adsorption process. The water volubility of mycotoxins can vary widely. For instance, Nivalenol is soluble in water, T-2 is relatively insoluble in water, and Zearalenone is insoluble in water. The following statements summarize mycotoxins:

  • Mycotoxins are poisonous fungal metabolizes.
  • A given fungus can produce more than one mycotoxin.
  • A given mycotoxin can be produced by more than one fungus.
  • Mycotoxins run the gamut of water volubility: from highly soluble to insoluble.
  • Mycotoxins are generally stable chemically and are resistant to oxidants including chlorine.
  • The analytical determination of mycotoxins is difficult and requires sophisticated equipment and complex procedures.
  • The trichothecenes comprise the most important single group of mycotoxins.
  • Mycotoxins must be regarded as potent BW agents.
  • Mycotoxins are easily produced. All you need is a grain substrate, a fungal inoculum, moisture, and heat.
  • Very little is known of the capability of Army field water purification equipment for decontaminating water containing mycotoxins.

MPC

The establishment of MPCs for biological agents in water is not feasible because the spectrum of possible agents in water, each with its own MPC, is far too broad. The susceptibility of human beings to infection by any given agent varies widely, depending upon many factors such as general health, antibody strength, previous immunological experience; and, the microorganisms themselves vary widely in virulence. In some instances, it is entirely conceivable that a single microorganism ingested into the body in drinking water could result in the soldier acquiring the disease. In other instances, massive doses could cause infection. The concept of MPC is too uncertain, therefore, to have significance as far as the contamination of drinking water with BW agents is concerned.

Detection in Water

BW agent contamination causes very little change in the chemical and physical characteristics of the water, such as pH, alkalinity, and color. This makes it difficult to devise an indicator test which might indicate the presence of microorganisms. An excessive chlorine demand to the water, however, should be viewed with concern. The excessive demand could be due to microorganisms or to the culture medium in which they were propagated and produced.

Every effort is being made to develop a quick, simple, and reasonably accurate method of detecting pathogenic microorganisms in water in the field. However, until a practicable BW water detection kit is developed, the Army must rely on one or more of the following suspicious signs or circumstances:

  • Enemy aircraft dropping unidentified material or spraying unidentified substances.
  • New and unusual types of bombs, particularly those which burst with little or no blast.
  • Smoke and mists of unknown source or nature.
  • Unusual or unexplained increase in the number of insects, such as mosquitoes, ticks, or fleas.
  • Any weapon not seeming to have any immediate casualty effect.
  • An increased occurrence of sick or dead animals such as dogs, livestock, or birds.
  • An increased incidence of sickness and disease among troops.
  • Intelligence reports indicating the possible use of BW by the enemy.

It is logical to assume that the potential enemies of the United States can produce various effective BW agents and deliver them by overt and covert means. BW agents contaminating field water supplies could produce illness or death among soldiers, impair morale, and reduce the will to resist. Soldiers and civilians have no resistance to germs used for BW purposes. It is conceivable that, in some instances, a single microorganism could initiate disease. Many microorganisms are characterized by a remarkable capability of survival. BW agents do not multiply significantly when present in water due to the lack of proper nutrients and conditions for growth. As a result of deliberate and unusual means of delivery, water supplies could become contaminated with germs that are not normally waterborne. Current routine bacteriological water quality examination tests are not useful in detecting the presence of BW material. Standard Army ROWPUs can be depended upon to decontaminate water containing BW agents. Raw water containing a chlorine-resistant BW agent might require the use of the CW/BW pretreatment set. Although specific wells are vulnerable to local BW contamination, ground water aquifers are assumed to be free of BW agent contamination and should be used whenever the tactical situation permits.

CHEMICAL CONTAMINANTS

Chemical agents can be delivered on target by a wide variety of systems. Consequently, CW agents are usable in a diversity of military situations. Chemical agents are of a search-and-destroy nature. They can harm an enemy if he is widely dispersed in the open or in fortified positions. Chemical agents are antipersonnel in makeup. They do not destroy buildings, emplacements, power plants, communication installations, or vehicles. These facilities can be used later by friendly forces. Chemical agents have an excellent capability of area denial. Chemical agents are effective for both overt and covert operations. They can travel around corners, diffuse through woods, and seep into dugouts and fortifications. They offer a spectrum of physiological effects from mild, temporary narcosis to severe bodily damage and death. They are colorless, odorless, and tasteless. The first indication of their use could be the appearance of casualties among military personnel. They affect people, animals, and plants but leave homes, factories, and other installations untouched. Most CW agents are relatively easy to produce in large quantities at moderate cost. Chemical agents are classified into seven major categories:

  • Nerve.
  • Blister.
  • Blood.
  • Choking.
  • Vomiting.
  • Irritant.
  • Incapacitating.

Toxins are not included in the above list because they are usually produced by living microorganisms and are classified as BW agents by our armed forces. All agents referred to in this section are US agents. These agents are similar to, and in many cases identical to, foreign agents.

Nerve Agents

When you consider threats to water supplies, the nerve agents tower above all others. Nerve agents function by inhibiting cholinesterase, a body enzyme. With cholinesterase unavailable, the acetylcholine essential to the functioning of the nervous system cannot be neutralized; and the body is stimulated to death. The physiological symptoms of nerve agents on the human body are:

  • Unexplained runny nose.
  • Tightness in chest.
  • Dimness of vision due to pinpointing of pupils.
  • Pain in eyes.
  • Difficulty in breathing.
  • Drooling.
  • Excessive sweating.
  • Nausea, vomiting, abdominal pains, and involuntary urination or defecation.
  • Twitching, jerking, and staggering.
  • Headache, confusion, drowsiness, and convulsions.
  • Coma and death.

Nerve agents are usually used as is. However, if desired, they can be thickened with a thickening agent such as methyl methacrylate. Also, be aware of the binary agent. According to the binary agent concept, a nerve agent is formed in flight in the shell or bomb on its way to the target. Two relatively harmless reactants are kept in storage on the ground and not added to the two compartments of the weapon until ready for use. Mixing of the two reactants is achieved in flight by means of compressed air, a mechanical mixer, or, in the case of the shell, by the inherent acceleration and spin.

In regard to the water contamination threat of binary agents, the primary concern is the agent itself. However, there is also the matter of incompletely used reactants, catalysts, and by-products.

INCAPACITATING AGENTS

Incapacitating agents also pose a threat to water supplies. Agent BZ, a hallucinogen, has received attention in the past as a threat to water supplies. Incapacitating agents fall into seven general groups (based on their effects) as follows:

  • Hallucinogens cause visions and illusions. Examples are marijuana, magic mushrooms, psilocybin, peyote, mescaline, belladonna, thron apple, henbane, scopolamine, and LSD.
  • Euphoriants cause an extreme state of well-being.
  • Depressants cause an extreme state of morbid gloom.
  • Cataplexogenics result in the subject thinking clearly but unable to translate thought into action.
  • Disinhibitors result in the subject overreacting to stimuli (for example, excessive talking or laughing). The most common example is ethyl alcohol.
  • Chronoleptogenics distort the sense of when events occur.
  • Confusants result in the victim being completely baffled, uncertain, and perplexed in whatever situation he finds himself.

Other Threat Agents

Other possible threat agents to water supplies, but of much less importance than nerve agents, include:

  • Arryl carbamates.
  • Nitrogen mustards (HN).
  • Lewisits (L).
  • Blood agents, including hydrogen cyanide (AC) and cyanogen chloride (CK).
  • Arsenicals, including ethyldichlorarsine (ED) and phenyldichlorarsine (PD).

Notice that HD is not on the list. Although HD is a very important area contaminant, it is not regarded as a water contaminant because of its density (heavier than water) and water insolubility.

MPC in Water

MPCs for CW agents in water are given in TB MED 577. Two sets of figures are given: one for short-term consumption (seven consecutive days or less) and one for long-term consumption (more than seven days). The figures are shown in Tables 2 and 3, Appendix C, FM 10-52. These short- and long-term standards have been updated. They can be found in Table 7-2.

Detection in Water

Detection of chemical agents in water is a major consideration. It is important to monitor the raw water to determine whether the chemical agent concentration is below the MPC and the water is thus suitable for use or whether the concentration is above MPC and the water must be subjected to decontamination. It is also important to know whether the treated water has been made safe to drink after decontamination.

Determine the presence of CW agents in water by the use of the M272 Detector Kit (Figure 7-5). In addition, the following information might be indicative of CW contamination in the water:

  • Dead fish or other aquatic life including vegetation.
  • Unusual odor to the water, perhaps the characteristic of certain CW agents.
  • An unusually high chlorine demand to the water
  • Intelligence information indicating that a general CW attack or direct sabotage of the water supply took place.

The M272 Detector Kit is a go/no-go test for the short-term consumption MPCs for the following agents (Table 7-2):

  • Hydrogen cyanide.
  • Lewisite.
  • Sulfur Mustard.
  • Nerve.

The kit is not applicable when dealing with long-term consumption figures or any situation where more than 5 liters of water per day are consumed.

Section V
NBC AND FIELD WATER PURIFICATION

DECONTAMINATION OPERATIONS

Decontaminate ROWPU equipment contaminated with NBC materials to prevent the water point operator from becoming contaminated and to prevent contaminants from getting into product water that is being produced. In line with these two objectives, the external surfaces of the ROWPU must be decontaminated. Upon occasion, the internal water circuits must be decontaminated too. Implement the following protective measures if the use of chemical or biological agents or nuclear weapons is expected:

  • Secure covers and caps on all open water tanks and bags.
  • Close doors and other openings on water purification units.
  • Close manhole covers, spigot box covers, and pumping compartment doors on water trailers and water tank trucks.
  • Place protective tarpaulins over water purification units, distribution equipment, and water containers.
  • Move small portable water containers, such as FAWPSS and water cans, under shelter or into enclosed vehicles.

Procedures for field expedient decontamination of water equipment and containers are presented in this chapter. Use these procedures only when the unit is isolated from the NBC defense company or detachment which is responsible for organized decontamination of equipment and personnel.

CONTAMINATION CONSIDERATIONS

In regard to external considerations, contamination by nuclear agents would be largely fallout dust or rain containing fallout material. Contamination might include either dry or wet biological agents. Contamination by chemical agents could be in various physical forms. In the later case, the problem would be most pronounced when vicious, nonvolatile agents, such as mustard, are used. Also, thickened agents are a problem. A prime example is GD which has been made sticky with a high-consistency liquid plastic such as methyl methacrylate.

Decontaminates might not be readily available, and weathering processes are only moderately effective for NBC decontaminates. Some NW agents decay rapidly. Many BW agents are destroyed by sunlight, high temperature, and low humidity. Some CW agents evaporate, and others are decomposed by sunlight and elevated temperature. Rain washes away many NBC agents.

Weathering, including time and isolation, requires that a ROWPU unit be removed from service for an indefinite period. Rather than rely upon natural processes for decontamination, apply positive techniques and substances to make the contaminated equipment safe for use.

EXTERNAL DECONTAMINATION

To decontaminate ROWPU equipment externally, first use a simple, clean water washdown procedure. Frequently, this will do the job. The nerve agent GB, for instance, is soluble in water in all proportions and is readily washed away. If a simple washdown procedure is not completely successful, resort to the use of decontaminates. This applies particularly to cases of CW contamination. In the case of BW agent contamination, you might use fumigants such as EYO or carboxide. Water purification personnel work with an effective chemical and biological agent decontaminate called calcium hypochlorite. Use this chemical for decontamination of equipment surfaces by following the preparation and use procedures described below.

Preparation

Construct a soakage pit or sump into which you will discharge the decontamination waste and rinse water. Personnel must wear personal protective equipment and prepare a 3 percent solution of chlorine by adding 3 canteen cups of calcium hypochlorite to 6 gallons of water.

Use

Apply the solution to the exterior of the equipment or container using brushes or brooms. One gallon of the solution should cover 8 square yards. The decontamination solution must remain in contact with the surface for at least 30 minutes. Reapply occasionally to keep the surface wet. After 30 minutes, thoroughly wash the surface with water.

INTERNAL DECONTAMINATION

The following describes how to decontaminate the internal water circuits of the ROWPU equipment. The three basic contaminants, NW, BW, and CW, will be considered in turn.

Nuclear Decontamination of ROWPU

Give consideration to the decontamination of ROWPU equipment used for processing water contaminated with radioactive materials. Two types of decontamination are involved. Gross decontamination involves quick, reasonably effective methods that can be applied in the field to remove the bulk of the contamination. Detailed decontamination, in contrast, refers to the lengthy, thorough process carried out in a rear area and intended to restore the equipment to its original clean condition. Decontamination of equipment contaminated by NW agents should proceed with awareness of the following fundamental facts:

Contamination with radioactive substances does not occur evenly. It favors rough and porous surfaces and those surfaces subject to scaling or encrustation.

Some radioisotopes are more readily absorbed on surfaces than others.

Radiological contaminants, unlike chemical or biological contaminants, cannot actually be inactivated, neutralized, or destroyed. No degree of heat or cold or chemical reaction can speed up or slow down the rate of decay. Time is the only factor capable of destroying radioactivity. Therefore, the only way of decontaminating equipment is to remove the radioactive substance and transfer it elsewhere, where it is less obnoxious.

Determination of the degree of contamination may be difficult. Most of the contamination will be inside pipes or pumps, for example. In fact, positive radiation readings outside the plumbing can be obtained only when the contaminating material is a gamma emitter. When the contaminating material is an alpha or beta emitter, the radiation particles will usually be shielded by the wall thickness and will not be detectable on the outside. In this instance, open the equipment, such as loosening a union and removing a section of pipe. Insert the probe of a beta-gamma survey meter, such as the IM-141/AN/PDR-27 radiacmeter, directly into the pipe.

Decontamination should always proceed using mild methods first and then proceeding to harsh methods. Before proceeding with equipment decontamination, establish the degree of contamination acceptable. For equipment to be transported to unrestricted areas, maintain a radiation level essentially that of the background, with the probe of a survey meter held directly on or close to the surfaces. For emergency wartime conditions, a much higher level of contamination would be acceptable, perhaps 20 mr/h or more. Radioactive substances inside pipes would not be harmful, as long as they were not leached out into the process water by a change in pH or other factors. Also, if the equipment is contaminated with fresh fission, accomplish decontamination by means of simple decay. Allow the equipment to stand idle for a week or more. This is effective if replacement equipment is available or if the equipment is not required immediately. If the radioactivity were of a long half-life or if the equipment is needed immediately, initiate gross decontamination procedures employing materials at hand, if possible. Flush the water circuits or recirculate with the following, in turn, as needed: clean, uncontaminated water and clean, uncontaminated water plus detergent. In many instances, this procedure would leave the equipment at a low enough level of contamination to be transferred to other areas. When a more extensive decontamination is required, conduct a detailed decontamination procedure in the rear area.

Biological Decontamination of ROWPU

Materials used for decontaminating the circuits of water purification equipment contaminated with BW agents should be effective disinfectants, rapid in action, nonhazardous, noncorrosive, and available in quantity. Although very few materials meet all these criteria, many are used in spite of certain disadvantages.

Chemical Decontamination of ROWPU

The principal materials used for chemical decontamination, STB and soap and water, are also effective against biological contaminants. Since most CW agents are water soluble, the simplest and usually the most effective method of decontaminating the water circuits of the ROWPU equipment is rinsing with pure uncontaminated water. The principal mechanism is simply dissolving the agent away. In addition, hydrolysis usually takes place. Soaps, detergents, and wetting agents also may be employed by virtue of their cleansing action. Chemical decontaminates may be employed if more potent forces are required.

NBC Waste Disposal

Take great care in the disposal of NBC-laden liquid wastes generated by washdown of the equipment or by actual operation. These wastes could be a distinct hazard to the water point operators. The three basic schemes used by the nuclear power industry, and also applicable to the disposal of BW and CW wastes, areas follows:

  • DI and DI - Dilute and disperse.
  • CO and CO - Concentrate and confine.
  • DE and DE - Delay and decay.

Reducing these principles to practice, consider one or more of the following procedures:

  • Discharge downstream.
  • Confine in lagoon.

NOTE: In case of BW/CW, add decontaminating chemicals.

  • Expose to weathering processes.

NOTE: Air, temperature, sun, and humidity all assist in the destruction of BW and CW agents.

  • Containerize and ship to a national or international landfill.

WATER PRODUCTION IN AN NBC ENVIRONMENT

The ROWPU can successfully decontaminate water up to 99 percent. A posttreatment section must be used in order to remove 99.9 percent of the NBC contaminants in the water.

NW Agent Removal

The ROWPU alone will remove a large amount of agents without the posttreatment section. RO removal characteristics for nuclear warfare agents are as follows:

  • 95.5 percent of iodine, leaving the nuclear cylinder to remove 4.5 percent.
  • 99.7 percent of strontium, leaving the nuclear cylinder to remove .2 percent.
  • 98.8 percent of cesium, leaving the nuclear cylinder to remove 1.2 percent.

CW Agent Removal

The ROWPU will also remove large amounts of chemical agents. RO removal characteristics for various chemical warfare agents are as follows:

  • GB--99.1 percent, leaving the chemical cylinder to remove .7 percent.
  • VX--99.9 percent, leaving the chemical cylinder to remove .1 percent.
  • BZ--99.9 percent, leaving the chemical cylinder to remove .1 percent.
  • GD--99.7 percent, leaving the chemical cylinder to remove .3 percent.

BW Agent Removal

The ROWPU will also remove large amounts of biological agents. RO removal characteristics for BW agents do not exist. However, BW agents that are not removed by the RO will be eliminated by the chlorine residual maintained in the product water.

POSTTREATMENT

The 600-GPH ROWPU posttreatment system consists of two NBC cylinders (one nuclear and one chemical) and components. Agents present will determine which cylinder(s) will be used. The NBC filters are capable of decontaminating water for 100 operating decontamination hours. Upon completion of operations, dispose of the cylinder as directed by the local commander. The cylinder marked Nuclear contains resin beads which absorb certain ions found on the nuclear battlefield. The cylinder marked Chemical contains activated carbon which absorbs the agents found on the chemical battlefield.

Setup

Position and set up the ROWPU according to TM 5-4610-215-10. Inspect NBC cylinders, hoses, and tanks for damage and missing or unserviceable parts.

Connect one 1 1/2-inch gate valve to one of your product water tanks. Next connect a 1 1/2-inch hard rubber hose from the gate valve to the suction side of one of your raw water pumps. Use this raw water pump to move water from one tank to the other.

Connect the inlet cylinder hose to the discharge side of the raw water pump using an 80- by 3/4-inch diameter hose and a 3/4- to 1 1/2-inch external thread bushing. Connect the discharge hose of an NBC cylinder to a product water tank using an 80- by 3/4-inch diameter hose, a 3/4- to 1 1/2-inch external thread bushing, and a 2-inch external thread bushing.

Complete the setup by establishing distribution from the second product tank. Connect a hard rubber hose from the tank to the suction side of the distribution pump and a canvas hose from the pump to the distribution nozzle.

Operation Procedures

Initially purify the water with the ROWPU, filling only one onion tank. When this tank is full, open the gate valve that connects it to the raw water pump and NBC cylinder and turn on the raw water pump. Pump water from the first tank, through the NBC cylinder, and into the second tank. You will distribute this water.

Dismantling of Posttreatment Section

Disconnect hoses from the pump and tanks. Drain water from the tank and all other components to the waste drain or raw water source. Remove valves from the tank and install caps. Follow the previous order in reverse to dismantle the tanks and equipment. After-operation maintenance will be done according to TM 5-4610-215-10.

NBC Cylinder Disposal

Follow local command directives to dispose of NBC cylinders that were used in an active NBC environment. However, use caution when handling and moving these items, as they are hot with contamination. Always wear MOPP gear, and perform personal decontamination after handling used NBC cylinders.



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