RDL Homepage |
Table of Contents |
Document Information |
Download Instructions |
LESSON 2
CROWD CONTROL TECHNIQUES
Critical Tasks: | 191-376-4120 191-376-4123 |
OVERVIEW
LESSON DESCRIPTION:
In this lesson you will learn to use crowd control techniques and supervise immediate action to be taken upon contact with an explosive device.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
ACTION: | Use crowd control techniques and react to an explosive device. |
CONDITION: | You will have this subcourse, paper and pencil. |
STANDARD: | To demonstrate competency of this task, you must achieve a minimum score of 70 percent on the subcourse examination. |
REFERENCES: | The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publication: FM 19-15. |
INTRODUCTION
Confrontation management operations will require control forces which can effectively confront a variety of crowds and mobs. Fast, effective crowd control is vital in every type of civil disturbance. Of equal importance is the maintenance of crowd control once order has been established.
PART A - CROWD CONTROL
1. Control.
a. Manner of Control. A suitable manner of controlling various types of crowds will be influenced by many variables. These include:
(1) The current strength level of the civil disturbance.
(2) Public opinion.
(3) Current policies.
(4) Crowd mood, intent, composition, and activity.
(5) Capabilities and readiness of control forces.
(6) Immediate and long-range benefits of control force action.
(7) Weather, terrain, and time of day.
b. Crowd Control Options. Consideration of the variables listed above will show the control force commander the general nature of the most suitable manner of controlling a particular crowd. Four crowd control options are available to the commander, based on his objective with a particular crowd. These options are available to provide the commander the flexibility of action. In order to advance this flexibility, there are numerous techniques available from which the commander may select and employ in various combinations. The commander has the capability of selectively tailoring his response for whatever crowd situation with which he is confronted. He may try to produce desired results with either the baton, rifle, or rifle with bayonet. A prime consideration in selecting an option or options will be the effect of the response on reducing the strength of the existing situation. The four crowd control options are listed below.
(1) Monitor. This option consists of watching the crowd's progress and development by control force teams. Monitoring helps the commander to gauge the crowd's activity and intent in relation to the larger civil disturbance and possibly to influence the crowd through persuasive means. While monitoring activities will be used throughout the crowd control operation, this option is particularly suitable for large, nonviolent demonstrations where more decisive action is not possible because of crowd size or where the strength of the situation would increase. This option is also suitable as a temporary measure pending the arrival of additional control forces. Techniques for fulfilling this option include passive observation of the crowd and the communication of interest and intent to leaders.
(2) Disperse. This option consists of action taken to fragment a crowd and is especially applicable to small crowd situations in a congested urban environment. Its selection should include the consideration that such dispersion may increase and spread lawlessness rather than reduce it. Therefore, the commander should establish control over the routes of dispersal, and area or areas into which he plans to disperse the crowd; provide security for those facilities which might become likely targets for small groups; and be prepared to follow up the dispersal operation with the apprehension of small groups still active in the area. Techniques for fulfilling this option would include the proclamation, show of force, use of crowd control formations, and use of crowd control agents.
(3) Contain. This option consists of restraining a large number of persons within the area that they are presently occupying, thereby containing any further aggressive activity. This option would be suitable in a college campus situation, to prevent demonstrations from spreading out to surrounding communities, and to prevent unauthorized personnel from entering the campus. Containment would also be the suitable option where the systematic apprehension of crowd members is considered. Crowd control formations make up the primary technique for this option.
(4) Block. This option consists of the physical denial of a crowd's advance upon a facility or area which is the potential or actual target of dissident activity. Crowd control formations, principally the line and barricades, are the most appropriate techniques for this option. Barricades, such as vehicles, concertina wire, and water-filled barrels can be erected to block or channelize the movement of the crowd. These devices, when used in combination with troops and other crowd control techniques, are useful in accomplishing the options of containment or blocking.
c. Techniques for Crowd Control. There are numerous techniques designed to provide the commander with flexibility of action in accomplishing crowd control. He must select a combination which will produce the desired results within the framework of the selected crowd control option. The most common techniques appropriate for military usage are discussed below.
(1) Observation. This consists of deployment of persons or teams to the periphery of a crowd for the purpose of monitoring its activity. It includes gathering data on crowd size, location, mood, and reporting on the developing situation. This technique includes posting persons on strategic rooftops and other high terrain overlooking the crowd. This latter measure provides additional security to control force personnel should they become committed to other crowd control operations. Such a team may be composed of an expert marksman, a radio operator, and an observer equipped with binoculars. Care must be taken to assure that committed control forces are aware of the locations of such teams to prevent their being mistaken for sniper elements.
(2) Communication of Interest and Intent. In certain situations, effective communication with crowd and mob leaders and participants may enable the commander to control the situation without resorting to more severe actions. When planned and organized demonstrations, marches, or rallies within the disturbed area are announced, the control force commander in coordination with local authorities should meet with organizers of the activity in order to communicate the interest of the control forces. The following matters, as appropriate, should be discussed.
(a) Parade or demonstration permits.
(b) Location of demonstration and routes of march.
(c) Time limits for the activity.
(d) Provision of marshals by activity organizers.
(e) Prevention of violence.
(f) Safety of all concerned.
The task force commander and local authorities should also communicate to the activity organizers their intent to cope with violence, unlawful actions, and violations of restrictions imposed on the activity. It is intended that, by this communication between activity organizers and control force personnel, the demonstration, rally, or parade will occur without incident through the mutual cooperation of all concerned. The intentions of control forces will not be effective if delivered as an ultimatum. A limited, begrudging dialogue with activity organizers reduces the opportunity for authorities to learn the plans of the demonstrators. It must be remembered that if this communication is not effected, the activity organizers might well hold the demonstration in defiance of local authorities, thereby creating a potential for violence that might not have existed if this technique had been employed.
(3) Channelization. Pressure can be brought to bear on the dissident leadership to channel the crowd into an area which will minimize the disruption when the following requirements are met:
(a) When communications have been established with the dissident leadership.
(b) When the intent and nature of the crowd activity is known.
(4) Diversion. When communication exists with the dissident leadership, consideration may be given to efforts to divert the leadership of the crowd itself from its stated or obvious objective. The diversion should support the objectives of the control force either by reducing the strength of the crowd situation or motivating the crowd to seek an area more easily controlled by the control force.
(5) Cooperation. Decreasing the potential disruption of the crowd activity may be accomplished by an active attempt on the part of the control force to obtain cooperation of the dissident leadership. Whenever there is an attempt by the crowd leadership to seek permission and cooperation of the local government, every effort should be made to maximize this cooperation by demonstrating an attitude of facilitation. This may be accomplished by helping the leadership to organize a peaceful demonstration while establishing guidelines which will minimize the impact of the demonstration on the community.
(6) Selection of Force Options.
(a) The commitment of federal military forces must be viewed as a drastic last resort. Their role, therefore, should never be greater than is absolutely necessary under the particular circumstances which exist. This does not mean, however, that the number of troops used should be minimized. The degree of force required to control a disorder is often inversely proportionate to the number of available personnel. Doubts concerning the number of troops required should normally be resolved in favor of large numbers since the presence of such large numbers may prevent the development of situations in which the use of deadly force is necessary. A large reserve of troops should be maintained during civil disturbance operations. The knowledge that a large reserve force is available builds morale among military and law enforcement personnel and helps to prevent overreaction to annoying acts by unruly persons.
(b) In selecting an operational approach to a civil disturbance situation, the commander and his staff must follow the "minimum necessary force" principle; for example, crowd control formations or crowd control agents should not be used if the area filled with manpower would be sufficient.
(c) Every effort should be made to avoid appearing as an alien invading force and to present the image of a restrained and well-disciplined force whose sole purpose is to help to restore law and order with a minimum loss of life and property and due respect for those citizens whose involvement may be purely accidental. Further, while crowd control personnel should be visible, tactical, or force concentrations which might tend to excite rather than to calm should be avoided where possible.
(d) The normal reflex action of the well-trained combat soldier to sniper fire is to respond with all firepower available. In a civil disturbance, this tactic endangers innocent people more than snipers. The preferred tactic is to enter the building from which sniper fire starts. Keeping with the controlling principle that he must use only the minimum force necessary to fulfill his mission, the commander may select any one of the following options for arming his troops:
1. Baton. The baton is most effective in a crowd control operation and is considered the primary weapon for crowd control operations. The baton is considered to be an offensive weapon with reduced lethality and unlike the rifle, the loss of a baton to the crowd does not create a serious threat. In order to ensure that additional levels of force are immediately available, units committed with the baton must have riot control agent disperser teams and selected marksmen in direct support. The commander may also have reserve forces armed with rifles, or rifles with bayonets attached, positioned for rapid commitment as reinforcement or to pass through and assume the crowd control mission. Except with extremely violent crowds, the baton in the hands of well-trained personnel is the more suitable weapon.
2. Rifle. The rifle, if capable of automatic fire, must be modified to prevent automatic operation. Keeping with the controlling principle of using only the minimum force necessary to fulfill the mission, the following options are available in arming the troops with rifles:
RIFLE | BAYONET SCABBARD |
Bayonet | AMMUNITION MAGAZINE CLIP |
CHAMBER |
At sling | On belt | In scabbard | In pouch or belt | Empty |
At port | On belt | In scabbard | In pouch or belt | Empty |
At port | On belt | Fixed | In pouch or belt | Empty |
At port | On belt | Fixed | In weapon | Empty |
At port | On belt | Fixed | In weapon | Round chambered |
While each of the above options represent an escalation in the level of force, they are not sequential in the sense that a commander must initially select the first option, or proceed from one to another in any particular order. So long as the option selected is appropriate, considering the existing threat, the minimum necessary force principle is not violated.
a. The rifle and rifle with bayonet attached have extremely limited offensive use as both may constitute deadly force. The primary value of the rifle or the rifle with bayonet attached is the psychological impact on the crowd. While the use of fixed bayonets can add considerably to this effect, the danger of intentional or accidental injury to demonstrators or fellow control force personnel prevents such use except with extremely violent crowds.
b. Fire by selected marksmen. Fire by selected marksmen may be necessary under certain circumstances. Marksmen should be preselected, trained, and thoroughly instructed. They may be placed on vehicles, in buildings, or elsewhere as required.
c. Full firepower. The most severe measure of force that can be applied by troops is that of available unit firepower with the intent of producing extensive casualties. This extreme measure would be used as a last resort only after all other measures have failed or obviously would be impractical, and the consequence of failure to completely subdue the crowd would be an imminent overthrow of the government, continued mass casualties, or similar grievous conditions.
d. Shotgun. The riot shotgun is an extremely versatile weapon; its appearance and capability also produce a strong psychological effect on rioters. It is particularly suited to certain applications in civil disturbance operations. When used with No. 00 buckshot ammunition, it is an excellent point target weapon extremely effective at limited range. By varying the ammunition from No. 00 to No. 7-1/2 or No. 9 "bird shot," the weapon can be employed with considerably less possibility of serious injury or death. This provides the commander with a desirable flexibility in selecting the ammunition most appropriate under the existing conditions. Regardless of the type of shot used, the shotgun, like any other firearm, constitutes "deadly force" which can be used only pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 6b. Positive control measures must also be established to ensure that when the shotgun is used, specific designation of the type of ammunition desired is made by the commander and adhered to without deviation by the individual soldier.
(e) The measures described in paragraphs 1 through 5 below, may be applied in any order as deemed suitable by the responsible commander as long as his application is consonant with prescribed confrontation management techniques outlined earlier.
1. Proclamation. A public announcement is considered an excellent medium to make known to a crowd intentions of the control force commander. In some cases, such an announcement makes further action unnecessary. An announcement puts the population on notice that the situation demands extraordinary military measures, prepares the people to accept military presence, tends to inspire respect from lawless elements and supports law-abiding elements, gives psychological aid to the military forces trying to restore order, and shows to all concerned the gravity with which the situation is viewed.
2. Show of Force. A show of force is effective in various situations in civil disorder control operations. When a crowd has gathered in an area, a show of force may take the form of marching a well-equipped, highly disciplined control force into their midst. When persons are scattered throughout the disturbance area in small groups, a show of force may take the form of motor marches of troops throughout the area, saturation patrolling, and the manning of static posts or similar measures.
3. Employment of Crowd Control Formations. Crowd control formations are used to break up massed mobs which do not react to orders of the control force instructing them to go peaceably to their homes. The use of such formations is part of the show of force and has a strong psychological effect on any crowd. While the use of fixed bayonets can add considerably to this effect, the danger of injury to nonviolent participants or fellow law enforcement personnel prevents such use in situations where troops are in contact with a nonviolent crowd.
4. Employment of Water. Water from a high pressure hose may be effective in moving small groups on a narrow front such as a street or in defending a barricade or roadblock. Personnel applying water should be protected by riflemen and in some cases by shields. In the use of water, the factors discussed below should be considered.
a. Water may be used as a flat trajectory weapon utilizing pressure, or as a high trajectory weapon using water as a rainfall. The latter is highly effective during cold weather.
b. The use of a large water tank (750 to 1,000 gallons) and a power water pump mounted on a truck with a high pressure hose and nozzle capable of searching and traversing will enable troops to use water as they advance. By having at least two such water trucks, one can be held in reserve for use when required.
c. In using water, as with other measures of force, certain restraints must be applied. Using water on innocent bystanders, such as women and children, should be avoided; ways to escape must be provided; and the more severe use, flat trajectory application, should be used only when absolutely necessary.
d. Fire departments are normally associated with lifesaving practices rather than maintenance of law and order. In order to maintain this image, fire department equipment will not be used for riot control and crowd dispersal.
5. Use of Crowd Control Agents. Crowd control agents are extremely useful in civil disorder control operations because they offer a humane and effective method of reducing resistance and lessen requirements for the application of more severe measures of force. Task force commanders are authorized to delegate the authority to use crowd control agents and other forms of nondeadly force at their discretion.
2. Establish Area Control.
a. General. Acts of violence, such as looting, arson, and vandalism, are greatly reduced when the physical and psychological influence of lawlessness is defeated. In establishing effective area control, commanders must recognize the problem of widespread looting and arson that has accompanied most large urban disorders. Performance of this task consists of reducing or eliminating those conditions which contribute to the outbreak or continuation of lawlessness in the disturbed area.
(1) Looting. When dealing with persons involved in looting, extreme care and adherence to the principle of minimum force must be observed. Looting may start at any time or place as an isolated incident and spread quickly throughout the affected areas. Looting is not limited to any particular sex or age group; it includes the very old, the very young, women, and children. For example, many children may be looting without any idea of how serious their actions are. In the control of looting, unit leaders must recognize that deadly force is not authorized.
(2) Anti-looting. Unit commanders must be familiar with anti-looting measures which can be taken by civil authorities, such as boarding up broken or unbroken windows, covering windows with photo-luminescent particles, and by the prompt posting of looting penalty proclamations. Anti-looting actions that can be taken by military forces include the establishment of foot and motor patrols, the posting of fixed guard posts, and the lighting of likely areas for looting. Guards at fixed posts will be briefed not to leave their posts to pursue individual looters on foot, but to remain on post and prevent looters from approaching their areas of responsibility. All guards must be briefed that looters will not be fired upon nor will deadly force be used to catch looters.
(3) Protected or Sensitive Commercial Establishments. A main consideration in the conduct of civil disturbance operations is to prevent liquor, drugs, weapons, and ammunition from falling into the hands of rioters. Therefore, liquor stores, drug stores, sporting good shops, pawn shops, and hardware stores are main targets for looters and must be kept under close observation by means of foot and motorized patrols. Normally, businesses of this type must be identified in advance and included in emergency plans.
(4) Arson. Arson is generally defined as a crime of purposely setting fire to a building or property. Acts of setting fire to buildings, property, etc., often follow disturbances. Certain situations may arise in controlling arson where the use of deadly force is authorized and necessary.
b. Area Control Techniques. The techniques (see figure 2-1) most suited to the task of area control include the following:
(1) Saturation Patrolling. Alert, aggressive patrolling deters the assembly of crowds, provides data on the developing situation, and creates a psychological impression that the control force is everywhere. Patrols are particularly valuable in preventing overt arson and for prompt reporting of fires and other violence. Whenever possible, patrols should be used with existing civil police patrols to concentrate forces and provide for a military/civilian communication capability. This gives the troops the advantage of early area familiarity and provides civil police aid to the military patrol members. Patrol routes for mounted and dismounted patrols should be varied, both as to patterns and times, to prevent snipers, arsonists, and looters from being able to select a safe time to conduct their activities. Patrol members must stick to proper standards of conduct and fair treatment of civilians at all times; they must realize that they are performing an important community relations function as well as a control function. Depending upon the nature and location of the civil disorder, several types of patrols can be used effectively.
(a) Motor Patrols. Because of their speed and mobility, motor patrols are able to provide the commander with timely ground reconnaissance, provide extended enforcement coverage, and respond to calls for aid from other patrols and guard posts. Radio communication should be maintained with the control force headquarters. Motor patrols may be used to make periodic contacts with foot patrols and stationary posts which may lack communication means. All motor patrols should be equipped with fire extinguishers with which they may put out small fires, thereby preventing larger fires and reducing the necessity for calling the fire department.
(b) Foot Patrols. Depending upon the degree of violence and extent of activity in the patrolled area, foot patrols may range from two- to four- or six-man elements or squad-size units. Foot patrols are more useful in areas where the population movement is heavy and/or the area to be patrolled is small. Foot patrols must be able to protect themselves and control a limited number of disorderly persons.
(c) Air Patrols. Air patrols can perform reconnaissance and surveillance missions over the disturbed area. They are an excellent means of providing timely data on the actions of dissidents, extent of damage, status of access routes, location and condition of road barriers, and other important data. They can help the commander in the direction of the overall control effort within the disturbed area.
(d) Water Patrols. Water patrols can be used where the disturbed area contains or is bordered by navigable water. Water patrols function in a similar manner to motor patrols.
(2) Imposed Restrictions. Except in the unlikely event of martial law, federal military forces will not have the authority to impose restrictions such as a curfew on the civilian population. Certain restrictions, however, may be imposed by civilian authorities to help in the control of lawlessness. Military leaders should be prepared to recommend which restrictions are of substantial value in comparison with the burden of enforcement. The most commonly used restrictions include:
(a) Curfew. The curfew is a control measure which has proved highly effective in many civil disturbances. Its purpose is to restrict the unauthorized movement of personnel on streets and public places during specified periods of time, especially during the hours of darkness. Joint planning with civil authorities regarding the imposition of a curfew should provide for:
1. Coordination of the initiation, enforcement, and termination of a curfew.
2. Public announcements of the beginning and ending of curfews. Civilian authorities make these announcements through local mass media, pamphlets, and public address systems to ensure maximum exposure.
3. Curfew exemptions and guidance on who should receive them, including written authorization or passes.
4. Provision for the apprehension and disposition of curfew violators.
(b) Sales Restrictions. Restrictions on the sale, transfer, and possession of sensitive material such as gasoline, firearms, ammunition, and explosives will help control forces in minimizing certain forms of violence. Limiting the availability of weapons to the potential sniper or terrorist may reduce the likelihood of such violence. The effective enforcement of these restrictions, however, requires extensive planning and the commitment of adequate manpower to this effort.
PART B - NEUTRALIZATION OF SPECIAL THREATS
1. General.
Lessons learned from past civil disturbances show that control forces will be frequently exposed to special threats which pose grave danger to both the control force and to the general community. Special threats include such acts as bombing and sniping. Three general steps are required to neutralize all special threats.
a. Take immediate action. The first concern is the person or the control force unit or team encountering a special threat, such as sniping, is personal safety and safety of others in immediate danger. Individual soldiers and control force leaders should be trained and rehearsed on the immediate action to be taken upon encountering sniping, a bomb threat, or an explosive device. The immediate action step specifically avoids a hastily attempted, disorganized response that will likely further danger the control force and the public.
b. Secure the area. Before the identified threat can be effectively neutralized, the danger area must be secured. The control force unit or team on the scene or reinforcements should be used to isolate the area to stop the escape of perpetrators and to prevent the influx of unauthorized personnel from the control force and from the general public. In addition, the entire area may have to be cleared of persons endangered by the threat. In the case of sniping, if evacuation of personnel from the danger area is not possible, warnings to seek cover should be issued using public address communications.
c. Employ special teams. Poorly trained and equipped control force personnel should not try to destroy a threat. Operations requiring the removal of a sniper from a barricaded position or the removal of an explosive device should be performed by selected teams of specially trained, specially equipped personnel. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units should be used to destroy explosive devices.
2. Bombs.
a. During civil disturbances, control forces should be trained to recognize fire bombs, pipe bombs, and other devices. They should also be trained and rehearsed in the immediate action necessary when discovering an explosive device. The actual destruction of the bomb should be accomplished by the EOD unit or civil police bomb unit. Two specific steps (See Figure 2-2) are required when an explosive device is found:
(1) Immediate Action. The individual soldier or control force unit or team that discovers an explosive device should:
(a) Take Cover. All personnel should immediately leave the area and seek cover wherever possible.
(b) Warn. Notify all personnel to clear the area.
(c) Report. Inform the appropriate personnel of the situation so that aid can be sent to the scene.
NOTE: DO NOT, AT ANY TIME, HANDLE THE DEVICE.
(2) Secure the Area. After the individual soldier or control force unit or team has taken the immediate action, steps should be taken to secure the area. If the control force unit or team is capable, they may be used to secure the area. The senior member of the element responsible for securing the area should consider the following:
(a) Isolate. Establish roadblocks or checkpoints as necessary to keep unauthorized personnel out of the area.
(b) Evacuate. Ensure that all personnel are out of the danger area.
(c) Alert. Notify fire and medical personnel and direct them to a staging area for quick deployment.
(d) Control Utilities. The close down of all gas, electric, and water service to the affected area should be accomplished by qualified personnel familiar with the utilities and the area.
b. The actual destruction and disposal of the explosive device should be accomplished by an EOD unit or civil police bomb unit. After the area has been secured, the EOD unit or civil police bomb unit should be escorted to the location of the device.
c. Bomb Threats. Bomb threats may increase during civil disturbances or during other times of tensions and crises. Frequently, warning calls or notice have been given when an explosive device has been actually planted to avoid loss of innocent lives. However, on occasion, cranks, deranged persons, or disgruntled soreheads may make threats or give fake notice following an actual explosion to cause activity or business to stop by forcing evacuation. If a fake call is successful in causing evacuation, more threats will follow. Safety must always be resolved in favor of evacuation. Most bomb threats are received by telephone operators in industry and educational facilities. It might also be expected that bomb threats will be received at rumor centers, police headquarters, and joint operational facilities during civil disorders. If possible, each facility should be provided with a telephone tracing capability. Telephone switchboard operators and others likely to receive bomb threats should be trained to accomplish the following:
(1) Activate the telephone tracer system.
(2) Discover and record through appropriate conversation with the caller:
(a) Bomb location.
(b) Time of explosion.
(c) Type of device, to include physical description.
(d) Sex, approximate age, and attitude of caller.
(e) Strange speech, accent, etc.
(f) Distinguishing sounds or background noises coming from the caller's location.
(g) Reason for the bomb placement.
NOTE: See Figures 2-3 and 2-4 for FBI Bomb Data Sheet.
(3) Inform the appropriate personnel of the threat (EOD or local police bomb unit).
d. Actions Upon Receipt of Bomb Threat. Upon receipt of a bomb threat, the responsible commander should accomplish the following:
(1) Alert. Notify the necessary control force elements, fire and medical service personnel, utilities personnel (water, gas, and electricity), and EOD units and direct them to report to a staging area near the threatened facility.
(2) Isolate. Establish roadblocks or checkpoints as necessary to keep unauthorized personnel out of the area. Isolation should take place at a safe distance from the area to prevent danger from an explosion.
(3) Evacuate. The senior occupant of the building makes the decision to evacuate. Control forces may only make a recommendation to evacuate. If the decision is made to leave, it should be done in an orderly fashion using a bomb evacuating plan, a fire plan, or appropriate announcements and directions to building occupants. Such a plan should name a building or area which provides shelter from the elements. Care must be taken not to create panic. Before leaving the building, occupants should check their immediate locations for any unusual or out-of-place objects or packages. Employees should be advised to take their briefcases, overcoats, and like items with them as they leave.
(4) Organize Search Elements. Selected occupants of the building (familiar with its layout) and control force personnel should be organized into search elements. They should be equipped with communications.
CAUTION: | THE USE OF RADIOS DURING THE SEARCH CAN BE DANGEROUS. THE RADIO TRANSMISSION ENERGY CAN CAUSE AN EARLY EXPLOSION OF AN ELECTRIC INITIATOR (BLASTING CAP). |
At first, searches should be made of public access areas such as utility areas, hallways, administrative areas, mess areas, outside of buildings, shipping or loading areas, vehicles parked near the facility, supply rooms, under stairwells, and accessible closets and storage areas. Suspicious objects or packages found during the search should be reported. They should not be handled. Even when a bomb is located, the search should continue since there may have been more than one bomb.
e. Whenever the bomb itself or a suspicious object or package is found, the EOD or civil police unit should be notified and used to destroy the bomb or suspect package. Further guidance in this subject area will be found in FM 19-30.
f. Arson is not usually the first of the special threats to happen. Arson itself is reasonably easy to handle in that fires can be seen and their size is readily definable. The following measures will help the control force in stopping arson, arresting arsonists, and limiting the damage resulting from both acts of arson and accidental fires.
(1) Preventive measures include convincing local members of the importance of security. This consists of selling them on the importance of creating a security atmosphere through the installation of lighting, alarms, gates, and other measures. Once a disorder has started, increased surveillance, through saturation patrolling, and stationary guard posts, and isolation of the affected area by the use of barricades and roadblocks will help in controlling arson. Patrols are especially effective in preventing overt arson, in giving notification of the location of fires and conducting spot checks of persons acting in a suspicious manner or searching for materials and devices used to set fires. Roadblocks and barricades reduce the movement of persons in the affected area and also provide an opportunity for searches of suspicious persons for materials and devices needed for arson. Control force commanders may find it helpful to develop lists of known and suspected arsonists from the files of civil law enforcement agencies and distribute this data to all control force personnel. Consideration should be given to forming specially trained teams or arson experts such as specialists from police, fire and insurance agencies to investigate promptly all acts of suspected arson and attempted arson and to help control forces at the scene of arson incidents.
(2) Weapons fire may be required to prevent acts of arson which would cause loss of human life or destruction of facilities vital to public safety and conduct of government. However, only the minimum necessary force should be used, and commanders are required to carefully supervise gun fire directed at arsonists.
(3) Some general methods for controlling the use of accelerants as starting devices for fires are as follows:
(a) Solicit active cooperation of vendors of various types of flammable liquids.
(b) Provide police protection to stations selling fuel in the disturbed area.
(c) Limit sale of gas in portable containers to 5 gallons.
(d) Protect gasoline supply in service stations abandoned because of civil disorders.
(e) Station auxiliary police in unattended fire stations.
3. Snipers.
a. Antisniping.
(1) Troops committed to civil disturbance control operations must be well-trained and rehearsed in the quick action that must be taken to stop sniper fire. Actual termination of the sniper should be accomplished by a special reaction team. The success of this team would depend upon the quantity and quality of prior planning and the proper preparation for handling such incidents. (See Figure 2-5)
(2) Immediate Action. The individual soldier or control force unit or team that encounters sniper fire should accomplish the following:
(a) Take Cover. All exposed personnel should immediately seek cover whenever possible.
(b) Warn. Notify all bystanders to clear the area or seek cover.
(c) Identify. Ensure that sniper fire has, in fact, been encountered. Automobile backfires, firecrackers, light flashes, accidental weapon discharges, random firing by control forces, or distance sounds of firing may all be misidentified as sniper fire at your position.
(d) Report. After verifying the sniper fire, inform the appropriate personnel of the situation so that help can be sent to the scene if required.
(e) Locate. Try to fix the exact position of the suspected sniper or snipers. Inform the special reaction team leader of the sniper's location.
(3) Do not, during any of the immediate action steps, return the fire unless a positively identified target is available and the requirements for the use of force can be met. If firing is necessary, it is accomplished by a selected marksman acting on orders from an officer or the senior person present and with instructions to shoot to wound. The military leader must make every effort to prevent a disorganized mass return of fire that will likely endanger innocent persons. When crowd control formations are being used,the threat of sniper fire increases. Members of the control force should be aware, however, that persons in the crowd may try to disrupt the formation by the use of loud noises, such as fireworks or bursting paper bags. Members of the control force should be alert to such tactics to prevent disruptions during attempts to maintain order.
b. Securing the Area. After the individual soldier or control force unit or team has taken immediate action, steps should be under-taken to secure the area. In most situations, however, it will be necessary to commit reserves or other control force elements. Regardless of what forces are used, the senior member of the element responsible for securing the area should accomplish the following:
(1) Isolate. Notify all control force units not committed to the termination of the sniper to stay clear of the danger area. Establish roadblocks or checkpoints to keep unauthorized personnel out of the area to block the escape routes of the sniper. Isolation should take place far enough away from the danger area to prevent exposure to sniper fire.
(2) Evacuate.
(a) When meeting a sniper in a lightly populated area or building, make an announcement advising residents to clear the area or building using a specific exit. Those personnel exiting the building or area should be screened and identified since the sniper may well be one of them. Witnesses and those suspected of involvement with the sniper should be detained. Some residents may be unwilling, unable, or afraid to leave the area or building. A second announcement should also be made advising the remaining residents to seek cover, remain still, and stay away from exposed areas and windows.
(b) When meeting a sniper in a heavily populated area or building where evacuation is impractical, make an announcement to warn all residents to seek cover, remain still, and stay away from exposed areas and windows.
(3) Observe. Establish observation posts on rooftops and in windows or adjacent high buildings. Communications should be provided to the observers. A selected marksman, under appropriate orders, may also be used with the observation posts.
(4) Support. Be prepared to provide necessary support to the special reaction unit. Such support may include:
(a) Establishment of a staging area for emergency and support equipment as well as for the team.
(b) Establishment of a command and communications center for the coordinated control of the operations.
(c) Control of crowds.
c. Employment of the Special Reaction Team. The actual search for and apprehension of a sniper is a difficult and dangerous operation. It should be performed by a special reaction unit which has been trained and equipped for such operations. The procedures outlined in this paragraph are suitable for the team or for other control force elements assigned to terminate sniping when a team is unavailable.
(1) Establishment of a Command Post. The command element of the team should establish a central location for the coordination of all elements. Communications should be set up and maintained with the force securing the area and with observation posts. In addition, continuous communications between the action and security elements must be maintained once they are deployed so that the progress of the search team can be monitored and so that the cover team does not mistake persons in the search team for the sniper.
(2) Deploy the Security Element. In order to observe sniper actions and all exits, the security element should be positioned outside the immediate area. In addition, the security element should establish a preferred route of entry into the area or building for use by the action element. The security element's selected marksman should be positioned at a location giving him the best possible observation and field of fire. If necessary, the selected marksman may fire at the sniper or snipers when they can be positively identified as snipers, when they are continuing fire, and when the requirements of the use of deadly force are met. This fire should be accomplished only by the selected marksman under the guidance and orders of the commander.
(3) Prepare the Action Element for Entry Into the Area or Building. Preparation should include:
(a) A briefing on the area or building through the use of maps, drawings, and knowledgeable residents.
(b) Equipment and communications checks.
(c) The issuance of an operations order.
(4) Prepare and Issue Warnings and Instructions to the Sniper. The sniper should be given enough time to surrender on his own.
(5) Attempt to Force the Sniper Into the Open. In open terrain or when meeting a sniper in a small unoccupied building, use crowd control agents in an attempt to force the sniper into the open where he can be taken into custody with less risk. Before using crowd control agents directly into the sniper's location, saturate the areas and rooms adjacent to the sniper. This will prevent him from using unaffected areas.
(6) If the sniper cannot be forced out, commit the action element to the area or building.
(a) When committing the action element to an open area, crowd control agents should be used to saturate the area prior to entry. The action element should enter the area on one side of the perimeter established by the cover element and then proceed through the area toward the other side of the perimeter.
(b) When committing the action element to a building, the following methods of entry can be used:
1. Entry at the top. Whenever possible, buildings are entered and searched from the top down. A sniper who is forced to the top may be cornered and fight desperately or escape over rooftops; one who is forced down to the ground level may try to withdraw from the building, leaving himself open to capture by the security element. Various means may be used to gain entry such as ladders, drainpipes, vines, toggle ropes, grappling hooks, roofs of adjoining buildings, or public utility vehicles designed for work on tall structures. Helicopters may also be used to deploy the action element on top of buildings.
2. Entry on middle floor. Sometimes it is impossible to enter a building at the top. In these instances, entry should be made at the highest possible point using the techniques described above. The floor on which entry is made should be thoroughly searched and secured first. The action element then moves to the top floor and searches from the top down.
3. Entry at the bottom. When entry must be made at the ground level, armored personnel carriers should be used to gain entry and provide protection. Smoke may also be used to hide movement. When entering single-story buildings, it may be preferable to use crowd control agents to saturate the building before the action element enters.
(7) Search the Area or Building. A systematic search for the sniper must be conducted.
(a) In an open area, the action element should maneuver and search under the protection of cover, firing only when necessary to protect life and property. Either the security element or the action element may use crowd control agents to aid the advance of the action element. Fire by selected marksmen may also be employed, if necessary. The "base of fire" technique (massed firepower) should NOT be used since it is destructive and creates hostility among innocent persons who suffer property damage or injury. The security element on the side of the perimeter where the action element entered the area should gradually close the perimeter as the action element moves forward. The security element on the opposite side should remain in position as the "noose" closes. The purpose of this action is to force the sniper to withdraw, leaving himself open to capture by the security element. The techniques used for terminating a sniper in an open area will require close coordination and communication between all elements involved.
(b) In an unoccupied building, when the sniper's location is not known, all rooms must be searched by at least two men. One man may throw a crowd control agent grenade, then enter quickly and place his back against the nearest wall. The second man follows and searches the room in detail. The action element leader should be kept informed of the progress made.
(c) In an occupied building, when the sniper's location is unknown, all suspected rooms must be searched. The action element should try to have occupants submit voluntarily to the search of their rooms. At the same time, occupants should be questioned in an attempt to pinpoint the sniper's location. If occupants will not submit voluntarily and there is probable cause to believe that the sniper is located in the room a search should be conducted as described above.
(d) In a building, occupied or not, where the sniper's location is known, the action element should proceed directly to the immediate area of the sniper's location. The rooms near the sniper's location should be checked first to ensure that the sniper has not moved. Once the rooms adjacent to the sniper have been cleared, crowd control agents should be introduced into the sniper's room by either the action element using bursting-type grenades or the security element using grenade launchers from the outside of the building. The door to the sniper's room should be opened or, if necessary, broken down. Before entering the room, allow time for the sniper to exit on his own. If he does not do so, proceed with caution into the room.
(8) Apprehend the Sniper. Whenever possible, the actual apprehension of the sniper is left to the civil police with help provided by military forces.
4. Integrated Tasks.
a. General. There are many additional tasks which must be fulfilled along with the five additional operational tasks. Some are more important than others and the following inclusions by no means exhaust the list of these integrated tasks. The extent of their use will depend on the nature of control force involvement in the civil disorder.
b. Specific Tasks.
(1) Gather, Record, and Report Data. Each functional element of the control force, regardless of size, acts as a source for providing vital data upon which commanders at all levels can base their decisions. Additionally, the requirements imposed for after-action reports, investigations, and other administrative or judicial actions make it desirable that detailed unit journals or logs be kept by each separate operating element. Consideration should be given to naming a person in each squad or platoon to act as a recorder for the purpose of keeping an accurate journal of the unit's activity. Personnel named to act as recorders should be equipped with appropriate recording devices and a camera as a minimum.
(2) Apprehend Law Violators. The apprehension of the individual law breaker is a vital function during confrontation management operations because of the legal consideration involved; however, civil police should make the actual apprehension whenever possible. When military forces detain or take a civilian into temporary custody he will be turned over to civil police as soon as possible. The apprehending individual will be required to complete DA Form 3316-R, Detainee Turnover Record, at the collection point. Use of this form is prescribed in the DA Civil Disturbance Plan. This form, when properly completed, can provide civil authorities with all the basic data required in case of prosecution. It further provides for proper control of those persons detained.
(3) Maintain Communications. Effective communications between all control force elements, both within the military chain of command and with other law enforcement agencies, must be assured. Radio equipment may require extensive interchange between military, state, and municipal agencies to provide for cross-agency communications. Other planning considerations are the provision for alternate means, such as commercial radios, pay telephones, and visual signals.
(4) Maintain Mobile Reserves. The control force commander and subordinate commanders must have the ability to respond to unexpected requirements and to influence adverse situations. To this end, mobile reserve forces should be set up and kept in readiness. Mobile reserves should be located at secure locations close to the disturbed area to permit employment within minutes. The reserve force must be reconstituted quickly upon commitment.
(5) Inform the Public. To deter the spread of rumors and false data, the control forces must ensure the public is informed of the true nature and purpose of the measures being imposed upon them. This is particularly important where dissident elements are known to be presenting false or distorted data. Procedures must be set up to give news media persons access to the disturbed area and to the facts; if they are denied this opportunity, their news coverage will likely be based on speculative or false data. Additionally, rumor control centers operated by the control force may be required to deter the spread of word-of-mouth rumors.
(6) Firefighting Task Operations.
(a) General. In many civil disturbances, the existence of destructive violence, particularly demonstrated by the setting of fires, requires that detailed consideration be given to the immediate and effective response designed to limit the effect of such destruction.
(b) Firefighting Task Forces. A primary factor in such a response will be the firefighting task force, which should be composed of a number of pieces of equipment and the required operational and security people. The concept is to provide a mobile force capable of moving rapidly, having enough equipment to quickly put out or contain large fires and then move on. In order for a task force to be efficient, the following considerations should be made:
1. A specific area of operation should be named.
2. Several task forces should be created.
(c) Security of Firefighting Task Forces. The primary mission of the firefighting task force is containing fires and due to that total commitment, the task force must depend on other agencies for its security. Firefighting personnel and equipment are extremely open to harassment and attacks by crowds or individuals. This mission of security will normally be assigned to military units which have been committed. When creating such a security force, two important areas must be addressed:
1. Size. The size of the force will depend upon several factors such as:
a. Size of the firefighting task force.
b. Level and amount of hostility found in the area of operation.
c. Available personnel and equipment that can be allocated to the mission.
2. Techniques. Methods of providing security will incorporate a number of concepts.
a. Mobility is a must and the best means to ensure this is to provide the security force with sufficiently equipped vehicles and communication equipment. Vehicles should have flashing, emergency lights to enable them to move safely or provide appropriate escort vehicles. Security personnel should never ride or position themselves on fire fighting equipment. The humanitarian (nonthreatening) image must be maintained in the public.
b. The following considerations should be observed at the fire scene:
The military unit leader should contact the senior fireman present and provide aid.
A protective cordon should be established around the fire service while it is operative. The cordon should face outward and personnel should be assigned areas of responsibility.
All vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the area should be blocked.
Observation posts should be positioned in any tall building to prevent sniper attacks.
Any hostile crowd activity should be controlled using appropriate crowd control techniques. If necessary, reinforcement should be promptly requested.
(7) Process detained personnel.
(8) Anti-looting measures.
(a) General.
1. Looting may start at any time or place as an isolated incident and quickly spread throughout the affected area. From previous civil disorder, looting of businesses has emerged as a problem calling for quick prevention action. Looting may take place at random throughout the time that an area is in turmoil.
2. From a previous discussion we know that looters are from all walks of life; young, old, male, and female. Again, emphasis is placed on the use of force which should be no more than necessary.
3. Lessons learned from various disorders have shown that looters will normally start with liquor stores, arms and ammunition stores, and drug stores. However, looters will also take such things as food, furniture, watches, rings, clothes, candy, television sets, major appliances, etc., whether they need them or not. Department stores may be looted and then burned in order to destroy records of money owed by the looters.
(b) Control of looting. The amount of force needed and the techniques used to control looting will vary considerably within the area of operation. As a general rule, looting should be stopped as quickly as possible to prevent it spreading to those who would not normally loot except when caught up in the actions of others. The following control measures will help in this objective:
1. Isolation and control of the affected area by use of barricades and road blocks to prevent looters from increasing in numbers.
2. Establishment of saturation patrolling and stationary guard posts within the affected area to prevent looting.
3. Quick arrest and removal of violators.
a. The techniques applied and the amount of force used will depend on the situation and the instructions issued to the commander. As a general rule, looters should not be fired upon merely to prevent their escape.
b. Looting can be expected to increase during hours of darkness. Therefore, favorite looting targets should be patrolled often and special night lighting should be used when and wherever possible to discourage open acts of looting. In addition, peak periods of looting activity should be carefully charted and increased efforts used during these times.
Practice Exercise