Military

(1) General. To be most effective, planning should be coordinated with local civil authorities to provide a complete coverage of all matters pertaining to operations and ensure that areas requiring joint efforts are properly considered. The provost marshal performs a key role in civil disturbance planning due to the mission of restoring law and order assigned a military force in confrontation management operations. His knowledge of police methods is particularly valuable to the commander and staff in their preparation to assist a community to restore law and maintain order. Considerations should be given to the provost marshal as a member of the advance party to further coordinate and represent the commander with civil police agencies. Planning is a continuing process involving personnel, correct information, logistics, and operational considerations. It provides for action to be taken before, during, and after disturbances. A military unit preparing for confrontation management duty passes through two general phases: the planning and training phase, and the alert phase.

(2) National Guard Units. During the planning phase, National Guard units which may be subject to call for duty should make the preparations prescribed in AR 135-100. Special attention must be given to the orientation of personnel with regard to their status when federalized.

(1) The alert plan should be based upon local conditions. It must be revised as a result of lessons learned and experience gained by rehearsals, or as necessary, to conform to changes in the alert plan of the next higher headquarters. It should include such items as:

(2) The alert plan must be thoroughly understood by every member of the unit. Each individual must know his duties, those of his next senior, and the unit's mission. He must be prepared to replace his next senior.

(1) Essentiality.

(2) Balance.

(3) Coordination.

(4) Flexibility.

(5) Efficiency.

(1) General. An important aspect of confrontation management is the great number of missions involved which creates the need for forces to engage in a variety of operations at the same time. This is a factor which must be thoroughly planned for and constantly evaluated in the development of an effective control force. The need for immediate decisions is great and the requirement for direct supervision is important; therefore, control must be decentralized. Commanders must develop small units capable of functioning as separate teams, as well as part of the overall force. These small units must be responsive to the changing situation and capable of immediate reaction based on the decisions of their leaders.

(2) Unit Integrity. To use small unit capability to the best advantage, organizational development should be based on unit integrity. For instance, for an infantry unit the squad should be considered the basic patrol unit; this gives a platoon (minus the weapons squad) the capabilities of a total of three 10-man patrols and the company (minus the weapons platoon) a total of nine. If smaller units are necessary, the fire team concept should be used. Other types of units may need to organize in a similar fashion.

(3) Decentralized Control. For proper development of decentralized control, clearly defined duties should be assigned to the lowest possible level and adequate authority given to the responsible person to permit him to do his job effectively.

(1) The ability to remain calm under physical, mental, and emotional strain.

(2) Respect all persons.

(3) Maintain an impartial, patient attitude.

(4) Be able to issue orders in a manner crowd members can understand.

(5) Must not show signs of fear.

(6) Be in a good physical condition.

(1) Morale and Welfare. Morale and welfare are areas of particular importance in planning for civil disturbance operations because of the restrictions imposed on the troops. Because control forces must perform their duties under great physical and mental stress, such services as rest and recreational facilities, postal services, religious activities, exchange services, special services activities, legal assistance, and financial services are extremely important. These services will help the continuance of high morale among confrontation management forces.

(2) Discipline, law, and order. Personnel planning must make provisions for maintaining discipline, law, and order. Guidelines must be published which clearly set forth standards of conduct and appearance expected of troops in the performance of their control mission. Their relationships with, and attitudes toward, civilians must be stressed.

(3) Personnel actions must be planned for, and administrative procedures developed, to meet requirements that result from the commitment of forces to confrontation management duty. This includes those actions required prior to commitment and those that can be reasonably expected to take place during the operation. Such items as care of dependents and personal property left at home station, handling of debts, emergency leave, sickness and injury, should be considered and provided for in personnel plans. To ensure that personnel matters are properly handled in the objective area, representatives of unit personnel section must accompany the control force.

(1) General. Confrontation management operations involve special consideration for logistical support. Logistical planning covers all phases of such operations from preparation and training to the end of the mission. Planners must include provisions for necessary supplies, services, and facilities, through local services, if necessary. These may include provisions for food and beverages, laundry, and sanitation facilities. Visits should be made to objective areas to determine logistical support sources and to coordinate provisions for that support.

(2) Equipment and Material.

(3) Unit-Accompanying Supplies. Preparation of unit-accompanying supplies and equipment is important for rapid reaction in emergency situations. Among the items which must be provided for are ammunition, food, water, gasoline, lubricants, spare parts, crowd control agents, maps, and administrative supplies. Unit-accompanying supplies should be developed with unit integrity in mind. A running inventory must be kept and complete inspections made as necessary. Based upon the characteristics of each item, a procedure for periodic exchange of certain items should be established. For example, crowd control agents, ammunition, foodstuff, and gasoline deteriorate in prolonged storage. Retention of unserviceable materials will have grave consequences in the event of an emergency. Further, ammunition should be kept apart by type. In the event of a late notification of weapons restrictions, the useless ammunition then can be separated prior to shipment.

(4) Transportation.

(5) Maintenance. Considerations should be given to expanding the existing maintenance capability of the unit. Particular attention should be given to replacement of windshields, tires, rearview mirrors, lights, and radio antennas. Coordination should be made with the field maintenance facility to establish maintenance and evacuation procedures after the unit is committed.

(6) Resupply. Definite procedures must be established for resupply in the objective area. Consideration should also be given to the establishment of logistical contact teams in the objective area. These contact teams should have direct communications with support units so that critical supplies can be obtained as soon as required with a minimum of delay. Priorities for requisitions should be established to afford the maximum response to requests for resupply.

(7) Loading Plans.

(8) Medical Facilities. Plans must provide for the provision of emergency medical attention to military personnel and civilians. Plans should provide for qualified personnel, ambulance service, medical and civilian, whenever possible.

(1) General.

(2) Movement. Movement to the main areas must be considered in developing operations plans. The disturbance control force is extremely weak during movement and could receive a substantial setback if rioters disrupt the movement route and debarkation points. Enroute security, to include aerial observation, must be provided at such places as over-passes, high buildings, and other vulnerable points. Further, the means of movement is critical to the success of the operation because of the time factor involved. Normally, troops will be committed to civil disturbance missions on extremely short notice and must arrive promptly if the disturbance is to be contained with minimal damage to property and injury to persons. Since rioters can apply tactics which will delay the arrival of troops, the most direct routes are selected which are least vulnerable. Alternate routes must be planned for.

(3) Assembly Areas. Movement planning must include the advance selection of areas for assembly of units and the accounting for personnel and checking equipment. Assembly areas should be sufficiently removed from the disturbed areas to preclude their being engulfed by the riotous element.

(4) Bivouac Areas and Billets.

(5) Command Posts. Locations for command posts should be selected in advance and plans prepared for staffing and equipping them with a minimum of delay. Consideration should be given to both the main command post and to tactical command posts within the various subdivisions where rioting is most likely to occur. Security measures must be taken to ensure command posts are not penetrted or overrun be unruly elements. Colloction of military and civil police command elements from highest to lowest level represents the best solution to the problem of command and control because of joint aspects involved. Consideration should be given to use of police precinct stations for collocated command posts because of their strategic locations throughout the entire area. Collocation of command posts in this manner facilitates continuing coordination between military and civil authorities.

(6) Army Aircraft. Operations planning includes consideration for the use of Army aircraft (helicopters and fixed-wing) for command and control, communications, observation, reconnaissance, enroute security, distribution of crowd control agents, controlling the movement of units, removing casualties, movement of troops, resupply, dropping leaflets, airborne loudspeaker broadcasting, and other appropriate requirements. Plans should include searchlight-equipped observation helicopters to be used in organizing ground patrols to ensure complete coverage day and night.

(1) Civil disturbance plans must include provisions for furnishing commanders in the area of operations with the personnel and equipment resources necessary to conduct information activities.

(2) Plans should provide for the use of printing and reproduction facilities to reproduce material developed by the staff (fact sheets, troop newspapers, orientation materials).

(3) In order for press relations to run smoothly, plans should provide for:

(4) To keep troops informed, plans should include:

(5) Battalion and larger size units in the area of operation must be capable of:

(1) General.

(2) Collection.

(1) Troops involved in civil disturbance duty require training to adjust themselves to the noise and confusion created by large numbers of people facing them. Countless other elements contribute greatly to anxieties and tensions. Our personnel are people very similar to the crowd in many respects. Therefore, we must be interested in their behavior.

(2) The individual soldier may be shouted at, insulted, or called abusive names. They must learn to ignore these taunts and not allow personal feelings to interfere with the fulfillment of their mission. In addition, troops can expect objects to be thrown at them, but must learn to avoid these objects; they must never throw objects back. Troops should understand that the well-disciplined fulfillment of orders is the most effective force applied against troublemakers. They must be instructed in all aspects of self-control so they may be mentally prepared for participation in civil disturbance operations.

(3) Psychological influences.

(1) Unit training must cover all aspects of civil disturbance operations and should entail more than developing mechanical skill in crowd control formations. Training should emphasize protection of fire-fighters, their equipment, residents of the area, and other people trying to control the disturbance. Training shall also include techniques of operations in those areas where you are most likely to be used, as well as procedures for neutralizing special threats.

(2) Generally speaking, the basic unit training objectives are:

(2) Military personnel should be instructed not to ask questions at the scene. No questions should be asked of the suspect other than identification inquiries such as name, place of residence, or place of employment. Questioning pertaining to the incident could create legal complications which might prevent a subsequent conviction.

(3) Personnel must promptly report to their superiors, follow-up in writing all important data concerning the detention of civilians, including the names and locations of witnesses. (DA Form 3316-R, Detainee Turnover Record, may be used for this purpose. See figure 1-1.) Photographs taken at the scene and attached to the report are very valuable for identification purposes and for later use in court testimony. The report should be retained at the appropriate headquarters, and used as a basis for preparing a report to the civil police. Any physical evidence obtained, together with evidence tags and receipts completed as required, will be delivered with the detained person.

(4) Violators must be treated fairly and impartially. Minimum force necessary should always be a guiding principle. Consideration must be given to the safety of innocent bystanders, the seriousness of the incident, and the weapons of the violators. Attitudes and commands are especially important. An offender may respond to firm statements regarding the disadvantage to him of further action. If the desired response is obtained, the apprehension or detention should be made using clear and concise commands with the exercise of due caution and vigilance.

(1) It is important that military commanders give special consideration to the proper procedures in handling detainees even though this problem normally is the primary concern of civil authorities. The large numbers of offenders which may be apprehended or detained in an area of civil disorder poses a special problem for disturbance control forces. If time permits, prior formal arrangements concerning details of handling civilians taken into custody should be made; if this cannot be done, arrangements should be formalized at the earliest possible time.

(2) Detainees should be quickly processed and removed from the scene of the arrest. This procedure should include a quick search, out of sight of onlookers, if possible. They should then be separated prior to removal from the area. The separation is based on the amount of custody needed to secure the detainee, sex, and age. Injured prisoners must be removed to medical facilities. Female personnel must be provided to search female detainees. It is especially important that names and addresses of witnesses be recorded by apprehending or detaining personnel.

(1) The Army will not operate facilities for confinement, custody, or detention of civilian personnel apprehended for violation of local or state laws as long as civil confinement facilities, operated by the Department of Justice, state, or local agencies are sufficient to accommodate the number of persons apprehended.

(2) When it appears that available local facilities are insufficient, due to the large number of persons apprehended or detained, and this fact can be verified by the person or agency responsible for the facilities, temporary confinement/detention facilities may be operated with prior approval from DA, specifically, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. These facilities will be operated only until custody of the persons detained can be transferred to and assumed by civil authorities. They will not be used for the confinement of persons charged or convicted under civil jurisdiction.

(3) Temporary confinement/detention facilities can be developed from local federal facilities provided they are adaptable to the requirements of custody and control. Such facilities should be established, if possible, within the affected area; this will conserve time, transportation, and escort personnel. However, if no suitable federal property is available within the affected area, they can be located elsewhere on any property under federal control as long as the persons to be detained are apprehended in the affected area. Whenever such temporary facilities are established during civil disturbance control operations, the Army is responsible for providing those personnel, facilities, and supplies necessary for the custody, control, health, comfort, and sustenance of persons detained.

(4) Officers and key NCOs specifically trained and experienced in confinement operations are required to operate such facilities. Guards and support function personnel operating under the direct control of such officers and NCOs need not be specifically trained or experienced in confinement operations as long as they are under close and continuing supervision of trained responsible personnel. Whenever females are detained, they must be held in physically separate detention facilities and under the control of selected female guards operating under the supervision of trained and experienced confinement personnel.

(5) Temporary detention facilities should be constructed and arranged to provide for adequate custody, control, and safety of detainees. It is advisable to use existing permanent-type buildings. Where sufficient permanent structures are not available, only that amount of new construction required for temporary custody, control, and administration of prisoners should be accomplished. Temporary field-type facilities provide compartments to assure effective control.

(6) The same operational procedures that apply to the operation of installation confinement facilities and treatment of detainees apply to these temporary facilities except that those policies and procedures establishing training, employment, mail and correspondence, and administrative discipline requirements will not apply. Detailed guidance in procedures for confinement of detainees is contained in AR 190-2 and FM 19-60.

(1) General. Certain items of equipment available to military and civil police forces can do much to limit injuries to civilian and military personnel and destruction of property. These items increase the psychological effects of a show of force and offer additional protection and versatility to civil disturbance forces during the operations.

(2) Weapons. As outlined in FM 19-15 and GTA 21-2-7.

(3) Vehicles. Armored vehicles and transport vehicles add to the readiness of the crowd control force. The use of these vehicles increases flexibility, reduces troop commitments, and provides protection for personnel. In considering the use of vehicles, however, it must be remembered that they should be secured by foot elements.

(4) Other Equipment. In addition to the special equipment discussed above, certain other items should be available for use in operations within the disturbance area.

(2) Perimeter Patrols. Perimeter patrols should be established to prevent entry or exit from the disturbed area, particularly by persons or groups trying to bypass barricades and roadblocks. These patrols operate along the outer operational boundary of the disturbed area. Perimeter patrols can be integrated with area patrol routes within the disturbed area.

(3) Pass and Identification Systems. Unit, installation, or municipal contingency planning should include a pass and identification system providing for the entry and exit of authorized personnel to and from the isolated area. Procedures should be established for press personnel, emergency medical personnel, public utility work crews, and for any other personnel who have a legitimate purpose for entering and exiting the isolated area. Consideration must be given to those persons residing within the disturbed area who must travel to and from work. An effective pass and identification system requires careful and detailed planning as a contingency measure.

(4) Public Utility Control. Ensure that civil authorities have established a means for controlling public utilities to include street lights, gas, electric, water, and telephone services so that they may be turned on or off to support the tactics employed by the control forces.

(1) The degree of security necessary to protect various buildings and utilities is determined by considering the following:

(1) Use of Personnel. This category includes employment of sentinels, walking guards, and checkpoints. Military personnel used in this manner should be committed jointly with existing guard forces from the protected facility or agency. Consideration should be given to the possibility of increasing existing guard forces capability with additional equipment. When manning fixed security posts, guard teams must be of sufficient size to fulfill their mission and protect themselves until help arrives; however, availability of reserve forces in lieu of stationary guards should be considered in an effort to conserve guard forces

(2) Use of Material. This category includes use of perimeter barriers, protective lighting and alarm systems, and intrusion detection devices. These are designed to deter and detect intruders and/or to slow down access to a facility by unauthorized personnel. Various measures of this type may or may not be in effect at the time of the civil disturbance. Military emergency planning should anticipate the requirement for the quick employment of additional physical security measures.

(1) A briefing on the area or building through the use of maps, drawings, and knowledgeable residents.

(2) Equipment and communications checks.

(3) The issuance of an operations order.

(1) Enter at the top when possible.

(2) If entry at the bottom is necessary, an armored personnel carrier should be used.

(1) In an open area, the action element should maneuver and search under the protection of cover, firing only when necessary to protect life and property. Either the security or action element may use crowd control agents to aid the advance of the action element. The security element on the opposite side should remain in position as the noose closes. The purpose here is to force the sniper or other dissidents to withdraw making themselves vulnerable to capture by the security element. The techniques used for neutralizing dissidents/snipers in an open area will require close coordination and communication between all elements involved.

(2) In an apparent unoccupied building the patrol dog should be used whenever possible. A well-trained patrol dog with its highly developed sense of smell can pinpoint the location of a dissident/sniper quickly and with a minimum of risk to members of the search force. When the patrol dog is not available, each room should be searched by at least a two-man team. One may throw a crowd control agent grenade in, wait for it to discharge, then enter quickly and place his back against the nearest wall. The second person follows and searches the room in detail. If available, a third person remains in the corridor to ensure that the suspect does not move from room to room while the two others are conducting their search. The action element leader should be kept informed of the team's progress. When using riot control agents to help in the clearing of a building, grenades of the nonburning type should be used to avoid the possibility of fire.

(3) In an occupied building, when the dissident's/sniper's location is unknown, all suspected rooms must be searched. The action element should try to have occupants submit voluntarily to the search of their rooms. At the same time, occupants should be questioned in an attempt to pinpoint the sniper's location. If occupants will not submit voluntarily and there is probable cause to believe that the dissident/ sniper is located in the room, a complete physical search of the room or rooms should be conducted. Use of the patrol dog will help in conducting such searches.

(4) In a building occupied or not, where the dissident's/ sniper's location is known, the action element should proceed directly to the immediate area of that location. If the dissident/sniper refuses to exit voluntarily, crowd control agent grenades should be thrown or projected into the room from the outside by the security forces. If this is not practical, the door should be opened or broken down and crowd control agent grenades thrown into the room. If crowd control agents cannot be used, the patrol dog in his attack role can again be effectively used in subduing and capturing the dissident/sniper with a minimum of risk to the search element.