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LESSON 5

ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLEFIELD AREA AND INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)

LESSON DESCRIPTION: In this lesson you will learn to apply IPB principles to the analysis of the battlefield area.

Terminal Learning Objective:

INTRODUCTION

The analysis of the battlefield area is a detailed comprehensive study with emphasis on weather and terrain data designed to enable the commander to determine the effects of the battlefield area on the enemy. It may include information about the people in the area, their economy, sociology, religion, and psychology. Its preparation is the responsibility of the intelligence officer, although other staff officers assist in its preparation. The analysis includes use of intelligence to serve as a basis for development of specific friendly courses of action and enemy capabilities (courses of action) in the commander's estimate, the operations estimate, the intelligence estimate, and other staff estimates. The analysis is oriented on the mission of the command with limiting considerations such as operational environment, time, and boundaries.

PART A - ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLEFIELD AREA

The G2 has primary staff responsibility for initiating, coordinating, and ensuring completion of the analysis of the battlefield area and the intelligence estimate. Other staff sections contribute within their respective fields. Primary contributions include:

• The engineer's terrain study.
• The SWO climatological studies and weather forecasts.
• The civil-military operations or G5s information on sociology, politics, economics, psychology, technology, and local labor conditions.
• The unconventional warfare officer's information from areas not under the control of friendly forces.

The G2 uses other sources such as area studies, periodicals, the US Army Institute for Military Assistance, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to prepare the analysis of the battlefield area. The analysis of the battlefield area is begun well in advance of hostilities. It focuses on each contingency area for which the command is tasked or anticipates tasking. IPB proceeds concurrently with the preparation of the analysis of the battlefield area, with each contributing to the other. The G2 ensures there is no duplication of effort between the analysis of the battlefield area and IPB. The weather and terrain analyses in IPB can provide data to fully support subparagraphs 2a, 2b, and 3a of the analysis of the battlefield area (see Figure 5-1). FM 101-5 presents this format and includes a general description of the contents of each element. When the pre-hostility IPB analysis nears completion, the G2 uses all available data and analyses to determine the effects of the characteristics of the battlefield area on both friendly and anticipated enemy courses of action.

On receipt of an order to implement a contingency plan, the intelligence officer reevaluates the analysis. After the commander has reached a decision and issues a concept of operations, the analysis of the battlefield area may require refinement because of the adopted course of action. As the operation progresses, changes in mission or receipt of additional or more accurate information may require a revision of the analysis of the battlefield area. The commander allocates AOs to subordinate units based on METT-T and the unit's capability. A written analysis is usually completed only at corps and EAC to support projected operations. At division, a written analysis may be prepared for projected operations (such as airborne operations) to be carried out at great distances. However, most division operations will use the corps analysis of the battlefield area supplemented by IPB information pertinent to the division.

Figure 5-1. Analysis of the Battlefield Outline.

PART B - THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The intelligence estimate is one of the major end products of the intelligence officer's activities. The collection and processing of information are oriented toward the intelligence estimate. The estimate brings together significant aspects of the area of operation (AO) and the enemy situation. It presents, analyzes, and discusses the enemy capabilities, weaknesses, and strengths, the relative probability of the enemy's adoption of courses of action open to him, and enemy vulnerabilities that can be exploited. With the intelligence estimate, the commander can balance these factors against all possible courses of action and chose the most favorable one.

The intelligence officer may present estimates orally or in writing. At corps and EAC, most estimates are written. The division uses both oral and written presentation, depending on the immediacy. Levels below division normally use oral presentation. Regardless of the manner of preparation and presentation, the intelligence officer bases the estimate, as far as practice, on a prescribed format. Paragraph 2 of the intelligence estimate contains an abbreviated version of the AO analysis. See Figure 5-2 for IPB as a systematic approach to analyzing the enemy, weather and terrain in a specific geographic area. It integrates enemy doctrine with the weather and terrain as they relate to the mission and the specific battlefield environment. This is done to determine and evaluate enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action.

Figure 5-2. Intelligence Estimate Outline.

Figure 5-3. IPB Steps.

IPB supports the entire planning and operations process and is normally initiated upon receiving the mission (see Figure 5-3). Other staff elements use the information and products derived from the IPB process to complete their estimates of the situation. Through the IPB process, the commander applies and maximizes his combat power at the critical point on the battlefield.

• Step 1. Define the Battlefield Environment. The G2 identifies those characteristics of the battlefield influencing friendly and threat operations. The G2 and G3 establish the limits of the area of interest (AI). He identifies gaps in current intelligence holdings. The definition and establishment of the AI includes the geographical area from which information and intelligence are required to permit planning or successful conduct of the operation. The knowledge derived from the review of the battlefield environment allows the G2 to begin the initial collection process in support of the operations. The AI must consider the electronic dimension. Depending on echelon, this may include: fixed ES or EA sites that support threat operations or airfields that support ES and EA aircraft.
• Step 2. Describe the Battlefield's Effects. The G2, in coordination with the G3 engineer coordinator (ENCOORD), analyzes and describes the effects of the battlefield environment (e.g. weather and terrain) on both friendly and enemy capabilities. This step includes the resources and input from the staff weather office (SWO), the G3 ENCOORD, and the division terrain team.

The SWO keys information to the equipment found in friendly and enemy forces. The SWO provides information to the G2 on the impact of weather to the operation. The SWO provides weather analysis and forecasting of threat airfields that may not be within the physical limits of the AI but may still pose a threat to the command. Although not required, having a SWO with an SCI security clearance helps the G2 staff. For example, the SWO could brief the G2 or assist analysts in a SCIF (sensitive compartmented intelligence facility); this facilitates the IPB process (and other intelligence operations).

The engineer coordinator (ENCOORD) is the special staff officer, the commander of the engineer unit, provides a terrain-visualization folder to determine the terrain's effects on both friendly and enemy operations. He coordinates with the G2 for planning and distribution of maps and terrain products, but is responsible for producing them.

The engineer terrain team provides analysis of items such as soil, bridges, water, and fording sites. The terrain team provides unique overlays for use by the intelligence analysts in determining avenues of approach, axis of advance, and mobility corridors. Terrain analysts also identify possible enemy and friendly helicopter landing or pickup zones, optimal sites for division support areas, line-of-sight overlays. The terrain team has a historical database from which to draw information for their products. Additionally, they have numerous automated tools (such as the multi-spectral imagery processor (MSIP), or the digital terrain support system, (DTSS)) for the mass production of specific terrain overlays. The G2 can request specific sets of overlays or image maps at the standard map scale for each of the division's contingency areas. By having this work done prior to an event or operation the G2 quickly provides these products to the division units.

The products from the SWO and the terrain team, in Step 2 of the IPB process, eliminate some of the guesswork in predicting the effects of the weather and terrain on friendly and enemy forces. They also provide these products to assist division units (e.g. S2 uses base map and overlays developed by the terrain team to define mobility corridors, landing zones (LZs), drop zones (DZs), and other tactical locations).

• Step 3. Evaluate the Threat. In this step the G2 and the ACE analyze the division's current intelligence holdings to determine how the threat doctrinally operates and organizes. When facing a well- organized threat, this step may be relatively simple. That may not be the case, as in stability and support operations (SASO) (formerly LIC, OOTW, or MOOTW), when the threat is unorganized or less known. The ACE develops doctrinal templates for each of the threat capabilities. These doctrinal templates provide the G2 and the ACE a point from which to develop the threat model. This threat model carries over to the war game process so it should be as realistic as possible. These threat models or doctrinal templates are not constrained by weather or terrain. The model must include an evaluation of the entire enemy operating systems.

The AS-WS of the ASAS has the capability to develop the situation template. The analyst develops doctrinal template overlays and then places it over the map. Units are moved around based upon threat tactics and the geography of area.

• Step 4. Determine Threat COAs. This step integrates the information determined within the three previous steps. The end result is a picture of how the enemy will most likely execute a course of action based upon the constraints of weather, terrain, and time. In this step the ACE (specifically the ASC) develops threat COAs. These COAs are recorded and event templates and matrixes are developed for use during the war game. The situational template (SITTEMP) threat model developed during IPB and mission analysis drives the decision making process. Model accuracy is dependent on the quality of effort accomplished in the first three steps of the IPB process.

There is no limit to the number of COAs that an ACE can develop. However, COAs should be limited to four. It is highly unlikely that more than four COAs apply for a given threat or area. By developing more, the G2 will only be providing the G3 with branches and sequels of the three or four most likely COAs.

The products of IPB prepared by a division G2 will only partially satisfy the requirements of most other staff sections and subordinate units. At the very least, these products must be refined to meet the particular needs of the staff or unit that will use them. In many cases, a unit's S2 will spearhead all necessary supplemental IPB products.

Specialized IPB emphasis is particularly important to units outside the combat arms. These units require a slightly different focus in the application of the IPB process to their mission requirements. For example, in an aviation unit, the weather intelligence needs to focus on factors like:

• Density altitude effects on performance and payload.
• Weather effects on threat air defense systems.
• Effects of wind speed and turbulence on flight operations, especially in close terrain.
• Restricting effects of low ceilings in air Assembly Areas.

PART C : IPB AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

Commanders and staffs use the decision-making process to select a course of action (COA) and develop a course of action and develop and operations plan (OPLAN), operations order (OPORD) or fragmentary order (FRAGO) that implements it. The results and products of IPB, conveyed in the intelligence estimate, are essential elements of the decision-making process. Accordingly, the major IPB effort occurs before and during the first five steps in the decision making process.

The decision-making process is a dynamic and continuous process. The staff continues to estimate the situation as the operation progresses, adapting the command's COA to unforeseen changes in the situation. The IPB which supports the decision-making process must also remain dynamic, constantly integrating new information into the initial set of facts and assumptions.

Mission Analysis. In this step IPB products enable the commander to assess facts about the battlefield and make assumptions about how friendly and threat forces will interact on the battlefield.

The description of the battlefield's effects identifies constraints on potential friendly COAs and may reveal implied missions. It also identifies opportunities the battlefield presents, such as avenues of approach, engagement areas, and zones of entry, which the staff integrates into potential friendly COAs and their staff estimates.

Enemy capabilities and vulnerabilities identified during evaluation of the threat allow the commander and staff to make assumptions about the relative capabilities of the friendly command. Threat evaluation also provides the detailed information on the threat's current disposition, recent activities, equipment, and organizational capabilities the staff needs to complete their own staff estimates and planning.

Enemy COA models developed in step 4 of the IPB process (Determine Threat COAs) provide a basis for formulating potential friendly COAs and complete the intelligence estimate.

The IPB process identifies any critical gaps in the command's knowledge of the battlefield environment or threat situation. As part of the initial planning guidance, the commander uses these gaps as a guide to establish his initial training requirements.

Develop Courses of Action. The staff develops friendly COAs based on facts and assumptions identified during IPB and mission analysis. Incorporating the results of IPB into COA development ensures that each friendly COA takes advantage of the opportunities the environment and threat situation offer and is valid in terms of what they will allow.

Analyze and Compare COAs. During the wargaming session the staff "fights" the threat COAs, developed in step 4 of the IPB process, against each potential friendly COA. Targeting conferences follow the wargaming session to refine selected HVTs from the enemy COA models into high-payoff targets (HPTs) that support the friendly COA. See Figure 5-4 on how G2/S2 products support the IPB process.

Figure 5-4. How G2/S2 supports the decision-making process.

Based on the results of wargaming, for each potential friendly COA, the staff—

• Constructs a decision support template (DST) and its associated synchronization matrix.
• Identified supporting intelligence requirements.
• Refines the enemy COA models and event templates and matrices, focuses on the intelligence required to execute the friendly COA.
• Arranges the threat COA models in order of probability of adoption.
• Identifies the most dangerous COA.
• Refines the friendly COA, to include identifying the needs for branches and sequels.
• Determines the probability of success of the friendly COA.

The results of wargaming each potential friendly COA against the set of enemy COA models allows the staff to make a recommendation on the best friendly COA. The G2/S2s recommendation includes an evaluation of the intelligence system's ability to provide the intelligence needed to support each COA.

Decision. Following staff recommendations, the commander decides upon a COA and issues implementing orders. He also approves the list of intelligence requirements associated with that COA and identifies the most important as priority intelligence requirements (PIR). The command's collection manager uses the results of IPB to develop and implement a collection plan that will satisfy these requirements.

Execution. As intelligence confirms or denies planning assumptions on the battlefield environment or the threat's COA, a continuous IPB process identifies new intelligence requirements. As the battle progresses, IPB is used to continuously evaluate the situation facing the command, bringing new iterations of the decision making process and the directing step of the intelligence cycle.