scope

APPENDIX G

INDICATES OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION

(Extracted from FM 34-3)

Indicators are any positive or negative evidence of enemy activity or any characteristic of the BA that points toward enemy capabilities, vulnerabilities, or intentions. Individual indicators cannot stand alone. Each indicator must be integrated with other factors and indicators before patterns can be detected and enemy intentions established.

Indicators are developed by the ASSISI analysts who are assisted by other TOC elements in the G2 or S2 section. All indicators are developed to answer the commander's PIR and IR. The analyst uses indicators to correlate particular events or activities with probable enemy courses of action. Indicators are also used to determine what events or activities must occur for any enemy to follow a particular course of action. The ability to read indicators (including recognition of enemy deception indicators) contributes to the success of friendly operations.

Enemy deception operations provide indicators in an attempt to create false or misleading patterns of enemy intentions. Analysts must be able to detect these false indicators and then determine what actual courses of action the enemy is attempting to initiate. Enemy attempts at deception can be discovered by comparing indicators, intelligence, and combat information from all sources to arrive at an accurate picture of the battlefield.

The following list contains different types of intelligence indicators. This list of indicators is by no means complete, nor is it intended to apply to all situations or all types of enemy forces. It gives some types of indicators which, when incorporated with other indicators, can create patterns or suggest a series of activities which point to typical enemy activities or courses of action.

ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Massing of motorized elements, tanks, artillery, and logistical support.	Areas of secondary importance are often denuded to mass maximum strength the main effort.
Deployment of combat element (motorized rifle, armor, antitank) echelons on a relatively narrow frontage.	Normal attack formation provides for the second echelon of the regiment to be located 5-15 kilometers in the rear of the first echelon, on-line; and the division second echelon 15-30 kilometers in the rear of the first echelon.
Forward units disposed on relatively narrow fronts and depths.	A MRRs breakthrough zone is from 2-4 kilo meters within an assigned attack frontage, which varies from 3-8 kilometers. MRR headquarters located approximately 4 kilometers from the FLOT during normal attack posture.
Concentration of mass toward either or both flanks within first echelon defensive area.	Single or double envelopment normally is attempted in the offense. Tanks and motorizedunits on either or both flanks may indicate single or double envelopment.
Demonstrations and feints.	Local, small-scale attacks or demonstrations involving motorized rifle units, tanks, and artillery frequently precede a general attack.
Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen.	Counterreconnaissance screens are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of troop movement,or regrouping of forces to be used in the attack.
Forward movement of hostile units.	Before launching an attack, troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy.
Increased patrolling (ground reconnaissance).	Patrolling by motorizes rifle units usually is more active before an attack.
Forward CPs located close to the FLOT. Other CPs move forward.	Preceding an attack, an auxiliary CP is established, if needed, by Army/Front. The division main CP is located 5-15 kilometers from the FLOT; the regiment main CP is located 2-3 kilometers from the FLOT; and the battalion CP/OP islocated 500-1,000 meters from the FLOT.
Locating division-sized operational maneuver group at Army; Army-sized OMG at front.	OMGs are formed preceding an offensive operation. They are generally (OMG) committed before the conclusion of the 1st echelon battle and operate independently of the main forces.OMG use a separate axis of advance from the main body.
Massing of artillery units.	Larger than normal RAGs, DAGs, and AAGs indicate initiation of main attack. enemy norms are 60-100 tubes per kilometer of frontage against well-prepared defenses for main attack; 60-80 tubes per kilometer of frontage against hasty defenses for main attack; and 40 tubes per kilometers frontage for secondary attack. The RAG is usually located 1-4 kilometers from the FLOT; the DAG usually 3-6 kilometers from the FLOT; and the AAG is usually more than 6 kilometers from the FLOT. TMS-65 are within 4 kilometers of the FLOT for smoke operations.
Extensive artillery preparation of upto 50 minutes in duration.	The offense is built around the striking power and shock of massed artillery. Preparations of 1/2 to 1 hour normally precede an offensive.
Dispersal of tanks and self-propelled howitzers to units.	Tanks accompanying leading waves of assault motorized units--with motorized self-propelled howitzers following the tanks closely, by bounds.
Movement of fire/missile control radars forward.	Enemy surface-to-air missile (SAM) control radars require time to be set up and oriented. The enemy prefers to establish SAM capability before moving other forces forward. In the event of the arrival of the second echelon, control radars are established to allow for an overlap of coverage as the first echelon moves their SAM radars forward in the offense.
FROG/SS-21/SS-23/SCUD units located forward.	Enemy offensive operations also occur in-depth. Forward movement of surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) puts friendly airfields and depots in jeopardy.
ZSU-23-4s located inforward areas (2 to 4).	Medium air defense guns are displaced before attack to protect assault forces and to facilitate forward displacement during the attack. ZSU 23-4s protecting the RAG are approximately 1.25 kilometers to the rear of the FLOT.
Increased air reconnaissance.	Air reconnaissance usually is more active before an attack.
Systematic air bombardment.	Before the attack, the enemy may engage in the systematic "softening up" of key positions by bombardment.
Establishment of auxiliary airfields or activation of inactive air fields.	Buildup of logistics and maintenance capability indicates increased capability support offense.
Clearing lanes through obstacles within own position.	Lanes are cleared and marked through mined area, and ramps and bridges prepared over ditches and trenches within enemy's own position. This is done before attack to facilitate forward movement and grouping, particularly at night.
Reconnaissance and destruction of obstacles that are part of our defenses.	Usually on the night preceding an attack, enemy patrols reconnoiter friendly obstacles to determine a plan for clearing lanes. The patrol destroys only such obstacles that will not disclose the direction of the main attack.
River assault crossing units located forward (providing there is a water obstacle).	Amphibious, bridge, and other engineer units with water-crossing capabilities are located near the FLOT and also echeloned to the rear. They are also collocated with other tactical units of the attacking force.
Airborne/airmobile/air assault attacks on our rear area.	The enemy conducts offensive operations throughout the depth of the defense. Heliborne attacks are also made to facilitate difficult operations, like river-crossings.
Increased enemy agent activity in rear area.	The enemy attempts to prevent or disrupt the forward movement of friendly supplies, equipment, maintenance, and reinforcements.
Extensive efforts to destroy nuclear storage areas and delivery systems by air, artillery, and sabotage.	Enemy doctrine calls for the elimination of friendly nuclear weapons by any means.The enemy considers that we are more likely to use nuclear weapons when we are in the defense.
Movement of noncombatants out the combat zone.	Noncombatants hinder rapid forward movement of follow-on forces.
Conducting drills and rehearsals rear areas.	Major attacks may be preceded by in drills or rehearsals. This is particularly true of attacks against fortified positions or strongly defended river lines.
Increased activity in rear areas.	Before an attack, supply and administrative activities increase in the rear areas.
Traffic control units marking routes to the FLOT.	Traffic control points are employed throughout the march routes to facilitate march formations. Allied border guards assist by controlling traffic through the barrier areas of the borders.
Forward placement of supply and evacuation installations.	Supply and evacuation installations usually are well forward for an attack. Technical observation points are established close to the FLOT. Repair and evacuation groups are located at assembly points close to the FLOT to repair/evacuate damaged vehicles. The division supply dump (ammunition, petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL), ration) is located 25-30 kilometers from FLOT. The regimental ammunition supply point is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT; the regimental repair points is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT; the regimental POL point is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT, and the regimental rations point is located 10-15 kilometers from the FLOT. Battalion ammunition and rations supply points are located 4 kilometers from the FLOT. The division repair point for wheeled vehicles is located 10-14 kilometers from the FLOT. Rear control points for the front are located 150-200 kilometers from the FLOT; for the Army are 25-40 kilometers from the FLOT; for the division is 20 kilometers from the FLOT; and for the regiment are 20 kilometers from the FLOT.
Location of maintenance parties lateral routes.	When the enemy conducts a march, he establishes several maintenance parties on lateral routes to facilitate march operations.
Medical points/stations move forward.	Medical units move forward before an offensive operation to support anticipated medical and evacuation requirements. Division medical points/stations are located 10-14 kilometers from the FLOT; the regimental medical points/station at 10-14 kilometers from the FLOT; and the battalion medical points/station at 1.5-3 kilometers from the FLOT.
Radio silence on nets organic division.	The enemy attempts to deny us the information which can be developed from intercepting his radio traffic.
Abnormal logistics traffic on command nets.	To expedite supplies to units about to conduct a main attack, commanders may get personally involved.
Dummy traffic in radio nets to cover unit moves.	The enemy will attempt to deceive us about the location of his sources.
Deception operations to cover unit movement.	Same as above.
Extensive smoke operations.	Smoke operations mask the movement of units during the period immediately preceding an attack.
SIGINT/jamming assets located well forward.	SIGINT and jamming assets will move forward to within 2-4 kilometers of the FEBA before attack.
Extensive spot and barrage jamming of our frontline units' communications nets, as well as communications systems associated with tactical air control systems.	Extensive jamming will precede an offense to cause the maximum disruption or our command control, and communications. However, jamming will cease when enemy forces reach our main defense area to prevent interference with their own communications systems.
Preparation of battalion and company defense areas consisting of company and platoon strongpoints.	Defense is based on holding prepared defensive areas and counterattacks by tank-heavy forces.
Extensive preparation of field fortifications.	The enemy makes extensive use of trenches, prepared positions, and overhead over in defensive operations.
Formation of antitank (AT) strongpoints in depth along logical avenues of logical avenues of approach.	AT strongpoints are formed along in depth along approach for armor. These are made up of motorized rifle, engineer, and AT gun/missile units with positions strengthened by mines, ditches, and other obstacles.
Attachment of additional AT units to frontline defensive positions.	In areas where there is a serious armored threat, the enemy will concentrate as many as 25 AT guns for every 1,000 meters of front.
Preparation of alternate artillery Positions.	In normal defensive operations, three positions are prepared for each firing battery.
Employment of roving artillery.	Roving guns are part of normal defensive operations.
Large tank heavy units located in assembly areas to the rear.	Tank units are held in assembly areas for employment in counterattacks.
Preparation and occupation of defensive positions.	In the defense, a security zone and main defense area are prepared and occupied.
Presence of demolitions, contaminated areas, obstacles, minefields.	Demolitions, minefields, and other obstacles are placed to cover and approaches to the position.
Deployment of motorized rifle units on good defensive positions.Preparation of company strongpointson key terrain.	Dominating terrain that has good fields of fire and is relatively inaccessible to tanks usually is selected for a defensive position.
Prestocking ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment and fortification of buildings.	Prestocking ammunition reduces the load on logistics throughout the system once the battle begins.Engineer tools and equipment may be used to dig trenches and to erect obstacles.
Entrenching and erecting bands of wire.	Digging of trenches and the erection of wire indicate preparations to hold the position.
Presence of dummy artillery observation points.	Dummy artillery observation points preserve the effectiveness of the actual artillery positions by deceiving us as to their location.
Presence of dummy CPs.	Same as above.
Increased activity of SIGINT/ES units.	Increased activity is an attempt to gain information but decreased activity of EC units about us before the attack.
Early warning sites hardened.	When early warning sites are hardened, it indicates the intention of those forces to remain in place and to protect an important facility.
CPs placed in hardened facility.	Same as above.
Additional AT units attached to first echelon maneuver units.	The enemy puts great emphasis on killing tanks early. The enemy believes that if the tanks can be stopped, the attack will fail.
Establishment of a security zone.	A security zone is established to enable fortifications to be constructed away from immediate danger from our artillery and direct-fire weapons.
Forward units disposed on relatively wide fronts and depths compared to offensive posture.	The defense zone of an MRR varies from 10 to 15 kilometers depending upon terrain and the combat availability of forces. MRR depth varies from 7 to 10 kilometers.
Displacement of CPs towards to the rear.	CPs move further to the rear reduce the chances that they will be overrun or destroyed during the initial phase of the battle.
Displacement of logistics and medical units towards the rear.	Logistics and medical units are displaced to the rear to facilitate combat force defense and counterattack operations.
Displacement of artillery and SSM toward units towards the rear.	Artillery units are displaced toward rear to reduce the change that these units will be lost/destroyed during the preliminary stages of the battle. During the defense, deep fires are not as critical as during the offense.
Presence of large AT reserves with mobile obstacle detachments (MOD).	Large AT reserves are established (with mobile obstacles (MOD) to provide AT capability.
Decreased communications intercepts (due to increased use of wire).	The enemy uses wire in the defense to increase security.
Air defense systems located in rear areas.	Destruction of logistics, command, and artillery units are high-priority missions for our deep attacks.

MARCH TO CONTACT INDICATORS
ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Increased air and ground reconnaissance along mobility corridors.	Accurate information about routes speeds the advance.
Road junctions, bridges, and other key features are occupied.	The enemy wants to control highspeed armor avenues of approach into our key areas.
Increased counterreconnaissance activity.	Counterreconnaissance is an attempt to prevent us from gaining information about his dispositions and movements.
Forward movement of columns dispersed laterally in two or more mobility corridors.	The enemy prefers to use search formation when moving to contact.

REINFORCEMENT INDICATORS
ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Movement of additional troops toward the front.	This action increases enemy's present strength.
Increased traffic toward present position.	Increased traffic brings up additional troops, equipment, and supplies.
Identification of new units in the combat zone.	The presence of new units--in addition to units already present--increases enemy's strength.
Additional CPs and supply and evacuation installations.	Presence of additional units causes an increase in the number of these installations.
Logistical installations moved well forward.	Indicates preparation for counterattacks after reinforcement.

DELAYING ACTION INDICATORS
ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Withdrawal from defensive position(s)becoming heavily engaged.	In delaying actions, units avoid becoming decisively engaged.
Successive local counterattacks with limited objectives.	Counterattacks are employed to assist in disengaging first echelon units, rather than to restore position.
Counterattacks broken off before position is restored.	Same as above.
Maximum firepower positioned forward; firing initiated at long ranges.	Long-range fires facilitate the delaying action.
Frontages up to four times that normally assigned to units on the defensive.	Forces conducting a delaying action are normally assigned frontages in excess of that normal for enemy units on the defense.
Prepositioning of nuclear weapons.	Prepositioning nuclear weapons facilitates the delaying action.
Discovery of dummy minefields.	Dummy minefields are easier and faster to prepare than active fields but cause approximately the same delay to advancing pursuers.

WITHDRAWAL INDICATORS
Indications for withdrawal are generally the same as those for delaying action with the addition of the following indicators.
ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Systematic destruction of bridges,communication facilities and other assets in enemy-held territory.	Deliberate demolition and scorched earth tactics may be employed in military withdrawals.
Establishment of a covering force rear guard.	Cover movement or withdrawal of and main body.The rear guard fights delaying action, if required.
Increased use of night-driving devices in all areas.	The enemy will attempt to withdraw at night, if possible.
Minimum logistical and medical services.	Nonessential logistics and medical services are withdrawn first.
Marking withdrawal routes.	Movement and location of traffic control units or parties to the rear along the LOCs that are to be used by major units.
Use of contaminated areas to camouflage forces and cover withdrawal.	Contamination hinders reconnaissance and pursuit.
Presence of rear guard/covering force.	Minimizes losses and permits main body more freedom of movement.
Preparation of future defensive lines behind main defensive structure.	If the withdrawal is deliberate, the enemy will want new positions ready before withdrawing.
Jamming or destruction of friendly air and ground battlefield surveillance radar.	Battlefield surveillance radars are capable of detecting withdrawals at night or during conditions of poor visibility.
Engineer reconnaissance and MOD detected long LOCs, tunnels, built-up areas, dams, and dikes.	Withdrawing forces will begin to systematically destroy all crossings and implement obstacles as they withdraw.
Stockpiling of explosives at central points.Distribution and establishment of small dumps of explosives and land mines near bridges, possible abatis sites, and other demolition target sites.	Withdrawing forces will attempt to delay pursuit with obstacles.
Preparation of target for systematic or hasty destruction.	Same as above.
Deception operations, such as dummy radio traffic.	Withdrawing units will attempt to portray a normal defense.
Smoke operations, such as dummy radio traffic.	Withdrawals must be unobserved to be effective.
Rearward movement of long-range back artillery.	Long-range artillery will be moved to new positions before the withdrawal takes place.
Movement of small reconnaissance parties to the rear.	Withdrawing units need current reconnaissance along withdrawal routes.
Displacement to the rear of emitters associated with logistics units.Destruction or removal of logistic material from existing depot and dump locations to the rear.	Logistics are withdrawn first to avoidbeing overrun during a possible pursuit.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS INDICATORS
ACTIVITY	EXPLANATION
Heavily guarded movement of supplies, equipment, and material.	Movement of supplies, equipment, and material of nuclear nature requires special security measures.
Heavily guarded installations.	Sites for storage of nuclear supplies and the locations of delivery units are heavily guarded.
Preparation of heavy artillery positions.	Primary and alternate positions for nuclear delivery artillery are prepared before movement of the units.
Presence of radars and other electronic equipment associated with SSMs.	SSM systems employ meteorological radars for control.
Movement of small, heavily guarded convoys, including closed vans, with high percentage of automatic weapons.	Nuclear warheads are moved under heavy security, usually in closed vans. Escort vehicles are equipped with machine guns.
Light aircraft circling over moving convoy.	Nuclear warhead convoys often use aerial radio relays to maintain communication.
Movement of small groups of heavily armed helicopters escorted by tactical fighters.	Nuclear warheads may be moved by helicopters, with guards and armed helicopters as escort.Tactical aircraft may provide air cover.
Movement of trailers with rockets missile or missile bodies.	Trailers are used to resupply and rocket units.
Identification of tall, slender objects, like towers, chimneys, or narrow trees,not previously in the area.	Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees,such as poplars.
Large, well-guarded complexes, including tank-trucks, radars, electronic equipment, generators, and maintenance tents, located well to the rear.	SSM units require extensive ground handling equipment.
Heavily guarded closed vans.	Nuclear warheads normally are carried in closed vans that are heavily guarded.
Evacuation or exclusion of civilians from specific areas suitable for nuclear storage or delivery sites.	Civilians may be evacuated from areas selected for nuclear storage or delivery sites.
Presence of meteorological radars.	An END TRAY RADAR is part of the organic equipment of both the FROG and SCUD systems, as well as other nuclear-capable systems. (END TRAYS also are found with conventional artillery and Air Force units.)
Construction of FROG, SCUD, or SCALEBOARD/SS-21/SS-23/8S- 22 launch positions.	All of these systems have confirmed nuclear capabilities.A survey-controlled launch position is constructed for each TEL before occupation.
Movement of SSM TELs to a launch site within 1/3 to 1/2 maximum range from the FLOT.	SSM TELs remain in camouflaged positions until movement to the launch area.
Passage of wind data from mid-range position to a command or technical element.	Enemy SSM accuracy is heavily dependent on wind data.
Passage of nonsense word over command and selected fire control nets.	May be a code word relative to preparation for or execution of a nuclear fire mission.
Volume of traffic on command nets suddenly increasing then dropping to a low level or stand-down.	May reflect passage of strike warnings followed by preparation for electro-magnetic pulse.
Identification of surface-to-surface missile unit-peculiar equipment.	Presence of nuclear-capable systems.
Limited withdrawal of frontline units without apparent tactical reason.	Frontline units may withdraw for a limited distance to avoid casualties from close-in nuclear explosives.
Sudden and energetic digging in enemy areas.	Prior to use of nuclear weapons, frontline units may be ordered to dig deeper foxholes or take other individual protective measures.
Large concentrations of radios, radars,and other electronic equipment located in the vicinity of suitable sites for guided missile launching.	Concentration of equipment is necessary to guide and control guides missiles, which must be located in close proximity of the launching site.
Sudden increase in communications and electronic activity.	Increase may be incident to delivery of nuclear weapons, for example, last minute orders and warnings, and use of electronic guidance and control.
Use of smoke cover on front-line troops.	Smoke may be used to protect troops against thermal effects of weapons used in close support.
Disappearance of known enemy agents from specific areas.	Prior to nuclear attack of an area, agents may be ordered to leave the area.
Increased or unusual air activity.	Delivery of nuclear weapons by air may require a temporary degree of local air superiority, special photo mission, or practice flight pattern runs by the delivery aircraft.
Additional antitank elements with first echelon units.	Enemy will expect friendly forces to react to a nuclear strike with tank-heavy forces. Also, tanks have greater survivability under nuclear conditions.
Movement of small convoys from the warhead storage areas.	Warheads being moved to be mated to missiles.
Removal of antennas and other equipment mounted on the exterior of vehicles.	To prevent blast damage.
Lowering of windshields on vehicles.	See above.
Removal of camouflage nets.	See above.
Movement of vehicles to reverse slopes.	See above.
Location of missile and/or free rocket units within striking maximum distances.	Missile and free rocket units are located within one third of the range from the line of contact on the offense, and one half of the maximum range on the defense.
Use of missiles or free rockets used to with high-explosive warheads.	Missile and free rockets may be delivered high-explosive warheads either in a normal support role or in a registration.
Location of very heavy artillery within supporting distance of frontlines.	Nuclear delivery artillery is located within one third of its maximum range from the line of contract on the offense, and one half of the maximum range on the defense.
Registration of very heavy artillery.	Registration may be conducted using smoke and low charge or high explosive projectiles prior to firing a nuclear projectile.
Special or unusual activity by frontline troops.	Frontline troops may construct special positions, usually deep or cover fighting positions, before enemy use of nuclear weapons.
Air defense weapons are deployed cover possible warhead storage areas.	Enemy expects friendly air to attempt to destroy nuclear warheads in storage.
Use of high-explosive warheads from SSMs or heavy artillery in a normal support role.	Indicates presence of nuclear-capable systems.
Use of missile-associated terms on selected radio nets.	See above.
Preparation of future launching positions.	See above.
Inability to locate previously identified missile units.	May be moving to firing positions.
Additional administrative, command, fire control, and logistics nets identified in the area of interest.	If these nets can be identified as nuclear-related,they indicate the presence of nuclear-capable units.
Presence of heavy artillery.	203 millimeter self-propelled (SP) gun, 240 millimeter SP mortar, and towed 203 and 240 have nuclear delivery capabilities, as to 152 millimeter SP guns.
Deployment of jamming assets.	Jammers are deployed to protect critical targets like nuclear units.

Military

APPENDIX G

INDICATES OF ENEMY COURSES OF ACTION