APPENDIX E
Sample of a Division Intelligence Estimate
(Classification)
Copy No ____ of ____ Copies
G2 Section, 52d Infantry Division (Mech)
Glenville (NF3277), EASTLAND
230830Z June 19__
(Classification)
INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NO. 20
Reference: Map series EASTLAND, sheets DELTA through KILO, edition 2, 1:50,000.
1. MISSION. 52d Division conducts mobile defense along DRY CREEK, accepts no penetration south of HILLS 333 and 421, and prepares to conduct offensive operations within 12 hours.
2. BATTLEFIELD AREA.
a. Weather.
(1) Existing situation. Weather for the period 23 June to 28 June will be rainy, and cool, gradually warming and clearing as a high pressure system moves through the area of operations from the south. Temperatures from 40 degrees F to 65 degree F. Visibility will range from 16 to 25 kilometers, except during precipitation and in morning fog in low drainage areas. Surface winds from the south 8 to 10 knots.
|
|
BM- |
BM- |
EE- |
EE- |
Moon- |
Moon- |
| Date |
|
NT |
CT |
CT |
NT |
Rise |
Set |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 23 June |
|
0331 |
0419 |
2029 |
2130 |
1746 |
0125 |
| 25 June |
|
0339 |
0422 |
2025 |
2124 |
1907 |
0214 |
| 27 June |
|
0344 |
0425 |
2022 |
2118 |
2001 |
0518 |
| 28 June |
|
0349 |
0428 |
2018 |
2112 |
2022 |
0820 |
|
(2) Effects on enemy courses of action:
(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross-country movement except in the low drainage areas of MINERTOWN.
(b) Southerly winds will not affect enemy employment of Nuclear Biological and Chemical.
(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will favor attack.
(3) Effects on friendly courses of action.
(a) Precipitation will not hinder cross-country movement except in the low drainage areas of MINERTOWN.
(b) Southerly wind direction will not affect friendly use of chemical or nuclear weapons.
(c) Low visibility during precipitation and morning fog will not favor friendly defense.
b. Terrain.
(1) Existing situation.
(a) Concealment and cover. Wooded areas around MIDWAY offer good concealment. Numerous ravines in drainage areas of MINERTOWN
offer limited concealment and cover.
(b) Observation and fire. There are good observation points along bluffs above GRINGO River. Fields of fire are excellent throughout plains area north of MUD CREEK but limited moderately in populated and vegetated areas near GLENVILLE.
(c) Obstacles.
1 SWIFT River (fordable 1 kilometer east of GLENVILLE).
2 Bluffs above GRINGO River.
3 City of GLENVILLE. Routes around city are passable; routes through city are impassable.
(d) Key terrain. Hill mass MUKELROY and HILL 333.
(e) Avenues of approach.
1 Available to the enemy into our sector:
a Avenue of approach 1 is from LARGO through gap around the northeast end of HILL 702, 34 kilometers southwest to MINERTOWN and south to DRY CREEK.
b Avenue of approach 2 is from LARGO southeast through MIDWAY to river-crossing east of GLENVILLE.
2 Avenue of approach available for US movement into enemy area will be generally the same as those listed for enemy into our sector.
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. Terrain favors the enemy attack using avenue of approach 1.
(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Terrain favors our defense of the area around DRY CREEK.
c. Other Characteristics.
(1) Existing situation. Local nationals throughout the area favor friendly military operations. Large numbers of refugees can be expected to pass through friendly lines.
(2) Effect on enemy courses of action. The enemy can be expected to insert infiltrators as refugees.
(3) Effect on friendly courses of action. Refugees can be expected to provide valuable intelligence.
3. ENEMY SITUATION.
a. Disposition. Annex A, Situation Overlay.
b. Composition. Enemy forces opposing 52d Infantry Division(Mech) consist of elements of the 4th Combined Arms Army.
(1) Identified units are:
(a) 10 MRD consisting of:
27th MRR
30th MRR
31st MRR
121st TK Regt (unlocated)
(b) 19th Mech Div Consisting of:
23d MRR
37th TK Regt
(2) Unidentified units are:2XU/IMRR of 19th MRD
c. Strength.
(1) Committed forces. 52d Infantry Division (Mech) is opposed immediately by 4 motorized rifle battalions and 1 tank battalion. These units are supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.
(2) Reinforcements. Reinforcements available to the enemy for commitment in our zone are a total of 5 motorized rifle battalions and 4 tank battalions from the 27th MRR, 121st TK Regt, and the second echelon battalions of the 30 and 31st MRRs and the 37 TK Regt. Also, the 23 MRR can totally reinforce within 8 hours from start of movement.
(3) Air. Enemy is supported by the 3d Air Army consisting of unidentified numbers of fighter-bomber aircraft, ground attack aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft. Air parity currently exists with either force capable of obtaining air superiority for limited periods of time. Up to now enemy has used a maximum of 60 fighter-bomber sorties in a 12-hour period.
(4) Nuclear. No estimate of the enemy's nuclear support for the next 30 days is available. Enemy currently has 152mm Sp How with nuclear rounds and SSM which can deliver rounds of 10-50 KT yield within range of our division.
d. Recent and Present Significant Activities.
(1) Air reconnaissance and photo reports indicate increased enemy movement along axis BRAVO to LIMA. movement indicates reinforcement of forward element of 4th CAA.
(2) Enemy's aerial recon and tactical air flights have increased in the last 36 hours, particularly in the line of contact.
(3) For the past 36 hours, volume of vehicular traffic has increased in southerly direction.
(4) Artillery fire from the enemy has become more intensive in the last 24 hours.
(5) Reliable source reports large tracked, amphibious vehicles moving into area vicinity HILL 805.
(6) Enemy has begun to employ smoke along the forward slope of HILL 702.
e. Peculiarities and Weaknesses.
(1) Personnel. Enemy, units are presently estimated to be at 85% to 90% authorized strength. Morale is high, although replacements may not be highly trained.
(2) Intelligence. Enemy stresses communications security and subordinate units of the 4th CAA have recently initiated intensive radio security and procedures training.
(3) Operations.
(a) Enemy is susceptible to mine warfare and antitank weapons.
(b) Enemy has trained heavily on attack formations and has been told offensive action is the only way to victory.
(c) Enemy is vulnerable to nuclear weapons due to massed forces and canalization by further advancement.
(4) Logistics. Supplies are adequate for the enemy's conduct of either the offense or defense. The enemy had previously stockpiled supplies well forward in division areas.
(5) Personalities. G/D Masonski, CG of the 1Oth MRD, is an advocate of penetration type offense on a narrow front with subsequent widening of the gaps to split enemy forces.
4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.
a. Enumeration:
(1) Attack at any time along sense of approach 1 with 4 motorized rifle battalions and 1 tank battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.
(2) Attack at any time along avenue of approach 2 with 4 motorized rifle battalions and 1 tank battalion supported by normal divisional and regimental artillery.
(3) Defend at any time with forces in contact supported by all available division and regimental artillery.
(4) Reinforce his attack or defense with all or part of the following units at the places and times indicated:
| UNIT |
PLACE |
TIME |
| (a) 30th MRR (-) |
Avenue of approach 2 |
immediately |
| (b) 31st MRR (-) |
Avenue of approach 1 |
immediately |
| (c) 37th TK Regt (-) |
Avenue of approach 1 |
immediately |
| (d) 27th MRR (-) |
Avenue of approach 1 |
2 hr after start of |
|
or 2 |
movement |
| (e) 23 MRR |
vic LITTLE |
8 hr after start of
movement |
| (f) 121st TK Regt |
Unlocated |
Unknown |
| (g) U/I MRR of 19th
MRD |
vic BRAVO |
9 hr after start of
movement |
|
(5) Delay in successive positions to the east of LITTLE.
(6) Employ chemical agents within our sector at any time.
(7) Employ nuclear weapons of a 0.5-50 KT yield with delivery by artillery or SSM.
(8) Employ guerrilla forces in our rear area either alone or in conjunction with the capabilities enumerated below.
(9) The enemy can attack our area with an undetermined number of fighter, ground attack, and bomb sorties daily. The maximum number of daily
sorties mounted in our area has been 60.
b. Analysis and Discussion.
(1) Attack along avenue of approach 1.
(a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:
1 Uses a good avenue of approach.
2 The enemy is massing motorized rifle elements, tanks, artillery and logistic support along this avenue.
3 Forward elements dispersed on a relatively narrow front.
4 Extensive artillery preparation along approach.
(b) The scant cover presented along this avenue of approach is a limiting factor but does not preclude adoption of this capability.
(2) Attack along avenue of approach 2.
(a) The following indicate adoption of this capability:
1 The enemy is massing mechanized elements, tanks, artillery and logistics support along this avenue.
2 Forward elements disposed on a relatively narrow front.
3 Extensive artillery preparation along this avenue.
(b) The following indicate rejection of this capability:
1 This avenue of approach accommodates only one deployed regiment and offers limited cover and concealment.
2 The limited obstacle presented by GLENVILLE.
(3) Defend. The following indicate rejection of this capability:
(a) The enemy is massing his forces along the line of contact.
(b) Enemy has followed known doctrine for attack.
(c) Terrain favors attack.
(4) Reinforce. The following indicate adoption of this capability:
(a) Movement of additional troops toward the front.
(b) New units identified in the combat zone.
(c) Forward logistical buildup.
(5) Delay. There are no indications of the enemy's adoption of this capability.
(6) Use chemical agents. There is no indication the enemy will employ chemical agents other than smoke.
(7) Use nuclear weapons. There is no indication the enemy will use nuclear weapons.
(8) Use guerrilla forces. The following indicates adoption of this capability:
(a) Doctrine calls for use of guerrilla force.
(b) Use would enhance enemy advance by creating panic and confusion.
(9) Air attack. Indications are the enemy will continue to use this capability as referenced in paragraph (9) above.
5. CONCLUSIONS.
a. Intelligence. Available intelligence indicates that the division can accomplish its mission. Intelligence support adoption of the division course of action.
b. Weather and Terrain. The weather and terrain favors our defense. The best defensive area is the high ground east of Dry Creek. The best avenue of approach into our defensive sector is avenue of approach 1.
c. Probable enemy courses of action.
(1) Attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery with the main attack of one motorized rifle regiment along avenue of approach 1. Will reinforce with elements as indicated in para 4a(4).
(2) Conduct secondary attack with forces in contact supported by air and artillery with one mechanized regiment along avenue of approach 2.
(3) Employ guerrilla or special forces in our rear areas in conjunction with the above courses of action.
d. Enemy Vulnerabilities.
(1) The Enemy is vulnerable to counterattack since he has been slow to exploit potential penetrations.
(2) Vulnerable to nuclear attack due to massing of troops and concentrated logistics depots.
(3) Mine warfare will be effective against mechanized elements.
KROOK
BG
OFFICIAL:
/S/ Bagger
BAGGER
GS
Annex: A - Situation Overlay (omitted)
Distribution: A
(Classification)
