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APPENDIX D

ORDER OF BATTLE ANNEX

(Classification)

Annex B (OB) to PARENTERAL 29, 3 Corps, 201800Z August 19

ORDER OF BATTLE

(Classification)

1. COMPOSITION AND DISPOSITION (see appendix 1, Overlay).

     a. All EPW captured during period are from Aggressor 2d Combined Arms Army. Unit identification include: (C-1)

COMMENT: 32 MRD accepted as being organic to 2d CAA. 52 TK Div previously accepted, completing organization of 2d CAA.

     b. Two large missile-type weapons mounted on large amphibious armored carriers and several smaller vehicles identified in position vic TMP 420513. (B-2).

COMMENT: Probably elements of Free Rocket Regt, 2d CAA, previously unlocated.

     c. Captured enemy field order reveals plan to attach 4080 TK Div to 2d CAA, effective 22 Aug. (B-1).

COMMENT: EPW previously reported 40th MTD moving to reinforce 2d CAA. Enemy main effort probably planned for this area.

2. STRENGTH.

     Enemy losses reported during period:

COMMENT: The marked increase in personnel losses during the period have been sustained primarily by enemy combat patrols. Aircraft loss was H1, Observation Helicopter equipped with aeronautics radar. Overall strength of 2d CAA is generally not affected.

3. TACTICS.

     a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state they have been instructed in the event their units are cut off to continue fighting as guerrilla units or in small groups, live off the land, and destroy as much US Army property as possible gradually infiltrating back to friendly lines. (C-6)

COMMENT: Intensive guerrilla activity in our rear areas can be expected if elements of these units are cut off.

     b. Enemy documents captured 07 Aug included a training pamphlet for battalion, company and platoon commanders, written by G/D Griboyedov, entitled "Tanks Out Front" (appendix 3). It advocates tactics permitting US patrols and advancing forces to pass through aggressor lines. A coordinated tank-infantry attack is then made on open flanks and rear elements with tanks continuing momentum of attack to destroy remaining US forces. (B-2)

COMMENT: Considering enemy doctrine that tanks are the decisive arm, the above is possible, particularly in view of reports of probable employment of 40 TK Div (para 1).

4. TRAINING.

     a. Reference paragraph 3b.

     b. Indications of enemy concern for COMSEC is noted in document captured from 2d CAA dated 10 Aug, directing all subordinate units to immediately initiate intensive training in radio security and communications procedures. (B-2)

COMMENT: MI unit confirms enemy lack of radio discipline and states that security violations increase during reinforcement and relief operations. Numerous enemy security violations have been noted since 17 Aug, further substantiating reinforcement or relief of 2d CAA units.

5. LOGISTICS.

     a. EPW states enemy supply personnel have recently contacted local merchants, farmers, and fisherman for supplies of most Class I items. (C-6)

COMMENT: Enemy either has critical shortage of Class I items or has a bottleneck in the supply system requiring local procurement of these items.

     b. Air and ground reconnaissance patrols have reported enemy stockpiling large quantities of supplies and equipment in rear areas of frontline division. (B-2)

COMMENT: Not normal supply procedures. Significance as yet undetermined. Would indicate enemy may be planning major offensive soon.

6. COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS.

     a. EPW from 16 MRD and 30 MRD state morale is high but senior officers are disgruntled because their units always receive difficult missions while the 32 MRD and 56 TK Div have, until recently, been assigned less hazardous missions. (F-6)

COMMENT: Analysis of unit history and recent operations of enemy 2d CAA indicates it has usually been highly successful in combat. This, and the fact 2d CAA has always had fine commanders, would account for high morale in units. This is first indication of dissatisfaction among officer personnel. Report seems cogent, however, since 32 Mech Div has not been engaged in combat with US forces in this campaign.

     b. EPW reports 30 MRD to be redesignated 30 "Fusilier" Mech Div for superior combat record. (F-6)

COMMENT: US III Corps rates combat effectiveness of 56 MRD from excellent to outstanding in comparison to other enemy divisions in same sector. 30 MRD casualties have been comparatively small; no deserters have been apprehended and its operations have been executed with determination.

7. MISCELLANEOUS DATA.

     a. Personalities Identified by EPW: (C-1)

COMMENT: Confirms previously obtained information.

     b. Unit History: Officer EPW stated his unit (32 MRD) trained extensively in special tactics for assault of river lines. (F-6)

COMMENT: Special training received by 32 MRD should increase its overall effectiveness when employed in river-crossing operations. No evidence of other units so trained.

     c. Field Post Numbers: Captured document reveal enemy field post numbers being used as identification symbols on documents and messages. First two and last three digits are transposed. Field post number of 46 MRD will appear as 75301 instead of 31750.

COMMENT: Enemy has used this system previously as a security measure. Expect this system of transposing digits will occur in different patterns during future operations.

Acknowledge.

LEE
LTG

Appendixes: 1-Enemy Disp Overlay
                    2-Enemy Army Org Chart
                    3-Enemy Training Pamphlet.

Distribution: Same as PARENTERAL 29

OFFICIAL

GRANT
G2

(Classification)