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LESSON FOUR
ATTACKS AND DEFENSE
OVERVIEW
TASK DESCRIPTION:
In this lesson, you will learn to identify and select the fundamentals, considerations, and methods of attacks used in offensive operations in a desert environment. You also will learn to identify and select the fundamentals and environmental considerations used in defensive operations in a desert environment.
LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
| TASKS: | Identify and select the fundamentals, considerations, and methods of attacks used in offensive operations in a desert environment. Identify and select fundamentals and environmental considerations used in defensive operations in a desert environment. |
| CONDITIONS: | You will be given information from FM 90-3. |
| STANDARDS: | Identify and select the fundamentals, considerations, and methods of attacks used in offensive operations in a desert environment, and identify and select the fundamentals and environmental considerations used in defensive operations in a desert environment in accordance with FM 90-3. |
| REFERENCES: | The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publication: FM 90-3, Desert Operations |
INTRODUCTION
The following material discusses offense and defense as modified by desert terrain. As in all other environments, the purpose of the attack in desert terrain is to destroy the enemy. You accomplish this by (1) concentrating friendly forces at a weak point in the enemy defense and destroying enemy combat units or by (2) driving deep into the enemy rear to destroy his combat service support and cut his lines of communication. No force can survive for long in the desert without combat service support.
Terrain constraints in seeking and destroying the enemy do not restrict an imaginative commander. Due to the scarcity of key terrain in desert, normally the only constraints placed upon a maneuvering force will be the forces ability to
- maintain responsive combat service support.
- protect its combat service support from enemy attack.
The longer the lines of communication become, the more susceptible they are to being cut. In most deserts, the scarcity of large areas of defensible terrain means that an enemy force has at least one flank open to attack. The attacking force must seek this flank and attempt to maneuver around it into the enemy rear before the enemy can react and block the envelopment with mobile reserves.
PART A - ATTACKS USED IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS IN A DESERT ENVIRONMENT
Successful offensive operations depend on rapid, responsive, and violent maneuver, seeking a vulnerable enemy flank and exposing none to the enemy. The enemy, realizing the danger of remaining stationary in this terrain, may choose to defend by attacking. The resulting engagement between two attacking forces will often be a series of flanking actions and reactions. Success goes to the one who can find the other's unguarded flank first.
Units of an attacking force may conduct or participate in any one of the following types of offensive operations:
- Movement to Contact.
- Hasty or Deliberate Attack.
- Exploitation or Pursuit.
Within a division, lead elements of forward units may conduct a deliberate attack on an enemy weak point or flank to open a gap for following units to move through and exploit success. Lead units of the exploiting force will conduct a movement to contact and hasty attacks to overcome pockets of enemy resistance.
1. Fundamentals of Offense.
a. Purpose of the Offensive. The task force conducts offensive operations to achieve one or more of the following specific purposes:
- Defeat enemy forces.
- Secure key or decisive terrain.
- Deprive the enemy of resources.
- Gain information.
- Deceive and divert the enemy.
- Hold the enemy in position.
- Disrupt an enemy attack.
b. Characteristics of Offensive Operations. Battalion task force operations are characterized by surprise, concentration, speed, flexibility, and audacity.
(1) Surprise. Surprise is achieved when the enemy cannot react effectively to the task force commander's scheme of maneuver. Surprise may be achieved by—
- Conducting thorough reconnaissance and surveillance.
- Striking the enemy from an unexpected direction at an unexpected time.
- Employing deception efforts.
(2) Concentration. Concentration is the massing and synchronization of overwhelming combat power against an enemy weakness. Concentration is achieved by—
- Planning on the basis of information generated by aggressive reconnaissance.
- Fixing the enemy to prevent his reaction to maneuver.
- Rapidly massing forces and fires to overwhelm the enemy defense.
- Synchronizing maneuver with combat support.
(3) Speed. The task force moves quickly to take advantage of enemy weaknesses. Speed in execution is key to denying the enemy time to reposition or reorient to meet an attack. Speed is achieved by—
- Planning and rehearsing battle drills.
- Conducting route reconnaissance.
- Wargaming contingencies with subordinate leaders.
- Exercising responsive command and control.
- Issuing mission-type orders.
- Using routes, movement techniques, and formations that allow the force to move rapidly and with security.
- Isolating enemy forces through fixing and suppressing fires.
- Providing rapid resupply with logistics packages (LOGPACs) to sustain the task force's offensive capability.
- Maintaining momentum to keep the enemy from reestablishing his defense.
(4) Flexibility. Flexibility is the ability to divert from the plan and exploit success by maintaining freedom of maneuver. Flexibility in planning results from wargaming. Flexibility is achieved by—
- Aggressive reconnaissance that continues to seek enemy weaknesses and ways to attack him from his flanks and rear.
- A reserve that can assume the mission of the main attack or exploit an enemy weakness. A reserve is the commander's primary means of maintaining flexibility.
- A command and control system that allows the commander to rapidly transmit decisions during the battle.
- The use of FRAGOs, checkpoints, and reserve graphic control measures.
- Contingency planning that permits shifting the main effort
(5) Audacity. Audacity is the willingness to risk bold action to win. The audacious commander is quick and decisive, and willing to take prudent risks. He bases his decisions on sound tactical judgement, personal observation of the terrain, and first-hand knowledge of the battle. He constantly seeks to attack the enemy on the flanks or rear and to rapidly exploit success. He shares the hazards of the battlefield with his troops, moving to the critical places to lead by example.
(1) The task force participates in the following five major types of offensive operations:
- Movement to contact.
- Hasty attack.
- Deliberate attack.
- Exploitation.
- Pursuit.
(2) The task force normally participates in these operations as part of a larger force. Commanders at each level
- Find or create a weak point.
- Suppress enemy fires.
- Isolate the enemy and maneuver against weak points.
- Exploit success.
2. Environmental Considerations.
a. Navigation. Lack of clearly defined terrain features complicates navigation and phased operations. Units conducting an enveloping maneuver are liable to lose direction unless they have reconnoitered routes carefully by the maximum number of leaders. Leaders may employ unit navigators. Although, they will be unable to control direction at night unless permitted to use radio. Mark routes with insignificant objects (such as small rock piles), and employ GSR sections to confirm locations.
b. Sandstorms. Do not allow attacking forces to get caught in unexpected sandstorms. Movement through a sandstorm will depend on the unit's distance from the enemy, trafficability, presence of minefields, and direction and density of the storm.
If a storm blowing from the enemy catches the advancing unit, the safest alternative is to halt until the storm abates. In this situation, the enemy will regain observation before the attacker. Begin suppressive fires on enemy positions as the storm lifts. In other situations it may be possible for platoons to form close column, using tail lights only, and continue movement. When the storm is blowing towards the enemy, it is possible and extremely effective, to conduct an attack immediately behind the storm.
c. Fires. Plan your fires as in temperate climates on any available terrain features. However, plan your targets using coordinates, when there are no significant terrain features along a route of advance. A moving force in a desert is at a disadvantage in comparison with a stationary unit due to lack of concealment and the presence of dust clouds. The defender may engage with missiles from an unexpected direction or from terrain features of no apparent significance. The attacker must be prepared to shift fires rapidly to suppress unforeseen targets. The command may use tactical aircraft to suppress or destroy targets. You can mark targets for aircraft with indirect- or direct-fire smoke. White phosphorus or illuminating rounds set for low air burst also are effective.
d. Maneuver. If terrain permits masking of maneuvering units and trafficability is good, use normal fundamentals of fire and maneuver. Restricted trafficability may arise from rocky terrain as in the Golan Heights, or the ground may be so flat that the defender has total observation of the area. Movement in these circumstances requires speed of maneuver, deception, and considerable suppression to degrade enemy observation and fires. You should avoid frontal attacks, especially in conditions of restricted trafficability. It is preferable to maintain pressure on enemy units in unfavorable terrain, while other forces find enemy weakness in terrain more favorable for an attack.
e. Tactical Deception. Deception plays a key part in offensive operations. Divide deception into two parts (objectives): First, weaken the local defense by drawing reserves to another part of the battlefield. This may be done by making a small force seem larger than it is. Second, conceal the avenue of approach and timing of the main attack. You can use some of the following attack methods:
- Dummy units and installations.
- Phony radio traffic.
- Movement and suppressive fires in other areas timed to coincide with the real attack.
- Smoke. You can place a screen across a possible avenue of approach. The defender's attention is drawn to it while the force attacks from a totally different angle.
f. Combat Service Support. Offensive operations in this environment may involve considerable expenditure of ammunition and high POL consumption. Units must carry maximum available combat supplies and plans for resupply must be widely disseminated and clearly understood.
Report the location of captured enemy supplies to higher headquarters immediately.
3. Attack Operations.
Most offensive operations in desert warfare result in meeting engagements and hasty attacks. In order to get into the enemy's rear, it is sometimes necessary to mount a deliberate attack to penetrate a strong defensive system established around natural or artificial obstacles. The following examples describe one way in which a meeting engagement might occur, and one way you might conduct a deliberate attack. These scenarios are examples of how you might fight particular battles. Every commander must apply the principles according to his experience and best judgment in each new situation.
4. Meeting Engagement.
a. Characteristics. A meeting engagement occurs when a moving force, incompletely deployed for battle, meets a stationary or moving enemy force, about which it has inadequate intelligence. The action ceases to be a meeting engagement when the situation develops and subsequent operations are undertaken. Meeting engagements may occur at all echelons in both offensive and defensive situations. However, they occur most frequently when moving to contact. The principal characteristics of meeting engagements are a limited knowledge of the enemy and limited time for the commander to develop the situation and to formulate and execute plans.
| NOTE: | The key to a meeting engagement is to seize and retain the initiative. By retaining the initiative, a commander can later adopt the best course of action to accomplish his mission. |
b. Actions. The following actions can assist division, brigade, and battalion commanders in retaining the initiative.
- Make a rapid estimate of the situation and issue fragmentary orders.
- Commit units from march column.
- Organize an advance guard with mobile forces capable of delivering large volumes of direct fire, capable of rapid deployment, and capable of speed in the attack. Use armored cavalry, air cavalry, or tank-heavy teams.
- Intersperse field artillery throughout the formation with some well forward so that indirect fires will be immediately available during any contact.
The enemy develops the situation vigorously and aggressively. Flanking movements generally disclose the enemy's configuration more rapidly than frontal movements and give more opportunity for tactical surprise and decisive results.
c. Example. The following example illustrates those points.
The 52d Infantry Division (Mech) receives orders to move east to contact enemy forces believed to be present and occupy a movement objective that includes a series of small oases and water holes about 80 kilometers away. On the division right, 3rd Brigade organizes with two tank battalions, one mechanized infantry battalion, one field artillery battalion (155-mm, SP), one engineer company, and one Vulcan battery. The commander organizes three tank-heavy battalion task forces and deploys for the movement as shown in Figure 4-1.
The brigade requires each leading battalion task force to provide a tank-heavy team as advance guard. They move by traveling overwatch or bounding overwatch as the situation dictates. Right task force is screening the brigade flank with its scout platoon. It can commit one, two or three teams if a threat develops on the right. Left task force maintains contact (not shown) with 2nd Brigade. The brigade commander moves well forward, mounted in a brigade helicopter. Each leading task force commander also has a brigade helicopter. Additional observation helicopters from division artillery supplement the advance guard company teams. Rear task force is responsible for rear guard and has a tank-heavy team marching at the rear with the battalion scout platoon (not shown). Dispersed throughout the brigade are field artillery batteries, Vulcan platoons, and engineer platoons.
Figure 4-1. Tank-Heavy Task Forces Deployed for Movement.
To complete the operation by nightfall and so U.S. forces will have the sun at their backs, commence the operation in the afternoon. Note the meeting engagement aspect of Figure 4-2.
Figure 4-2. Meeting Engagement.
At first, movement is rapid and no sign of enemy activity. After about 40 kilometers, aerial observers report several small dust clouds to the front and move off to investigate. The leading tank-heavy teams provide overwatch but continue to move. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter on the left receives a high volume of fire from automatic weapons. The observer reports an estimated 25 BMPs and six or seven tanks moving west on a collision course with 3rd Brigade. You speculate this enemy force is a reinforced motorized rifle battalion, deploying from battalion column to company columns at the time of the report.
The aerial observer completes his initial fire request as ground fire forces the aircraft away. An aerial observer for the south reports no enemy activity except the now increasing volume of dust he can see to the north. The brigade commander, satisfied that fire is being placed on the enemy and that reports are on the way to division, tells his S3 to be certain 2nd Brigade is aware of this contact. He then turns his attention to further developing the situation and ordering whatever deployment is necessary.
It becomes apparent, as the leading forces rapidly close with each other, that the enemy is starting to veer slightly to the north, toward 2nd Brigade. Behind the leading enemy force another cloud of dust reveals a larger force also moving rapidly west. The brigade commander orders task force left to block and destroy the leading enemy force. He redirects the remainder of the brigade to the southeast to attack the enemy main body from the south and trap it against 2nd Brigade. He orders redeployment as shown in Figure 4-3.
Figure 4-3. Flanking Movement.
Task force left moves to block the enemy advance and provide a pivot around which the brigade will maneuver. Its rear team moves to the north to prevent enemy maneuver into the 3rd Brigade left flank. Its scout platoon screens the left flank and maintains contact with 2nd Brigade. The field artillery battery is in position and firing on the enemy battalion. The trains of all three task forces have dispersed within a lightly manned perimeter. On the west the scout platoon of task force rear is screening. The three engineer platoons not needed in support of this maneuver, provide backup for the scout screen. Task forces right and rear, with field artillery batteries and ADA platoons are maneuvering to strike the enemy main body from the south. The brigade commander intends to make a wide envelopment and thus must take the field artillery batteries with him. The scout platoon of task force right screens the right flank as before.
Having developed the situation, planned the attack, and started to maneuver, the brigade has completed those actions that are part of a meeting engagement. Actions that follow are, in this case, a hasty attack, as shown in Figure 4-4.
Figure 4-4. Hasty Attack.
The 3rd Brigade commander chose this plan for several reasons. Halting to defend would not satisfy the mission of securing the oasis area still 30-40 kilometers away. Maneuver to the north would drive the enemy to the south and perhaps into the rear or behind 52d Infantry division (Mech). Maneuver to the south drives the enemy to the north and into the path of 2nd Brigade where destruction of the enemy is quick.
5. Deliberate Attack.
The following example describes one way in which an attacking division and a brigade might take advantage of the speed and mobility afforded by desert terrain. You must remember that as the terrain in the desert becomes more broken, the techniques employed in the attack will more closely resemble those employed in more temperate environments where natural obstacles abound.
a. General Situation. The 25th Armored Division is making the main attack as part of the corps. The corps has been advancing against scattered resistance for the last 24 hours. Corps G2 has indicated that forward units of the corps will strike the first echelon of the enemy main body the following day. The best intelligence estimate is that the enemy will continue to defend in place.
b. Special Situation 1. Air and ground reconnaissance has revealed that enemy units occupying defensive positions in the 25th Armored Division zone appear to be three motorized rifle regiments of a motorized rifle division. A situation map like the one shown in Figure 4-5 can be drawn. Reconnaissance has not yet located the tank regiment of the division, but it presumably occupies positions in the division second echelon, prepared to counterattack.
Figure 4-5. Motorized Rifle Division in the Defense.
The G2 estimates that the regiments are defending with all three motorized rifle battalions forward. A few tanks have reinforced each motorized rifle battalions. However, the bulk of each motorized rifle regiment's tank battalion appears positioned in depth in the regimental second echelon. An area of very rocky broken ground, judged impassable to track vehicles, separates two of the regiments. This obstacle is unoccupied, heavily mined and covered by observation and indirect fire. Two kilometers to the front of the enemy's positions is another area of impassable ground, approximately three kilometers in diameter. This ground also will present an obstacle that you must bypass.
The 25th Armored Division has the mission of penetrating the enemy division first and second echelons. The corps reserve will attack through the penetration to drive into the enemy rear to cut lines of communication and destroy the enemy combat service support system.
As drawn in Figure 4-6, make the division main attack on a narrow front by a balanced brigade of two tank and two mechanized infantry battalions, south of the obstacle in late afternoon. The brigade will attack to secure an objective approximately ten kilometers deep, and will then continue the attack to the east on order. The second brigade, also balanced, will conduct a supporting attack to the south of the main attack to secure an objective in the enemy first echelon.
Figure 4-6. Division Attack.
The division reserve is a three-battalion tank-heavy brigade. It will follow the main attack, prepared to assist or assume the mission of the leading brigade, and prepared to destroy counterattacks by enemy regimental tank battalions or the enemy divisional tank regiment. The division cavalry squadron will conduct a demonstration to the north of the obstacle as part of the division deception plan. Use all available indirect fire to seal off the objective areas. A corps attack helicopter company is under operational control of the division to assist in the destruction of enemy counterattacks.
This course of action has the following advantages:
- Orienting the main attack on an objective immediately south of the obstacle prevents counterattack and direct-fire engagement by enemy units positioned to its north. It also affords the main attack a degree of flank protection. The concentration of a brigade on an estimated enemy company creates a force ratio favorable to success.
- A supporting attack and a demonstration will deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the main attack, force him to delay commitment of reserves, and prevent local counterattacks against the main attack by forces in the first echelon.
It is impossible to conceal the movement of the main attack. A rapid advance however, will provide the enemy a moving target and obscure all but the leading vehicles-with a large dust cloud. Suppressive fires on and around the objective will degrade enemy direct fire from the front and flanks. Attacking from the west will force enemy gunners to look into the afternoon desert sun to engage targets. Finally, the enemy second echelon will carry out operations after nightfall, compounding confusion and control problems of enemy counterattacks.
Locate the reserve to further concentrate combat power against the enemy's weakest point. After the 1st Brigade penetrates the enemy's first echelon, the reserve can either pass through to attack the second echelon or react in any direction to destroy enemy counterattacks.
Continuing the attack east into the enemy rear with the main attack or the reserve brigade will retain the initiative, maintain the momentum of the attack, and orient on the enemy's greatest vulnerability-his combat service support system.
c. Special Situation 2. The brigade conducting the main attack organizes with two mechanized infantry battalions and two tank battalions.
(1) Plans. It has one field artillery battalion in direct support and reinforcing fires from two additional battalions. Two engineer companies are also in direct support. Based on his analysis of terrain, the brigade commander realizes that his units will be unable to conceal their approach from the enemy. He therefore plans to approach the enemy positions as rapidly as possible from an area far enough away that the rolling terrain and heat haze will initially obscure visual observation. The dust cloud created by the brigade will inform the enemy that a large force is approaching, but it will also prevent the enemy from determining the size and composition of the force. During the approach, suppress enemy positions with smoke. Battalion task force scout platoons will move ahead of the main body to identify obstacles.
(2) Situation. Figure 4-7 shows a situation map.
Figure 4-7. Division Main Attack.
Leading the main attack will be a heavily-mechanized battalion task force with the mission of punching through the enemy first echelon just south of the obstacle. The following task force, also mech-heavy will follow in and attack the enemy first echelon unit on objective JOE from the rear. A tank-heavy task force-initially the brigade reserve will follow these two mech task forces. An engineer company will accompany each attacking mech-heavy task force. Meanwhile, a tank battalion task force will advance on the right (south) and abreast of the leading mech task force. It will take up firing positions and suppress enemy first echelon positions immediately to the south of the area of penetration. When the second mech task force assaults objective JOE from the rear, this tank battalion will follow the tank-heavy task force of the brigade along axis FRED and become part of the brigade reserve. These two tank-heavy task forces will rapidly press forward on axis FRED and seize objective ZULU.
(3) Threat. The major threat to the success of the plan is a counterattack by the regimental tank battalion or the divisional tank regiment. The division supporting attack and demonstration, may tie these enemy forces down. However, the brigade commander makes plans to defeat a counterattack from any direction if the enemy determines the location of the main attack and commits his tank units before the brigade has reached its objective.
(4) Attack. Initially, the obstacle will protect the northern flank of the brigade. The brigade main attack will be exposed to an enemy counterattack from the south, but unless the counterattack takes place before the brigade supporting attack has reached its objective or the main attack has punched through, the fires of both battalion task forces will destroy it. With his entire regimental sector under attack, it is unlikely that the enemy regimental commander will be able to determine the time and place to commit his tank battalion until it is too late. Once the brigade reserve is through the first echelon, an extremely unfavorable force ratio will face a counterattacking enemy tank battalion.
(5) Counterattack. The enemy tank regiment also poses a dangerous threat. A counterattack by a force that size early in the attack will have a good chance of blocking the penetration. Fortunately, facing the enemy division commander is a problem similar to his regimental commander's. With the entire division under attack, it will be extremely difficult for him to determine the correct time and place for the counterattack. The attack helicopter company committed through the gap in the enemy defenses can intercept the enemy tank regiment, attack it by fire, and delay any counterattack against the penetration. Once the brigade secures its objective, circumstances will force the tank regiment to attack a defending force of equal size with the advantages accruing to the defender. Once the division reserve brigade moves up behind the leading brigade, a counterattacking enemy regiment will expose itself to counterattack.
(6) Attack Plan Advantages. The brigade plan of attack has the following advantages:
- Plan the main and supporting attacks on narrow fronts to increase the attackers chances of attaining favorable force ratios. The main attack takes advantage of an enemy weakness by attacking through an area occupied by minimum enemy forces and with one flank protected by an obstacle.
- The proximity of the main and supporting attacks allow mutual support.
- The reserves, readily available for commitment, will support the main effort with their fires.
- A rapid, violent advance out of the sun will make target acquisition and engagement difficult for enemy gunners who are not suppressed.
- The plan takes full advantage of the mobility and speed of track vehicles.
- The scheme of maneuver keys on terrain mobility and speed and allows enemy commanders very little information or time to react.
- The plan fully supports the division scheme of maneuver to rapidly advance into the enemy's rear to destroy his combat service support.
d. Special Situation 3. Organized as before, the reserve brigade has two tank battalions and one mechanized infantry battalion. The division mission is to penetrate the two defensive echelons of the enemy division. Thus, this organized brigade has sufficient tank strength to assist the 1st Brigade (main attack), assume its mission, or defeat enemy counterattacks. When you commit this brigade, it will become the main attack of the division. It will have a battalion of field artillery in direct support, and as much additional field artillery support as you can devote to this action at the time. The brigade has a combat engineer company and an air defense artillery battery. These make a strong and self-contained combined-arms force capable of semi-independent action, needed to achieve decisive results in this attack.
Launched on schedule, the attack by 25th Armored Division progressed generally according to plan. The enemy commander, apparently unable to determine where the main thrust was coming from, withheld his counterattacks. As shown in Figure 4-8, 1st Brigade (main attack) succeeded in penetrating the enemy first echelon and continued, with little loss in momentum, toward objective ZULU. As the leading battalion task forces approached ZULU they reported a counterattacking enemy tank force approaching from the southeast.
Figure 4-8. Enemy Counterattack.
1st Brigade committed its following battalion task forces to continue into objective ZULU while the leading task forces met this enemy counterattack. At approximately the same time the division G2 received information from the commander of the attack helicopter company that the enemy tank regiment was under attack and was moving south. When the corps commander evaluated the situation, including the progress of 25th Armored Division, the movement of the tank regiment, and original corps plan, he issued a fragmentary order.
He instructed 25th Armored Division to continue toward ZULU and to defeat the enemy tank regiment on ground that would leave the way clear for the corps reserve division to pass north of ZULU and into the enemy rear.
Based upon this, Commander, 25th Armored Division, identified three options. He could:
(1) Commit his reserve brigade to the southeast to meet and block the enemy regiment somewhere south or southeast of ZULU. This had the advantage of keeping 25th Armored Division forces massed to some degree. It had the disadvantages of requiring maneuver of the reserve brigade through or around the ongoing battle between 1st Brigade forces and the smaller enemy counterattack, and of meeting the enemy regiment nose on.
(2) Commit his reserve through objective ZULU to strike at the flank of the enemy regiment. This angle of attack would be advantageous, but the requirement to pass through 1st Brigade and ZULU would slow the commitment of the reserve.
(3) Commit his reserve around the north side of objective ZULU to strike the enemy tank regiment in its flank and rear. This would be slower in terms of overall distance to travel, but require no passing of one force through another. It also would permit pinning the enemy against 1st and 2nd Brigades. Most importantly, it tended to ensure that the major enemy forces in the area would be out of the way of the corps reserve as it passed to the north of ZULU.
The 25th Armored Division commander chose option (3) and committed his reserve brigade at once. Once committed, the brigade received direct support of one field artillery battalion. Due to the distance over which this wide envelopment was to take place, this field artillery battalion accompanied the brigade until it reached an area from which it could provide fire for the attack. Air defense weapons and engineers also moved out with the brigade.
A situation shapes up like Figure 4-9. As 3rd Brigade attacked into the flank of the enemy regiment, the leading brigade of the corps reserve division drew abreast of objective ZULU and continued on to the east into the rear area of the enemy division.
As shown in Figure 4-10, the three U.S. brigades trapped and destroyed the enemy tank regiment. The 25th Armored Division then consolidated, reorganized, and prepared to continue to the east to follow and support the corps main attack. In this situation the 25th Armored Division succeeded in rupturing the defenses of an enemy division, cleared the way for the corps reserve to exploit the breakthrough, and met all counterattacks. It applied offensive fundamentals to desert environment and defeated an enemy division.
e. Special Situation 4. The following example describes one way in which a tank company team might conduct an advance guard mission during a movement to contact. In this situation the 25th Armored Division is moving rapidly through the enemy security zone in order to rapidly close on the main enemy defense positions. Company A is the advance guard for the task force and has three tank platoons and one attached mechanized infantry platoon. A squad of combat engineers is with the mechanized infantry platoon to assist in breaching minefields. The battalion's AVLB section is in direct support and available to the company commander on call. Dedicated to Company A is an artillery battery of 155-mm SP howitzers.
Figure 4-9. Reserve Attacks Flank of Counterattack Force.
Figure 4-10. Counterattacking Force is Destroyed.
Figure 4-11 depicts the enemy and terrain. Many hills and ridge lines break up the desert terrain. They rise to an average height of 20-30 feet above the desert floor. Armored vehicles can scale most of these terrain features. The enemy has a dug-in infantry platoon and tank platoon on Hill 391 surrounded by a protective minefield. Dug to the north of Hill 371 is an antitank ditch. It is anchored on the east by a steep escarpment that is untrafficable to armored vehicles. Hills 413 and 301 have enemy tank platoons located on them. Hill 419 has an enemy infantry platoon dug-in. It is supported by an antitank platoon of BRDM vehicles with Sagger missiles. A protective minefield partially protects it to the south and east. Located along the desert road between Hills 413 and 301 is an enemy artillery battery of six 100-mm howitzers.
As shown in Figure 4-12, Company A advances to the north by employing the bounding overwatch technique with its platoons. The lead tank platoon, the 1st Platoon, occupies Hill 399. The mech infantry platoon follows and also occupies Hill 399. They observe to the front and determine that the enemy does not appear to occupy Hills 397 and 385. They observe enemy positions on Hill 391, but since they are out of effective range no one exchanges fire. The company commander passes the 2nd Tank Platoon around Hill 399 and occupies Hill 397. Enemy tanks on Hill 391 open fire against the 2nd Platoon on Hill 397. The 2nd Platoon returns the enemy fire. Desiring to build up his firepower as rapidly as possible, the company commander moves the 1st Platoon from Hill 399 to Hill 397 to join the 2nd Platoon and bring its fires against the enemy on Hill 391. The mech platoon follows but remains in complete defilade behind Hill 397. The company commander decides to move his 3rd Tank Platoon to Hill 385 in order to get better flanking shots into the enemy tank platoon positions. The 1st and 2nd Platoons cover by fire the movement of the 3rd Platoon. With platoons in good firing positions on Hills 397 and 385 a tank duel ensues with the enemy on Hill 391. You place artillery fires on the dug-in enemy infantry platoon in order to suppress any suitcase Saggers that may be present on that position.
You employ smoke against the tank platoon on Hill 413 to ensure that it cannot bring effective fires against friendly elements. Due to superior tank gunnery, the overwhelming volume of fire, and the excellent angles of attack, the friendly tanks gain the edge in the duel and knock out several enemy tanks. The company commander senses the moment is right to take Hill 391.
Keeping the 3rd Platoon on Hill 385 to overwatch the movement of his other platoons, the company commander begins his maneuver. His forward observer calls upon the battalion 4.2-inch mortar platoon to lay down a small smoke screen northwest of Hill 397 to shield his movement forward to a small hill. This small hill north of Hill 397 is the last cover available before assaulting the enemy on Hill 391. From this closer range, the two tank platoons deliver more effective fire against the remaining tanks of the enemy tank platoon. Now you direct the combined suppressive fires of the dedicated artillery battery and the battalion 4.2-inch mortar platoon against Hill 391. You employ both smoke and HE rounds. As soon as this suppressive fire becomes effective the maneuvering tanks and APCs move rapidly to the minefield. Under cover of the tank and artillery fire, the combat engineers swiftly breach a lane through the minefield and tanks and mech infantry pour through as fast as possible. The mechanized infantry rapidly dismount their carriers and get into the enemy trenches to root out the last remaining enemy resistance. Company A rapidly consolidates and reorganizes on Hill 391.
Figure 4-11. Special Situation 4.
Figure 4-12. Hasty Attack Initiated.
The company commander acts decisively to keep up the momentum of the advance, as shown in Figure 4-13. The 1st and 2nd Platoons immediately engage the enemy tank platoon on Hill 413. The company commander shifts the smoke to Hill 419 in order to obscure the vision of the enemy Sagger gunners located on that position. Under the covering fire of the two tank platoons on Hill 391, the 3rd Platoon advances to the north to Hill 371. The engineers bring forward an AVLB and under the covering fires of all three tank platoons, it spans the antitank ditch. The 3rd Platoon rapidly crosses the antitank ditch on the AVLB and takes up firing positions on a little knoll just to the north of the ditch. Under the covering fires of the 3rd Platoon on the knoll and the 1st Platoon on Hill 391, the 2nd Platoon and the mech platoon move across the antitank ditch and join the 3rd Platoon. The combined fires of all three tank platoons take a heavy toll, knocking out three tanks of the enemy platoon. The surviving tank withdraws to the north. Observing this withdrawal, the company commander rapidly advances the 2nd and 3rd Tank Platoons.
This rapid advancement to Hill 413 catches the enemy artillery battery in the open as they were in the process of withdrawing from their position. The two tank platoons completely destroy the surprised enemy artillery battery. The mech platoon closes on Hill 413, but remains in complete defilade. From his positions on Hill 413 and Hill 391 the Company A commander now directs his fires against the enemy on Hill 419, as sketched in Figure 4-14. He smokes the enemy tank platoon on Hill 301 in order to reduce its effectiveness. Elements bring to bear artillery, mortar, and tank fires against Hill 419 in order to suppress the Sagger missiles on that position.
Under cover of this suppressive fire the two tank and one mech platoons on Hill 413 begin to maneuver to assault the enemy on Hill 419. The 3rd Tank Platoon moves to a good firing position on the western edge of Hill 413 in order to bring effective fires to bear at a short range. Under cover of the fires of the 1st and 3rd Platoons, the 2nd Platoon and the mech infantry platoon breach the minefield and assault the enemy positions. As soon as they are into the enemy positions on Hill 419 the 3rd Platoon moves up rapidly to join them in mopping up the last remaining enemy resistance.
Figure 4-13. Continuing the Attack.
Figure 4-14. Final Attack.
This example highlights the following techniques:
- One element is always in position to cover by fire while another element is moving to a new position.
- Effectively employed, the combined arms team of tanks, infantry, and artillery, maximize the capabilities and minimize the limitations of each. No single arm can do it alone.
- Making the maximum use of terrain to protect friendly elements from enemy fire while moving and to provide good firing positions.
- The momentum of the attack maintains a rapid and aggressive tempo.
f. Special Situation 5. Because of the possibility of encountering strongpoints during desert operations, the following example suggests one way to attack a strongpoint. Normally, you should bypass strongpoints or neutralize them by air or artillery whenever possible. However, there may be times when there is no other recourse but to assault and capture a strongpoint. In such a circumstance you normally conduct the attack of a strongpoint by dismounted infantry at night or possibly during a blinding sandstorm to achieve surprise and minimize casualties. The following example presents one technique for reducing a specific type strongpoint. This attack is described in three phases. However, during the conduct of the operation these phases flow together rapidly.
(1) Phase I (Breaching). The first phase consists of breaching the minefield, shown in Figure 4-15. Preferably, combat engineers perform this task. However, all infantrymen must be trained and prepared to accomplish this. The construction of this type of strongpoint is such that it is usually not practical to assault it with armored vehicles. Therefore, you must use dismounted infantry.
The breaching group may consist of three separate elements-a breaching team and two suppression teams. The breaching teams may consist of an engineer squad to breach the minefield and an infantry squad to assist and to help the assaulting forces to get through the lane, the antitank ditch, and over the berm.
Figure 4-15. Attacking a Strongpoint— Phase I (Breaching).
Stealth characterizes the initial phase of the attack. No one opens fire until the enemy discovers the attack. Once the enemy discovers the attack, the suppression teams concentrate a high volume of automatic weapons and antitank fires near the intended breaching points. Other tanks and APCs are used farther to the rear in an over-watching role. They may intensify their fires once they discover the attack. Similarly, after discovering the attack, artillery and mortar fires (HE and smoke) suppress the entire strongpoint. Once breaching terms have breached the minefield, they assist the passage of the assaulting forces. They mark the lanes, set up small ladders, and help the assaulting troops to their objective.
One technique to do this is to use small colored lights to designate which troops go to the right and which go to the left. For example, a small blinking blue light would indicate members of one platoon go to the right while a small blinking red light would indicate forces of another platoon go to the left. This is important in the smoke and confusion of an assault.
(2) Phase II (Assault). Phase II begins as the assault groups abandon their attack positions and charge through the breached minefield and into the strongpoint trenches, depicted in Figure 4-16.
Figure 4-16. Attacking A Strongpoint— Phase II (Assault).
First, they set up blocking positions in the trenches and establish a base of fire. The primary task of the element providing the base of fire is to gain fire superiority over the enemy in the center of the strongpoint. The assault groups also try to suppress enemy activity around the entire strongpoint. Squads, working by buddy teams, begin the systematic process of clearing the trench line in both directions simultaneously. To avoid confusion, there should be a predetermined point on the trench line where the two clearing forces will meet. The clearing elements usually stay in the trenches. Their procedure is generally to fire down the trench line, throwing grenades until one goes in or very near the side trenches or weapons positions, whereupon one or two individuals assault with automatic weapons. The clearing elements must contend with one-man holes, complete with overhead cover, recessed along the sides of the main trench. After a team takes one or two of these positions, call another team forward to pass through and take the lead. This leap frogging process continues until teams have cleared the trench. At times it may be expedient to move outside the trench line along the outside of the berm to flank a weapon position and come in on it from a different direction.
(3) Phase III (Mopping Up). After friendly elements take the trench line, teams move to eliminate any enemy elements of resistance in the center of the strongpoint. Figure 4-17 shows tanks and other vehicles located behind berms of earth. Also, command and control and supply elements may remain in trenches or bunkers. The teams sent in to mop up these elements generally move from one covered position to another under the covering fire of friendly forces now occupying the trenches. They make use of hand grenades or explosive charges to toss over the berms and into the trenches and bunkers. This mopping up and consolidation completes the attack on this type strongpoint.
g. Offensive Operations in Hot. Barren Mountains. Avenues of approach are normally few, with very limited lateral movement except by helicopter. Reconnaissance must be continuous using all available means, as enemy defensive positions will be difficult to find. Normally, helicopters emplace observation posts on high ground.
After making contact, airmobile infantry can outflank and envelope the enemy while you place suppressive fires and close air support on all suspected positions, especially on dominating ground. Engineers should be well forward, to assist in clearing obstacles. If airmobile infantry is unable to outflank the enemy, it will be necessary to launch a deliberate attack.
Frontal attacks in daylight, even with considerable supporting fires, have limited chance of success against a well emplaced enemy. Flank attacks on foot take a lot of time. The best opportunity is at night or in very poor-visibility, but progress of men on foot will be slow and you should limit objectives. The force should make every effort to secure ground higher than enemy positions to allow the attack to be downhill. It may be possible to infiltrate to a position behind the enemy, preferably using the most difficult and hence unlikely route. This is very slow but it normally has the advantage of surprise.
Figure 4-17. Attacking A Strongpoint— Phase III (Mopping Up).
The importance of dominating terrain, together with the enemy's knowledge that troops on the objective will be physically tired and dehydrated makes an immediate counterattack likely. The offense must bring forward supporting weapons at once, preferably by helicopter, and remove casualties by the same method.
Airmobile and attack helicopter units are well suited for pursuit operations. They can outflank retreating enemy, and set up positions overlooking likely withdrawal routes. You can emplace small engineer parties to block defiles and interdict trails.
Close air support and field artillery can reinforce airmobile and attack helicopter units and can counter efforts by enemy engineers to create obstacles.
PART B - DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS USED IN A DESERT ENVIRONMENT
1. Defensive Operations.
It is possible, but unlikely, that a U.S. force will fully deploy in a desert country before an enemy attacks. The more probable situation is a secure lodgement area with part of the force in position supporting an allied army, while the remainder is moving in by air and sea, as shown in Figure 4-18.
Figure 4-18. Deployment to a Secure Lodgement Area.
Strategically, the outnumbered allied force's initial mission will be to gain time until the whole force is present in the operational area. This will require a defensive posture initially, but a defense undertaken so aggressively as to convince the enemy that his offensive action is too costly in personnel and equipment to be worth maintaining. The enemy will be well aware that a U.S. force is arriving in the area, and will make every effort to conclude his operation successfully before the U.S. force fully prepares for battle. The first defensive battle will be critical to the outcome of the operation. Therefore, it is essential that the mission of destroying an enemy attack be fulfilled. Thus, in the first battles of this war, U.S. forces will defend outnumbered and they must win.
a. Terrain. The force may conduct defensive operations at any stage of the battle. Some part of the force may have to defend important terrain types like
(1) Man-made Features. These are features such as ports, key logistic installations, roads, railroads, water pumping stations, airfields, and wells.
(2) Natural Features. These are features such as mountain passes, or an occasional piece of dominating ground such as Mount Hermon on the border of Syria and Israel, or the Sollum escarpment near the sea between Libya and Egypt.
(3) Tactical Terrain. This feature need not necessarily be a major feature but one whose loss will inhibit the force in some manner. For example, the loss of terrain close to a lodgement area may hinder the planned rate of buildup.
Except for such cases, the holding of desert terrain normally makes little difference to the final outcome of battle. This does not mean that a commander has complete discretion to move his force wherever and whenever he wishes, as this will affect the dispositions of other U.S. forces or allies. It does mean that possession of terrain is less important and the destruction of enemy forces is the primary focus. It will be necessary to dominate certain terrain or retain freedom to maneuver in large areas of desert. Yet there is no more sense in permanently occupying such areas than there would be permanently occupying a patch of sea. With equally equipped opposing forces, the critical factor in defense is the force ratios involved and the relative state of morale and training of the opposing forces.
b. Best Defense. A defense of aggressive maneuver at all levels is the best way to destroy large numbers of enemy without becoming destroyed in the process. If the defending force fails to remain mobile and active, the enemy will easily outflank it and strike directly at vital targets such as the lodgement area. It is almost certain that one flank or the other will be open as were the south flanks of the British and German forces in Egypt and Libya in 1940-43.
c. Security. Since it will not be possible to maintain an unbroken line between strategic obstacles, position air and ground security forces in width and depth to guard against an enemy trying to outflank the defender.
An unfavorable force ratio relies entirely on the defending force's ability to identify enemy avenues of approach early in the battle. This way, units may maneuver to locally change the force ratio in favor of the defender. If the force must defend on a broad front, you will need to define enemy avenues of approach and enemy strength on each avenue early. Then you can concentrate against the most dangerous threat while slowing or containing the enemy elsewhere in the battlefield.
It will be difficult for a brigade or battalion task force to determine where the enemy is going. So, a strong covering force is necessary to cause the enemy to concentrate for a main attack. If he hits the main battle area, advancing on a broad front, the advantage will be with the attacker.
d. Counterattack. Once you achieve a local force ratio of three or four to one, the defender can destroy the enemy force. The defense uses available obstacles, both natural and artificial to slow or contain the enemy or to isolate enemy targets and destroy his units one at a time. Forward units block and canalize the enemy into one or two avenues where you can engage him from the flank. A reserve can then counterattack by fire or fire and maneuver to destroy remaining enemy elements.
Mutual support is normally a factor of time rather than weapon range, due to the large areas that you have to cover. You may have to accept gaps in initial positions between and within task forces. Ideally you position units in such a manner that forces in at least two positions can engage an enemy maneuvering on any one of them. This greatly reduces any possibility of defeat in detail. Keep existing gaps under surveillance by some means. The defensive plan must include provisions for maneuvering to fire on any part of a gap before the enemy can move through it. Higher headquarters must define a unit's area of responsibility. You should be able to clearly identify it on the ground, which, due to the absence of significant terrain features, may require marking by artificial means.
e. Defensive Measures. Strongpoints are rare in desert warfare. Although, they may be necessary to defend an oasis, or, perhaps a mountain pass essential to the defender's scheme of maneuver. When it is necessary to deny terrain to an enemy force, it is far better to
- initiate the defense well forward of the terrain feature.
- conduct the defense in depth.
- destroy the enemy or force him to break off his attack before he reaches the critical feature.
When it is necessary to delay or withdraw, a desert offers many advantages to the defender. Long range fields of fire allow
- engagements at maximum effective range of direct-fire weapons systems.
- disengagement before the enemy can begin to close on the defender's position.
Dust clouds roused by a moving force make it necessary to disengage under cover of smoke or darkness. Units can use a sandstorm to advantage. Commanders can use field artillery, air force fighter bombers, and attack helicopters to allow a ground maneuver unit to disengage and move rapidly to the next position.
When it is necessary to trade space for time, often a counterattack to destroy enemy advance units will do more good than trying to defend longer from an intermediate position.
f. Plans. Commanders at all levels need to clearly understand the scheme of maneuver and concept of the operation, and what they are expected to do, especially should communications fail. Plans must include provisions for alternate means of communication. Units should clearly mark and reconnoiter their routes to the extent practical.
Due to the distances involved and constantly changing task organization and deployment, passage of lines will be more difficult to coordinate and control. You will have to pay extra attention to identification of vehicles, routes of passage, signals, and coordination of movements.
Deception should be a part of all desert retrograde operations. The object of deception is to conceal the fact that a retrograde operation is going to take place and that units are thinning out. You can use smoke, prepare dummy positions, transmit false radio messages, and even use dust clouds to deceive the enemy.
2. Fundamentals of Defense.
Doctrinal manuals appropriate to each level of command more fully describe the fundamentals of defense. Described below are the characteristics of defensive operations which are preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility.
a. Preparation. The below listed information is considered when preparing for defensive operations:
(1) The defender has significant advantages over the attacker. In most cases, he not only knows the ground better, but, having occupied it first, he has strengthened his positions. He is stationary and under cover in carefully selected positions, with prepared fires and obstacles.
(2) The attacker, however, has the initiative to choose the time and place of battle. The attacker tries to shatter the defense quickly and prevent its reconstitution by continuing the attack at a fast pace. The defender must slow the attacker's tempo, thereby providing time to isolate, fight, and destroy the attacker.
(3) Operational security is the defender's first requirement to defeat an attack. Units must maintain operational security, avoid patterns, and practice deception to hide the defender's disposition. Enemy reconnaissance efforts and probing attacks must be defeated without disclosing the scheme of defense. The reconnaissance battle is normally a prelude to the larger battle. The winner of the reconnaissance battle is usually the winner of the final battle.
(4) An enemy attack is preceded and accompanied by massed supporting fires. To survive, units must use defilade, reverse slope, and hide positions. Use supporting and suppressive fires and avoid easily targeted locations. The defender must use all available time to prepare fighting positions and obstacles, to rehearse counterattacks, and to plan supporting fires and combat service support in detail.
b. Disruption. An attacker's strength comes from momentum, mass, and mutual support of maneuver and combat support elements. The defender must slow or fix the attack, disrupt the attacker's mass, and break up the mutual support between the attacker's combat and combat support elements. This results in a piecemeal attack that can be defeated in detail. A general aim is to force the attacker to fight a nonlinear battle to make the attacker fight in more than one direction. This makes it more difficult for him to coordinate and concentrate forces and fires, and to isolate and overwhelm the defender. It also makes the securing of his flanks, combat support, combat service support, and command and control elements more difficult.
c. Concentration. To gain local superiority in one area, the defender is often forced to economize and accept risks elsewhere. Reconnaissance and security forces enable him to "see" the battlefield, and thereby reduce risk. The defender should be able to rapidly concentrate forces, thereby massing combat power to defeat an attacking force, then disperse and be prepared to concentrate again. The main effort is assigned to one subordinate unit. All other elements and assets support and sustain this effort. The commander may shift his focus by designating a new unit to be the main effort if other units encounter unexpected difficulties or achieve success.
d. Flexibility. Commanders designate reserves and deploy forces and logistic resources in depth to ensure continuous operations and to provide options for the defender if forward positions are penetrated.
(1) Contingency planning permits rapid action. Understanding the commander's intent and contingency plans allows subordinate commanders to rapidly exploit enemy weaknesses.
(2) Flexibility also requires that the commander "see the battlefield" to detect the enemy's scheme of maneuver in time to direct fires and maneuver against it. IPB determines likely enemy actions, while security elements verify which actions are actually taking place. The commander does not limit his intelligence gathering efforts only to the forces in contact, but also concentrates on formations arrayed in depth. The enemy may attempt to bypass areas where the defense is strong. Hence, the defending commander ensures that he is able to detect and react to enemy movement along all possible avenues of approach throughout the course of the battle. The defender must never allow the attacker to gain tactical surprise.
3. Environmental Considerations.
In the desert, you must modify techniques of defense described in How-to-Fight manuals applicable to each level of command. Do this according to the fundamentals described in the preceding paragraph, and the mission, and environmental considerations described below.
a. Observation. The enemy will try to attack with the sun low and behind him so as to dazzle the defender. The defender's observers must be as high as possible above the desert floor in order to see the advancing enemy as soon as possible. Figure 4-19 illustrates this.
You can detect active light sources from great distances, especially during nights with low ambient light. You must maintain positive control of active sources until you join the battle. Even then, the force equipped with passive devices will have the advantage over the force which is not.
Heat from combat vehicles can give an enemy using thermal imagery devices a complete picture of the defensive scheme. So, combat vehicles should not prematurely occupy battle positions at night.
b. Sandstorms. The enemy may use sandstorms to hide an offensive operation, especially if the sandstorm is blowing away from him. When this is the case, units should occupy battle positions immediately before the storm arrives and remain there until it ends, ready to fire and maneuver against the attacker following the storm. If vehicle patrolling is possible, a scout platoon or similar unit should cover all gaps, preferably moving in pairs, and on straight lines in view of navigational difficulties.
Figure 4-19. Observe from Height.
c. Terrain. From the point of view of a defending brigade or battalion task force commander, avenues of approach will often seem unlimited. You must maximize long-range observation and employ scouts well forward to offset this problem. Extensively use radars to provide early warning. Artificial obstacles can help to limit avenues of approach, but as previously mentioned, they must be large to have any effect. It is necessary to identify the enemy's main effort early in order to move to concentrate.
Lack of concealment, especially from the air, prohibits units from occupying firing positions until just before engaging the enemy. Combat vehicles must displace immediately after engagement or risk destruction. Because of frequent displacement, reconnoiter routes between battle positions and mark them when possible, without revealing the scheme of defense. You must frequently use smoke to conceal movement.
Commanders must employ mech infantry in the way that they can best contribute to the fight. Deploy them either mounted or dismounted, depending upon the mission and/or terrain. For example, a tank-heavy company team may have the mission to engage a threat mechanized force at long range. The mechanized infantry cannot contribute to the long-range fight. Consequently, they may well remain mounted in a well-concealed hiding position. However, in certain locales, desert terrain is also hilly, and sometimes broken up. Therefore, they can effectively use their shorter range weapons.
d. Fires. As previously described, the desert offers excellent fields of fire. Place tanks and heavy antitank weapons in positions that will take advantage of their long range and accuracy. Firing accurately and first is most important in desert operations. It is easy to become disoriented, so it is often necessary to mark sectors of fire on the ground with poles, or rocks if available. Use indirect fires to slow the enemy advance, to suppress enemy weapons and observers, and to conceal movement between positions with smoke.
Long-range engagements with tanks and ATGM'S characterize defensive operations in deserts are:
4. Defense Example.
Figure 4-20 shows one way in which a division and a brigade may defend in the desert. Units depicted here are defending on almost featureless terrain against a larger enemy force. The units alter defensive operations to fit the terrain as it becomes more broken and avenues of approach become more easily identified. It is important to remember that in the desert, offensive maneuver may be the best defense.
Figure 4-20. Security for Lodgement Area.
5. Defensive Operations in Hot, Barren Mountains.
A defense from a series of strongpoints is normal in hot mountains, due to the need to hold dominating terrain and due to restrictions on ground mobility. Due to the amount of rock in the soil, it takes more time to prepare positions, and normally requires engineer support.
You need to hold terrain-dominating avenues of approach. You must either hold or deny the enemy by fire any terrain that dominates a friendly position. You may need to stock several days' supplies, especially water, ammunition, and medical equipment in a position in case helicopters or supply vehicles are unable to reach it.
When using a covering force, organize it around cavalry reinforced with attack helicopters, supported by field and air defense artillery. Airmobile infantry operates on ridge lines. If the enemy closes on a battle position, it is difficult to extract airmobile infantry. Therefore, you should have sheltered landing sites nearby. In any event, you must cover extractions by air or ground suppressive fires. Use stay-behind observers to call down field artillery fires on targets of opportunity or just simply to report enemy activity. When tanks are a threat and terrain is suitable, reinforce the covering force with tank-heavy units and antitank weapons systems.
Combat in the main battle area is usually a series of isolated actions fought by strongpoints on ridgelines and in valleys. Use patrols extensively to harass the enemy and prevent infiltration. You must cover all possible routes. If the enemy attempts to outflank the friendly force, you must block him by attack helicopters, if available, or airmobile infantry.
Keep reserves centrally located and deployed by air to block or counterattack. If this is not possible, reserves may have to be split up and placed behind key terrain where they are available for immediate foot counterattack.
If retrograde operations are necessary, mountainous terrain is as good a place to conduct them as anywhere. You need more time to reconnoiter and prepare rearward positions, and you should prestock them as much as possible. Unlike the desert floor where movement between positions is likely to cover great distances, movement in these conditions is usually from ridge to ridge. You must cover routes with flank guards, especially at defiles or other critical points, as the enemy will attempt to block them or cut off rear guards.
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