|
RDL Homepage |
Table of Contents |
Document Information |
Download Instructions |
LESSON 2
MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN (DEFENSE)
OVERVIEW
LESSON DESCRIPTION:
In this lesson you will learn to perform a specific task required in planning for and conducting a defensive operation on urbanized terrain.
TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:
| ACTION: | Explain Threat doctrine for conducting an attack on urban terrain. |
| CONDITION: | Given extracts of doctrinal literature, a tactical situation for a battalion TF S3, and a series of multiple-choice questions relating to Threat force offensive doctrine. |
| STANDARD: | To demonstrate competency of the task, you must achieve a minimum of 70% on the subcourse examination. |
| REFERENCES: | The material contained in this lesson was derived from the following publications: FM 34-130, FM 90-10-1, and FM 100-2-2. |
COMBAT IN CITIES
1. Although their doctrine stresses speed and dynamic maneuver, the former Soviets fully realize that movement through urban areas may result in greater ammunition expenditures and casualties and slower rates of advance. The former Soviets have long acknowledged that combat in cities will be unavoidable at times. Given urbanization trends in Western Europe, combat in cities could be more the rule than the exception in that area.
2. The former Soviet ground forces consider combat in cities to consist of only those missions conducted in heavily populated cities and towns. Combat in isolated villages or groups of buildings along roads in agricultural or open areas are considered actions in or against strongpoints and are outside the scope of this lesson.
3. The former Soviets classify towns and cities according to shape, population, and perimeter. The former Soviets calculate that in Europe there are one or two small cities for every 200 to 300 square kilometers of terrain. In a European conflict, there is potential for involvement in combat in cities on the average of every 40 to 60 kilometers.
4. The decision to attack a city or town may be politically, strategically, or tactically motivated and normally is made at army level or above. Tactical reasons for attack may include:
a. The city or town is key terrain.
b. The area encompasses vital communications crossings.
c. It is necessary to protect an exposed flank.
d. It serves as a diversionary operation.
e. It would tie down enemy troops and reserves.
f. The built-up area is unavoidable due to the extent of urbanization.
5. In the offense, the former Soviets plan for their lead echelons to cut off and to destroy enemy forces before they can occupy cities. If this is not possible, the former Soviets plan to bypass pockets of resistance with leading echelons and continue the advance. Bypassed enemy-held areas are sealed off and may be neutralized by the following echelons.
DOCTRINE
1. Former Soviet principles for offensive combat in cities at division level are:
a. Conduct initial attacks from the march, after reconnaissance.
b. Launch attacks from positions in contact with the enemy if initial operations fail to make progress.
c. Decentralize command and control to the maximum possible extent.
d. Maintain continuous pressure on the enemy through day and night combat.
e. Conceal movement through the use of smoke, darkness, or low visibility.
f. Integrate company-sized tank, motorized rifle, and combat engineer assault groups with the direct support of anti-tank guns and the direct and indirect support of artillery and mortars.
2. While combined arms assault groups provide the main effort during combat in cities, heliborne assaults on key points may be used. Helicopters may lift motorized rifle troops to key points in the battle area. During combat in cities, a former Soviet division normally attacks in two echelons at each level of command with the following frontages:
a. Division 4 to 6 kilometers.
b. Regiment 2 to 3 kilometers.
c. Battalion 400 to 600 meters.
d. Company 200 to 300 meters.
3. Main axes are along major roads to capture key areas, to disrupt the defense, and to cross the area in the shortest possible time. Division and regimental axes are major roads. A battalion might advance on two or three parallel streets, with one company axis per street.
4. Combat on such restricted frontages and axes of advance, results in the following significant control problems:
a. Difficulty in coordinating attacks progressing at different rates with fire support.
b. Communications problems caused by a large number of VHF radios operating in close proximity and being screened by buildings.
c. Identification of targets and coordination of fire against targets in depth.
d. Logistic problems, particularly the resupply of ammunition, which may be used at an extremely high rate in intense combat.
5. The commander determines force size and composition based on the area's size, shape, building type, and street patterns as well as the strength of defending forces. Attacking forces are not evenly distributed around the built-up area. They are employed over the most favorable avenues of approach. Because of the manpower-intensive, close-combat nature of combat in cities, motorized rifle rather than tank units are preferred. Normally, regiments coordinate the attacks and battalions conduct them. Division and regimental resources reinforce the battalions as required. Individual battalions may have a variety of missions, depending on the situation. Reserves are created at regimental rather than division level.
Figure 2-1. Tactics and Analysis.
6. Motorized rifle battalions may be employed in either the first or second echelons of an assault on a city or town. In either case, their organization, tasks, and assault tactics are probably the same. Figure 2-1 shows the representative tactical features of city attack.
7. In combat in cities, the former Soviets call their assault battalions "assault detachments." They are organized into two echelons. Each company is formed into an "assault group." A typical combat organization for an assault group is:
a. A motorized rifle company.
b. One or two tank platoons.
c. Antitank guns.
d. An artillery battery, in the direct fire role.
e. A combat engineer platoon.
f. Flamethrower and chemical specialists.
8. Besides the fire support on hand at company level, the battalion commander normally has artillery and mortar units under his control to give indirect fire support to his assault groups. Indirect fire weapons are employed to destroy enemy strongpoints and to neutralize enemy reserves.
9. Assault groups are task organized and may include:
a. Attack or seizure groups consisting of a motorized rifle platoon reinforced by tanks.
b. A covering and holding group consisting of up to a motorized rifle platoon reinforced by antitank guns.
c. A fire support group which includes attached artillery in the direct fire role and flame-throwers.
d. A group of combat engineers equipped with bangalore torpedoes and mine-clearing devices.
10. One or two motorized rifle squads may be used as a reserve force to either strengthen attacking or holding groups or to carry out a contingency task. Tank units are used to:
a. Serve, with combined arms reinforcement, as an advance guard in the approach to the city.
b. Cut off or envelop the enemy before he reaches the built-up area.
c. Envelop the city.
d. Reinforce infantry in street fighting.
e. Serve as a mobile reserve.
11. Artillery is decentralized during offensive combat in cities. The commander may attach up to 50 percent of available artillery to assault groups to be used in the direct fire role. The remainder is organized into an artillery group to provide on-call indirect and counterbattery fire. Howitzers and mortars are used for counterbattery tasks. Preparatory fires are shorter than normal, 5 to 20 minutes being the historical precedent.
12. The missions of engineer subunits accompanying assault groups are engineer reconnaissance, destruction of buildings, mine clearance, and clearing routes of rubble to allow movement of tanks, APCs, and artillery.
13. Antiaircraft weapons, both handheld and crew served, are used to cover artillery firing positions and commander's observation posts against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. When not engaged in this primary role, they suppress enemy ground fire.
14. Unlike combat in more open terrain, the former Soviet doctrine stresses decentralized control in combat in cities. This puts a heavy burden on the battalion's communication systems. However, only through decentralization can they cope with the tactical problems of controlling troops fighting in close quarters.
15. It is unlikely that nuclear weapons would be used within a city. Extensive destruction and contamination would only hinder offensive progress. They may however, use non-persistent chemical weapons because of their potential for human destruction without causing material damage.
16. The former Soviets can be expected to use psychological warfare, including threats, promises, misinformation, and rumors. These would be directed against both military defenders and the civilian population.
THE OFFENSE
1. Combat in the cities imposes demands for a slower pace and tempo of attacks; longer duration of commitment; shorter, intense preparatory fires; and specially tailored forces. The former Soviet tactics reflect these concepts.
2. Initial reconnaissance of a target urban area is made following study of large-scale maps, aerial photographs and background intelligence reports. Tactical intelligence will update such background data from long-range reconnaissance patrols, agent reports, aerial reconnaissance, and signal intelligence. When required, task-organized reconnaissance groups drawn from motorized rifle and tank units reinforce divisional and regimental reconnaissance.
3. The specific mission of reconnaissance units and groups from division and regiment is to identify:
a. Enemy deployments outside the built-up area.
b. Strongpoints within the city.
c. Command posts and communications centers.
d. Reserves.
e. Enemy withdrawal routes and successive defensive positions.
4. On receiving his orders from the regimental commander, a battalion commander clarifies his mission by studying his superior's concept of attack. He immediately gives his subordinates a warning order containing the battalion's mission, with his guidelines for its completion. The battalion commander then makes his estimate of the situation. He assesses the enemy, the need for reconnaissance missions, the battalion's combat organizations, tasks for his own troops, and terrain. Using large-scale maps and aerial photographs, the battalion commander studies the objective area and assigns tasks to individual assault groups.
5. If time and situation allow, the battalion commander conducts a terrain reconnaissance of his objective, from a suitable vantage point. The assault group commanders accompany him, and they coordinate on-the-ground reference points and targets for supporting weapons. During this reconnaissance, the commander selects and defines departure lines and unit boundaries.
6. The battalion commander and his staff prepare the attack order, which includes:
a. Objectives to be seized.
b. Approach routes, lines of departure, and phases (lines) for assault.
c. Method of assault of individual buildings and blocks.
d. Actions of flanking units.
e. Method of destroying bypassed groups of enemy.
f. Details of fire and movement.
g. Details of smoke, chemical, and flame-thrower use.
h. Locations of command posts and control points and the procedure for moving them forward during the attack.
7. Control of battalion offensive tactics in cities differs significantly from combat in open terrain. Company-size assault groups attack concurrently and independently. A major reason for decentralization is the greatly restricted area of observation and radio transmission range. The former Soviets pay particular attention to the difficulties of coordinating indirect artillery fire.
8. The battalion command observation post is located 200 to 300 meters behind the assault groups. The battalion commander personally assigns indirect fire missions to the artillery commander, who is collocated with him. The former Soviets believe that the battalion commander, by staying as far forward as possible, can personally influence the conduct of an attack.
9. Preparatory indirect artillery fire against urban targets is intensive but short, normally lasting only 5 to 20 minutes. Tactical aircraft attack enemy reserve positions, artillery emplacements, and communications centers. As assault units reach a safety line, artillery fire is shifted to the enemy rear. Smoke is used to conceal approach routes.
10. Canals and rivers that flow through cities pose significant obstacles to the attacker. Accordingly, reconnaissance elements identify likely crossing areas and standing bridges which are designated as priority objectives. Assault crossing parties with tank-launched bridges may be positioned well forward in attack units.
11. After destroying strongpoints at the edge of the city, assault groups move forward on major roads toward the center of the city. Smoke may be used to cover flanks or conceal forward movement. Infantrymen carry up to twice the normal allocation of ammunition to compensate for high intensity of fire. If resistance is light, the former Soviets may move infantry forward by mounting them either in APCs or on tanks. Most common, however, is for infantry subunits to move on foot along streets, clearing buildings one by one. Where necessary, they clear houses by simultaneous assaults from roof and ground floor. They also use automatic weapons and grenades extensively. Combat engineers attached to assault groups make entry and exit holes through masonary walls. They make maximum use of underground passages. Specially assigned teams follow up assault groups to destroy small enemy parties that survive the initial assaults. Figure 2-2 shows a reinforced MRB attack through a city.
Figure 2-2. Reinforced MRB attack through a city.
12. Tanks are used to support infantry and to neutralize enemy strongpoints. Former Soviet doctrine calls for strong reserves of tanks at both battalion and regimental levels.
13. Tactics for fighting at night remain basically the same as those used by day. The former Soviets try to maintain the same attack intensity at night. Illumination is used both as an aid to their troops as well as a means to blind the enemy.
14. The battalion second echelon is used to exploit the success of first-echelon assault groups. Normally, the regimental commander gives the order to commit the battalion second echelon to the assault. It may leapfrog through first-echelon subunits already in contact with the enemy. Occasionally, the second echelon must complete the task of first-echelon subunits.
