Military

a.   Threat Tactics. Threat tactics stress the use of speed and firepower to overwhelm and destroy an opposing force. Threat doctrine directs and average daily rate of advance of 40 to 50 kilometers under conventional conditions and 30 to 50 kilometers under normal conditions. To do this, armored vehicles require enough ground for rapid movement and adequate space to maneuver and fire. High speed avenues of approach, such as roads, ridges, and flat, rolling terrain, should be constantly observed. An initial rally point (IRP) is useful to pinpoint these areas to evaluate terrain from the Threat's viewpoint. The questions to be answered by the IRP are:

• How can the enemy use the terrain?
• Where is the enemy likely to appear first?

b.   Terrain. Terrain is constantly changing because areas are cleared for farming and new roads and buildings are constructed. Since weather influences the effects of terrain, ground reconnaissance is needed. It obtains current, detailed information about roads, trails, man-made objects, the density of trees and brush, and the seasonal condition of streams and rivers. If a ground reconnaissance is not possible, an aerial reconnaissance should be used.

c.   Mobility Characteristics. Knowing the mobility characteristics of the Threat armored vehicles also helps antiarmor platoons determine where to look. If the situation permits, tank and motorized units should avoid terrain or obstacles that can stop or impede movement such as the following:

• Slopes steeper than 30 degrees.
• Sturdy walls or embankments three feet high or higher.
• Ditches or gullies nine feet wide or wider and three feet deep or deeper.
• Hardwood trees 10 inches or larger in diameter and 10 feet or fewer apart.
• Water obstacles at least five feet deep. (Warsaw Pact tanks are equipped with snorkels, but they are time consuming to install).
• Swampy terrain or rough, rocky terrain.
• Built-up areas in which vehicles are restricted to movement on confined roads, through park areas, or across sports fields.

Armored vehicles can breach some obstacles and can move through restrictive terrain, but these factors greatly slow their terrain. Therefore, a commander may continue to observe those areas and move TOWs only to react to Threat initiatives from those areas.

a.   Sectors of Observation. The TOW squad leader assigns areas of responsibility to the squad members to ensure that the entire sector (assigned by the section leader) is covered. TOW gunners use their TOW sights to observe their sectors from the maximum engagement line back about 2,500 meters. The squad leaders use binoculars to observe from 2,500 meters back to about 1,000 meters. The drivers are responsible for local security and for observing the area from 1,000 meters back to the TOW position. The exact distance that each squad member is responsible for depends upon the terrain and is normally keyed to easily recognizable terrain. Sectors of observation should be rotated routinely so that personnel do not become fixated.

b.   Scanning. Proper scanning methods (as shown in Figure 2-1) allow TOW squads to locate and identify targets quickly. With the naked eye, observers should first make a quick overall search for obvious targets or signatures such as exhaust smoke or dust. They should also listen for sounds such as engine noises. If possible, observers should turn off their engines so that the sounds of enemy vehicles can be heard.

c.   Optics. Using the TOW sights (both optical and night), squad leader's periscope, binoculars, and night observation devices, gunners can acquire targets at ranges greater than with the naked eye. Thermal night vision sights and devices can also be used both day and night to acquire targets through smoke, light vegetation, camouflage, and fog.

Because the TOW sights have limited fields of vision, observers must scan slowly across their sectors to avoid missing targets or target signatures--for example, the field of vision for a TOW optical sight at 3,000 meters is limited to an area less than 300 meters wide; the field of view of a night sight at 3,000 meters is 360 meters. However, the field of vision with the naked eye is much wider. This means that with a TOW optical sight, a much narrower field of the sector can be viewed at one time.

The TOW 2 night sight can be used 24 hours per day. The thermal sight reads heat sources to detect targets even in daylight. However, observers using night sights tire quickly and must rotate often when they are scanning their sectors. When dismounted, soldiers scanning with the night sight are limited by the amount of operational time available from the night sight's batteries. This time can be increased by alternating observation periods between crewmen of squads covering the same sector.

The efficiency of binoculars in daylight can be increased by using only one eyepiece or by cupping the eyepiece with the hand to prevent more light from entering the eye. Keeping the binoculars steady by resting them against a steady object also increases efficiency.

An observer with binoculars and a means to communicate with the squad that is operating dismounted can often cover a sector better than a soldier with a night sight. This may be required when the vehicle is in a hidden position.

a.   Signatures Indicating Soldiers' Presence. Signatures that indicate the presence of soldiers can include the following:

• Fighting positions.
• Trash.
• Cut or missing vegetation (cleared for fields of fire or camouflage).
• Freshly dug earth, indicating fighting positions.
• Voices.
• Light from matches, cigarettes, or fires.

b.   Signatures Indicating Tracked Vehicles' Presence.   Signatures that indicate the presence of tracked vehicles include the following:

• Large dust clouds.
• Diesel smoke.
• Noise from vehicle's engine.
• Vehicle tracks on the ground.
• Distinctive silhouettes or shapes.

c.   Signatures Indicating Antitank Weapons' Presence. Signatures that indicate the presence of antitank weapons include the following:

• Smoke and flash of missile launch.
• "Swish" of missile launch.
• Long, thin wires in brush, trees, or along the ground.
• Traces of slow-flying antitank guided missiles (ATGMs).
• Dismounted soldier looking through a periscope-type device (the launcher could be up to 80 meters from the gunner).

d.   Signatures Indicating Obstacles' and Mines' Presence. Signatures that indicate the presence of obstacles and mines include the following:

• Loose or disturbed dirt in a regular pattern
• Areas where large trees have been removed.

a.   Target Recognition by Type. Learning to recognize targets by type is not difficult, but identifying them as friendly or enemy requires study and attention to detail. This is especially true of tanks because friendly and Threat tanks are similar in design. Side by side, tanks may look different, but when they are camouflaged at a distance, their differences are hard to notice. Antiarmor squads must know what friendly and Threat armored vehicles they can expect to see on the battlefield. Training aids, such as graphic training aid 17-3-13 (GTA 17-2-13), 35-mm color slides, scale models, or pictures from magazines and newspapers, can be used to study the armored vehicles of various nations.

b.   Differences Among Armored Personnel Carriers. Several obvious differences exist among armored personnel carriers. Because observers can seldom see an entire armored personnel carrier, they should know the different structural characteristics of enemy and friendly vehicles. Four structural areas, common to all tanks, can be used to identify each type:

• Suspension system.
• Turret.
• Main gun.
• Commander's station.

c.   Tank Recognition Features. The type, location, and absence or presence of certain equipment within the four areas (suspension system, turret, main gun, and commander's station) can identify any tank in the world. If any two of the areas can be identified, usually this is the tank. This is true even of a tank in the hull-down position because three of the four areas-turret, main gun, and commander's station--can still normally be seen, even with the thermal sight.

a.   Range Estimation. TOW gunners need not know the exact range to engage targets before engaging them. They need only know when targets are within range. Using a maximum engagement line speeds this determination. A TOW maximum engagement line (shown in Figure 2-2) is an imaginary line drawn across a sector of fire 3,750 meters from a TOW firing position. To establish this line, the squad leader or the gunner identifies the terrain features at or near his maximum range. Any target crossing or appearing short of this line should be within range. Established soon after a firing position is occupied, the maximum engagement line greatly reduces target engagement times, especially for targets that seem to be near maximum range. Several range determination techniques can be used to determine a maximum range line or the range to specific targets.

a.   Fire Control Methods. Fire control and distribution measures must be simple--leaders must know them well. Leaders must use these measures routinely, with no need for detailed instructions. The following are the commonly used measures for controlling the fires of an antiarmor platoon:

a.   Concentration. Concentration of effort is essential. Successful attacks are usually launched from sudden concentrations and dispersed rapidly as the penetrating forces move into the depths of the defended area. They succeeded by massing unexpectedly where they can achieve a brief local superiority and by preserving their initial advantage through relentless exploitation. When concentrating forces for the attack, the commander must avoid patterns or obvious movements that indicate the attack's timing or direction. Mobility, speed, security, and deception are essential to successful concentration of forces. Concentration also applies to CS and CSS elements. Cooperation between and integration of these assets are essential to maintaining momentum. Disrupted engineer support, air defense coverage, field artillery (FA) fires, communications, and logistic support limit the success of offensive actions.

b.   Surprise. Surprise can be attained by moving quickly, by doing the unexpected, or by deceiving the enemy. The commander must strive to surprise the enemy. The initiative of the offensive allows him to choose the time, place, and means of launching the attack. The basic requirement for surprise is to strike the enemy at an unexpected place and time. This means avoiding the enemy's strengths and attacking his weaknesses,which is referred to as the indirect approach. Through the careful use of surprise, the commander can strike when and where the enemy least expects, which contributes to the likelihood of success. Surprise can also be achieved by infiltration or night attacks.

c   Speed. "Speed" is a relative term that refers to the enemy's ability to react. An attack must move rapidly. The commander must decide and react faster than the enemy. The use of speed keeps the enemy off balance, contributes to the security of the battalion, and degrades the defender's countermeasures so that they cannot keep pace. The use of speed allows a unit to shift its strength quickly for wider penetrations, to roll up exposed flanks, and to reinforce success. The enemy must not be allowed to recover from the shock of an initial attack.

d.   Flexibility. Flexibility is necessary for success. The plan of attack must allow for developments and reflect the uncertainties of offensive combat. It must allow the exploitation of opportunities that arise in the course of operations. The commander must avoid fixing his attention on his initial attack so completely that he is unaware of other opportunities for success; he must be able to change quickly between offense and defense (with attended task organization changes), to conduct continuous operations, and to fight on an integrated battlefield. He must be prepared for diversions from the original plan, which should include provisions for changing the direction or location of the main effort.

e.   Audacity. An audacious commander is one who is daring, confident, and original. Boldness and the willingness to take risks have always been the keystones of a successful offense.

a.   Scheme of Maneuver. The scheme of maneuver reflects the commander's intent and plan to position elements. The scheme has enough detail to ensure that subordinates understand the purpose of the operation. The scheme of maneuver

• identifies objectives for platoons and assigns responsibilities and tasks.
• states the route and formations used to get from the line of departure (LD) to the BP. Routes chosen should cover and conceal, allow the unit to move rapidly, avoid obstacles and enemy kill zones, and mass combat soldiers on the enemy flank. Movement formations give the company flexibility to react.
• identifies the primary, alternate, and supplementary positions for the platoons. Having positions allows the commander to direct TOW missiles onto the likely infantry avenue of approach.
• describes the commander's plans to use the platoon's fires to destroy the enemy in the engagement area. The commander identifies the TRPs and trigger lines based upon how he views the battle and intends to defeat the enemy. He establishes disengagement criteria to prevent the company from becoming decisively engaged.

b.   Fire Support Plan. The effective use of supporting fires is critical to the success of combat operations. The fire support plan complements the scheme of maneuver and shows how the commander plans to use fire support (mortars, artillery, precision-guided munitions, close air support, NGF). The commander gives the FSO requirements and tasks that support his concept. The FSO determines available fire support assets and whether those assets can accomplish the tasks. Known or suspected enemy positions are identified by the S2 or by the commander's reconnaissance, and fires are planned upon them. The plan covers the following actions:

• Suppression or destruction of the enemy's direct-fire weapon systems.
• Breaking up of enemy fortifications.
• Degradation of enemy command and control.
• Destruction of enemy logistics sites.
• Screening company movement.

a.   Preparatory Fires. Preparatory fires are intense volumes of fire delivered according to a schedule. They suppress enemy direct-fire weapons and support the movement of the company

b.   Fires During Engagement. Fires during engagement are provided to:

• Destroy or suppress enemy weapons.
• Isolate the enemy within the engagement area.
• Stop second-echelon forces from reinforcing the enemy.
• Lower the enemy's counterattack ability.

c.   Fires in Support of Disengagement. Fires, in support of disengagement, target likely enemy counterattack and withdrawal routes. This helps destroy the enemy and allows the company to withdraw to new positions. During this stage, fires screen the movement of the company to its new positions.

a.   Receive and Analyze the Mission. Company commanders receive their mission in an oral or written operation order (OPORD), fragmentary order (FRAGO), or warning order. Upon the receipt of this order, a commander begins his estimate of the situation and plans the use of available time. The commander uses the information available in the battalion OPORD to determine the mission, its purpose, and the constraints upon the company. This information is in the battalion's mission statement, in the intents of the battalion and brigade commanders, and in the coordinating instructions. The commander then considers the factors of METT-T and other relevant factors to determine implied missions. Using this information, the commander determines how to restate the mission for the company and how to accomplish the mission.

When a unit receives a new mission, the most crucial resource is time. The leader should use only one-third of his time for company planning and should leave the rest for his subordinates to plan, reconnoiter, and issue their subsequent orders. This one-third rule increases the chance for mission success. It allows time for the commander's intent and concept to be carried to and understood by the whole unit. This knowledge helps create a sense of purpose in the unit, which makes the unit more effective.

b.   Issue the Warning Order. The company commander issues a warning order explaining the restated mission. He issues it as soon as he receives a warning order or other information about an impending mission. Warning orders are issued through the chain of command to ensure that all personnel are informed. No standard warning order format exists. However, the warning order must include the following:

• An addressee.
• The time and nature of the operation.
• The earliest time of the move or degree of notice.
• The time and place that the operation order will be issued.
• New information may also be issued in the warning order. If time is too short for a FRAGO or an OPORD to be issued, a warning order may have to suffice.

c.   Make a Tentative Plan. The company commander's tentative plan states how he intends to accomplish the mission. He must analyze the factors of METT-T. Developing the plan is not a mechanical process. It is one that requires the commander to use his judgment. The result of this step is the commander's concept of the operation. The commander's plan is based upon his knowledge of the following factors:

• His knowledge of the situation.
• The mission analysis.
• The estimate of the enemy's situation.

The estimate is based upon patrol reports and on information from battalion S2.

The commander continues by choosing a COA, which is his tentative plan. He can change the plan based upon the leader's reconnaissance or new information. The tentative plan forms his concept of the operation and includes a scheme of maneuver and a fire support plan. This plan is the basis for the following:

-   Coordination.

-   Unit movement.

-   Reorganization.

-   Reconnaissance.

The mission statement includes the mission's

-   who.

-   what.

-   when.

-   where.

-   why.

Since the company commander has no staff, he can discuss his plan with subordinates or attached personnel. This gives subordinates a better view of the commander's concept and gives attached personnel a chance to advise in their areas of specialized knowledge.

d.   Start Necessary Movement/Begin Preparation. The company commander acts quickly, using available time well so that his platoon leaders can move, reconnoiter, and prepare their units. If the company is to move a great distance before the operation, it should be moved upon the receipt of the battalion's warning order. If the company is to take part in a tactical or a strategic airlift, preparations should start after the company warning order is issued. This permits platoons and the commander to arrive at the terrain early. When the commander is called to receive an order, he brings with him his company fire support officer and executive officer. The executive officer returns to the unit with the warning order and, in the commander's absence, moves the company. The first sergeant supervises the logistical operations. He coordinates the fuel, ammunition, medical, maintenance, transportation, and food support. The commander reconnoiters, checks his plan, and issues his final order. When the company conducts a tactical movement, many of the tasks involved are routine and should be part of the company SOP.

e.   Reconnoiter. Sometimes commanders must issue orders based upon a map reconnaissance. They should do this only when a ground reconnaissance cannot be conducted. A ground reconnaissance shows the commander whether his concept will work on the terrain. The commander takes his company fire support officer, platoon leaders, and a security force with him during reconnaissance. They travel by covered and concealed routes to one or more vantage points and observe the terrain. The security party provides overwatch while the leaders reconnoiter. If ground or air reconnaissance is not possible, then the commander should request any new information on the terrain, such as detailed maps and photographic reconnaissance.

f.   Complete the Plan. Reconnaissance may change the plan and add detail. New information is used to refine the tentative plan and to make any final changes to the operation.

g.   Issue Orders. Company commanders rarely issue written orders. Normally, the commander prepares his notes in the five paragraph order format and gives an oral order. He should give it to his orders group, which consists of the following individuals:

• His executive officer.
• The company fire support officer.
• The platoon leaders.
• The first sergeant.
• The leaders of attached elements.

The graphics that support the operation should be on the commander's map already and should be copied on subordinates' maps before the order is given. When the concept of the operation is given, the commander should use either a terrain model or sketches or he should give the OPORD while overlooking the area of operations to illustrate his concept. This ensures that subordinates understand the concepts of maneuver for their element and other elements. By having his subordinates brief him back or walk through the plan, the commander can ensure that it is understood.

h.   Supervise. A leader supervises the preparation (precombat checks and rehearsals) and the execution of the mission. Constant supervision is as important as the issuance of the order. Officers and noncommissioned officers ensure that all phases of the preparation are complete.

i.   Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, and Time (METT-T) Analysis. METT-T analysis is used as an analytical framework for planning combat operations. The following shows how it can be used to accomplish a mission:

j.   Operations Security. Operations security includes all measures taken to maintain security and achieve tactical surprise. It includes the following:

• Countersurveillance.
• Physical security.
• Signal security.
• Information security.

It also involves identifying, eliminating, or controlling tactical indicators that can be used by the enemy.

• Operations security (OPSEC) is a command responsibility. All personnel must practice good OPSEC procedures before and during the battle. This requires high standards of discipline and training.
• Enemy forces use a wide range of intelligence-gathering sources to learn locations, abilities, and intentions of friendly units. These sources can include the following:

-   Ground reconnaissance elements.

-   Photographic and signals intelligence.

-   Espionage.

Operations security measures should be considered during the planning and conducting of each operation and after each afteraction report.

• To provide effective OPSEC, the company commander must see the enemy first. Although the commander must depend upon the battalion for intelligence, he can include the following checklist in his SOP to avoid OPSEC violations:

-   Observation posts are used to cover areas that are hard to observe.

-   Positions, vehicles, and equipment are camouflaged.

-   Defilade positions are used for concealment and to reduce exposure.

-   Noise and light discipline are enforced to reduce the possible detection of the unit in day or night.

-   Smoke is planned and used when necessary.

-   When communications security (COMSEC) devices are unavailable or nonoperational, friendly graphic control measures are encoded using the current signal operation instructions (SOI). Enemy locations are sent by radio.

-   Radio transmissions must be fewer than 15 seconds with a break between transmissions.

-   The SOI authentication tables are used. Platoons request authentication either when a change in the mission is received, when the authenticity of a transmission is in doubt, or when a net is opened or closed.

-   When jamming, interference, or deception is detected, the company submits a meaconing, intrusion, jamming, and interference (MIJI) report.

• The key to operations security is reducing electronic, visual, thermal, and operational signatures.

k.   Control Measures. Several control measures (shown in Figure 2-10) are commonly used in the offense.

a.   Forest and Jungles. The degree and type of forestation affect the employment of antitank guided missiles.

b.   Hills and Mountain Ranges. Degree of forestation on hills affect the employment of antitank guided missiles.

c.   Swamps and Wetlands. True swamps stop all mounted movement except on hard surfaced, elevated roads. Floodplains and moors can support at least lightly armored vehicles but are often trafficable during dry periods only. In northern Europe, terrain broken by drainage ditches and dikes is common; this type of terrain prevents armor from moving off roads. Visibility is good when the weather is clear, allowing for long TOW shots. As in mountains, this good visibility also makes suppression of obvious ATGM firing positions much easier.

d.   Urban Areas and Villages. Degree of urbanization also affects the employment of antitank guided missiles.

a.   Mutual Support. This is vital when terrain restricts range. Instead of massing TOW fire into an engagement area, as can be done when adequate range is available, leaders may have to mass firing units and increase the risk of enemy suppression to bunched-up TOWs. Leaders can reduce the effectiveness of enemy artillery by positioning TOWs in less obvious patterns. Finally, the size and shape of the engagement area determines the degree of mutual support needed. Figure 2-11 shows two TOW sections massed for mutual support, engaging targets with volley fire.

b.   Security. Shorter ranges and the ample concealment associated with restrictive terrain make TOW crews more vulnerable to dismounted infantry. TOWs should be positioned so that infantry can protect them. Difficult terrain tends to "soak up" infantry, so TOW units must be able to protect themselves sometimes. This means that they can man fewer TOW systems--for example, a TOW section can crew a TOW while the second squad performs security.

c.   Flank Shots. These are critical because surprise engagements are the best way to overcome slow tracking times and obvious signatures. The feasibility of flank shots often determines whether or not TOWs should be used. Enemy armor is thickest on the frontal slope of a tank. Also, crewmen concentrate upon their immediate front and are usually more vigilant in close terrain. At short ranges, a tank gunner or commander may fire his main gun or coax machine gun reflexively in reaction to the flash of a TOW launch. Seeing them fire can be enough to cause the TOW gunner to flinch. Flank shots are so important that leaders should consider giving up range if by doing so they can take advantage of flanking shots. Units should be trained to watch for chances to make flank shots.

d.   Volley Fire. Leaders can use mass and volley fires to offset short engagement ranges. Again, the width and the depth of the engagement area sets the perimeter for TOW use. The amount of ground available for enemy engagement is a key factor, as Figure 2-12 suggests. TOW leaders must calculate the time of flight carefully. A three- to five-second flight time will allow gunners enough time to steady their tracking without allowing enemy vehicles to react fully to a surprise engagement. Engagement ranges between 1,000 and 1,500 meters expose TOW crew members for too long unless their fires are complemented by other weapons. Engagements over 1,500 meters give TOWs advantages: reduced signature detection and Threat suppression.

e.   Cover and Concealment. Good TOW positioning and use of camouflage are especially important in restrictive terrain. Although TOW units often fight from prepared positions, infantry units seldom have enough engineers available to make extensive terrain modifications. Often TOW units must fight from hasty positions--both dismounted and mounted--which can be built with little help from engineers. Fire lanes are important in restrictive terrain. TOW units must use existing fire lanes such as fire breaks, forest trails, and power line rights of way. They must also be trained to cut fire lanes and to strive always for flank shots. However, without engineer aid, the construction of most fire lanes takes too much time and labor. Sometimes the unit can find a lane that needs little work, such as one that requires the removal of only a few large bushes or scrub trees.

f.   Employment in Depth. The lack of long-range shots limits a unit's ability to position TOW squads or sections in depth. However, battalions can create depth by positioning TOW platoons within the battalion sector where TOW can use its 2,000 metersplus range. One technique that can be used to achieve depth is emplacement of TOWs so that they can fire into engagement areas from the rear and flanks at the same time, as shown in Figure 2-13.

g.   Employment as Part of a Combined Arms Team. TOW units must be employed as part of a combined arms effort. Infantry units that skillfully blend TOW, Dragon, AT4, mines, and other obstacles, small arms or machine guns, M203s, and indirect fires in surprise engagements can devastate an unwarned enemy strung out on restrictive terrain. Leaders should try to position all antiarmor weapons so that all rounds impact upon the enemy formation at the same time. Volley fire techniques are especially effective in this situation, as Figure 2-14 indicates.

a.   Conduct a Detailed METT-T Analysis. The use of the TOW in restrictive terrain presents few obvious choices. Each leader must think about the unique aspects of his tactical situation and carefully decide which principles apply.

b.   Make a Detailed Ground Reconnaissance. A map reconnaissance is not adequate. It serves only as a starting point. Leaders who conduct a reconnaissance may find that the right fold or break in the ground where a TOW can be positioned or the reconnaissance may reveal that the TOW cannot be used on that ground. Especially in the defense, a good reconnaissance can cut down on the amount of engineer effort needed as leaders find natural cover that needs little reinforcement.

a.   Armored Enemy. An armored enemy defends with dug-in armor. Enemy infantry fighting vehicles/armored personnel carriers (IFVs/APCs) are supported by dug-in infantry. Unless the terrain allows TOWs to fire from overwatch positions more than 1,000 meters away, TOW units may not survive if they engage as an overwatch support fire force. Only if TOW units surprise the enemy with volley fires and if they outnumber the enemy can they survive, although, even then, the operation is a high-risk one. Two better options remain:

• The TOWs can cover the more open flanks of a restricted avenue of approach, or
• The TOWs can move quickly upon the objective to protect consolidating infantry or follow-on forces from armor counterattack.

b.   Dismounted Enemy. Here, the enemy relies mainly upon dug-in infantry, possibly reinforced with a few dug-in tanks or APCs, on terrain, such as mountainous terrain, that restricts armored vehicle movement.

The best use of TOW units is providing fire support for a deliberate attack or infiltration. TOWs fire at hard targets such as bunkers, dug-in vehicles, weapons emplacements in trench systems, and fortified rooms in houses. TOW rounds penetrate several feet of dirt or concrete. While TOW rounds are less effective than HEAT or HEP rounds against bunkers, their performance is perfectly adequate.

Units can sometimes dismount TOWs. This usually makes stealthy occupation of positions easier. Often, TOW units can reach good firing positions by man-packing the TOWs. This may limit a TOW section to manning one weapon. If an infantry squad is available, its members can carry the extra missiles and provide security. If one is not available, a TOW squad must do it.

A good ground reconnaissance is needed to find the best protective position, especially if the objective is 1,000 meters or fewer forward of the support-by-fire position.

The antiarmor leader and assault force commander must ensure that signals for lifting fires and designating targets, such as M203 colored-smoke rounds, various colored star clusters, or infrared chemical lights, are coordinated before the attack begins.

TOW fires should be mixed in with artillery/mortar and small arms/machine gun fires. This array of fires distracts enemy gunners and prevents them from concentrating fires on TOWs. If possible, TOWs should be positioned away from the main infantry support-by-fire elements so that the enemy must shoot in two directions. Care must be used when employing smoke; it can blind TOW gunners (unless they have TOW 2s). TOW should be used either to knock out bunkers first before bringing down smoke or smoke and high explosive (HE) should be mixed to isolate the point of penetration, as shown in Figure 2-15.

TOW units can do the same mission at night, either using illumination or thermal night sights. If fired under illumination, TOWs should be brought closer because flares and shadows distort the gunner's vision through the TOW sight.

a.   Reconnaissance. The enemy recognizes that reconnaissance is needed to defeat US antitank defenses and, therefore, emphasizes it in all Threat operations. Continuous reconnaissance locates and targets US ATGM systems. To protect friendly forces from Threat ground reconnaissance elements, US forces must conduct effective counterreconnaissance operations. Units must use all available concealment and infrared-defeating camouflage nets. Using hide positions and dummy positions also helps give the enemy a false picture of the US defense.

b.   Destruction. Destruction of US antiarmor weapons is likely if Threat reconnaissance identifies and locates US ATGM positions. Once they find these positions, they fire 40 rounds (observed fire) or 140 rounds (unobserved fire) of 120-mm mortar or 122-mm howitzer to suppress them. They can also use a 152-mm howitzer round to counter US ATGM fire. Each flechette round contains about 8,500 flechettes and covers an area about 30 meters in diameter.

The 152-mm howitzer can deliver the flechette round up to 17,000 meters. The round then explodes above the ground and scatters thousands of small, finned flechettes. These flechettes are effective against unprotected soldiers and equipment. The Threat then follows up with attack helicopters after the artillery preparatory fire. They seek routes that fire ATGM through the main gun of the tank. The T-64B and the T-80 tanks are known to fire the AT-8 Songster ATGM. The Songster has a 4,000-meter maximum range. The main role of these missile-firing tanks is to destroy antiarmor systems.

c.   Deception. Deception as a doctrine for Threat survival includes the following:

• Camouflage to disguise, conceal, or distort.
• Exploitation of terrain.
• Use of darkness and weather to mask operations.
• Use of dummy or decoy equipment.
• Masking of light and sound.
• Use of searchlights and lasers to suppress ATGM gunners.
• Demonstration or diversionary actions.
• Communications security.

a.   Purpose. The purpose of defensive operations is to defeat the enemy's attack and to gain the initiative. Defense is a temporary measure. It is conducted to identify or create enemy weaknesses that allow the early opportunity to change to the offense. Initially outnumbered, the defender uses maneuver first to blunt the attack. Then, he concentrates combat power by counterattacking and by directing friendly strength against enemy weakness. Defensive operations should destroy the enemy by achieving one or more of the following:

• Causing an enemy attack to fail.
• Deceiving the enemy.
• Gaining time.
• Concentrating forces elsewhere.
• Controlling key terrain.
• Wearing down enemy forces before offensive operations.
• Retaining terrain temporarily.

b.   Characteristics of a Successful Defensive Operation. Successive defensive operations incorporate the characteristics of preparation, disruption, concentration, and flexibility.

c.   Planning Considerations. Planning for defensive operations begins when the commander receives a warning order or OPORD. He formulates a plan for defense that meets his requirements for the mission. The commander bases his plan upon the factors of METT-T and upon the considerations developed in the estimate of the situation. Based upon this analysis, he completes the estimate of the situation and formulates a concept of defense. He decides how to defeat the enemy, where to concentrate effort, and where to take risks. The commander must use every resource available to offset the attacker's numerical advantage, to identify dangerous threats, and to mass combat power against the enemy's weaknesses. The terrain influences the design of the defense by its natural obstacles and potential for cover, concealment, and movement. Natural obstacles must be reinforced with man-made obstacles to enhance the strength of defensive positions and to protect the defender's maneuver.

d.   METT-T Analysis. The mission, enemy, terrain, and own troops must be considered through a quick mental process. With the information available, the commander establishes his time schedule by identifying actions that must be done (time-critical tasks) to prepare his unit for the operation.

e.   Control Measures. Control measures help the leader explain his concept and the execution of the defense. Control measures are used to

• position units.
• control movements
• distribute and control fires.
• synchronize the effects of combined arms

a.   Defilade Positions. Defilade positions are classified as either turret-down or hull-down. A turret-down position uses terrain to mask the ITV, and only the 3X acquisition sight is exposed to the enemy. A hull-down position exposes only as much of the ITV as needed to engage targets.

b.   Keyhole or Window Positions. Keyhole or window positions afford the ITV additional protection from enemy overwatching fire (shown in Figure 2-16). These positions limit exposure by deliberately restricting an ITV's sector of fire. The ITV is exposed only to its targets. As these targets are destroyed, it shifts to other firing positions. A keyhole position must be selected carefully so that fires can be interlocked with other ITVs in the company. The driver can vary the ITV's field of vision into its field of fire by moving toward and away from the opening to the position.

c.   Battlefield Obscurants. Battlefield dust, smoke, fog, and darkness normally limit observation and fields of fire. When engagement ranges are reduced, flanking fires, the use of obstacles, and mutual support with infantry and covered and concealed positions increase in importance. Due to battlefield obscuration, weapons must be positioned to fight during limited visibility or to quickly move to limited visibility positions.

a.   Map and Ground Reconnaissance. A careful map and group reconnaissance of potential engagement areas based upon existing obstacles and mounted avenues of approach/mobility corridors is the best starting point. TOW leaders who cannot identify and use the available engagement area waste time in fruitless reconnaissance.

b.   Ambush Tactics. Units must use ambush tactics by engaging in ways that surprise the enemy and by massing fires (with volley fire). The commander or TOW leader keeps in mind the commander's concept of the operation. He determines how much massing of TOW systems he can accept based upon the artillery threat and upon the predictability of his actions to the enemy.

c.   Weapons Integration. The integration of all weapons so that all fires (ATGM, AT4, small arms, and indirect fires) impact in the engagement areas created by obstacles (existing and reinforced) is the most desirable method for destroying enemy formations. When the defender's fires overwhelm the enemy, each part of the defense is protected; the enemy cannot afford to concentrate upon one element at a time. However, if the defenders engaged the enemy in sequence--for example, TOWs fired before Dragons, which fired before infantry--the enemy could counteract or could suppress these elements as soon as they engaged.

d.   Enemy Smoke. The TOW units must assume that a mounted enemy will use preplanned smoke to cover his movement across the more open danger areas or engagement areas. While TOW 2-equipped units can see and fire through most kinds of smoke, TOW leaders must ensure that they have prepared good range cards so that the gaps are covered.

e.   Placement of TOWs in Reserve. In some cases, leaders may find no suitable engagement area along the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) or terrain deeper inside the battalion sector may offer better TOW shots. In these cases, TOWs can be placed in reserve with several clearly defined missions in which they move to hasty firing positions to counterattack or block enemy penetrations. Routes and firing positions must be prepared; the TOW platoons must rehearse daytime and nighttime occupation.

Counterattacking works best when TOW fires are combined with indirect fires and CAS (shown in Figure 2-18). TOW units must rehearse these missions; they need engineers to construct at least hasty vehicle firing positions or better still, to reinforce existing natural positions. If only one good engagement area exists, commanders may position TOWs to cover it from the start.

f.   Engineer Support. In all defensive operations, TOWs require engineer support. Constructing TOW positions by hand is very time-consuming. Since engineer support is always limited, the commander must make a difficult METT-T decision. In many cases, however, engineers can begin the construction by loosening or excavating dirt and TOW crews can complete the construction. In very wooded terrain, engineer bulldozers can also create rough paths for fire lanes or trails for "rapid" vehicle movement.

Lesson 2 Practice Exercise:
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