EN5481 LESSON 3

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LESSON 3

ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF AN ARMORED
BATTALION/TASK FORCE

Critical Task: C-100-000

OVERVIEW

LESSON DESCRIPTION:

The armored battalion/TF is a temporary grouping of combat, CS, and CSS forces organized and equipped to accomplish a specific mission. This lesson discusses the considerations in forming an armored battalion/TF and the capabilities and limitations of tank forces and mechanized infantry forces.

TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVE:

ACTION:	You will identify the missions of a battalion/TF and how and why a commander task-organizes. You will also identify engineer units that may support a battalion/TF.
CONDITION:	You will use the materials contained in this lesson.
STANDARD:	You will correctly answer all questions on the practice exercise at the end of the lesson.
REFERENCES:	The materials contained in this lesson were derived from FM 5-71-100, FM 7-90, FM 71-1, FM 71-3, FM 100-5, ST 100-9, and other materials approved for instruction by the US Army Engineer School. Refer also to Appendix C, pages C-42 through C-70 (extracted from FM 71-2).

INTRODUCTION

The armored battalion/TF usually includes tanks; mechanized infantry; antitank guided missile (ATGM) sections; combat engineer companies; and other combat, CS, and CSS units. The specific organization of the armored battalion/TF is dictated by the factors of mission, enemy, terrain (and weather), and troops and time available (METT-T). The TF commander and staff must fully understand the TF's capabilities and limitations of the TF and how they should organize the TF to maximize the potential of the forces under their control.

PART A
EMPLOYMENT

Tank and mechanized infantry battalions/TFs are organized to fight and win engagements on any part of the battlefield in conventional, nuclear, or chemical environments. They combine the efforts of their CO/TMs and CS and CSS elements to perform tactical missions as part of a brigade or division operation. The key to victory is to quickly mass the combat power of maneuver CO/TMs and to integrate and synchronize CS and CSS combat multipliers.

3-1. Battlefield Focus. The battalion is the lowest echelon at which firepower, maneuver, intelligence, and service support are combined under a single commander. Battalions normally fight enemy forces that they can see and engage. Their area of operations extends from less than 100 meters in forests, urban areas, or close terrain to 5 to 6 kilometers from the battalion's direct-and indirect-fire weapon systems.

a. Offense. During the offense, the battalion/TF is expected to defeat a defending enemy company. The close fight consists of breaching obstacles, penetrating defenses, and defeating defending platoons. Following any penetration, the battalion prepares to fight enemy battalion reserves (platoon or company). The battalion has no rear battle and responds to rear threats as part of the close fight. Battalion reserves are designated as required to meet changing situations. Reserves add weight to the main effort. The TF provides security and reconnaissance to support attacking CO/TMs. During the battalion's close fight, the brigade conducts its deep fight against enemy regimental reserves, then fights enemy units defending in subsequent defensive positions.

b. Defense. During the defense, the battalion/TF is expected to defend against and defeat an enemy regiment.

(1) Close fight. The battalion/TF close fight consists of subordinate companies defeating the companies of the enemy's first-echelon battalions and then defeating the companies of second-echelon battalions.

(2) Deep fight. The battalion has no deep fight but may be charged with the execution of the fight against follow-on enemy battalions.

(3) Rear threats. The battalion responds to defensive rear threats as part of the close fight. The battalion normally designates a company-size reserve as a counterattack force.

(4) Security measures. The battalion employs defensive security measures in concert with the brigade plan.

The brigade's deep fight supports the battalion's close fight by interdicting the follow-on battalions, then shifting to the lead battalions of the second-echelon regiment.

3-2. Battalion Composition. The fighting characteristics of the battalion are a reflection of the character of the battalion commander. Bold and tenacious battalion commanders have bold and tenacious battalions. If a commander is tactically skillful and innovative, history supports that most of his battalion's missions will be successful and his battalion will suffer minimum casualties. Battalion commanders who possess the technical, tactical, and leadership skills and who develop teams out of individual soldiers and units will win even if outnumbered. Battalion commanders who are also competent and courageous can successfully lead soldiers on the dynamic, lethal, and chaotic modern battlefield.

The battalion/TF commander must have an understanding of all of the tools at his disposal. He must effectively combine these tools for each tactical situation. The commander achieves maximum effectiveness from the battalion/TF by being aware of all of his tools (personnel and equipment, units, and support systems) and knowing how to employ them.

a. Personnel and equipment.

(1) Staff. The battalion is the lowest tactical echelon with a staff. Small but essential, the staff helps the commander do the things necessary to coordinate the battle and ensure adequate CS and CSS to allow for continuous operations. The commander is then free to fight the battle. Supply, maintenance, communications, administration, and reporting are supervised by the staff which normally conducts much of its business according to the SOPs. The staff ensures continuous support to the CO/TMs to allow them to fight the battle.

(2) Subordinate unit commanders. The CO/TM commanders and special-purpose platoon leaders directly influence the battle by employing their fire and maneuver elements in a way that accomplishes the mission. They are the commander's principal assistants for fighting the battle. They must understand the commander's concept, know the capabilities and employment techniques of their combat assets, and know the support assets provided by the TF commander.

(3) Weapon systems. The battalion commander has three kinds of weapons or weapon systems that he can maneuver on the battlefield, whether in the attack, the defense, or the delay:

(a) Infantry. Infantry forces are especially designed to operate at times and in places of limited visibility or relatively short fields of fire.

(b) Armor. Tanks are principally effective where they can move fast and shoot at long ranges.

(c) ATGMs. The ATGM cannot operate effectively where rifle elements are usually deployed and cannot lead the attack like the heavily armored tank. It can deliver long-range, highly lethal, pinpoint fire against enemy armor.

(4) Fire support. The battalion commander must use fire support systems in accordance with their peculiar strengths and weaknesses. The battalion commander must organize and coordinate the firepower available for support of his maneuver systems. Using both organic and supporting systems, he must bring to the battlefield those elements that help him move, suppress, and destroy.

(5) Other support. The commander must also use his R&S elements to help him see the battlefield and avoid surprise. His engineers must help him move and prevent enemy movement. Finally, he must ensure complete CSS to keep his soldiers and vehicles moving and prepared to fight.

b. Types of units. A tank or mechanized infantry battalion consists of pure companies under the command of a battalion headquarters. It takes part in brigade or division operations according to with the principles and concepts set forth in FM 71-3 and FM 71-100.

(1) Companies. Armor and mechanized infantry battalions are similar in organization. Each has a headquarters company, maneuver companies, and a CS company. The headquarters company provides C², administration, and CSS. The CS companies provide reconnaissance, surveillance, air defense, and indirect-fire support. There are some important differences in the combat, CS, and CSS found in the two battalions and in the headquarters of their companies (see Table 3-1). These differences must be considered whenever brigade and TF commanders alter the task organization.

Table 3-1. Principal differences between armored and mechanized battalions

(2) Scout platoon. The battalion scout platoon performs reconnaissance, provides limited security, and assists in controlling movement of the battalion/TF. The platoon is not organized or equipped to conduct independent offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations. It operates as part of the battalion and should be assigned missions that capitalize on its reconnaissance capabilities. The scout platoon is one of the commander's primary sources of combat intelligence before the battle and is his eyes and ears during the battle.

(3) Mortar platoon. Mortars are organic to the battalion. They are high-angle, relatively short-range, area fire weapons, well suited for providing close, indirect-fire support to maneuver units.

(4) Communications platoon. The battalion communications platoon is responsible for establishing and operating the battalion radio and wire communications systems. In addition, the platoon provides couriers to help the battalion's liaison officers.

(5) Support platoon. The support platoon provides organic transportation as well as Classes I, III, and V resupply to the battalion. It is composed of a platoon headquarters; an ammunition section; a petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) section; a transportation section; and a mess section. The platoon provides the majority of the battalion's CSS.

(6) Medical platoon. The battalion's medical platoon is responsible for providing treatment and evacuation of casualties.

(7) Maintenance platoon. The battalion's maintenance platoon is structured to maintain, evacuate, and repair the vehicles in the battalion. It is organized into a platoon headquarters, an inspection and quality-control section, a maintenance administrative section, a recovery-support section, a maintenance/services section, and company maintenance teams.

c. Command relationships. Command relationships determine the chain of command and the degree of authority that a maneuver commander may exercise over support units. The command relationships are –

(1) Organic. Organic units are part of a parent organization. The parent unit exercises full C² over its organic units.

(2) Assigned. Assigned units are under the C² of a higher headquarters, usually above division level, on a relatively permanent basis. Nondivisional engineer units are assigned to the theater army.

(3) Attached. Attached units are under the C² of the gaining commander except for limitations imposed by the attachment order. The commander has the same authority and responsibility as over organic and assigned unit except for personnel transfer and promotion, which remain under the unit's parent organization. The commander is responsible for logistical support of the attached unit.

Attachment is appropriate when a subordinate maneuver commander needs task-organization or direct command authority over support units and when time, distance, or communications prevent the parent support-unit headquarters from providing adequate logistical support. Attachment is also necessary when those same factors keep the parent support unit from making timely command decisions. Support units attached in this manner often need an accompanying support slice from logistics elements. Attachment must occur early to enable full integration into the maneuver force.

(4) OPCON. Units under OPCON of a commander are under that commander's C², but the parent unit retains responsibility for administration and logistical support. The gaining commander can use the support unit the same as attached units without the burden of making the logistical arrangements. The parent support unit coordinates with logistics organizations to make this viable. OPCON is appropriate when a subordinate maneuver commander needs task-organization or direct command authority over support units but the parent support headquarters can provide continued logistical support. A support unit that is OPCON to an allied formation cannot be task-organized by that formation's commander.

(5) Operational command (OPCOM). Units under OPCOM to a US unified or specified commander are under that commander's C² in the same manner as OPCON. The parent unit retains responsibility for administrative and logistical support. OPCOM is appropriate when a support unit supports another service in a joint operation. In this case, OPCOM is synonymous with OPCON concerning command, administrative, and logistical responsibilities. OPCOM may also be used for combined operations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). OPCOM, as used in NATO, gives a commander the authority to assign missions or tasks, deploy units, reassign forces, and retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control.

d. Support relationships. Support relationships dictate the manner of support that a maneuver commander receives and determine logistical responsibility, if any, to the supporting elements. The higher headquarters or parent unit maintains command responsibilities, responsibility for logistic support, and the authority to reorganize or reassign component elements of a supporting force, unless otherwise specified. Support relationships are routinely established through DS, general support (GS), general support reinforcing (GSR), and reinforcing (see Table 3-2).

Table 3-2. TF command and support relationships

(1) DS. A unit in DS of a specified unit or force is required to give priority of support to that unit or force. The supporting unit will take support requests directly from the supported unit. The supporting unit will establish liaison and communication and will provide advice to the supported unit commander. A DS unit has no command relationship with the supported unit and cannot be task-organized by the supported unit.

(2) GS. A unit in GS will provide support to the total force and not to any particular subdivision of the supported force. Subordinate units may request support through the supported force headquarters, but only the supported force headquarters can determine priorities and assign missions to GS units.

(3) GSR. GSR is used primarily with artillery units. The GSR artillery unit is required to support the force as a whole and to provide reinforcing fires to another artillery unit as a secondary priority. A GSR battalion remains under the control of the force's artillery headquarters, which has priority of fires. The GSR mission offers the force commander the flexibility to meet the requirements of a variety of tactical situations.

(4) Reinforcing. Reinforcing is also an artillery mission. It is a tactical mission that causes one FA battalion to augment the fires of another FA battalion. When a DS FA battalion needs additional fires to meet the FA support needs of a maneuver force, the reinforcing mission may be assigned to another FA battalion.

3-3. TFs. The battalion/TF is a combination of tank and mechanized infantry companies and other units grouped under the command of a tank or mechanized infantry battalion. Attack-helicopter units frequently operate with the battalion/TF, which will normally be supported by FA or ADA. A wide range of engineer, signal, and logistics support is available and may be part of the TF. Tank and mechanized infantry battalions form the core of the battalion/TF.

a. Tank battalion. Normally, there are five to six tank battalions in an armored or mechanized division and from one to five tank battalions in a brigade. The tank battalion is well equipped for operations that require mobility, direct firepower, and disruption of the enemy's rear and subsequent echelons of defense. It contributes mobility, firepower, and shock effect to the combined-arms team. Armor shielding reduces the vulnerability of personnel to hostile fire and permits rapid exploitation through contaminated areas.

A tank battalion requires more CSS than a mechanized battalion does. It is also more sensitive to difficult terrain and barriers. The tank battalion is usually assigned to a brigade. It can reinforce other units in offensive and defensive operations, can be cross-reinforced to form a combined-arms TF, or can be employed without attachments. A tank battalion has a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and four tank companies as shown in Figure 3-1.

Figure 3-1. Tank battalion organization

b. Mechanized infantry battalion. The mechanized infantry battalion is organized and equipped for mobile warfare with the M2, Bradley fighting vehicle (BFV). Rapid changes in location and fighting mounted and dismounted characterize its operations in the offense and the defense. The mechanized infantry battalion is normally assigned to a brigade when it is part of tank and mechanized divisions. The brigade can employ the battalion without attachments or can cross-attach the battalion to form a combined arms TF. This battalion is especially suited for employment in dynamic defense, exploitation, pursuit, and counterattack operations. When dismounted, it is well suited for holding terrain, operating in difficult terrain and adverse weather, moving by aircraft, and breaching fixed defenses.

The mechanized infantry battalion requires more CSS than other types of infantry battalions. It is also more sensitive to difficult terrain, obstacles, and barriers than other infantry battalions.

The battalion is organized with an HHC, four rifle companies, and an antiarmor company, as shown in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2. Mechanized-infantry battalion organization

c. Force allocation. The brigade commander determines the forces allocated to battalions/TFs based on his concept of the operation. This concept includes how he plans to operate given the mission the brigade is to accomplish, the enemy his forces will encounter, the terrain on which the brigade will fight, and the forces the division commander has allocated. The TF is generally described by the type and number of maneuver companies assigned to it. These include –

(1) Armor heavy. This TF is composed of three armor companies and one mechanized infantry company.

(2) Mechanized heavy. This TF is composed of three mechanized infantry companies and one armored company.

(3) Balanced. This TF is composed of two armored and two mechanized infantry companies.

(4) Pure. Only armored companies or mechanized infantry companies are assigned to this TF, which is referred to as a battalion rather than as a TF.

3-4. Battlefield Operating Systems. TF functions are grouped into seven BOSs that must be integrated to support the commander's intent. A functioning system requires the coordinated efforts of all elements of the TF. The commander and staff integrate these systems into a combined arms force tailored to the situation. The BOSs are intelligence, maneuver, mobility and survivability (M/S), fire support, air defense, CSS, and C².

a. Intelligence. All units have a responsibility to report information about the enemy. However, the TF has only the scout platoon and infantry patrols dedicated to gather information. Other assets may be attached from the division military intelligence battalion. Electronic-warfare units operate in support of higher headquarters. The brigade provides intelligence to the TF that is beyond the TF's capability to collect.

(1) Organic components include –

(a) Scouts. The scout platoon is an important intelligence-gathering component. The primary mission of the scout platoon is reconnaissance and security to its parent unit.

(b) S2. The TF must look to brigade and higher headquarters to provide the timely intelligence they need but is beyond their capability to collect. The S2 is the commander's representative for getting that information. The S2 is not in the business of intelligence analysis. He spends most of his effort ensuring that every bit of useful processed intelligence and combat information has been made available to the TF and disseminated to all its elements.

(c) Patrols. Reconnaissance patrols can be used to collect information and check the accuracy of previous information. Patrols can have area, zone, or route reconnaissance missions. They can perform surveillance, establish contact with adjacent units, and monitor gaps between units. Combat patrols may be used to raid enemy observation post (OP) positions or to ambush an enemy patrol.

(2) Nonorganic components. In this BOS, the only nonorganic component is radar. Ground-surveillance radar can be used during most conditions of visibility. It can be a significant asset when visibility is limited by darkness or other conditions. The battalion TF ground-surveillance-radar section is normally organized with four radar teams.

b. Maneuver. The maneuver companies of the TF destroy enemy forces and seize and hold terrain. All other TF assets support the maneuver elements.

(1) Organic components. Organic components include tanks and mechanized infantry.

(a) Tanks. Tanks are most effective where they can move fast and provide rapid, accurate direct fire at extended ranges. Thermal sights increase the tank fighting capability during limited visibility.

(b) Mechanized infantry. Historically, the infantry has been most effective during limited visibility where observation and fields of fire were limited and during close combat. With the introduction of the improved tube-launched, optical wire-guided missile (TOW) vehicle and BFV, the infantry has gained increased flexibility to destroy armor at long range. The equipment has also increased the ability to fight mounted during limited visibility, while retaining the ability to fight dismounted as the situation requires.

(2) Nonorganic component. In this BOS, the only nonorganic component normally used is the attack helicopter. Attack helicopters may operate with the battalion even though they are normally under the OPCON of the brigade. They are highly mobile and can provide accurate, long-range AT fires during the defense, attack, exploitation, or pursuit. Attack helicopters can deny terrain to the enemy but cannot seize and hold terrain, and they are not effective against a dug-in enemy.

c. M/S. The S3 helps the commander employ this BOS.

(1) Organic component. The organic component of this BOS includes mostly nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) aspects. Units must be able to operate under NBC conditions to survive and to accomplish their missions. This requires that units apply and adhere to the NBC defense fundamentals of contamination avoidance, NBC protection, and NBC decontamination.

(a) The TF has decontaminating apparatuses that provide a hasty decontamination capability. Additionally, there are two organic lightweight decontamination systems per battalion/TF, with the support platoon's chemical specialists as the operators.

(b) Every combat battalion S3 section includes an assigned chemical officer and noncommissioned officer (NCO), and each company has a chemical NCO. Additional NBC support may be available from the division level. This support could be in the form of a chemical company, which includes four decontamination platoons, a reconnaissance platoon, and a smoke platoon. Each decontamination platoon is equipped with three M12A1 power-driven decontaminating apparatuses (PDDA) mounted on three 5-ton trucks. The smoke platoon is equipped with 12 mechanical smoke generators mounted on six M113s. During offensive operations, a decontamination platoon may be attached to or placed in DS of a brigade. Sometimes, more than one platoon supports a brigade, particularly when the brigade is making a main attack.

(2) Nonorganic component. The nonorganic component of this BOS is in the form of engineers. Although all units can perform limited engineering tasks such as digging two-man fighting positions and emplacing mines, combat engineers provide additional M/S support to the TF. Engineers construct obstacles, conduct breaching operations, prepare demolitions, improve roads, provide bridging, and dig vehicle fighting positions.

(a) The role of engineers in mobility support is to improve movement of maneuver forces and critical supplies by reducing or eliminating obstacles, breaching minefields, and improving routes for maneuver and supply. Their role in survivability support is in constructing vehicle fighting positions and dismounted fighting positions with overhead protection. This protection reduces the effectiveness of enemy weapons.

(b) Engineers are a combat multiplier. They provide skills and equipment needed to assist the TF in accomplishing M/S tasks. The brigade commander normally places at least one combat-engineer platoon and one combat-engineer company in support of the TF. This allocation is dependent on the available engineer support. The engineer unit leader advises the commander on the employment of his unit. The S3 ensures that the obstacle plan supports the scheme of maneuver.

(c) The engineer platoon has organic mine detectors, demolition kits, carpenter and pioneer tools kits, one 5-ton dump truck, and four M113s. The platoon also has two M9 ACEs with bulldozing capability and a MICLIC. The MICLIC is a trailer-mounted, rocket-projected explosive line charge that is towed within 62 meters of a minefield to clear a lane 5 to 8 meters wide and 100 meters long. Additional engineer equipment that can be requested from the engineer company includes –

Small-emplacement excavators (SEEs). The SEE has a backhoe, bucket loader, and other attachments such as a handheld hydraulic rock drill, a chain saw, and a pavement breaker.

AVLBs. The AVLB is a tank chassis modified to transport, launch, and retrieve a 19.2-meter span, military load classification (MLC) 60 bridge. The bridge is capable of carrying MLC 60 track loads across a 17-meter gap and MLC 70 track loads across a 15-meter gap.

CEVs. The CEV is a basic M60A1 tank with a hydraulically operated dozer blade, a 165-mm turret-mounted demolition gun, a retractable boom, and a winch. The gun provides direct-fire support that can be used in obstacle reduction or against bunkers or buildings.

Ground-emplaced mine-scattering systems (GEMSSs). The GEMSS is trailer-mounted. Its 800 on-board mines include a built-in self destruct capability. The AT mine has a magnetic-influence fuze. The AT mine is activated by trip wires. In most AT minefields, units will emplace three 60-meter-wide belts separated by 50 to 100 meters of unmined area. A well-trained crew can emplace a 1,000-meter minefield in one hour.

d. Fire-support. The TF commander plans and coordinates his fire support to suppress, neutralize, or destroy the enemy. The FSO helps the commander plan and coordinate fire support. In addition to organic mortars, the commander receives fire support from FA units and close air support from the Air Force.

(1) Direct fire. Fire support improves the TF's direct fire by –

Blinding the enemy's armor forces.

Suppressing and blinding other enemy direct-fire weapons.

Isolating targets.

Slowing the enemy and forcing him into areas where the full power of ATGMs, tanks, scatterable mines, and artillery can take effect.

Providing separate communications channels for additional combat information, intelligence, and emergency command nets.

(2) Maneuver. Fire support enhances maneuver by –

Destroying targets.

Containing enemy withdrawal and lateral moves.

Deceiving the enemy through the support of feints.

Assisting economy-of-force operations.

Screening with smoke or isolating areas with scatterable mines.

Covering attacks with overhead variable-time (VT) or improved conventional-munitions (ICM) fires against enemy infantry.

Suppressing long-range ATGMs.

Providing high rates of fire under all weather conditions.

Reducing the effects of enemy artillery by active counterfires.

(3) Organic components. Organic components include mortar platoons and FSOs.

(a) Mortar platoon. The mortar platoon provides indirect fire support to the battalion/TF. The platoon has a headquarters section and six mortar squads. Each squad is equipped with one carrier-mounted mortar. The mortars can fire HE, white phosphorous (WP), illumination, or chemical ammunition. Mortar fire can kill and suppress enemy soldiers and weapons and can conceal TF movement.

During offensive operations, the mortar platoon is most often used in GS of the TF. A priority of fires may be given to a leading CO/TM as determined by the TF commander. In some operations, such as deliberate attacks, the mortar platoon may control fires of some or all CO/TM mortars to permit concentration of fires. As a general rule, the platoon is positioned about 1,000 meters to the rear of the leading battalion/TF elements.

(b) FSO. The FSO is skilled in maneuver tactics and in the techniques and procedures for integrating each part of the fire-support system into the scheme of maneuver. Each company has a fire-support team (FIST) headed by a FA lieutenant, who is the fire-support coordinator (FISCOORD) for the team commander. He is the front end of the fire-support system that puts steel on target. It is important for the TF commander to know that the FSO and the FISTs work for him.

(4) Nonorganic components. Nonorganic components include FA and CAS.

(a) FA. FA provides a variety of indirect fires to the TF. It can deliver smoke, scatterable mines, cannon-launched guided projectiles (Copperhead), antipersonnel and antimateriel munitions, and chemical and nuclear munitions (when they have been released).

While the commander has complete control of his mortars, his control of the FA depends on the mission or status assigned to those units by higher headquarters. A battalion/TF is normally supported by an FA battalion in DS to the brigade. Unless the TF is conducting covering force or separate operations, only a portion of the FA battalion will support the TF. The brigade commander decides how much FA support will be available to the TF from the DS battalion.

(b) CAS. The battalion/TF may be supported by attack aircraft. Because of its large and varied ordnance load, the tactical fighter bomber is the best weapon to use in attacking well-fortified enemy positions. Tactical-air fire support should be integrated into the battalion/TF scheme of maneuver and used simultaneously with other fire-support means.

A tactical air-control party (TACP) operates with the TF to advise the commander and his staff on integration of close air support with ground operations and to coordinate and direct close air strikes. The TACP includes an air liaison officer (ALO) and a forward air controller (FAC).

e. Air-defense. A system for the dissemination of timely early warning greatly enhances the effectiveness of both active and passive air-defense measures. Active TF air-defense measures are provided by its organic individual and crew-served weapons and by nonorganic supporting ADA units. Passive air-defense measures consist of all the measures taken to preclude the enemy from locating the unit.

The battalion TF has no organic, dedicated air-defense weapons. Normally, the minimum air defense provided to the battalion is an air-defense platoon. However, the TF must rely solely on passive air-defense measures such as concealment, camouflage, and dispersion coupled with the use of small arms, machine guns, and main tank guns as its means of defense.

(1) Airspace C² procedures are issued by corps and are coordinated down to the TF. These procedures are used to synchronize the efforts of Army aviation and the Air Force, as well as indirect-fire and ADA. This synchronization allows the commander to simultaneously apply the combat power of all systems. The S3 air-coordinates airspace C² measures and ensures that they complement the scheme of maneuver.

(2) The brigade commander may retain all available ADA under his control, or he may assign a portion of the ADA to the TF with a support relationship such as DS or attached. Normal TF organization may include a section of Stingers and a platoon of air-defense gun systems.

(3) The senior air-defense officer functions as a special staff officer during the planning process. He provides his estimate and recommendations to the TF commander. ADA elements with a GS mission may provide incidental coverage over the TF area and should be considered in the planning process.

(4) To properly employ the ADA element, the commander must assign tactical missions to the ADA element and establish priorities for air defense such as the main effort, choke points, and axes.

f. CSS. CSS sustains the TF's ability to fight. The sustainment functions in combat are manning, arming, fueling, fixing, transporting, and protecting. The Adjutant (US Army) (S1), Supply Officer (US Army) (S4), HHC commander, maintenance officer, medical platoon leader, and support platoon leader supervise their CSS operations. However, the executive officer (XO) monitors CSS during all phases of operations.

(1) Organic components. The TF commander ensures that CSS is provided, not only for his organic and attached elements but also for any OPCON or supporting units. The TF provides mission-essential CSS to a supporting unit. The S4 coordinates other CSS for the supporting unit and verifies who is to provide this CSS and how it is to be requested. When a large attachment joins the TF, the attachment should bring an appropriate slice of CSS assets from its parent unit. These assets are controlled by the TF S4. The attached unit leader must coordinate with the TF S4 and furnish him with a copy of his unit battle roster. The attached unit then submits reports and requests resupply according to the TF SOP.

The TF combat trains CP is the focal point of CSS for the unit. Under the supervision of the S4, this CP anticipates, requests, coordinates, and supervises execution of CSS. The three categories of support are logistics, personnel services, and health services.

(a) Logistics support includes –

Supply.

Transportation.

Maintenance.

Field services. Field services encompass such activities as graves registration, clothing exchange, bath, salvage, laundry, textile renovation, airdrop and airlift, and bakery.

(b) Personnel-services support includes –

Personnel and administrative services. These services encompass strength and personnel accountability, replacement operations, casualty reporting, awards and decorations, and personnel management.

Chaplain activities. These activities involve conduct of services, personal and religious counseling, and pastoral care.

Legal services.

Finance services.

Public affairs.

Postal services.

Enemy prisoner of war support.

(2) Nonorganic components. The principal source of external support to the TF is the forward support battalion. It is organized with a headquarters and headquarters detachment, supply company, maintenance company, and medical company to provide support to a maneuver brigade. Additional support can be provided by the main support battalion of the division support command.

g. C². When the TF organization is completed and all of the other operating systems are working internally, it is the C² system that gets them working together. The C² system consists of the command component and the communication component.

(1) The command component consists of the commander and all of the personnel whom he trusts to make the individual BOSs function. The commander fights from a forward location where he can best see, hear, and influence the battle. He issues the orders necessary to control his subordinate units. His subordinate commanders and soldiers must be aware of his presence on the battlefield. The S3 is responsible for orders preparation and, through the TF signal officer, he manages the electronic, wire, and messenger systems.

Command methods are unique from commander to commander, and each commander has his own variation. The members of the C² system circle vary, as do their functions. For example, one commander may talk directly to the S1 and the S4 for the operation of the CSS system, using the XO for other matters, while another may use the XO for the operation of the CSS system. Regardless of the exact interface the commander chooses, the objective is fluid communications requiring the TF commanders involvement in giving direction and solving major problems. When a TF is operating efficiently, the commander can focus on the systems most directly impacting on mission accomplishment, fire and maneuver, and fire support.

(2) The communications component is the link that the commander uses for directing the systems to work together. The TF uses standard military terminology, symbology, and reports and orders formats to distribute information and instructions. The methods of communication are –

Face-to-face coordination. Face-to-face coordination is the most reliable of all means of communication.

Copies of orders and instructions. Copies of orders and instructions are limited and are generally in the form of operations overlays with superimposed execution matrixes.

Wire. Wire is used as the preferred means of communication between elements that will be in position for more than a few hours.

Radio. Radio communications are critical to fast-moving operations, but they have limitations and the enemy can disrupt them during critical times. Knowing the commanders intent and concept of the operation allows subordinates to act on their initiative and precludes an overdependence on radio communications.

PART B
TF OPERATIONS

A commander task-organizes to make the best use of his forces. Each maneuver element has its capabilities and limitations. The enemy may easily overcome the strengths of a pure tank or mechanized infantry force alone on the battlefield. But when combined into a TF, the team is much stronger than the individual components. Task organizations allow the commander flexibility to create the proper mix of firepower, maneuver elements, and other available operating systems to defeat the enemy.

3-5. Armored Battalion/TF Capabilities and Limitations. Mechanized infantry and armored battalions are organized, equipped, and trained to accomplish compatible missions, yet each type of battalion has unique capabilities and limitations.

a. Mission. The missions of armored battalions and mechanized infantry battalions in their pure configuration are:

(1) Armor pure. The mission of the tank battalion is to close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect or to repel his assault by fire and counterattack.

(2) Mechanized infantry pure. The mission of the mechanized infantry battalion is to close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

(a) Mounted. The responsibilities of mounted troops are to –

Protect tanks and ATGM from dismounted infantry and AT gunners.

Move with the tanks, swim streams, and negotiate terrain (too restrictive for tanks).

Suppress and kill soft targets with machine guns and small arms while moving.

Destroy tanks and thinner-skinned vehicles with TOWs, dragons, and light antitank weapons (LAWs) out to 4,000 meters.

(b) Dismounted. The responsibilities of dismounted troops are to –

Clear woods, buildings, obstacles, and dug-in positions.

Conduct infiltration attacks.

Secure prisoners.

Dig in and hold ground against a dismounted infantry assault.

Provide security, patrols, and OPs.

Ambush mounted or dismounted enemy.

Lay mines.

(3) TF. The mission of the TF is to support brigade operations. They accomplish this by –

Conducting sustained combat operations in all environments.

Accomplishing rapid movement and limited penetrations.

Exploiting success and pursue a defeated enemy as part of a larger formation.

Conducting security operations (advance, flank, or rear guard) for a larger force.

Conducting defensive, retrograde, or other operations over assigned areas.

Conducting offensive operations.

b. Capabilities.

(1) Armor (pure).

Mobility, armor protection, and firepower.

Ability to kill tanks and soft targets at long ranges.

Artillery and small arms relatively ineffective deterrents.

(2) Mechanized infantry (pure).

Mobility, late armor protection, and firepower.

Ability to kill tanks and soft targets with ATGM fire at long ranges.

Ability to conduct assault breaches and dismounted assaults.

Ability to defend against dismounted attacks.

(3) TF. The TF acquires the same capabilities as the mechanized infantry or tank battalion since it has components of both elements. The mission capabilities of the tank and mechanized infantry battalions are enhanced through task organization.

c. Limitations. Because of the high density of tracked vehicles, the battalion has the following limitations:

(1) Mobility and firepower are restricted by urban areas, dense jungles and forests, very steep and rugged terrain, and significant water obstacles.

(2) Strategic mobility is limited by substantial quantities of heavy equipment.

(3) Consumption of supply items is high, especially Classes III, V, and IX.

(4) Armor (pure) is vulnerable to ATGM, AT guns, tanks, and mines; has slow speed in crossing water; and has difficulty identifying infantry and AT gunners in close terrain.

(5) Mechanized infantry (pure) limitations differ depending on whether the force is mounted or dismounted.

(a) Mounted. Carriers can be destroyed by ATGM, AT guns, tanks, BMP cannons, mines, or a direct hit by artillery or air strike.

(b) Dismounted. Dismounted infantry is less vulnerable when properly dug in and positioned. Infantry is vulnerable to tanks, automatic small-arms fire, NBC attack, and artillery and mortar fire.

(6) The TF has the same limitations as the mechanized infantry and tank battalion since it has components of both elements.

3-6. Task-Organizing Considerations. Task-organizing considerations include TF mix and organization configurations.

a. TF mix. The variables that influence TF mix are –

(1) Effective use of fighting elements.

(a) Tanks. Tanks are most effective where fields of fire are relatively long and tanks can move rapidly.

(b) Infantry. Infantry operates in situations where fields of fire are relatively short.

(c) ATGM. Heavy AT weapons are most effective overwatching at longer ranges. They deliver long-range, highly lethal point of fire against armored vehicles and field fortifications.

(2) Mission requirements.

(a) Missions requiring rapid movement over considerable distances generally call for tank-heavy or balanced forces.

(b) Missions requiring retention of terrain generally call for mechanized-infantry-heavy or pure mechanized-infantry forces.

(3) Enemy situations.

(a) In a movement to contact, tank-heavy or balanced forces are preferred when anticipating a meeting engagement followed by a hasty attack.

(b) Mechanized-infantry-heavy forces are preferred against deliberate enemy defenses featuring strong AT systems.

(4) Terrain and weather.

(a) Conditions providing good, long-range observation and fields of fire generally call for balanced forces or forces heavy in long-range ATGM.

(b) Terrain with shorter engagement ranges but with high-speed avenues of approach favors the tank cannon over the ATGM. Tank heavy forces are preferred.

(c) Operations in terrain (forests or urban areas) that has significant obstacles generally call for heavy or pure mechanized infantry forces.

(d) During conditions of poor visibility caused by fog, snow, or rain, mechanized infantry (dismounted) is preferred.

b. Possible configurations. The commander can configure the organization into a battalion/TF or a CO/TM, depending on the mission.

(1) Battalion/TF organization. Figure 3-3 shows how the TF commander can organize tank and mechanized infantry battalions to meet the enemy with the best possible mix of combat power.

Figure 3-3. Battalion/TF organizations

(2) CO/TM organizations. Figure 3-4 shows how CO/TMs are organized to accomplish missions based on the factors of METT-T.

Figure 3-4. Tank and mechanized infantry TF CO/TMs

3-7. Troop-Leading Procedures. Troop-leading procedures represent an effective method that has a long tradition in the US Army. These procedures, which are designed for use by commanders at the small-unit level, provide a handy guide for planning, coordinating, executing, and supervising tactical operations.

a. C². Troop-leading procedures are the basis for the C² process in the US Army, especially during situations of limited time. This is particularly true for commanders without staffs (company level and below) or when the commander does not have time to assemble his staff.

Troop-leading procedures are as detailed or as simple as time allows. The commander plays the central role in this process. He bases his decisions on analysis of the factors of METT-T, comparison of feasible COAs, war-gaming, and personal judgment. Troop-leading procedures can occur in almost any sequence, with several actions occurring simultaneously. Some actions, such as reconnaissance, may begin early and be repeated as often as required.

b. Application. The determined application of troop-leading procedures can reduce friction and gain a time advantage. Additionally, if commanders without staffs habitually use troop-leading procedures, it will aid in the implicit understanding of the commander's decision-making process. Experience from the National Training Center proves that successful commanders apply these procedures in a systemic fashion that they have trained their units to expect.

c. Steps. Troop-leading procedures start with an assigned or perceived mission. The 1942 edition of FM 101-5, Staff Officers Field Manual, described them as follows: "First, make an estimate of the situation. Then, develop a plan to execute the decision. Next, by means of an order, issue instructions. Finally, supervise to ensure that the operation is executed according to plan." Current doctrine follows the same basic philosophy, although the steps are somewhat expanded, as discussed below.

(1) Step 1: Receive the mission. The best situation is for the commander to receive his mission in person from his higher commander. If possible, the order is issued overlooking the ground where the action will take place. Often, the mission is received over the radio. If this is impractical, maps, sketches, and terrain models should be used. No matter how the mission is received, it is critical to get a clear understanding of the higher commander's intent and the intent of the next higher commander. The time spent in understanding the commander's intent will save hours later in proper execution. The commander should analyze the mission using the factors of METT-T as a guide. The first step in this process is to plan the time available. Time is the common factor of the battlefield. To emphasize the importance of time in military operations, it is useful to make the location of the time available first in METT-T. The new order is explained as follows:

(a) Time. Without a time plan, the commander can lose track of time and waste precious minutes. Time drives the planning and execution of all military operations. Reverse-planning and ruthless enforcement of the time plan are the keys to effective time management. The commander must make the most of his available time by starting reconnaissance units moving as soon as possible. He should disseminate as much preliminary information as possible to allow subordinate units to begin planning and preparing.

The reverse-planning technique starts with the last known action and works backward to the present time. The time plan includes the unit's major tasks, starting with the time for the crossing of the LD (offensive battle) or from the time when the defense must be established (defensive battle). The time plan should list the times of the following actions:

The battle action (crossing the LD or the time to be set, ready to defend).

The battle update briefing.

The orders issue.

Reconnaissance.

The initial movement.

Commanders must enforce the time plan. The goal is to give the subordinate units enough daylight to conduct planning, reconnaissance, and preparation prior to the start of combat operations. It does more harm than good to present a perfect plan to subordinate units if they do not have the time to disseminate their own orders and prepare.

(b) Mission. The mission is what the unit must accomplish. The commander should restate the mission from the higher commander in a clear, concise statement of the task to be accomplished. In doing so, he should be careful to include the elements of who, what, where, when, and why.

(c) Enemy. The commander evaluates enemy forces by their doctrine (how they fight) and by known enemy information (what is out there opposing the friendly force). The goal of this analysis is to determine the enemy's intent and most likely COAs.

(d) Terrain and Weather. The commander analyzes the terrain and the weather for their military application and their effects on friendly and enemy COAs.

(e) Troops. Units measure their combat power two echelons down. For example, brigade commanders consider the number of companies they can employ, while battalion commanders consider the number of platoons they can employ. This analysis of friendly forces available is essential to establishing what a unit can do. Commanders must also consider the condition of the troops because a tired battalion, reduced to less than three companies, cannot fight in the same fashion as a fully rested, full-strength unit.

(2) Step 2: Issue the warning order. Warning orders are partial orders issued to gain time. They are critical to effective parallel planning. Warning orders get forces moving in the right direction as commanders continue to develop the plan. They allow the preparation to get started. A clear warning order saves time and focuses the planning effort. The commander issues the warning order over the radio or verbally while overlooking the area of operations. He issues the warning order immediately after completing his initial analysis of the mission. The warning order must inform subordinates what the mission is, when it will commence, what preliminary actions are required, and where the operations order (OPORD) will be issued.

(3) Step 3: Make a tentative plan. The commander develops a tentative plan based on an estimate of the situation. Using the best information available and the results of the METT-T analysis, the planner must develop COAs. One or two COAs may be all that are possible.

(4) Step 4: Initiate movement. Movement should begin as soon as possible to position the force to execute the mission. In some cases, early movement will be critical if long marches to the area of operations are required. The commander can often order his unit to move while he is receiving orders from the higher commander. He may also designate his second in command to move the force while he continues to plan and to conduct reconnaissance.

(5) Step 5: Conduct reconnaissance. The commander must focus his reconnaissance to gain the information he needs to execute his branch plans. Nothing can replace a good reconnaissance. Reconnaissance demands careful planning. The commander must issue specific objectives to each of his subordinate leaders. He must specify a time and a place to meet with designated subordinate leaders to discuss the results of the reconnaissance. The commander will then war-game any changes these revelations have made on the tentative plan. If possible, the commander should choose a site for this meeting that allows the group to observe the terrain over which they will fight.

(6) Step 6: Complete the plan. The commander and his staff continue to refine the concept. They adjust the plan as they receive more information about the enemy, terrain, and weather. They finalize task organization, fire-support plans, CSS, surveillance, communication, and C² measures. They also make coordination with adjacent, supporting, and higher headquarters.

(7) Step 7: Issue the order. The ideal OPORD is simple and clear and must be issued in time for subordinate commanders to fully brief and rehearse their missions with their subordinates. The friction of battle will quickly eat away at available planning time. Ideally, the commander should issue his orders verbally, either over the radio or in person. Maps, sketches, and overlays are critical to effectively communicating the plan. Subordinate commanders copy the overlay from their commander's map. Accurate map overlays are essential for synchronizing the movements and actions of the force. Without them, directions given over the radio would be very difficult to understand.

If possible, the commander issues his OPORD from a vantage point overlooking the terrain of the area of the operation. If this is not possible, the commander should use visual aids such as terrain models or sketches to help clearly explain his plan.

After the commander issues the OPORD, the subordinate commanders conduct an oral back brief of the plan to ensure understanding. Each subordinate commander should listen to the other back briefs to help synchronize his own battle actions. This procedure ensures that subordinate commanders will know the entire plan before they return to their units. It also strengthens their ability to continue the mission if the commander becomes a casualty. Ideally, back briefs are conducted while all commanders, fire-support officers, and key staff are present and are overlooking the terrain. Finally, the commander issues a time check to synchronize everyone's actions. A misunderstanding over the difference of a minute can lose a battle!

(8) Step 8: Supervise and refine. The commander and his staff must supervise and inspect preparations prior to combat. The preparations include coordination, reorganization, fire support, engineer activities, maintenance, resupply, and movement. Rehearsals are conducted for the maneuver and fire plans. Commanders above the company level must emphasize supervision of those items that require coordination between units of the same size.

Refinement of the plan is a continual process. The reconnaissance determines which branch plan the commander executes during the battle. Branch plans are executed when the reconnaissance discovers information on critical enemy weaknesses. Once the battle starts, the commander makes the decisions necessary to give his force an advantage over the enemy. If communication is interrupted, subordinates are expected to act without active supervision, based on their best judgment and their understanding of the commander's intent. To do nothing when the situation demands action is a sure way to surrender the initiative to the enemy.

3-8. The Command Estimate. The estimate of the situation, in its broadest sense, is a mental problem-solving process. The difficult part is to select the best way to accomplish the mission. Before battle, the TF commander and his staff may have a great deal of time, even days, to consider in detail what they intend to do to build the concept and the detail of how they will do it. This process culminates in an OPORD that presents the plan for the battle in logical, commonly understood language. During the permissive time situation, the TF commander can function not only as the order giver but also as a member of the planning group. He has time to attend to a certain amount of detail. The resulting plan is the detailed expression of the concept.

The command estimate depicts the dynamics of decision-making between the commander and his staff. In this process, the commander and his staff follow a series of steps to derive the optimum solution. The process requires interaction between the commander and his staff, but the amount and nature of the interaction depend on how much the commander trusts his staff. He is responsible for training them to properly support him. This process works extremely well during times when the situation is vague and when the goal is to determine the best COA.

The commander and his staff use the command estimate when there is sufficient time to conduct detailed planning. The command estimate provides a logical, analytical method for developing a detailed solution to combat situations. It is the primary guide to conducting the tactical-orders process, which strives to achieve both agility and synchronization. The format for the command estimate is listed in Figure 3-5.

Figure 3-5. Command estimate

a. Receive the mission. The first step occurs when the commander receives or deduces the mission. The mission is usually prescribed by a higher authority, but it may be deduced by the commander from his knowledge of the situation or the intent or plans of his higher authority.

b. Develop facts and assumptions. After receiving the mission, the commander and his staff gather the available known facts on the enemy, battlefield, weather, and friendly forces. This information supports the analytical presentation of the situation. The staff then develops assumptions to replace any missing facts that are critical to the commander's decision.

c. Analyze the mission. In this step, the staff organizes the facts and assumptions and determines what tasks must be accomplished, what the limitations are, which assets are available, and what the degree of risk is. Although the commander is solely responsible for analyzing the mission, the S3 and other staff officers provide information and assist the commander.

The mission is a statement of the tasks and their purposes as seen by the commander issuing the mission. The commander will always restate the mission within his planning guidance. His restated mission will include the sequence and priority in which all tasks are to be accomplished. He may also include any specific COA he desires the staff to consider or reject when making their estimates. Additionally, the commander may identify key terrain within the area of operation.

A mission, prescribed or deduced, will not always clearly identify all of the tasks which must be performed. The mission from higher headquarters will identify the basic combat action to be taken such as attack, defend, delay, screen, block, move, or reinforce. These tasks are referred to as specified or directed tasks.

The commander or the S3 must determine additional tasks essential for mission accomplishment. This information supports the analytical presentation of the situation. There is always more than one way to solve a problem. These additional tasks are called implied tasks and should be major tasks that are essential to the accomplishment of the mission. They should not be the routine or SOP tasks that must be performed to accomplish most tactical missions. Neither should these tasks be the type that are inherent responsibilities of the commander, such as providing flank protection for his own unit.

These SOP and inherent tasks, as well as other tasks that are of less than major magnitude, may be of concern to the commander and should be appropriately addressed in his planning guidance. Whether or not implied tasks are identified during mission analysis depends on the mission that is received and the judgment of the commander. At corps and above, the missions received are usually stated in general terms, and implied tasks are frequently identified. At division and below, where the missions received are more detailed, fewer implied tasks will be identified.

d. Issue the commander's guidance. The commander issues his guidance to direct the staffs planning effort. As a minimum, the commander's guidance should include the restated mission, initial concept of the operation, initial scheme of maneuver, time plan, and type of order to be developed. The commander should issue his guidance to the staff as soon as possible and send a warning order to subordinate commands.

e. Develop COAs. A COA is a possible plan that will accomplish the mission. With the commander's guidance, the staff begins to develop COAs. They –

Analyze relative combat power.

Array initial forces.

Develop the scheme of maneuver.

Determine C² means and measures.

Prepare the COA statement and sketch.

(1) IPB. The IPB plays an important part in developing the COAs. Through IPB, the commander develops a clear picture of the battlefield, the COAs available to the enemy commander, and the COAs the enemy will likely adopt. He also establishes decision points to key friendly actions. These decision points require a specified action to occur (a counterattack or the firing of an artillery target, for instance) on order or as directed in the OPORD.

(2) Synchronization. Each COA must be synchronized before the war-gaming process begins. Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. Synchronization is a process and a result. Commanders synchronize activities, thereby produce synchronized operations. Battlefield activities are tasks, events, procedures, or groups of procedures that can be reduced to time.

(a) Commander's role. The commander is the critical participant in the synchronization process because he must provide focus for the staff in the synchronization effort. When the commander receives the mission, he will analyze the situation and determine the time available. He will also form a concept of operation based on his knowledge of the situation and will issue planning guidance to the staff along with his initial concept. This critical step will speed the synchronization process because it immediately focuses the effort of the entire staff who are working to minimize the amount of time required for planning so that more time can be devoted to preparation and execution.

(b) Synchronization steps. During synchronization, the commander should –

Lay out the timeline in actual hours, H-Hour sequence, or by event.

Depict the enemy's most likely COA for each event. An important consideration is the time-space relationship of the enemy as he moves over various terrain (slower in slow-go terrain, faster on high-speed avenues).

Review the enemy COA and indicate where the enemy may change his presentation of forces in time, based on the enemy-event template. These points will become decision points for friendly branch plans.

Conduct a time-distance analysis. The commander or S3 conducts this analysis to determine how long it will take each subordinate maneuver unit to complete planned and anticipated moves on the battlefield. This time-distance study is conducted for every maneuver element.

Array supporting activities. Once all friendly force movements have been determined and posted on the map, the remainder of the staff arrays their supporting activities in a similar manner based on the commander’s guidance. For example, if the commander wants to suppress the enemy at a certain point, the FSO must determine the number of artillery tubes in range of the target and the number of rounds required to suppress the desired target. He then translates this information into a time for the event. The staff accomplishes this type of analysis for each staff officer responsible for an operating system. The information should be recorded on the synchronization matrix.

(3) COA statement. A COA is usually stated in broad terms, with details determined during the war-gaming process. A COA should include all the elements of a mission statement except who. The staff determines the what, when, where, and why for each COA. The commander determines the who, although the staff can offer recommendations.

Each COA developed must be significantly different from any other. These differences are identified through the use of reserves, task organization, designation of the main effort, scheme of maneuver, and defeat mechanism (which chain of events will trigger the enemy's defeat).

f. Analyze COAs. Staff analysis is designed to determine the best COA. To analyze a COA, the staff employs the concept of war gaming (see Figure 3-6). War gaming is a mental process of visualizing each step of the battle and considering friendly and enemy actions and counteractions. The war gaming begins with a detailed look at the enemy. The staff asks questions such as Where will the enemy attack from? and Where do I want to kill him? Such questions are asked based on the enemy's capabilities. A thorough understanding of the enemy and his tactics, organization, and weapons capabilities is essential to developing a tentative plan.

Figure 3-6. War-gaming steps

When the S3 has identified all specified and implied tasks, he will proceed to the next step of the estimate process. He must determine all tactical requirements that affect possible COAs for a given situation. In order to determine the tactical requirements of the situation, the S3 must consider METT-T. In order to analyze COAs, the S3 must ask himself various questions:

How will the terrain affect our attack?
Of the avenues of approach given to us by the S2, which is the best to our objective?
What recent and present significant activities did you detect in this situation?
What are the peculiarities and weaknesses?
What are the enemy's capabilities with respect to our unit?
How will the weather affect our attack?

Tactical COAs will not normally convey complete schemes of maneuver at the beginning. They do provide an easy and flexible basis for beginning the analysis. Each COA will be developed into a general scheme of maneuver as it is analyzed.

An attack COA is stated in terms of the direction and objective of the main attack. In some cases, it may be necessary to make the enemy force the objective rather than a terrain feature. In other cases, the distance to the objective, uncertainty about the enemy situation, or the size of the objective may make main and supporting attacks not feasible. COAs may then be formulated in terms of formation rather than in terms of the main attack. For example, if the commander announces that key terrain is to be seized, the S3 uses this information in formulating COAs. This key terrain will normally become an objective.

The S3 must then consider the avenues of approach leading to this terrain and formulate COAs that lead to and terminate at that terrain feature. The S3 initially uses the avenue of approach as announced by the S2 in his intelligence estimate.

The S3 may determine that there are two or more pieces of terrain within the objective area whose seizure would give his unit the opportunity for success. In this case, he would identify each terrain piece as an objective to be seized by a maneuver element. The S3 must ultimately determine which piece of terrain will become the objective for the main attack while developing the complete scheme of maneuver. Considerations other than key terrain will now take on added significance.

(1) The staff can analyze COAs using any of the techniques shown below:

(a) Avenue-in-depth. This technique focuses on one avenue at a time, starting with the main effort.

(b) Belt. Using this technique, the staff divides the battlefield into areas that run the width of the sector or zone or by phase of the operation.

(c) Box. This technique requires microanalysis of a few critical areas (for example, an engagement area). In doing so, the staff isolates each area and focuses on the battle in that area.

(2) The staff uses the following techniques to record and display the results of the war game:

(a) Narrative (sentence form).

(b) Sketch note (make notes on the map or a sketch with reference to their specific actions and location).

(3) At this point in the estimate, the S3 should have arrived at his own COAs. At brigade and battalion levels, there is an informal relationship between the commander and the S3 with regard to possible COAs. Although there may be no formal recommendation of COAs by the S3 and approval by the commander, they do mutually agree, after studying the mission, as to possible COAs open to them. It is a responsibility of the S3 to formulate COAs. This analyzing process is sometimes referred to as war gaming.

War gaming analyzes each selected event by identifying the components of its subevents or tasks one level down and its assets two levels down. The visualization step tries to identify how the immediate subordinate commander would employ allocated forces and how he would determine the composition of those forces. The war-game sequence is action reaction counteraction.

g. Decide on a COA. The staff will brief the commander. Each COA is discussed for its advantages and disadvantages. A useful technique for presenting COAs to the commander is to develop COA sketches. Each COA sketch consists of a sketch with a short explanation of how the operation will occur. The statement and sketch must cover what, when, where, how, and why. It must clearly and briefly state the purpose of the operation, the main effort or main attack, the scheme of maneuver, and the defeat mechanism (what chain of events will trigger the enemy's defeat). Each COA sketch should include –

The unit and subordinate-unit boundaries.

Planned control measures such as phase lines.

Ground or air axes of advance.

Zones of attack or defense sectors.

Assembly areas.

Strongpoints.

Battle positions.

Engagement areas.

The objectives.

The forward edge of the battle area (FEBA)/LD.

Fire-control measures.

The main effort (defense) or main attack (offense).

The COA sketch should provide a clear picture of how the unit will defeat the enemy. These events are addressed by the elements of the battlefield framework as explained in FM 100-5.

The commander makes his decision based on his own estimate of the situation, his experience, and his trust and confidence in his staff. The commander must refine the COA into a clear decision and concept of the operation. A warning order is issued immediately after the commander has made his decision. The staff then prepares to issue the order. Figure 3-7 shows an example of a COA sketch for a TF attack in zone.

Figure 3-7. Sample COA sketch

h. Issue the order. The last step in the command-estimate process is issuing the written order. Staff members help the commander reach decisions by preparing staff estimates in their own areas of responsibility. The staff must analyze how factors influence mission accomplishment; confirm that their information is critical, relevant, and accurate; and prepare and present their estimates. The commander also relies on his staff to provide technical expertise in their functional areas. They must be able to provide the commander with the judgments they derive from their experience, training, intellect, and gut feelings. Staff estimates are integral to the command-estimate process. They also form the basis for staff annexes to orders and plans. The types of staff estimates include –

(1) Personnel. The personnel estimate analyzes personnel and administration factors on soldier-and unit-effectiveness during the mission.

(2) Intelligence. The intelligence estimate analyzes the enemy situation and the characteristics of the area of operations in terms of how they can affect the mission.

(3) Operations. The operations (commander's) estimate analyzes all of the factors that could affect the mission to determine all reasonable COAs and their effect on friendly forces.

(4) Logistics. The logistics estimate analyzes logistics factors affecting mission accomplishment.

(5) Civil-military operations (CMO). The CMO estimate analyzes the influence of CMO factors on mission accomplishment.

3-9. The Abbreviated Command Estimate. The command estimate just described focuses on finding the optimized or best COA. The command-estimate process requires the integrated work of a commander and his staff. The staff must thoroughly war-game and synchronize each COA before they can present the commander with a decision briefing. When the decision is made, the command-estimate process usually results in a detailed, written order. It is a very thorough and time-consuming process. When there is insufficient time, the command-estimate sequence of events is often ignored or abbreviated. Staffs try to abbreviate the command-estimate process by doing every step faster. The decision brief that results usually provides the commander with the choice between one fully developed COA and one or more partially developed straw-man COAs. The commander is then forced to choose the completed COA or risk running out of time by trying to rework a new plan.

a. Decisive action. The first demand in war is decisive action. The abbreviated command-estimate process is designed to be used by commanders when time is not available to complete the full command-estimate process. The abbreviated command estimate reduces planning time by relying on the commander to make a recognitional decision concerning the battle. His staff then implements the commander's decision.

b. Competence of the commander and staff. The abbreviated command estimate rests first on the competence of the commander, staff, and unit. It requires a skilled commander to make a decision and then let the staff arrange the tactics that implement the decision. After the staff quickly updates the IPB and reports on the status of critical battlefield information, the commander mentally develops feasible COAs. He must mentally war-game these COAs and make a decision. The commander's decision is based on his best judgment of the situation. This saves the time used in the standard process for fully developing competing COAs. The staff then implements the commander's decision rather than developing alternate COAs. The staff synchronizes this decision and provides for agility through the development of branch plans.

c. Agility in planning. The abbreviated command estimate works only when the commander and staff emphasize agility in their planning. Agility is gained through operations flexibility. This flexibility is provided by the staff when it develops a base plan and at least one branch plan. The commander's decision becomes the base plan. The staff then develops a complementary branch plan.

3-10. Summary. This lesson discussed how and why tank and mechanized infantry battalions are task-organized and the BOSs involved in helping the TF commander accomplish his missions. The specific organization of the armored battalion/TF is dictated by the factors of METT-T. The TF commander and staff must fully understand the capabilities and limitations of the TF and how they should organize the TF to maximize the potential of the forces under their control. They must also be capable of effectively using the command-estimate process to develop COAs.

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