LESSON 1 - HISTORY OF AIR DEFENSE AND EARLY WEAPON SYSTEMS
TASK
This lesson does not specifically relate to any enlisted or officer task but provides general information on the development of Air Defense Artillery (ADA).
CONDITIONS
Use only the lesson material to complete the examination.
STANDARDS
You must attain a grade of 70 percent on the examination to receive credit for this subcourse.
REFERENCES
Lesson material.
Learning Event 1: THE ARTILLERY CORPS FOR INSTRUCTION AND THE ARTILLERY SCHOOL OF PRACTICE (1824-1834)
ORIGIN OF ADA
The history of ADA is long and colorful. It originates as far back as 27 September 1776, when COL Henry Knox recommended to members of Congress that an artillery school should be established. Although the Colonel's recommendation was not completely accepted at that time, it did cause congressional and military leaders to recognize the need for some type of specialized artillery instruction. Consequently, about a quarter of a century after the colonel's original recommendation, the United States Military Academy was established in 1802 at West Point, New York.
In 1818, the Bernard Board, headed by BG Simon Bernard, recommended to Secretary of War Calhoun that a school specializing in artillery, engineering, and topographic skills be established for young officers. That recommendation, in part, was approved in 1823, and a school for artillery officers only was established. The new school, which was to be called the "Artillery School for Instruction," would be located at the largest fort under construction at that time --Fortress Monroe, Virginia. On 5 April 1824, the school was officially organized with the publication of General Orders No. 18 (Figure 1) by the Adjutant General of the United States Army.
The Artillery Corps for Instruction
BG John R. Fenwick was assigned to the new artillery school in January 1825 to organize it, but was called away that same year. In his absence, the responsibility for organizing the school fell to his second in command, LTC Abraham Eustis. LTC Eustis arrived at Fortress Monroe on 31 March 1824 and immediately started planning the organization of the school. On 11 April 1824, Orders No. 1, Artillery School for Instruction (Figure 2), was issued.
By July of 1824, LTC Eustis had completed organization of the staff departments and a band, had located a post office, and had received the necessary books to form the nucleus of the library. He and his staff began to work on a set of regulations prescribing the course of instruction to be used at the school. The course length was set at two years. The school's first regulations (Figure 3) were forwarded to the War Department and approved. Note that the regulations are for the Artillery School of Practice rather than the Artillery Corps for Instruction. The two names differentiate between the school development and support organization and the school itself.
Although instruction was frequently interrupted due to garrison duty and details, the school operated basically in the manner shown in Figure 3. At the end of the two-year period of instruction, the school was considered to be so successful that a similar Infantry School of Practice was established at Jefferson Barracks, Missouri.
LTC Eustis left the school in the fall of 1828 to assume command of the New York Harbor. The years that followed were plagued by shortages of funds, troops, and facilities. Finally, on 19 April 1834, the War Department published General Orders No. 31 directing that Fort Monroe would no longer be considered as a School of Practice and would assume the same duties as any other post.
Although the school never reached the degree of efficiency originally planned, it was recognized as a success in that three-fourths of all active artillery personnel had received instruction during the 10-year period. The school remained closed until 1857.
Reestablishment of the Artillery School
On 29 December 1857, the Adjutant General's office published General Orders No. 15 directing the organization of an Artillery School for Practice at Fort Monroe, with COL Harvey Brown as Commandant. In January 1858, a board of officers was appointed to prepare a program of instruction as a basis for the commandant's plan of organization. The organization and plans of operation were forwarded to the War Department for approval and were duly published by General Orders No. 5, War Department, 18 May 1858, (Figure 4).
Sundays were used for in-ranks and barracks inspection.
The school operated for one year before being closed on 19 September 1860 because of the war between the states. After the Civil War, the school staff was reorganized and the school was renamed "The Artillery School of the United States Army."
By 1875 almost all lieutenants of artillery and some officers from other branches had received instruction from the school. In 1878, the school received its first annual appropriation from the United States Congress in the amount of $3,923. Up until that time the school was supported by what funds other departments of the Army could spare.
The Spanish-American War caused a suspension of instruction on 17 May 1898 and the school remained closed until 3 September 1900. On 20 October 1902, a course for enlisted gunnery specialists began, and in 1903 the course became known as the School for Master Gunners. Also, by 1903, the School's Congressional appropriation had increased to $5,000 per year.
In 1906, The Department of Artillery of the United States Army was redesignated The Department of Coast Artillery. The mission of the Artillery School became one of preparing officers and enlisted men for duties pertaining to seacoast gun defense. In effect, the Artillery School had become a Coast Artillery School in every sense except in name, thereby separating Coast Artillery and Field Artillery. Official separation was by General Orders No. 24, War Department, dated 2 February 1907. This order provided that the Artillery of the United States Army would consist of the Chief of Artillery, the Coast Artillery, and the Field Artillery.
Learning Event 2: THE COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL (1907-1942)
COAST ARTILLERY SCHOOL ORIGIN
After the Coast and Field Artilleries were separated, the Artillery School was reorganized under the name of The Coast Artillery School as directed by General Orders No. 178, War Department, 28 August 1907 (Figure 5).
Wartime Instruction at the School During World War I
Until 1917, the school functioned routinely with only minor administrative changes. In that year, the United States entered World War I. This action caused the mission of the school to be changed to one of training officers and enlisted men for duty with railway, tractor, antiaircraft, and trench mortar artillery. By November 1918, the school was providing a steady flow of officers at a rate of 200 per week.
Although training officer candidates was the school's largest task during World War I, officers already commissioned were not neglected. In 1918, a series of short courses began, not the least of which was the introduction in February 1918 of a five-week course in antiaircraft artillery. This course was mainly of the orientation type to prepare selected officers for admission to the American Antiaircraft School at Arnouville-les-Gonesse, France. In July 1918, the length of the course was increased from five to eight weeks, with each class averaging about 30 officer students.
Wartime instruction at the school came to an end with the signing of the Armistice on 11 November 1918. The wartime graduates totaled 4,432 officers and 4,221 enlisted men.
Demobilization Following World War I
In 1919, all United States antiaircraft artillery units were demobilized, and the antiaircraft artillery ceased to exist. The Artillery School returned to normal peacetime operations with primary emphasis being on coastal defense. The need for antiaircraft artillery was not completely forgotten, however, as evidenced by its inclusion in the battery officers course established in 1920 to teach tactics and techniques of antiaircraft and heavy artillery to company grade officers.
The Comeback of Antiaircraft Artillery
By the year 1930, new emphasis was being placed on antiaircraft artillery. In fact, antiaircraft artillery and seacoast artillery were now being viewed as having equal tactical merit. In March 1930, a team of instructors from the Artillery School traveled to the Air Corps Tactical School at Langley Field, Virginia, and conducted a two-week course on antiaircraft tactics, techniques, and equipment to Air Corps officers--further evidence of antiaircraft artillery's newfound respectability.
On 22 and 23 August 1933, a hurricane struck Fort Monroe, destroying and damaging property estimated at $1,500,000. Wilson Park, the antiaircraft park, was demolished and the guns were damaged extensively. In spite of this extensive damage, the school opened as scheduled at 0930 on 9 September 1933.
In 1938, the school furnished its first field manual transcript on antiaircraft to the Adjutant General for printing. Entitled "Coast Artillery Field Manual, Volume II, Antiaircraft Artillery, Part I, Tactics," it was to be a text for use by extension course students in addition to its use by resident students. The year 1938 also found additional emphasis being placed on antiaircraft materiel when the War Department dictated that not less than $800,000 of the Seacoast Defense Appropriation Bill, amounting to $5 million, was to be used for procurement of mobile antiaircraft guns and mounts.
February 1941 found approximately 100 students arriving every 2 weeks at Fort Monroe to pursue a special 10-week course in antiaircraft artillery.
The Antiaircraft Artillery School
On 9 March 1942, the Anticraft Artillery (AAA) School was organized at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Its first mission was to establish and conduct an Antiaircraft Artillery Officer Candidate School (OCS). Once in operation, the school at Camp Davis made the separation of Coast Artillery and AAA complete.
Learning Event 3: THE ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SCHOOL, CAMP DAVIS, NC (1942-1944)
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SCHOOL ORIGIN
The AAA School expanded at a rapid rate from April 1942 to April 1943, with particular emphasis being placed on training officer candidates. During this year, a special 13-week course for upperclassmen of the United States Military Academy was introduced. The course included AA gunnery, fire control, 90-mm gun and automatic weapons operations, and searchlights. The OCS curriculum was changed to allow the candidate to specialize during his 8th, 9th and 10th weeks. The three specialized courses were AA gunnery, automatic weapons, and searchlights.
The enlisted men's division was divided into six teaching sections: electrical, radio and wire communications, master gunners, radio detection, automotive, and stereoscopic height finder. A small number of those graduating from the master gunner's course were selected for warrant officer. In its first year of operation, the AAA School graduated 14,500 from OCS, 4,300 from the officer's division, and 4,500 from the enlisted men's division.
It was necessary in March 1943 to extend the OCS course to 17 weeks to provide more instruction in the highly technical and multiweaponed AAA. In December, a motion picture depicting the experiences of AAA OCS candidates, which had been filmed at the school during the year, was released under the title, "There's Something About a Soldier."
In March 1944, the school was reorganized and consolidated to form a more compact organization. Its elements were the Officer Student Battalion, Enlisted Student Battalion, OCS Battalion, Enlisted Overhead Battalion, and the Women's Army Corps (WAC) Detachment. (WAC officers occupied many of the administrative positions at the school.) A new research section was charged with studying and evaluating various methods of employing AAA units in support of any Army unit, preparation and dissemination of this information, and conducting periodic seminars at AAA training sites.
On 25 May 1944, OCS Class No. 100 graduated. This marked the end of the AAA OCS program. In 26 months, the school had graduated the many thousands of AAA officers needed throughout the world.
In 1944, the school purchased a "Polaroid Trainer," the first device of its type ever used in the Army. This device was used for training AAA troops in high-angle fire techniques. It shot electrical impulses, in the form of a moving dot of light, in place of .50-caliber bullets. The Polaroid Trainer, which cost $100,000, resulted in a monthly savings of over $250,000 in ammunition.
In July 1944 a War Department directive on utilization of manpower stripped the school to the bare minimum of its enlisted personnel necessary for operation. Nearly every enlisted man who had been assigned to the school prior to 1 January 1944 was reassigned to a unit destined for overseas.
Learning Event 4: THE AAA SCHOOL MOVES TO FORT BLISS, TX, AND BECOMES THE US ARMY AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL (1944-PRESENT)
MOVEMENT OF ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY SCHOOL TO FORT BLISS
On 3 August 1944, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, directed the transfer of the AAA School to Fort Bliss, Texas. The move took place on or about 30 September 1944 and classes were resumed at the school's new location on 14 October 1944. Fort Bliss was an excellent location for the AAA School. It provided large, modern buildings which were located near good firing ranges, and the year-round clear weather of the desert Southwest provided an excellent environment for AA training.
Post-World War II Antiaircraft Developments
During 1946, in development of the postwar AA program, the AAA School undertook a series of interesting projects. One of the most important of these was the development of surface-to-air missiles (SAM). The First Antiaircraft Artillery Guided Missile Battalion was activated to assist the Army Service Forces in this project. The personnel of the battalion, in addition to antiaircraft personnel, included members of the Ordnance and Signal Corps. The battalion participated in the first American firing of a captured German V-2 rocket at White Sands Proving Ground, New Mexico, on 16 April 1946.
The school also conducted a flak analysis test-firing project. In this project, photographic records were obtained of the firing of 12,000 90-mm rounds and 5,000 40-mm rounds. The purpose was to obtain basic data on the accuracy of AAA to enable the Air Force to develop tactics to minimize aircraft damage from AAA fire.
Two Air Force officer's courses were introduced, one for officers from air bases throughout the country, and one for the XIX Tactical Air Command, Biggs Field, El Paso, Texas. The course included instruction on AAA tactics materiel, both foreign and our own and flak analysis.
The Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Center
Effective 11 June 1946, the AAA School was placed under the command of the newly established Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile Center, Fort Bliss, Texas.
Guided missile instruction was made an official part of the school's curriculum on 1 September 1946, when the Department of Guided Missiles was formed. The missions of the department were to--
o Teach, in detail, the tactics and technique of guided missiles and to qualify officers as competent commanders for all guided missile units of the Army field forces.
o Train selected enlisted men as leaders of guided missile units, guided missile technicians, and instructors on guided missiles.
o Serve as an agency of the Army field forces in the development and perfection of guided missile tactics and techniques.
In addition to instruction, the department was responsible for much of the early development of concepts for the employment of guided missiles and assisted in the preparation of Tables of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for guided missile units.
The Antiaircraft and Guided Missile Branch, The Artillery School, Fort Bliss, Texas
Effective 1 November 1946, the AAA School was redesignated as the Antiaircraft and Guided Missile Branch, The Artillery School, with command being assumed by the Commandant of The Artillery School, Fort Sill, Oklahoma. This redesignation was directed by the War Department as part of an overall consolidation of the service schools system.
Early 1947 was highlighted by the firing of the first all- American missile. The "WAC Corporal," as it was designated, was launched by the 1st AA Guided Missile Battalion.
On 31 October 1949, the first class of a special 26-week course began receiving instruction. The purpose of the course was to qualify selected officers for duty with AAA technical instruction teams. A total of 15 teams was to be organized for the purpose of traveling throughout the United States and overseas to provide commanders with AAA instruction.
The Korean conflict of the early fifties caused an increased demand for officers. In response to this demand, the AAA OCS reopened on 14 October 1951 with the first class arriving 15 November. The OCS was geared to handle an annual quota of 2,500 candidates.
By the latter part of 1952, both Nike and Corporal units were approaching an operational state. The formation of these units required considerable numbers of officer and enlisted personnel who were skilled in the use of the two missile systems. This need prompted the establishment of several additional courses in maintenance (electronic and mechanical) and operation for both officers and enlisted men.
The school had played an active part in Project Nike from its beginning in 1945, and it was a proud entity during activation ceremonies of the first Nike Ajax Battalion on 10 August 1953. The first battery moved on-site at Fort George Meade, Maryland, in December 1953.
One of the most important events of 1954 was the dedication of Hinman Hall, headquarters for the school, on the 23d of November. The hall, named for BG Dale Durkee Hinman, an early advocate and leader of AAA during World War II, was built at a cost of approximately $2,500,000.
The Antiaircraft and Guided Missile School, Fort Bliss, Texas
On 13 April 1955, by authority of General Orders No. 25, Department of the Army, command of the school was returned from Fort Sill to Fort Bliss. The order also redesignated the school as the Antiaircraft Artillery and Guided Missile School.
A major reorganization of the administrative staff of the school took place on 22 March 1956. GEN Rutledge, in announcing the change, said that the old structure was not keeping pace with the school.
In June 1956, a complete Nike system was installed within a single building by the Surface-to-Air Division, Guided Missile Department. The installation was built to give better and faster training to more students. The gigantic new training aid vastly increased the potential for instruction, as it was visible by up to 200 students at one time and could be presented by just one instructor.
The school's name was changed again in July 1957 to the US Army Air Defense School, (by General Orders No. 57, 4th US Army), and Fort Bliss officially became the US Army Air Defense Center and Fort Bliss. Classes at that time were being conducted 20 hours a day and were using equipment and facilities valued at more than $200 million. Fort Bliss had become, and still is today, the largest guided-missile training center in the free world.
Learning Event 5: WORLD WAR I AIRCRAFT AND ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPONS (1914-1918)
WORLD WAR I AIR DEFENSE
As discussed earlier in this lesson, the Coast Artillery Corps (CAC) served as the foundation of what has evolved into modern ADA. The first step in this evolution occurred at the outset of World War I when attack from the air became recognized as a serious threat to ground forces. Up to this time, the Army had considered the airplane to be a "military toy" and thought it unnecessary to expend its limited resources on the development of AAA.
When it became apparent that the United States would become involved in the fight "across the pond," the Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, sent a board of officers, under the direction of COL Chauncey B. Baker, to observe the Allies and prepare a report, making recommendations as to how American forces should be employed in France. His report included, among many things, a recommendation for the establishment of a training school for officers of AAA in the United States, and a school for both officers and NCOs in France. This recommendation was based on the board's observation that enemy air power posed a significant threat to Allied ground forces.
The First American Air Defenders
COL Baker's recommendation that AAA be part of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) was accepted, and plans were made to develop a comprehensive system of American antiaircraft defenses. Major problems that had to be overcome in this development included where to get the men for the AAA, what kinds of weapons they would use, where they would come from, and finally, who was going to train them in the gunnery techniques heretofore unknown in the American Army.
The first problem, that of manpower, was solved when the CAC was given the AAA mission. The CAC was chosen for two fundamental reasons. First, inasmuch as the British Navy had effectively blockaded the German fleet, there was no threat to the American coast. This meant that the trained manpower of the CAC was available. Secondly, the CAC was the only branch that had any experience at all in firing at moving targets.
The 3-inch antiaircraft gun M1917, which the AEF expected to have available to its AAA units, was still only a prototype and would not be available for many months. This meant that just as the Allies supplied the AEF with its field artillery and heavy artillery, so also did the Army in France have to turn to the French for its antiaircraft guns.
Since the AEF was going to use French weapons, it followed that they would adopt French antiaircraft gunnery techniques. French fire direction technology at the time was not very reliable, but it was the best the Allies had to offer. And, as unreliable as it was, it was better than nothing.
Organization of the Antiaircraft Service
With the source of men, equipment, and training having been determined, the next step was to go to France and begin organization. Enter GEN James A Shipton.
GEN Shipton is considered to be the founder of American AAA. It was he and his party, which consisted of two captains, Glenn P. Anderson and George Humbert, who founded the American AAA school in France. The school, although small in the beginning, eventually grew into a large operation which was capable of handling all types of training. It is interesting to note that the tactics and techniques developed by the officers of the American AAA service in 1918 have stood the test of time; AD tactics today are very much the same as they were in World War I.
The Air Threat
The most damaging and longest-ranging bombing attacks mounted by Germany during the war were accomplished by using Zeppelin dirigibles and the twin-engined Gotha bombers.
The Zeppelins, although severely hampered by adverse weather, their large size, and vulnerability to AA fire and fighter attacks, made a total of 51 raids against England. They dropped a total of 5,806 bombs, causing an estimated $7,500,000 damage and producing 1,915 casualties. A few Zeppelin raids were made on Paris, but little damage was done. The destruction of the LZ-70, Germany's most advanced Zeppelin (top speed 82 mph), on 5 August 1918 by the British, virtually ended the use of airships during World War I.
The twin-engined Gotha (Figure 6) was the primary German bomber during the war and was used for both day and night raids on London and Paris. The Germans, however, did little tactical bombing during World War I. This was due in part to the fact that bombing techniques of the time were crude and inaccurate, usually placing the attacking pilot and aircraft in as much jeopardy as his intended target.
The Germans also made limited use of light fighter aircraft such as the Fokker Dr.1 (Figure 7) and DVII. These planes conducted various missions, including reconnaissance and observation, airborne AD against Allied bombers, and, later in the war, strafing of ground forces. In the beginning, German aviators would not engage in the "barbaric" act of firing on men from the air. They considered it unsportsmanlike and not becoming of a gentleman.
AA Weapons
Although the United States was in the process of developing a 3-inch AA gun in 1917, the beginning of US involvement in World War I found us with virtually no weapons that had been designed specifically to combat aircraft.
As a result, US AAA units were forced to adopt French weapons and firing techniques. These weapons were basically ground defense guns that had been modified to perform in an AA role.
Weapons used included the French 75-mm AA gun (Figure 8), the 75-mm auto-cannon, and the Hotchkiss machine gun (Figure 9) which was adapted to a variety of antiaircraft mounts.
Target Detection and Fire Direction
Although the soldiers of the CAC had some experience firing at moving targets, the speed and maneuverability of the air threat rendered visual sighting and fire adjustment ineffective.
The need for some sort of data computer to assist gunners in engaging aircraft caused the US to adopt the French Brocq and R.A. correctors (Figure 10). These devices computed aircraft speed, altitude, and direction to provide the gunner with appropriate lead and angle of fire information.
Aircraft operations at night presented another problem in that the planes could not be engaged until they could be seen. Searchlights, like the Cadillac 60-inch (Figure 11), were employed to illuminate the attacking aircraft.
The pickup of a target by searchlights required knowledge of the plane's general location. The noise of the aircraft's engine and propeller provided a clue, and sound locators of the type shown in Figure 12 were used to help pinpoint its location. The sound locators greatly increased the sensing ability of the operator who then directed the searchlights.
Combat Achievements
Because of the nature of AAA, air defenders had little opportunity to really distinguish themselves. There were, however, some occasions that allowed the men of the AEF to demonstrate their ability and unconquerable spirit during the war.
Battery B, 1st AA Bn, is responsible for one of these occasions. This unit set the best engagement record of any, US or Allied, during World War I when they shot down nine German planes in a 118-day period, using the mobile French 75-mm AA gun.
The 1st and 2nd AA Battalions distinguished themselves as a whole by shooting down a total of 41 aircraft in three months, compared with an average of 3 per month in the entire British sector.
During 118 days, the 75-mm gun batteries of the AEF shot down 17 planes, an average of 1 plane for each 605 rounds fired. This was considered a "phenomenal" record by headquarters, and was far superior to any other Ally's.
Learning Event 6: ANTIAIRCRAFT WEAPON DEVELOPMENT (1919-1939)
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT AFTER WORLD WAR I
After World War I, waves of pacifism, disarmament, and isolationism swept the United States. Public opinion caused rapid demobilization and reduction in armed services strength, and most wartime developmental projects were dropped. This post-hostilities aversion to war, plus the concept of depending upon mobilization of the citizen-soldier, plagued the AAA along with the entire Army establishment. By 1919, all United States AAA units were demobilized and, although the need for such units was recognized, AAA ceased to exist until 1920.
In the years 1920 and 1921, the United States' AAA force was reestablished. It consisted of six regiments, mostly at battalion strength, which were assigned to cover critical harbor defenses and other priority installations such as the Panama Canal.
New Gun Development
At the end of World War I, the bulk of the US antiaircraft materiel and equipment was French or wartime-produced. The only American AA guns in the production were the M1917 3- inch AA gun (fixed mount) and the M1918 3-inch AA gun (mobile) (Figure 13). The M1918 was the mainstay of antiaircraft gun defense until 1927.
Beginning in 1926, and continuing through 1929, a series of AAA tests were conducted at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. All antiaircraft materiel and equipment in use at that time were tested. As a result of these tests, the art of antiaircraft gunnery advanced tremendously.
One of the guns evaluated during these tests was the M3 3- inch AA Gun. This gun had an automatic breechblock, 360 degree of traverse, and could be fired from -1 degree to +80 degree elevation. The M3 gun (Figure 14) became the standard mobile AA gun, replacing the M1918.
Other new guns tested at Aberdeen included the 37-mm, 40-mm, and 90-mm (M1) AA guns. Also, in 1927, a 105-mm gun on a fixed mount was tested. This gun (Figure 15) featured power loading, 15 to 20 rounds per minute rate of fire, and a muzzle velocity of 2,800 feet per second (f/s). It was adopted by the Army in 1928 and eventually 15 of the guns were installed in the Panama Canal Zone.
Searchlight Developments
During the Aberdeen tests, searchlights were given continual attention and development. This consisted of improvements to the arc feed and thermostatic control, increased intensity of the light source, and a 60-inch metal searchlight mirror (Figure 16).
Sound Locator Developments
Sound locators and acoustic correctors, such as the M1A1 shown in Figure 17, received much attention and passed through many stages. By 1940, however, they had mostly outlived their usefulness in that aircraft speeds had so far outpaced sound lag correction methods that they were becoming ineffective. This method of target location would soon be replaced by a new development--radar control.
Fire Direction Improvements
The M1917 R.A. corrector, left over at the end of World War I, left much room for improvement. To this end, MAJ William P. Wilson proceeded to develop a prototype director, called the Wilson TI director (Figure 18), which was designed to eliminate many of the inaccuracies of the R.A. corrector.
MAJ Wilson died suddenly in 1927, and the Sperry Company took over his project. This resulted in the adoption of the first American-manufactured director, the M2, in 1930. The computations within the M2 (Figure 19) were simple, but it was a large, heavy (2,500 pounds), and complex instrument.
In 1935, a new director, the M3, was adopted. It was essentially the same as the M2 except for simplification and a large reduction in weight. The M3 weighed in at 650 pounds. The M3 was also capable of tracking a target which was travelling up to 250 mph. This was a distinct improvement over the M2's 185-mph maximum target speed.
The Sperry Company continued improving the M3 director and soon came up with a new model designated the M4 (Figure 20). Directors, up until the advent of the M4, could only predict the location of an aircraft that was traveling in straight and level flight. The M4 could also predict the location of a target which was climbing or diving at a uniform rate. Its maximum target speed was also advanced to about 400 mph.
Radar Developments
In 1922, while Dr. A. Hoyt Talor and Leo Young of the Naval Research Laboratory were conducting a radio communication test, a boat passed between the transmitter and receiver. When this happened, it was noticed that the receiver signal was distinctly changed. This discovery was the beginning of further tests which eventually led to the development of the first US radars.
In May 1937, the Signal Corps demonstrated the SCR-268 prototype. This early radar was a mobile, short-range radio locator designed for controlling searchlights. Its objective was the rapid location of aircraft at night, giving range, elevation, and azimuth accurately enough for the coast artillery AA searchlights to pinpoint and illuminate the aircraft.
The SCR-268 (Figure 21) went into full production at the start of World War II and was used not only for searchlight control, but was also adapted to the role of a gun-laying radar.
After observing demonstrations of the SCR-268 in May 1937, the Air Corps developed a modified version of this radar to be used for early warning. The new radar was fielded in two versions--the SCR-270 (mobile), shown in Figure 22, and the SCR-271 (fixed).
As a result of these early radar developments, the US was able to enter World War II with workable radars in the early warning, searchlight, and heavy antiaircraft fire control fields.
Learning Event 7: ANTIAIRCRAFT IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER (1939-1945)
THE EUROPEAN THREAT
As with the other major air powers of World War I, Germany had given considerable emphasis to aircraft development in the years following the 11 November 1918 Armistice. Particular attention was given to the development of dive bombers.
German Dive Bombers
The principal German dive bomber was the Ju-87, known as the Stuka (Figure 23). It had a speed of 242 mph and a range of 498 miles. Normal armament was two wing-mounted 7.9-mm machine guns, with a flexible 7.9-mm machine gun mounted in the rear cockpit. One 1,100-pound bomb could be carried under the fuselage, or one 550-pound bomb under the fuselage with four 110-pound bombs carried under the wings.
German Medium Bombers
The principal medium bombers were the Heinkel He-111 series and the Dornier Do-17 series.
The Heinkel 111 (Figure 24) was the first modern medium bomber acquired by the German Luftwaffe. It had a maximum speed of 267 mph and a service ceiling of 22,950 feet. Armament consisted of three 7.9-mm machine guns, and the plane carried 2,200 pounds of bombs.
The Do-17 had a speed of 220 mph, a service ceiling of 18,050 feet and a range of 990 miles with a 1,760-pound bomb load. Normal armament consisted of two 7.9-mm machine guns.
German Fighters
The principal German fighters, until the advent of the Me-262 jet, were the Me-109, Me-110, and the FW-190.
Until the introduction of the much superior FW-190 in July 1941, the Messerschmitt Me-109 was the mainstay of the German fighter force. It was capable of speeds up to 428 mph and had a range of 350 miles. Armament consisted of three cannons, two 15-mm, and one 30-mm.
The Messerschmitt Me-110 was developed as a long-range escort fighter but was far inferior to the British Hurricane and Spitfire. The most successful model was the G-series night fighter, but it was no match for the Thunderbolts escorting American day bombers.
The Focke-Wulf FW-190 (Figure 25) was the finest of the German fighters. It was produced in many variants, and was used as a high-altitude fighter, fighter-bomber, and dive bomber. The FW-190 was capable of speeds up to 440 mph with a range of 500 miles. Armament varied with model and purpose. The heaviest had two 13-mm and four 20-mm cannons, or twelve R4M aerial rockets.
The Me-262 (Figure 26) was the first turbojet warplane to achieve operational status and could have changed the course of the war but for the indecision of German leaders. Because of their indecision, the Me-262 did not go into operation until the fall of 1944, too late to tip the air battle scales in favor of the Germans. In its very first actions, the Me-262 showed itself far superior to Allied fighters. Normal armament consisted of four 30-mm cannons or 24 R4M rockets.
The V-1 and V-2 Missiles
The V-1 and V-2 were long-range bombardment weapons used primarily against the United Kingdom.
The German V-1 was a relatively small, automatically controlled, jet-propelled monoplane carrying nearly a ton of high explosives. Its range was 250 miles, its speed 300 to 400 mph, and its altitude preset for 600 to 10,000 feet. Control in flight was by magnetic compass and gyros. Its maneuverability was a preset straight course with one turn of up to 45o possible.
The V-2 rocket (Figure 27) was a cigar-shaped, streamlined, guided missile 46 feet, 10 inches long, with a maximum diameter of 5 feet, 5 inches. Its takeoff weight was 14 tons of which 1 ton was explosives and 9 tons were fuel. This fuel was consumed in the first 60 seconds of flight.
The first V-2 rocket fell on London on 9 September 1944 and the last on 28 March 1945. In all, 1,115 rockets fell in the United Kingdom, launched from 190 to 220 miles away in Holland.
World War II Aircraft Weapons
When the United States entered World War II, it had in its inventory 807 3-inch AA guns, 13 105-mm AA guns, and 8 37-mm AA guns.
Shortly after the war began, it became obvious to air defenders that the 3-inch AA gun was no longer effective against Germany's new higher-performance aircraft. A replacement, the M1 90-mm AA gun (Figure 28), was selected, and, by 1942, was being supplied to the field. The M1 had a much greater lethality than the 3-inch AA gun, and had an effective altitude of about 30,000 feet.
In 1943, another new gun was standardized; however, it did not see active operations in World War II. This was the M1 120-mm AA gun on the M1 antiaircraft mount (Figure 29). The gun was massive, weighing in at 30 tons, and, although classed as mobile, it could be moved only when there were good roads, strong bridges, and lots of time.
In 1944, a new gun, the M2 90-mm AA gun on the M2 mount, appeared. The M2 (Figure 30) was ballistically the same as the M1 gun, but it had an automatic loader and automatic fuze setter which permitted an increase in rate of fire to 25 to 35 rounds per minute. This was the last AA gun developed by the United States.
The light antiaircraft 37-mm gun had been standardized in 1927 but underwent continual improvements until 1940 when it was placed on a power-operated, turret-type mount. Coaxially with the 37-mm gun were mounted two .50 caliber, air-cooled, machine guns. The turret was mounted on the M15A1 multiple gun motor carriage (Figure 31).
In 1941, the Bofors 40-mm AA automatic weapon was adopted as the American M2 40-mm AA gun. The Bofors 40-mm had been developed by a Swedish firm and had been tested during the Spanish Civil War. It was undeniably superior to the 37-mm gun.
The .50 caliber machine gun was used in a variety of AA configurations. The one shown in Figure 32 is the M16 multiple gun motor carriage, mounting the M45 power turret with four caliber .50 AA machine guns.
Fire Direction
In 1941, the M4 AA director was superseded by the M7 director (Figure 33), which was basically an improved version of the M4. The major improvement was an increase in the target vertical rate capability from about 100 mph to 400 mph. The M7 was the last of the United State's mechanical directors.
The first electrical computer, since the Brocq corrector, began production in 1942. The M9 director (Figure 34) was designed for the new 90-mm gun and was to be used primarily with the SCR-545 and SCR-584 radars. It was a ballistic director capable of handling target speeds up to 600 mph. This director was also adapted for use with the 120-mm AA gun.
Another director designed specifically for use with automatic weapons was the M5A2 (Figure 35). The M5A2 could be used with either the 37-mm or 40-mm AA automatic weapons.
Radars
Radar technology advanced rapidly from the onset of World War II, but production could not begin to meet the demand from the field for the new equipment.
In the field of fire control radars, there were several developments, one of which was SCR-547 (Figure 36). This was a microwave height finder radar with which the target was tracked optically, and radar range was converted to altitude for use by a director.
Another radar, the SCR-545 (Figure 37), was really two radars in one. It had a long wavelength radar, used for search and local warning, and a microwave radar used to track a target automatically.
The gun-laying radar project, started in 1938, culminated in the SCR-584 (Figure 38) which had a microwave radar used for both search and tracking. Automatic tracking in azimuth and elevation was a feature of this set. This was the best and most advanced fire control radar to be produced during the war by any of the powers.
Combat Achievement of AAA in Europe
AAA units in World War II were very often called upon to use their weapons in a ground support role. There were many reasons for this, but probably the most significant were the ease with which 90-mm gun units and automatic weapons units could be converted to the ground role and their tremendous effectiveness in that role.
The following paragraphs describe some examples of AAA units in action:
Remagen Bridgehead. On 7 March 1945, the 9th Armored Division of the 1st US Army captured intact the Ludendorff Railway Bridge over the Rhine River. Elements of the 482d AAA AW Bn, among the first combat troops there, sent platoons across the river immediately to help secure it from German air attack. At that time, Remagen was the only Rhine crossing in Allied hands. The Germans reacted violently in attempts to destroy it. A defense was set up by the 16th AAA Group, assisted by the 11th AAA Group. This defense remained active until the crossing was secure and other bridges were erected by the engineers. Between 7 and 21 March 1945, the bridge was attacked by 442 German aircraft; of those, 142 were destroyed by AAA defenses, with an additional 59 probables.
The defense was successful although the bridge eventually collapsed, having been weakened by sapping mines exploded by the Germans when they retreated.
Antwerp. In October 1944, the Allies captured the Belgian Port of Antwerp. The Germans recognized that this would shorten supply lines and enhance operations for both the 12th (US) and 21st (UK) Army Groups. German attacks on Antwerp began 24 October, using V-1 missiles. Attacks were continuous through 30 March 1945, with some 4,883 V-1s launched against the port. Only 211 of them actually fell within the port area.
In a letter to General C. H. Armstrong, then US Commander of AAA Defenses, General Bernard Montgomery wrote, regarding the effect of AAA in defense of Antwerp, that "Success of the defense kept in full operation the main supply base for 12th and 21st Army Groups, has profoundly influenced the present battle and made the success of present operations administratively possible.
Battle of the Bulge. There was no air power employed at the start of the Battle of the Bulge due to bad weather. Because of this, 90-mm battalions were used in field artillery (FA) and antitank (AT) roles. Battery C of the 143d AAA Gun Battalion, for example, under the command of 1LT Leon E. Kent, was employed with the 30th Infantry Division at Staumont, Belgium. On 18 December 1944, the battery was ordered into an AT role and proceeded to establish a road block on the la Gleize- Staumont Road. 1LT Kent's men had never been under fire before. At 0700 on 19 December, German tanks emerged from the fog down the road. At 0735, the crew of No. 2 gun opened fire on a Tiger tank at 30 yards and destroyed it. The gun was subsequently knocked out by the remaining tanks, but the crew, undaunted, went out into the fog with bazookas and destroyed two more tanks. Later on, Battery B of the 143d destroyed three Tiger tanks and a German-operated Sherman tank at a range of 2,000 yards. In all, the 143d AAA Gun Battalion destroyed 13 enemy tanks in the Battle of the Bulge.
There are many more examples of AAA units exhibiting exceptional valor and courage in both air and ground defense roles. The point to remember here is that AAA in the European theater played a key role in the overall success of Allied forces there. This fact will also be evidenced in the following pages as the role of AAA in the Pacific theater is presented.
Learning Event 8: ANTIAIRCRAFT IN THE PACIFIC THEATER (1941-1945)
THE PACIFIC THREAT
Japanese Fighters
The Japanese planes in operation in 1941 were built for maximum maneuverability. They had almost no armor protection and were structurally weak. As a result, they were very vulnerable to Allied fighters and antiaircraft. Their structures, in fact, were so weak that, if early Japanese fighters attempted to match the dive of their opponents, they would more often than not lose their wings or go out of control. As the war progressed, Japanese fighters improved, but production could not keep up with needs. The principal Japanese fighters that saw service in World War II are described briefly in the following paragraphs.
The Mitsubishi Zero-Sen Zeke (Figure 39) was the backbone of the Japanese fighter force, and more of these fighters were produced than any other Japanese warplane. The Zero had complete mastery of the air over the Pacific until the battle of Midway in June 1942. From then on, its value as a fighter steadily declined until finally, in the last year of the war, it was used mostly as a Kamikaze plane. The Zero had a maximum speed of 334 mph and a range of 1,130 miles. Armament consisted of two 7.7-mm machine guns and two 20-mm cannons. The Zero also carried two 66-pound bombs.
The Kawasaki Hien Ki.61 Tony was the standard Japanese army fighter during 1943-1944, and it was one of the finest all- round army fighters. The diving ability of the Tony was far superior to other Japanese fighters, and it could hold its own in a dive against the heavier American fighters. Later in the war it was used in suicide missions against B-29s. The Tony had a maximum speed of 348 mph and a range of 1,118 miles. Armament consisted of two 12.7-mm machine guns and two 20-mm cannons.
Further development of the Ki.61 produced the Ki.100, a much superior aircraft. The Ki.100 was a match for the best of the Allied fighters, including the P-51 Mustang. In fact, the outcome of P-51 versus Ki.100 engagements was usually determined by pilot skill and numerical advantage rather than any discrepancy between the capabilities of the two fighters. The Ki.100, however, was used mainly for home defense duties.
Another Japanese fighter that was outstanding in fighter-versus-fighter combat was the Kawanishi Sniden 21 George. Even in the hands of an average pilot, the George was equal to any Allied fighter. The Sniden 21 had a maximum speed of 370 mph and a range of 1,069 miles. Armament consisted of two 7.7-mm machine guns, four 20-mm cannons, and 1,250 pounds of bombs.
Kamikaze Attacks
In October 1944, the Japanese Air Force, no longer able to match the American planes and fliers, started using suicide (kamikaze) attacks. Japanese pilots on a kamikaze mission would deliberately crash their explosive-packed planes into enemy targets, most frequently ships. Kamikaze attacks accounted for 50 percent of the damage to American vessels during the entire war.
The Mitsubishi Zero was the primary kamikaze plane, but almost every type of aircraft was used. Obsolete planes and any aircraft that could be fixed long enough to make a one- way flight were adapted for suicide missions. Also, new aircraft were produced specifically as kamikaze instruments. One of these specially produced aircraft was the Baka bomb.
The Baka bomb was the only example of the application of jet propulsion to aircraft in World War II by the Japanese. This famous infallible weapon was modeled after the German jet-propelled glider bomb, which was taken to Japan in 1944 by U-boats. The Baka bombs (Figure 40) had a one-man crew who took it right up to the target and sacrificed himself for the Mikado. The Baka bombs were taken by carrier aircraft to a point near the target and released.
They were six meters long and had a wing span of five meters. The thrust of the jet propulsion was so great that the bombs reached speeds of 1,000 km/hrs during powered flight.
Japanese Bombers
Japanese bombers throughout World War II were obsolete in comparison with Allied bombers, but they proved highly effective against the relatively weak opposition encountered during the early period of the war. The principal Japanese bombers used during World War II are described below.
The Mitsubishi K1-21 Sally heavy bomber (Figure 41) had a maximum speed of 247 mph and a range of 1,680 miles with maximum bomb load of 2,205 pounds. Armament consisted of five or six 7.7-mm machine guns.
The Mitsubishi G4M Betty heavy bomber (Figure 42) had a maximum speed of 292 mph and a range of 2,670 miles. Armament consisted of six 7.7-mm machine guns and one 20-mm cannon. It could carry 2,000 pounds of bombs or one large torpedo.
The Nakajima K1.49 Helen heavy bomber (Figure 43) had a maximum speed of 305 mph and a range of 1,490 miles. Armament consisted of five 7.7-mm machine guns and one 20-mm cannon. It could carry 1,654 pounds of bombs.
Antiaircraft Weapons in the Pacific
At the start of the war, US antiaircraft units in the Pacific had only interim period equipment such as the 3-inch AA gun M2 or M4, caliber .50 machine guns, and searchlights equipped with sound locators. The first units going out after Pearl Harbor were provided with mechanical time fuzes for the 3-inch gun, a few SCR-268s, and the 37-mm gun. A number of these 37-mm guns were also retained and used after the arrival of the 40-mm Bofors gun. Equipment using dual and quadrupel caliber .50 machine guns on a turret mount followed. In 1944, the new gun-laying radar, the SCR-584, and the M9 director reached the combat area. With this equipment, the antiaircraft part of the AD in the Pacific was complete. Once air supremacy was established by our forces, US AD problems diminished radically, with the exception of kamikaze attacks in the later stage of the war.
Combat Achievements of AAA in the Pacific
As was true with AAA units in Europe, air defenders in the Pacific often found themselves involved in ground defense actions. A good example of this can be found in the following report from LTC Dorsey E. McCrory.
"One of the first known cases on record of automatic weapons providing ground support was provided by Battery C, 209th AAA(AW) Battallion on Roosevelt Ridge, New Guinea, on 13 August 1943. On 20 July, American infantry encountered heavy resistance on Roosevelt Ridge. The best they could do was take the extreme west end of the ridge, suffering heavy casualties in the process. The Japs were completely dug in and field artillery was not effective. On 13 August, Battery C occupied positions for surface firing and at 1020 hours opened fire with seven 40-mm guns and 16 caliber .50 machine guns at a 1,400-yard range. When the fire was lifted after 35 minutes, the infantry was able to advance along half the ridge before receiving enemy fire. The infantry halted and Battery C fired for 20 more minutes. When the fire was again lifted, the infantry took the rest of the ridge without opposition and without a single casualty. The automatic weapons fire set the Japs on the ridge in panic and they withdrew, leaving between 150 and 200 dead. "
One of the most well-known defenses in the Pacific theater occurred at the Battle of Bataan. The Bataan peninsula, located on West Luzon, in the Philippines, was defended by 78,000 soldiers (66,000 of whom were Filipinos under the command of MG Edward P. King, Jr. MG King's command, known as the Luzon force, included elements of the 60th CA(AA) which had been assigned to defend the airfields on Bataan. The Luzon force had withdrawn to Bataan by the first of the year 1942 and had held out against tremendous pressure from the Japanese for the next four months. By March 1942, rations on the peninsula had become so scarce that the daily issue to each soldier was less than 15 ounces. Poor sanitation, malnutrition, mosquito and black fly infestation, and inadequate clothing and shelter all combined to make the Bataan defenders ready victims for disease. In fact, by the end of March, at least 75 percent of the troops at the front had malaria to some degree. On 9 April 1942, MG King, having determined that his men no longer had the strength or means to fight, surrendered to the Japanese.
For their part in the heroic defense of Bataan (and Corregidor Island), the members of the 60th Coast Artillery (AA) earned more than a dozen Distinguished Service Crosses, a host of Silver Star Medals and lesser decorations, the Presidential Unit Citation, and the admiration of a nation. In the process, and despite impossible conditions, they shot down more than 50 Japanese aircraft. Unfortunately, the heroics of these men and the other members of the Luzon force were incident to a lost campaign.
The following poem, penned by an anonymous Bataan defender, perhaps best describes their plight:
We're the battling bastards of Bataan, No mama, no papa, no Uncle Sam, No aunts, no uncles, no nephews, no nieces, No pills, no planes, no artillery pieces ...and nobody gives a damn.
Learning Event 9: ANTIAIRCRAFT IN KOREA (1950-1953)
KOREAN AIR DEFENSE
The years between World War II and the beginning of US involvement in the Korean conflict saw little change in American antiaircraft weapons and support equipment. This was due mainly to the same postwar public sentiment that plagued the military services after World War I.
The First Engagement
When the Korean conflict (it was never declared a war) broke out, General Douglas MacArthur, then in Japan, flew to Korea to inspect, landing at Suwon airfield. Before his arrival, a detachment of the 507th AAA AW Battalion, then in Japan, deployed to Suwon to set up an airfield defense. The detachment was composed of 3 officers, 32 men, and four Quad- .50 machine gun mounts. They arrived by air and set up on 29 June 1950. That afternoon, they engaged and destroyed two North Korean air force fighters. After that engagement, there was very little air threat for AAA units to cope with, because the US Air Force dealt very effectively with the Communist air forces. Therefore, the AAA units functioned in a ground role. The 90-mm gun battalions functioned largely as FA, supplementing, but not replacing the fire of the 155-mm howitzer battalions. In one case, a 90-mm battalion served as division artillery. The 90-mm long-range fire was extremely effective and accurate.
Automatic Weapons Battalions
Automatic weapons battalions also served, very conspicuously, in the ground role. The best example out of many is that of the 15th AAA AW Battalion of the 7th Infantry Division. The 15th formed the rear guard of the 7th Division in the retreat from the Yalu River in 1950. Quoting from a Distinguished Service Cross citation for an air defender in that unit perhaps best illustrates the kind of war they fought.
"Sergeant Harold P. Haugland, a member of Battery D, 15th AAA AW Battalion (SP), 7th Infantry Division, distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy near Chosin Reservoir, Korea, on 29 and 30 November 1950. On these dates the battery to which Sergeant Haugland was assigned was providing ground defense for FA elements, and his M-19 (twin 40-mm guns) was covering one sector of the perimeter defense. The enemy made numerous heavy attacks against his weapon on 29 November, and, by exposing himself voluntarily to intense fire, he was able to direct his guns to the most vulnerable points with speed and efficiency. As a result of his selfless exposure to enemy fire, he was seriously wounded in one foot and was carried to the aid station. Early on the morning of 30 November, the enemy renewed the attack against the perimeter. Sergeant Haugland, with complete disregard for his own welfare and safety, wrapped his wounded foot in cloths and, using an empty ration box for a shoe, made his way under fire from the aid station to his M-19, where he resumed command and continued to expose himself to enemy fire while commanding the weapon. During this action, an enemy mortar set fire to the ammunition trailer. In order to direct the driver of the M-19 to an alternate position, Sergeant Haugland, with great valor, in the midst of exploding 40-mm high explosive shells, coolly walked in front of the vehicle and guided the driver of the gun carriage. As a direct result of his outstanding devotion to duty, his fearless leadership, and his exemplary heroism, Sergeant Haugland's M-19 prevented penetration of their perimeter and killed scores of the enemy. His display of extraordinary heroism on this occasion reflects great credit on himself and the military service."
Learning Event 10: THE BEGINNING OF THE MISSILE AGE
EVOLUTION OF THE MISSILE AGE
The advent of new, high-performance jet aircraft made the development of antiaircraft guided missiles inevitable. Research into this area began as far back as June 1945, when the 1st Guided Missile Battalion was organized to conduct experimental launchings of German V-2 rockets that had been captured at the conclusion of World War II.
Nike Ajax
In 1953, the age of the Army guided missile arrived in the form of the Nike Ajax weapon system. The Nike Ajax was the forerunner of today's family of US Army guided missiles. It represented a major breakthrough in technology in that it solved the "air defense problem;" that is, detect, identify (as friend or foe), engage, and destroy. The system included advanced radar technology that was capable of directing the missile to targets as high as 60,000 feet. This was three times as high as our best AA gun could reach.
Homing All-Weather Killer (Hawk)
Development of the Hawk weapon system began in 1957. Its purpose was to fill the gap in low-to-medium AD left by Ajax. The Hawk system was deployed and became operational in the late 1950s and early 1960s.
Nike Hercules
The Nike Hercules missile system was first deployed in June 1958. It was faster and had a greater range than the Ajax missile, and it was also capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The Hercules remained the Army's primary long-range AD missile system until the deployment of Patriot in 1984.
Antiballistic Missiles
The threat presented to the United States in the late 1960s from Soviet and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) prompted the development of the SAFEGUARD antiballistic missile system. The SAFEGUARD system employed two missiles, Spartan and Sprint, to accomplish its mission.
The Spartan missile was a super-fast, long-range interceptor which provided large payload intercept capability for extremely high-altitude attack of ICBM targets.
The Sprint missile was an ultrafast, highly maneuverable interceptor which provided terminal defense of point targets against ICBMs. The Sprint accelerated so fast that air friction heated the skin of the missile to a temperature greater than that of the missile motor interior.
The SAFEGUARD system was abandoned shortly after initial deployment, but the missile and radar technology developed with it has been incorporated into the Patriot missile system.
Learning Event 11: AIR DEFENDERS IN VIETNAM
AIR DEFENSE IN VIETNAM
The story of AD in Vietnam centers not on any great tactical and technical advances made because of wartime experience; it centers, rather, on the exploits and accomplishments of the air defenders themselves, whose primary mission in this unconventional war was changed from one of defense against aircraft to one almost exclusively of ground defense.
Prior to the escalation of the American war effort in Vietnam, antiaircraft guns had been determined to be obsolete, and the Army had turned all of its guns over to the National Guard.
When the war started in Southeast Asia, it became evident to Army leaders that the missile systems then in the arsenal of the United States would not be able to provide adequate support for ground forces against the expected air threat. Because of this, automatic weapons (AW) battalions were reorganized and equipped with M-42 Dusters and Quad-.50s that had to be scrounged back from the National Guard. The AW battalions, after a crash training course at Fort Bliss, Texas, began arriving in Vietnam in 1966.
The men who crewed the Dusters and Quad-.50s that went to Vietnam hoped to become the first AAA men credited with bringing down an enemy aircraft since the Korean War. However, when they arrived, they soon discovered that the enemy air threat had failed to materialize. Their new mission therefore--that of ground support--was one for which they were not trained but, as in all wars, the battlefield provided excellent on-the-job training.
Duster
Three Duster battalions served in Vietnam. Each one of these battalions had a headquarters, four Duster batteries, an attached machine gun (M-55) battery, and an attached searchlight battery.
The 1st Battalion, 44th Artillery, was the first AW battalion to reach Vietnam, arriving there in November 1966. A self-propelled Duster battalion, the 1/44 Artillery, was to become one of the most decorated artillery units in history. It supported the Marines at places like Con Thien and Khe Sahn, as well as supporting Army divisions is South Vietnam's rugged I Corps region. The 1/44 Artillery left Vietnam in 1971.
The 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, arrived in Vietnam in March 1967, and left in December 1971, while the 5th Battalion, 2d Artillery, arrived in November 1966, and left in June 1971.
Dusters were assigned a variety of ground-support roles to include indirect fire, but, most commonly, they served in perimeter defense and as convoy escorts.
Convoy duty was dangerous and nerve-racking. Normally, the lead Duster covered the left side of the road, while the rear track covered the right side. When caught in an ambush, the Dusters pulled off the road, traversed their guns, and provided covering fire for the convoy's other vehicles as they hurried to escape the kill zone. The tactic was effective, but it meant that Duster crews spent "eternities" in the kill zone.
Dusters on perimeter defense were often the number one objective of enemy attack. Knowing this, units made it standing operating procedure (SOP) to move the gun after dark to conceal its position. A Duster spitting fire on the perimeter during the first few minutes of an attack was often intimidating enough to discourage further attack. This made the weapon a tremendous asset to the firebase defense plan.
Duster crewmen, like FA cannoneers, were vulnerable to mortar fire because they manned their guns during mortar attacks and returned fire while riflemen sought the shelter of bunkers and foxholes.
SFC Jerry Kiker and his Duster crew were involved in one of these mortar attacks at LZ Oasis near Pleiku when their track took a direct hit that killed the gunner and disabled the gun. Kiker and his driver were blown-off the track but got back on and continued to return fire with M-16s and the track's M-60 machine gun. This, in spite of the fact that both men had been wounded when the mortar exploded.
The track's mascot, Tiger, a Vietnamese dog with a keen eye for defilade, was the only crew member to emerge from the combat at Firebase Oasis without a scratch. He hid under the track. Tiger was still with the track when the wounded crew members returned from the hospital. His faithfulness was rewarded when one of the Duster's crew took him home to Ohio.
Quad-.50s
Four Quad-.50s batteries served in Vietnam. They were Battery E, 41st Artillery, which arrived in March 1967 and left in December 1971; Battery G, 55th Artillery, which arrived in February 1967 and left in December 1971; Battery G, 65th Artillery, which arrived in October 1966 and left in December 1971; and finally, Battery D of the 71st Artillery which served two tours in Vietnam from November 1966 to June 1971, and from September 1971 to March 1972.
Quad-.50-caliber machine gun batteries were attached to the Duster battalions, but they went wherever the tactical situation dictated. Some were mounted on trucks to provide convoy security, while others manned perimeter defenses.
Because of their relative light weight, Quad-.50s were also used to provide maximum firepower where the much heavier track-mounted Duster could not go. For example, Quad-.50s floated through the Mekong Delta on barges, and they were also airlifted onto remote firebases in danger of being overrun.
Like their fellow air defenders on Dusters, the crews of the Quad-.50s anxiously awaited the opportunity to engage an enemy aircraft. One rainy night the crew of a Quad-.50 on Firebase Helen thought their opportunity had finally arrived.
Firebase Helen was perched on a razorback ridge overlooking a mountain stream called the Rao Trang. The Quad-.50 crew lived in the mud at the end of the firebase, guarding a landing pad and searching the perimeter for signs of the beginnings of an expected enemy attack.
That night a helicopter swooped out of the darkness and strafed Firebase Helen. It caught the Quad-.50 crew by surprise and the gun was unmanned. As the crew scrambled to reach their gun, one of them went down with a .50-caliber slug in the leg. The helicopter ceased firing and moved off.
The attacking helicopter turned out to be friendly. It had mistaken kerosene lanterns being carried down the middle of Helen for lights aboard a VC sampan. The pilot, upon realizing his mistake, wanted to land and apologize but the crew of the Quad-.50 was in no mood for apologies. They had their gun elevated and were praying that the helicopter would try a second pass.
The firebase's artillery liaison officer telephoned the Quad-.50 position. "The helicopter is friendly. It's going to come in at the lower pad," he said. "Good," said the Quad-.50 crew chief, "we'll get him when he hovers."
The TOC had to radio the helicopter to stand-by, out of range, while the infantry company commander ran down and ordered the Quad-.50 crew off the gun.
Hawk
Two Hawk battalions served in Vietnam. They were the 6th Battalion, 56th Artillery, which arrived in September 1965, and was deactivated 5 June 1969; and the 6th Battalion, 71st Artillery, which arrived in September 1965 and left Vietnam in June 1971.
Because the air threat never materialized, Hawk was of little or no value in Vietnam. For that reason, Hawk commanders asked that higher headquarters move them north to take on NVA helicopters rumored to be operating in and just below the demilitarized zone (DMZ). Their requests, however, were denied.
The only live missiles fired in Vietnam were launched during Hawk annual service practices. And even those were fired from islands in the South China Sea.
Vulcan
Vulcan made its debut in Vietnam. To the infantry soldier, it was a beautiful machine. It was so glamorous as a Cobra gunship and just as welcome on the battlefield.
The 1st Vulcan Combat Team was deployed to Vietnam for combat evaluation in November 1968. They were scheduled to leave in March 1969, but stayed an additional 45 days to finish mopping up after the 1968 Tet offensive. The team consisted of five Vulcans, 2 officers, and 21 enlisted men.
It didn't take long for Vulcan to earn an enviable reputation. A typical Vulcan action took place close to Firebase Thunder III on Highway 13 near Quan Loi. A force of six armored cavalry assault vehicles (ACAVs) and one Vulcan was clearing the road for a convoy from Saigon when they were ambushed by about 200 NVa. Five of the six ACAVs were hit by rockets during the first 15 seconds. The two lead ACAVs were stopped in the road. The cavalry commander, CPT Harold Fritz, was hit and seriously wounded. His column, with the damaged ACAVs blocking the road, was pinned in the kill zone.
The Vulcan, which was third in line, pulled around the second ACAV, traversed its guns to the rear and fired a 30- round burst. The track commander then switched to 10-round bursts to conserve ammunition and radioed Thunder III for help. During these first critical minutes of the attack, the Vulcan was the only weapon delivering effective fire against the ambush.
Despite his wounds, Fritz, who had won the Medal of Honor that morning, was able to move to the Vulcan and direct its fire into the enemy assault. The Vulcan delayed the attack long enough for Fritz to regroup his unit, remove machine guns from the destroyed ACAVs, and establish a defensive position.
A ready reaction force, consisting of a tank platoon and a Vulcan, roared out of Thunder III. The relief force broke through the beleaguered column about 30 minutes after the fire-fight began. The battle lasted about four hours. When it was all over, the cavalrymen counted 41 enemy dead.
CPT Fritz later said, "The survival of my unit during the first critical minutes of the ambush can be attributed to the Vulcan's ability to engage the enemy quickly and place a high volume of fire on the target."
Conclusion
Air Defense Artillery units had been in the war zone two years when they learned they had become part of a new branch. ADA was separated from FA by DA General Orders No. 25 in 1968. The change probably meant nothing to the soldiers who fought with the ADA men. In fact, those few who knew about it probably forgot as soon as the next subject was introduced. But the air defenders themselves will not be forgotten--not by the FA cannoneer who watched a Quad-.50 stop a sapper attack in the wire, not by the cavalry platoon leader who rallied his platoon while a Vulcan stood off an enemy ambush, or not by the infantrymen who embraced the Duster leader who broke through an enemy assault to save their besieged platoon.
Vietnam did little to give ADA men experience in AD tactics, but it did provide the branch's junior officers and NCOs with valuable combat experience.
Air Defense Artillery AW battalions in Vietnam fired more than 4 million rounds of Duster ammunition and more than 10 million rounds of Quad-.50 ammunition while participating in every major American campaign during the war.
Each battalion won either a Presidential or a Meritorious Unit Citation. The soldiers who served in them won more than 450 medals for valor and earned more than 1,000 Purple Hearts.
Learning Event 12: AIR DEFENSE IN GRENADA (OPERATION URGENT FURY)
OPERATION URGENT FURY
On 25 October 1983, the US Army's 82d Airborne Division, along with elements of the Marine Corps and eight Caribbean nations, made up a multinational force which assaulted and vanquished Cuban and local forces on the island of Grenada. ADA was part of that force.
The deployment to Grenada was accomplished in two phases: an assault echelon and a follow-on echelon. The assault echelon was the first element to enter the objective area. It was a specifically tailored light force. In the follow- on echelon were those elements required to sustain combat operations.
The Assault Echelon
The assault force was composed of two infantry battalions, two FA batteries, an engineer platoon, and a military police platoon. The initial AD element for the assault force consisted of four Stinger teams and a headquarters element, all from the 3d Battalion, 4th ADA Brigade. Each ADA paratrooper carried one Stinger and a PRC-77 radio.
The primary AD mission was to defend the airhead at Point Salinas Airport and the FA batteries. These two assets were essentially collocated, and the four teams were able to provide excellent AD coverage.
The Follow-On Echelon
The follow-on echelon consisted of combat and combat support elements from the 3d Brigade, 82d Airborne Division, to include the Stinger assets which normally supported them.
By 30 October, 27 Stinger teams were deployed in defense of the entire airfield, the division support command, and the division headquarters. One Stinger team deployed to Pearls Airfield to provide AD coverage of 3d Brigade elements.
Lessons Learned
Although no aircraft were engaged by the Stinger teams in Grenada, the operation nonetheless was a valuable learning experience.
One of the lessons learned concerns Stinger portability. Since this operation required all Stinger assets to deploy without organic transportation, they were severely limited in firepower, communications, and mobility.
Mobility was especially difficult since the average infantry paratrooper carried about 75 pounds of equipment, while the average airborne air defender carried between 105 and 115 pounds. This weight made it almost impossible for the Stinger teams to move with maneuver units in the rugged hills of Grenada.
The paratroopers of the 3d Battalion, 4th ADA, played a significant role in the 82d Airborne Division's mission. Operation Urgent Fury also proved once again that AD elements are an integral part of the combined arms team.
Conclusion
The purpose of this lesson has been to bring to the reader an understanding of the development of ADA as a functioning branch of the US Army. It is by no means a complete history. Whole lessons could easily be written about the personalities, events, and items of equipment that were only mentioned here. It should have been noted, however, that the History of Air Defense Artillery shows a close and continuing bond between AD units and the field maneuver forces. As was shown, AAA has fought alongside the ground-gaining arms in all of America's wars in the twentieth century. This is likewise the role we see for ADA in support of the field forces in the air-land battle. Time marches on and so does the development of sophisticated new weaponry which will, in turn, take its historical place in the arsenal of democracy. (The following lessons will introduce you to some of our most current AD weapon systems.)
