• Military Menu                       

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Industry
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• WMD
• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

PM Netanyahu's Remarks from his Press Conference

Israel - Prime Minister's Office

Events and Speeches
The 37th Government
03.09.2024

Following are Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's remarks, at the GPO in Jerusalem :

"Citizens of Israel, we are in the midst of an existential war against Iran's axis of evil. The first condition for victory in this existential war is unity among us. We need to stand united as one against a brutal enemy who wants to destroy all of us, without exception - left and right, religious and secular, Jew and non-Jew.

We discovered this not only on October 7, but all throughout the war. But we especially discovered again it in the terrible massacre, the cold-blooded execution of six of our hostages: Carmel Gat, Eden Yerushalmi, Hersh Goldberg-Polin, Sasha Lobanov, Almog Sarusi and Master Sergeant Ori Danino, may G-d avenge them.

In the last 24 hours, I have spoken by telephone with several of their families. During the conversations, I looked at the photos of these pure souls and my heart, the heart of the nation, was shattered. You see the light shining from their faces. You see the hope. You see the nobility. You hear the stories of their wonderful lives. And all this light is suddenly extinguished. All the purity is brutally cut down by monsters.

I told the families and I reiterate this evening: I request your forgiveness that we did not succeed in bringing them back alive. We were close, but we did not succeed.

I also reiterate this evening: Israel will not overlook this massacre. Hamas will pay a very heavy price.

In the war against the axis of evil, in this specific war against Hamas and in the north, we have set four objectives: Eliminating Hamas, returning all of the hostages, ensuring that Gaza never again constitutes a threat to Israel, and returning our residents securely to their homes on the northern border. Three of these goals pass through one place: The Philadelphi Corridor. This is Hamas's lifeline and armament line.

I would like to take several minutes to explain the significance of the Philadelphi Corridor, what it is, what it means for Israel's security, its meaning and its importance in ensuring that we will not have more and more October 7's, like Hamas has promised.

First of all, I would like to show you what we had in the years up until we left there (slide 1; click here for Hebrew slides): This is the State of Israel. This is Egypt. You see the Gaza Strip. The distance to Tel Aviv is not great; neither is the distance to Be'er Sheva. Of course, the Western Negev is meters away. But we had an international border, which ran from the sea to Eilat. This was the international border of the State of Israel. When you see this enlarged (slide 2), you see that all of these borders, the maritime border is under our control. The entire land border is under our control. Ashkelon, Sderot, the kibbutzim, Kerem Shalom, and at the bottom is the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah crossing; all of them are under our control.

Here is what happened when we left Gaza (slide 3): What happened is that the borders remained in our possession. They tried to break through the maritime border with all kinds of craft, for example the Marmara. We blocked that. The land border is ours, nothing gets in. But the moment we left the Philadelphi Corridor, in effect the Philadelphi Corridor is the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, and the moment we left there, we did not have any barrier to the massive infiltration of weapons, war materiel, machinery to manufacture rockets, and machines for excavating tunnels - all under the aegis of Iran, directed by Iran and financed by Iran. All the things that you see here came in. Gaza became a massive threat to the State of Israel because there was no barrier here (on the Philadelphi Corridor). This is what happened.

Therefore, the question may be asked: If it was so bad, why didn't you occupy it? The answer is that we were constantly trying to attack, of course. After this happened, right after the Disengagement, this arming went on energetically under the Morsi regime, but it went on afterwards, from the Mubarak regime as well through other regimes. This arming went on constantly and we fought it in a series of wars. I led three of them, three operations: Pillar of Defense, Protective Edge and Guardian of the Walls. We fought this and we eliminated thousands of terrorists, and senior commanders, including Hamas chief-of-staff Jabari. But there was no national or international legitimacy to go in, to conquer Gaza, to recapture the Philadelphi Corridor and the Rafah Crossing. There was neither national nor international agreement.

I am not just talking about the importance of the Philadelphi Corridor now, I said it 20 years ago. Sharon declared the Disengagement at the end of 2003. Several months later, on 26 March 2004, I described my minimal demands. I said that my first condition is control over all of the crossings into and out of the Gaza Strip - on land, sea and air. The Philadelphi Corridor that separates between the Gaza Strip and Egypt will not be evacuated. If Israel gives up control, I said, Gaza will become a terrorist enclave. When I resigned from the Government, when it became clear that they were going to uproot communities and carry out the Disengagement, I gave Prime Minister Sharon a letter of resignation and I told him that at minimum, I demanded that we be responsible for safeguarding the Philadephi Corridor.

This is not new. It was clear that if we did not have this corridor, there would be arming here, that a monster would be created. The axis of evil needs the Philadelphi Corridor. It is for this reason that Hamas is insisting that we not be there and it is for this reason that I insist that we will be there.

Our presence in the Philadelphi Corridor is, first of all, a diplomatic and strategic issue. We must determine the fact that we are there. I am told: 'What is going on, we will soon leave? You can leave for 42 days and return afterwards.' And I say that we have been in this situation before. We were in it when we left Lebanon. With the first rocket, the first missile, 'We will go in and conquer the place and we will have great international support for it.' Thousands of missiles have been fired from there and there was no international support for it. In the Strip, now that we have done this, they said 'What's the problem? With the first rocket, we will go in. The first rocket that is fired above ground or smuggled underground and we will go in.' Twenty years passed and we did not go in.

Whoever says we can go in and it won't be a problem, there's quite a problem. It is not easy to do such a thing. It is not a question of military tactics as it is a question of the great diplomatic pressure that the entire world will use on us. If we leave - we will not go back.

It was very difficult for us to overcome the international pressure, which I withstood, in order to go into Rafah. See what it has cost us. There was considerable pressure on us. They brought us to the ICC a day or two before the decision. They knew that we were going to approve the decision. We have been subjected to an embargo that is spreading. We paid with the lives of our soldiers. But this is nothing compared to what will be directed against us if we leave. Everyone understands the importance of this but do not support us; they want us to finish the war. This, in effect, is what everyone wants - for us to finish the war.

This corridor is different from all other corridors and places. It is central and determines our entire future. Its importance for us is immense. But the world wants an end to the war. The last thing it wants is for us to go in there and we will be under great pressure in the Security Council. On other issues, I do not want to go into detail or give ideas to others. I already know what will be. Why should we go into this trap? We are told that it is possible. I say that this will not bring us the hostages, on the contrary.

When we entered the Philadelphi Corridor we felt a change. For many long months, after the first deal, Hamas did not budge. It insisted 'You must first declare an end to the war.' 'You must commit to leaving the Gaza Strip' - in effect 'You must allow us to control Gaza.' And of course, this did not lead to a deal or the release of even a single hostage. But the first crack came when we entered Rafah, took control of the Philadelphi Corridor, and took control of the Rafah Crossing - Hamas's lifeline. Then suddenly, they started to talk differently. They backtracked a bit afterwards when they thought that Iran or Hezbollah would come to save them. Now they are hoping that international and domestic pressure will come to save them.

But the fact is that the first effective change ahead of a deal has been made possible precisely from taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor. Its evacuation - you leave, you don't return.

I was quoted that we are not leaving for 42 days because we are going to be there for 42 years - I did not say that. I saw that I was quoted on one of the channels - it is incorrect. But I know that if we leave, it could be that we will not return for 42 years, because we left there and did not go back for 20 years.

After we have sacrificed, fought, captured and grabbed them by the throat and this is what can also give us the hostages. By the way, this is also preventing the hostages from being smuggled underground. They could take them and smuggle them during these 42 days, to Sinai, it is only a few meters away. They cross the fence and disappear. They could reappear in Iran or Yemen - no way.

After we have received all of this, we will not give it up, and will not put ourselves into a terrible trap. It is not a question of military tactics - it is a diplomatic and strategic question. Just as there were security people who said 'There is no problem; it is possible to disengage and leave the Gaza Strip' and 'There is no problem; it is possible to leave Lebanon and we can go back immediately'. I think that after October 7, we have learned to be slightly more cautious with our assessments and to understand all of the components in the picture here.

Unfortunately, we are committed with our very souls, and I am committed with mine, to achieve a deal and advance a deal - unfortunately, we have not seen a similar response on the part of Hamas. We agreed to the framework that President Biden submitted on May 31st. We agreed to what they called 'the final bridging proposal' on August 16th. We agreed to all this. Hamas refused the first. Hamas refused the second. Its representative Al-Hiya said yesterday 'Retreat from the entire Strip, an end to the war, leave us in control.' This is their position. I said that they have moved a little but the moment they think that there is any weakness on our part, or some pressure that will break us, they backtrack. Therefore, we are not leaving.

The Philadelphi Corridor is of cardinal importance both in bringing the hostages and ensuring that Hamas will be crushed and that Gaza will never again constitute a threat to us.

Therefore, we have made it clear that this is our position. However, among us voices are beginning to be heard, from inside the Security Cabinet, Government ministers have said 'There is no problem; it is possible to leave.' Even though we have already decided not to. Therefore, I needed to submit this to the Security Cabinet formally, and determine this, and make it clear that there are things we will not compromise on.

I want to make it clear: I am flexible where I can be flexible. I am not insistent where I can be flexible, and I am not flexible where I must be insistent. On this we must all be insistent, otherwise we will receive all of this disaster again.

The axis of evil needs the Philadelphi Corridor - we need to hold it. Therefore, after we approved the Security Cabinet decision, I was simply astounded to hear from among us that we could leave again, but when was this said? After they massacred us and murdered six of our hostages in cold blood? What message does this send to Hamas? Murder hostages - and receive concessions.

That is perfectly legitimate in discussions. Every minister must speak his mind. Whoever is in these discussions a little, and is in them a little too much, I encourage everyone to speak their minds and I do not block anyone - on the contrary. But as soon as a decision is made, it is binding on everyone in the Security Cabinet. It is not do-it-yourself. As soon as a decision is made, it binds everyone.

The message that we will change a vital strategic decision, the idea that we will alter decisions under pressure of a massacre of our hostages, is a terrible message. It is an incentive for terrorism and additional murders; therefore, it will not happen.

It simply will not happen. Of course, Hamas thinks that it will happen, as long as they see the rifts among us. By the way, it is not seeing anything new. It has been using this tactic for an entire year. First of all, this is what we want to occur, The IDF stays here and blocks in order to get us out, not just from there but from the entire Gaza Strip. Hamas has been using this tactic to divide us, to weaken us and in the end, to defeat us.

How does it do this? (Slide 5). Here is a page of instructions that was found by our soldiers in a tunnel for senior Hamas commanders. By the way, the media said that this is Sinwar but I cannot commit to that. I can commit that it was senior Hamas commanders. Here is the original document in Arabic and here is the translation: Increase the distribution of photos and videos of the hostages due to the psychological pressure that they create. Do everything to increase the psychological pressure on Gallant. Continue with the line that Netanyahu is responsible for what happened. Strike at the Israeli narrative that the ground operation serves the return of the hostages. This is Hamas's message sheet. This is Hamas's strategy. It wants to divide us; it is counting on internal rifts.

It thinks that most of the nation will follow this - it is mistaken. I said during the debate over refusal to serve, that on the day of need, we will all line up together. I thought that debate was terrible. It created among our enemies the expectation that we were weak and divided, and that we would be defeated - but on the day the order was given, all of us fought.

Now it is creating the same thing, the same delusion, that we will be defeated on cardinal things that are important to ensuring our future and our existence, that it is possible to sow discord and strife among us and defeat us. I will not give in to this pressure; I have withstood greater pressure. Neither will our people give in to this pressure because most of the public understands exactly what I have said. It is not important what can be seen from bunkers or on TV screens - I say to Sinwar: Forget it. This will not happen.

We need to stand united on our existential interest. We need to act together so that the other side will understand, like it understood about an end to the war; it will also understand here that we will not give in on what is essential.

By the way, we do give in on things that are not essential. I have given great room for flexibility throughout the year and also now. But on existential things, we stand together. As soon as Hamas understands this - there will be a deal. The moment that it understands this - we will ensure both our existence and our future.

Together we will stand, together we will fight, and - with G-d's help - together we will win."