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Military

Daily Press Briefing

Mark C. Toner
Deputy Spokesperson
Daily Press Briefing
Washington, DC
October 17, 2016

Index for Today's Briefing

IRAQ
DEPARTMENT
IRAQ/REGION
SYRIA
EGYPT

 

TRANSCRIPT:

1:52 p.m. EDT

MR TONER: All right, I beat Matt. I'm off to a good start. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MR TONER: Hey, everybody. Happy Monday. Welcome to the State Department. And just at the top, obviously, yesterday, as you all know, Prime Minister Abadi announced the start of Iraqi operations to liberate Mosul from Daesh. As you heard President Obama and the prime minister himself say earlier this month, this is certainly not going to be an easy struggle, but we're confident that brave Iraqi forces, with the support of the international coalition, will eventually be victorious in this effort.

The United States wishes the Iraqi forces success in the battle ahead, and as leader of the coalition supports Iraqi efforts to rid Mosul, Nineveh, and all of Iraq of these terrorist gangs. At the Iraqi Government's request, the U.S. will continue to provide training, advice, and assistance to complete this critical mission.

The United States will also continue to support the humanitarian efforts led by the Government of Iraq to help displaced Iraqis return to their homes and rebuild their lives. We recognize this is going to be a considerable challenge, but we have coordinated closely with Iraqi authorities and NGOs to be as prepared as possible.

We also welcome the announcement over the weekend that Syrian opposition forces, assisted by our ally Turkey and the counter-ISIL coalition, liberated the Syrian town of Dabiq from Daesh control. Dabiq is not only a significant military defeat to Daesh, but it also represents a serious blow to the terrorist group's twisted ideology.

Matt, that's it.

QUESTION: Ah, right. Well, you caught me by surprise. I thought you were going to go on and on and on. (Laughter.)

I'm sure we'll get back to Iraq and Syria --

MR TONER: Okay, sure.

QUESTION: -- in a minute, but I want to start with the kind of news of the day on the emails, on the release of these FBI 302s.

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: I guess the allegation – I guess I would first ask you to address on camera the allegations made in one that there was an offer --

MR TONER: Sure, happy to.

QUESTION: -- a quid pro quo for declassification.

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: Can you speak to that?

MR TONER: I certainly can. So the allegation of any kind of quid pro quo is inaccurate and does not align with the facts, so there was no quid pro quo. And I would note, first of all, that the FBI, I think this past weekend, put out a statement strongly refuting that there was any kind of quid pro quo.

So just to outline just so other folks know what we're talking about – I'm sure everyone does – but there was an allegation that there was some kind of exchange for us to – or for the FBI not to upgrade one of the emails among the 55,000 that we put out from the FOIA request in exchange for increasing FBI slots in Baghdad.

So just to walk people through this, first of all, the State Department did actually upgrade the document at the request of the FBI when it was released back in May of 2015, and everyone can see it on our website. And secondly, there were no increase in FBI slots in Iraq that resulted from this conversation.

So what did occur, just to clarify, Under Secretary Kennedy, Pat Kennedy, sought to understand the FBI's process for withholding certain information from public release. And as all of you know, throughout this process we were very clear in talking about, at times, that this was – the decision to upgrade or not upgrade certain parts of emails was a topic of discussion among our interagency colleagues about whether certain information should or should not be upgraded in classification. And as we also know individuals with classification authorities often have or sometimes have different views on how to do that or whether something should be upgraded.

So again, no quid pro quo, no exchange here; just simply a request from our Under Secretary Pat Kennedy to clarify the reasoning or the rationale behind upgrading.

QUESTION: Why would he have raised the issue of additional slots for the FBI? I mean, I --

MR TONER: So my understanding – right, no, no, no. Right.

QUESTION: I get that you say there was no quid pro quo, but was it ever discussed? Was a quid pro --

MR TONER: It was. So he just raised it – this official --

QUESTION: A quid pro quo was discussed?

MR TONER: No, no, no, no.

QUESTION: Oh.

MR TONER: Let me clarify here. I thought you were talking about the additional slots in Iraq.

QUESTION: No, no, no, no. I want – I'm going to get to that in a second. But I want to know first, was there a – even if it didn't happen in the end --

MR TONER: No.

QUESTION: -- was there – there was no discussion?

MR TONER: No, no.

QUESTION: All right. Just so we're perfectly clear, there was no discussion of any quid pro quo?

QUESTION: (Inaudible) can I just jump in here one second, please?

MR TONER: I'll let --

QUESTION: There was no discussion of any quid pro quo?

MR TONER: I'm sorry. There was --

QUESTION: There was no discussion --

MR TONER: No.

QUESTION: -- of any quid pro quo?

MR TONER: No. No, there was no discussion.

QUESTION: Was there any discussion of any kind of an exchange --

MR TONER: No, no.

QUESTION: -- with regard to classification procedures on the one hand and FBI slots at U.S. embassies abroad on the other?

MR TONER: No.

QUESTION: Thanks.

QUESTION: Okay, I – have you read the FBI 302? Because that is not what it says in black and white. I'll read it to you right here. It uses the term "quid pro quo" – those are the words of the FBI agent – and then it says, "In exchange for marking the email unclassified, State would reciprocate by allowing the FBI to place more agents in countries where they are presently forbidden." I mean, this conflicts directly with what you're saying today.

MR TONER: I'm sorry, and I can speak to the fact that 302s are simply interviews conducted by the FBI --

QUESTION: So you're saying the FBI agent either got it wrong or is lying in this 302?

MR TONER: I can't speak to what his or her intentions were saying these kinds of things, but clearly expressing a personal opinion about what happened.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MR TONER: All I can say is as I understand the course of events, Catherine --

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MR TONER: As I understand this, Catherine, this was – any idea – or any, really, assertion that this was somehow a tit for tat or a quid pro quo exchange of – in that manner really, frankly, is insulting. This was a process that we worked diligently through the interagency with, including the FBI. Did we have disagreements regarding classification upgrades? Certainly, and we have discussed that at length. We've talked about the fact that sometimes upgrades are – and we talked about this – are more art than science.

QUESTION: I just --

MR TONER: Let me finish.

QUESTION: Okay, go ahead.

MR TONER: And we talked about that there were strong disagreements on whether to upgrade some of this material.

QUESTION: Okay. That is not with this 302 says.

MR TONER: I again --

QUESTION: It says right here – listen. Listen, please.

MR TONER: Okay, sure.

QUESTION: "Kennedy spent the next 15 minutes debating the classification of the email and attempting to influence the FBI to change its markings." Is that in keeping with the high ethical standards of the State Department?

MR TONER: Could you read that to me one more time?

QUESTION: Yes. "Kennedy spent the next 15 minutes debating the classification of the email and attempting to influence the FBI to change its markings." Is that in keeping with the high ethical standards of the State Department?

MR TONER: Well, look, I'm not going to debate every point and every excerpt from these 302s. But what you just read to me sounds like it was a discussion on whether a certain portion of the email should or should not be classified. We – Pat Kennedy, all of us at the State Department – are going to make their case as best they can. That's called interagency exchange and the kind of discussions that we carry out all the time.

QUESTION: Well, this is – I would really – I would strongly suggest you --

QUESTION: Mark --

MR TONER: Please, Matt.

QUESTION: -- read the 302, because this is the paragraph after the FBI agent specifically uses the term "quid pro quo." This is no small thing.

MR TONER: I understand that.

QUESTION: A senior executive is accused of trying to bribe an agent.

MR TONER: I understand that. I understand that, which is why I came out here and said there's no quid pro quo, absolutely not.

QUESTION: Well, it never happened, but there was clearly a discussion of having a --

MR TONER: There was a discussion over the classification of this material. There was no implicit or --

QUESTION: Well, it reads like "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours." I'm sorry, let – final question --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: -- from me. Congressman Chaffetz and Congressman Nunes have called for the immediate removal of Patrick Kennedy.

MR TONER: Well, that's their prerogative, but I can say that Pat Kennedy is going to remain at his job and he has the full confidence of the Secretary of State.

QUESTION: Are you saying then that the conversation – this 15 minutes of back and forth – was unrelated? You're – it was --

MR TONER: No, Matt. I'm sorry, it was – we got pulled aside here, but --

QUESTION: Wait, you're basically saying, yes, there was – I think – tell me if I'm wrong. You're saying there was this 15-minute exchange or however long the exchange was about the classification, but you're saying that it was not related to the placement --

MR TONER: Correct.

QUESTION: -- of FBI personnel?

MR TONER: So my understanding of the conversation was certainly there was the conversation – Pat Kennedy reached out --

QUESTION: Right.

MR TONER: -- to this individual in order to talk about the classification. After that discussion took place, at the end of this conversation, the individual and the FBI took advantage or not – took – not – that sounds bad – but he was on the phone with Pat Kennedy and took advantage of that fact to raise the issue of more FBI slots in Baghdad.

QUESTION: So you're saying that --

QUESTION: That's not what it says here.

QUESTION: So you're saying that --

MR TONER: I'm sorry.

QUESTION: -- it was the – that it was – so --

QUESTION: (Inaudible). So the agents have got to be lying then? That's your position? I'm mean, I'm – this is a really serious thing. You're saying that the FBI agents' recollection of what happened is incorrect or that they misled the person who interviewed them in this 302.

MR TONER: Catherine, all I can do is stand up here and give you the facts as we understand them to be, and I've done so. I can't speak to what this person's intent – whether they misunderstood the atmosphere of that conversation, I have no idea. All I can say is that there was no prid quo – quid pro quo, excuse me.

QUESTION: Can you --

MR TONER: Please, Matt.

QUESTION: Yeah. So what the documents say that Pat Kennedy was – wanted to happen with this was to get it to be declared, I think it's (b)(9); is that correct?

MR TONER: Yeah, which is also another source of confusion, but let me – so yes. What he wanted to do was question the – what he called up this individual to discuss was whether a certain portion needed to be upgraded in classification. They did talk about it, frankly, at the end of it. And I said this at the top, we did upgrade the document. So there was no --

QUESTION: But I don't – but did he --

MR TONER: There was no exemption. What I think the – so just to clarify, you said a (b)(9) exemption. We looked at that. I think what – that was some kind of garble. There is a (b)(7) law enforcement redaction that he may have been referring to. We don't know.

QUESTION: Who?

MR TONER: Pat Kennedy. He would have – again, we're trying to reconstruct this.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR TONER: But there's a (b)(7) law enforcement redaction that from State's perspective would have been applicable, but it's not a (b)(9) exemption.

QUESTION: Does --

QUESTION: All right. Well, (b) – but that --

MR TONER: Because a (b)(9) – because then again, the assertion with a (b)(9) is that it somehow would be like off the grid and put in some kind of basement.

QUESTION: Well, yeah, because that's what it says in the 302, that it would be filed away forever.

MR TONER: But it's not, it's on the website.

QUESTION: Huh?

MR TONER: It's on the website.

QUESTION: No, I know that it – yeah, but the discussion --

MR TONER: No, we did not.

QUESTION: -- was – and it was apparently an attempt to have it classified in such a way or marked in such a way that it would never be released at all because it would have been --

MR TONER: No. So what it --

QUESTION: -- exempt under the FOIA --

MR TONER: -- would have been was – again, all we can conjecture is that there was some kind of garble here. He explained that from State's perspective it would be to use a (b)(7) law enforcement redaction.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR TONER: It's just a form of redaction. But that would have – but that still would have – the document still would have been released on the website.

QUESTION: It would have been?

MR TONER: Yes.

QUESTION: Okay. But I mean, that's not the case with a (b)(9)?

MR TONER: Yes, I think that's true with a (b)(9).

QUESTION: Okay. So there was some kind of – you're saying there was some kind of confusion between (b)(9) and (b)(7).

MR TONER: That's all we can consider, yeah, or what we can conjecture.

QUESTION: Why -- Okay. In the end --

MR TONER: Yep.

QUESTION: -- regardless of what happened in the discussion and whether or not there was a talk of a quid pro quo or not, you guys agreed to upgrade it.

MR TONER: Upgrade, mm-hmm.

QUESTION: Why wasn't it classified at the beginning when it was sent? That's what I don't understand.

MR TONER: Well, we talked about this a lot, I mean, that as we went through these – all these emails – you know this, Matt; I mean, we upgraded a lot of them.

QUESTION: Yeah, I know.

MR TONER: That was our – what we looked at was not necessarily whether it was --

QUESTION: But this --

MR TONER: -- classified at the time it was sent but whether it needed to be classified before public release.

QUESTION: Yeah, yeah, but that was – most of that was for FOIA exemptions. There was classification issues as well, but most of that was with – this was redacted --

MR TONER: Yeah, but there were – sorry.

QUESTION: This was redacted because it was classified.

MR TONER: But that also happened, I mean, during --

QUESTION: Why?

MR TONER: -- as we went through – I mean, I don't know the number of cases --

QUESTION: But I guess the point is is that if you guys agreed in the aftermath to upgrade it, and maybe we're going over old ground here, but because this has --

MR TONER: I think we are.

QUESTION: But because it's come up again, I think it's important to address.

MR TONER: I mean, I think we are.

QUESTION: If you guys agreed --

MR TONER: Yeah, that's okay.

QUESTION: -- in the end that it was indeed classified and should be redacted, why wouldn't it have been classified in the first place and not sent to an unsecure private email server?

MR TONER: So for a variety of reasons – and we talked about this at the time but I'm happy to say it again – is certain information which may or not – which may have not have been classified at the time for various sensitivities or reasons, when we looked at it again before public release, we upgraded the classification. And I don't know if this – I actually don't know which – what this was even upgraded to, this particular document. But we did upgrade to confidential in several cases – I don't have the number in front of me. We talked about that, I think, and I can get you more details on that.

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR TONER: It was part of the process of just – as we went through it when we did. And that was, again, part of this interagency process that's detailed in this 302, was we didn't – we did this internally, but then we shipped out these – when they had other departments, other agencies' equities, we shipped them out to them for also – to also be reviewed.

QUESTION: All right. And did you know the date of the conversation?

MR TONER: Darn, I knew you were going to get me here. I do not have the date. I'm sorry.

QUESTION: Then, I can --

MR TONER: Wait.

QUESTION: Go ahead.

MR TONER: What are you --

QUESTION: The date of the --

MR TONER: You talking about the date of the email or the date --

QUESTION: The – no, the --

MR TONER: Okay.

QUESTION: -- date of the conversation between Pat Kennedy and the FBI.

MR TONER: I'll get that for you. I can get that for you.

QUESTION: Yeah, because it – I don't – unless I'm mistaken, I don't think it's in the 302.

MR TONER: Yeah, no. And oddly enough, I have the date of the email in question but not the date of the conversation.

QUESTION: So can I just briefly run something --

MR TONER: Of course.

QUESTION: Because – okay. These FBI interviews were done with two separate FBI officials, and the State Department's position is that they both messed it up and they got it wrong.

MR TONER: You're asking me?

QUESTION: Yeah. That's – that's, I think – that's your position.

MR TONER: I mean, look, I would refer you to the FBI to speak to their --

QUESTION: Well, no, I think I --

MR TONER: -- own assessments.

QUESTION: These are --

MR TONER: I mean, they're not – so first of all, 302s are not transcripts. They're summaries. Secondly, I'm not going to --

QUESTION: But that's routine for FBI.

MR TONER: -- parse every section or every sentence in every 302. Director Comey said at the time – was that there are no charges appropriate in this case, talking about the investigation that they conducted. And that remains a fact.

QUESTION: I'm just trying to be clear in my own mind.

MR TONER: Of course. Of course, go ahead.

QUESTION: You dispute the content of the FBI interviews, and I'm just trying to point out that these were two separate interviews with two different FBI officials.

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: And the State Department's position is that they're both wrong?

MR TONER: We dispute the assertion that there was any kind of quid pro quo involving the case of upgrading an email in exchange for additional slots for FBI officials in Baghdad.

QUESTION: Mark --

MR TONER: We refute that assumption.

QUESTION: Well then --

MR TONER: Or that allegation, rather.

QUESTION: -- it could have been another – something else?

MR TONER: I'm just saying, I don't want to get into, like, parsing out every 302 out there, but I'm saying essentially what I'm refuting.

QUESTION: Do you dispute, though, that --

QUESTION: I'm just trying to make the point that it's just not one person who says this happened.

MR TONER: I understand, Catherine. I understand that.

QUESTION: It's in fact two FBI agents who say it happened.

MR TONER: I understand that. And again, I can't speak to why they said what they said. But I will refer everyone to the fact that the FBI – sorry, Nick, I'll get to you – did put out a statement over the weekend also saying there was no quid pro quo.

QUESTION: Well, they say it didn't happen, but they acknowledged that here was a discussion of additional slots overseas in the same conversation of making revisions to the classification that would have benefited the State Department.

MR TONER: We can go back and forth, Catherine. I'm just saying – I'm just repeating myself.

Please.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: You talked about there was this discussion where Kennedy was trying to understand how these emails were designated. But do you dispute that he sought to have a designation changed on these emails?

MR TONER: You're saying – I don't dispute that. In fact – I mean, well, he contacted the FBI in order to understand what their rationale was for requesting an upgrade of this particular information. So it was a discussion about the classification of this information.

QUESTION: Because the 302s – I mean, setting aside the issue of a quid pro quo, they're pretty explicit that he – it's not just him seeking to understand how this happens. It's him seeking to change a designation.

MR TONER: Well, again, he initiated the call to clarify or to understand what the rationale was behind it.

QUESTION: So but did he seek --

MR TONER: In that exchange, he may have – and I think I didn't argue that when she put that forward – given our views or his views on whether that should or should not be classified.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR TONER: That's just a conversation. If you and I had a disagreement over --

QUESTION: Sure, but number one is --

MR TONER: -- something, I wouldn't expect us to discuss – I would put forth our argument for not classifying.

QUESTION: Sure. The other question is --

MR TONER: Please.

QUESTION: -- just a quick follow up.

MR TONER: Yes, sir.

QUESTION: There's also a mention in this report that there was this 7th floor group or shadow government that convened with Jon Finer and several other --

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- high ranking officials. I mean, does that indicate that Clinton – former Secretary Clinton was getting special treatment? Why was there the need for this group?

MR TONER: No, no, no – this is really – I mean, look, this was – so a couple of points to make. One is that given the profile of this release of emails, the Department took it very seriously and brought together senior State Department staffers to work through how we were going to get through this process – through these 55,000 emails and release them publicly and --

QUESTION: Pages.

MR TONER: Pages, sorry. I apologize. Thank you. Pages – and release them publicly in a process that involved not just a lot of allocating of resources within our own department, but also managing, as we can see, an interagency process of whether – or clearing this material for public release. It was a pretty extraordinary effort, and as such, there was – responsibly, I would say – there was high-level attention to detail to this.

QUESTION: Can I follow up with this?

MR TONER: Please, go ahead. Yeah.

QUESTION: Just to be clear, is it – who brought up the question of additional slots for FBI personnel abroad?

MR TONER: The FBI official.

QUESTION: The FBI?

MR TONER: Yeah. And as I understand, it was a kind of like – after the conversation took place about the upgrade in classification, at the end of that, there was a kind of, oh by the way, hey, we're looking at upgrading; we want more slots. And there was a discussion about that.

QUESTION: And then --

MR TONER: So a clear pivot to another --

QUESTION: Well, it's not --

QUESTION: Okay, so, so – can I finish please? Can I finish, Miss? So Kennedy, to your knowledge, never brought up the issue of additional slots for the FBI, correct?

MR TONER: No.

QUESTION: Okay. Secondly, the agent who is quoted as raising – who was quoted as saying there was quid pro quo discussed, to your understanding, was that agent party to the actual conversation or not?

MR TONER: I'm not sure to be honest. That's a very good question. I mean, that's a very good question.

QUESTION: Can we move on? I understand that the email issue is quite cathartic.

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: I have one more on this.

QUESTION: And we can talk about it endlessly, but you got --

MR TONER: Okay, last one and then I – last one.

QUESTION: Yeah, okay.

QUESTION: Thank you. There is a separate email in which someone – I believe a security, Diplomatic Security official – says that Clinton in her tenure blatantly disregarded security and diplomatic protocols. They specifically mention her decision to travel in motorcades with Huma Abedin instead of ambassadors, which they said caused insult and embarrassment.

Has there been any kind of – during her tenure, had there been any kind of formal complaints lodged about either of these – either the assertion of security protocols or diplomatic protocols?

MR TONER: So first of all, every secretary of state, including Secretary Clinton, and his or her immediate staff, work very closely with diplomatic security – John Kerry is no different – to make sure that Department business can be carried out under a variety of security conditions. And finding that balance of security, but also effectiveness is a constant effort and requires close coordination.

With regard to the limo and who sat in there, there's no official protocol for seating arrangement in the Secretary's motorcade. I've seen it – and myself, personally, work many different ways. Sometimes I'll ride with the Secretary if I'm in – going on the way to a media interview with him. I need to prep him for that and then in that case, the ambassador from that country may not ride in that motorcade. So it just depends on what is the business at hand and how do we use the secretary's time most efficiently. There was one more question on there. I can't remember. Oh.

QUESTION: Were any formal complaints lodged.

MR TONER: I'm not aware that there were, but I can't answer that definitively. I just don't have that information available to me.

QUESTION: If that's something you could get back to me on.

MR TONER: I can try. I can try. I just would say though that – and I'm looking for a particular quote, but I don't want the impression that somehow – well, here it is. In the last batch of 302s, the head of Diplomatic Security during Secretary Clinton's tenure described her as very responsive to security issues. So just another opinion.

QUESTION: Can we move on?

MR TONER: Please. Yeah.

QUESTION: Thank you. Can we go to Iraq? Mosul?

QUESTION: Yeah, Mosul.

MR TONER: We can go to Iraq, yes.

QUESTION: Okay. Well, tell me, you have 100,000 soldiers that are converging on Mosul to fight something like, I don't know, maybe 3-4 thousand ISIS fighters and so on, including, apparently, about 5,000 Americans and so on. Who is taking command of this operation?

MR TONER: The Iraqi Government.

QUESTION: So are you telling --

MR TONER: It's under Iraqi command and control.

QUESTION: Right. Okay. Under Iraqi command and control, which means that American forces are taking orders from the Iraqi commanders in the battle?

MR TONER: I'm sorry. The American --

QUESTION: American forces --

MR TONER: No, we're there – look, we're there as train --

QUESTION: I understand.

MR TONER: -- to train and advise. And we're working – but we're working there – sorry, I don't mean to talk over you – but we're working there with the clear understanding that this is an Iraqi-led operation.

QUESTION: I fully understand that, Mark.

MR TONER: Yeah. Sorry.

QUESTION: But I'm saying that you have American forces. Whether it's a dozen or 5,000, it doesn't make any difference. Do they take orders from the Iraqi commanders on the ground? What is the relationship in this command-and-control structure?

MR TONER: I would – frankly, for the best explanation of that, I'd refer you to the Pentagon.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR TONER: But we operate in Iraq with the clear understanding that it is the Iraqi Government who is running this operation.

QUESTION: Okay. Now, I know that you – and when Mr. McGurk was here he spoke about the humanitarian efforts and all these things and all the logistics and so on. But now with the fall of Dabiq in Syria, are you concerned that you have this – again, I mean, I asked John about this, about this hydraulic effect you have – all these fighters going into Syria, into Deir al-Zor, into other areas, maybe into Raqqa, all these things. What are the safety valves in place to prevent that from happening?

MR TONER: Just to be clear, you're saying that fighters leaving or departing Dabiq.

QUESTION: Yes, fighters from Mosul – right.

MR TONER: Or --

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR TONER: You're talking about some kind of a cross-flow or --

QUESTION: I'm talking about ISIS fighters, Daesh fighters --

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- moving from Mosul and going on to elsewhere where you would have to fight them again. Because I think the U.S. is also preparing to do something in Raqqa, so --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: So they go – this hydraulic effect.

MR TONER: I'm very – sure. I'm very hesitant to give, given that I'm a career diplomat and not a military man, but I think it's safe to assume that military planners are looking at how to prevent that kind of movement from happening. And certainly, any prudent planning would take that under consideration. You don't certainly want, as you said, fighters fleeing from one area to another area only to retrench and fight again, but that's always a possibility.

QUESTION: And my last question --

MR TONER: Please.

QUESTION: -- on this, because there was also fear of ethnic cleansing or revenge, much as happened in Tikrit and so on. And that's why, apparently, Shiite forces like al-Hashd al-Shaabi, the Popular Mobilization Units, are prevented. Could you – or could you share anything with us on this issue?

MR TONER: On the issue of?

QUESTION: On the issue of what are the safety measures taken to --

MR TONER: Well, I – sure. I know that the Government of Iraq in coordination with the Kurdistan Regional Government and the Nineveh governor are, have been, and continue to plan for this – for post-Daesh or post-ISIL governance of Nineveh province and have established a stabilization committee comprising representatives from both bodies, the UN, Germany, and the U.S. And I know Prime Minister Abadi has empowered provincial leaders, governors in fact, in Anbar and Salah ad-Din to work with the UN to address local needs and stabilize communities liberated from ISIL. And UNDP has also, I know, increased staffing and capacity to support stabilization activities and that includes pre-positioning $13 million worth of equipment.

And I think – these efforts are ongoing. We've learned from past operations – Ramallah, Fallujah.

QUESTION: (Off-mike.)

MR TONER: Sorry?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR TONER: Oh, I'm sorry. That you can win the battle but not the war, in the sense of what's really important is in the aftermath that you have pre-positioned assistance and that you've got an infrastructure there that's able to get citizens back – who have been displaced by the fighting back into the cities. And, frankly, we've been pretty successful so far in that effort.

QUESTION: Follow-up?

QUESTION: Can I get a follow-up?

MR TONER: Please. Oh, of course, of course.

QUESTION: It's a simple question.

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: I think Samir said and I think you assented to the notion that there are 5,000 American troops among the forces converging on Mosul --

MR TONER: I don't think – sure, go ahead and finish the question.

QUESTION: Isn't that more the number of U.S. troops overall in Iraq?

MR TONER: Yes. Yeah, I think that's right. I don't have the number in front of me, but yes, who are there to train and advise.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) representations about how many troops are actually with the Iraqi forces?

MR TONER: I don't. I'd have to refer you to the Pentagon for that.

QUESTION: Thanks.

MR TONER: Yeah. Please.

QUESTION: Follow-up? Yeah, to follow-up on Said's question about the sectarian dimensions.

MR TONER: Of course.

QUESTION: The two points that I'd appreciate your comment on – one is in today's coverage of the liberation of Mosul, the major U.S. media like The Washington Post and Wall Street Journal are carrying pictures showing Iraqi units preparing for the offensive, and they're flying Shiite flags. So given the concern about sectarianism, is this issue of concern to you, the Iraqi units with the sectarian flags?

MR TONER: Well, I will get to your question. Sorry, Said, I found a couple more things I wanted to just address in your first question about the fleeing of fighters. And I was looking for it when I answered, but I just found it. So as Iraqi Security Forces push towards Mosul, they are already identifying and working to identify escape routes and communicating also directions to civilians as the offensive proceeds, and the overall plan envisions that there will be security screenings that'll be carried about by Iraqi and Kurdish forces and civilian agencies, including the ministry of migration and displacement and the ministry of transportation. And they're going to register and move civilians from screening sites to settlements. So that's an important component. So they're not only going to work to receive civilians as they flee the fighting, but also screen these civilians to make sure that Daesh fighters aren't intermingling with them or trying to seek escape that way.

Sorry, over to your question, which was about concerns about sectarian --

QUESTION: The Iraqi army units flying the Shia flags.

MR TONER: Look, I mean, we have talked about at length these local security forces on the ground, Kurdish and others, who have been very effective fighting forces against Daesh. But again, I'd go back to what I said before, which is that certainly we want these forces to recognize Iraqi Government leadership and command and control. But also, Prime Minister Abadi has been very clear that he won't accept any kind of sectarianism and that any credible allegations of human rights abuses will be investigated.

QUESTION: Well, okay, let me --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: It's not clear, I mean, that the --

MR TONER: Go ahead.

QUESTION: -- that these newspapers describe them as Iraqi forces. It's not clear that – I mean, they're not local. They could be Hashd al-Shaabi, they could be Hashd – they could be the Iraqi army. It's not clear, but those were the pictures.

The second part of my question – the Syrian foreign ministry issued a statement that Syria welcomes the announcement of the start of the Mosul offensive and declares its strong support for the Iraqi Government and army and the forces supporting it, including the Popular Mobilization Units, i.e. the Hashd al-Shaabi.

MR TONER: Popular – yeah, exactly.

QUESTION: I mean, this is – what's your comment on that?

MR TONER: I don't really have one, honestly. The Syrian regime has been much more focused on going after moderate Syrian opposition in and around Aleppo than going after Daesh. We've talked before about the fact that we've seen, frankly, collusion between the Syrian regime and Daesh in Syria. Where we're focused – our efforts in Syria in fighting Daesh are with the different ethnic groups in northern Syria who have been very effective fighting forces against Daesh and really have put Daesh on the defensive in many parts of Syria.

QUESTION: You don't --

MR TONER: Last question. Sorry.

QUESTION: Yeah. You don't see this Syrian comment as part of a sectarian kind of alignment that's building up around Mosul among the Shia in Damascus, Baghdad, and Tehran?

MR TONER: We're confident at this point that the Iraqi Government is in command and control of the operation and that these forces recognize that, and that there is a structure and coordination mechanism set up that where we see any kind of problems arising that they'll be able to be addressed.

QUESTION: One more question, please. Thank you. The same.

MR TONER: Please.

QUESTION: So about the timing of the operation --

MR TONER: Sure.

QUESTION: Today, President Barzani said even though there have been military planning, that he wished to see political planning as well for a post-ISIS Mosul. In other words, he hinted that there is no post-political planning. I just wonder whether the United – and then he said our friends rushed this a little bit. I just wonder whether the United States played any role in making sure the operation happens at this time before President Obama leaves office or before the November elections.

MR TONER: Not at all. We've been very clear that this is an Iraqi-led operation and it's for the Iraqi authorities to decide when and where that takes place. Our role, as we've said all along, has been to support them as best we can through training, advisement, as well as assistance in terms of equipment and other forms of assistance.

QUESTION: But this is what Vice President Biden told Iraqi Kurdistan president --

MR TONER: But --

QUESTION: -- on August 31st. It says, "The leaders underscored the urgency of sustained progress in the fight against ISIL," then it goes on, towards liberating Mosul – "to liberate Mosul." So it's clear that Biden urged Barzani to --

MR TONER: But – well, I certainly don't want to get into a back and forth with President Barzani, but I do want to emphasize, in talking about governance in the area – and I just said this – I mean, look, we've been – we, for our part, have stepped up our police training and our work with locally based fighters so that we can hold the gains that the Iraqi Security Forces make in and around Mosul. That's going to require – and we recognize – continued attention to Iraqi efforts to mobilize Nineveh police and locally based fighters so that they can provide security in Mosul and the broader province in the aftermath of fighting. And as Mosul's cleared of ISIL, the Iraqi army will begin the process to hand over responsibility to hold forces, if you will, who can take over security of the city. The Iraqi Security Forces are making preparations to hand over control of Shirqat to the Iraqi police and to other hold forces.

And then, as I just answered to Said, there's also a planning mechanism with the Government of Iraq. It's already working in coordination with the governor of – with the Kurdistan Regional Government as well as the Nineveh governor in planning for post-ISIL governance in Nineveh.

QUESTION: Just to be clear, can you just say explicitly that the United States played no role in the timing of the operation?

MR TONER: Yes, I can say that explicitly.

QUESTION: Mark --

QUESTION: Hey, Mark --

QUESTION: -- on Iraq too, Turkey is insisting to play a role in the liberation of Mosul. What role it's playing?

MR TONER: I would let Turkey speak to its role and even its desired role. We've been very clear about this and I'll say it again: Any foreign military activities in Iraq must have the consent of the Iraqi Government. We continue to support dialogue between the governments of Iraq and Turkey to resolve any disagreements on what role they may or may not play.

QUESTION: But Mark --

QUESTION: Do you know if they are playing any role in coordination with the coalition, not with the Iraqi Government?

MR TONER: Well, I know they're conducting a training program in Bashiqa, but I don't know --

QUESTION: (Inaudible) this time?

MR TONER: Yeah, I don't – I would leave that for the Turkish Government to define what role they're playing.

QUESTION: Since when is it the position of the United States that any foreign military action in Iraq must have the consent of the Iraqi Government?

MR TONER: Well, I've said that --

QUESTION: Since you invaded and threw the guy out – threw the guy you didn't like out?

MR TONER: Previous regime --

QUESTION: Does this apply to Syria as well?

MR TONER: Previous regime and previous set of circumstances. What I can speak to is today --

QUESTION: Can you replace Iraq with Syria in that sentence?

MR TONER: -- with a democratically elected government in Iraq. And I would not hold the same standard to previous governments in Iraq, nor would I hold the same standards to the current government in Syria.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR TONER: We respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq.

QUESTION: So if you're a leader or a government that the United States does not believe was – is legitimate or was democratically elected, then all bets are off?

MR TONER: I think --

QUESTION: They have no sovereignty?

MR TONER: No, but we have said that when in the imminent national security interests of the United States – but we're getting off tangent – we're getting off topic here – we'll act accordingly.

QUESTION: Well, I don't know. I just find it a bit surprising that you guys pick and choose when it is that a government has the right to – or that foreign militaries can't operate unless they have this express consent of that – of a country's government.

MR TONER: In the case of Iraq and in the case of democratically elected governments.

QUESTION: Hey, Mark --

QUESTION: So, Mark, are you saying --

MR TONER: Please.

QUESTION: -- that in effect, if the Turkish – if the Turks start marching into Mosul as part of this operation, the U.S. will still not have an opinion? Will it still say it's the Iraqi – something for the Iraqis to sort out?

MR TONER: I think that this is something that the Turkish Government is fully capable of speaking and discussing and working through this to coordinate with the Iraqi Government. And again, I mean, let's take a step back here. This is about enabling the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi Government to carry out this operation to rid the country of Daesh and to provide security for the people of Iraq. This is a long-term gain here, because if they can do that, then they can move forward democratically, politically, and grow economically and provide greater stability going forward. So any operation that they're conducting right now within Iraq we believe should be done with the consent of the Iraqi Government. That's not saying it can't be done or that it's unachievable. What we're saying is the two should talk.

QUESTION: Mark, do you call Turkey to withdraw from Bashiqa after they're done with the training --

MR TONER: I didn't hear what you just said.

QUESTION: Do you call Turkey to withdrawal from Bashiqa since the Iraqi Government doesn't want them to be there and they're done with the training work?

MR TONER: I'm – again, I'm – all I'm – all we're saying is that any steps they take should be done in coordination with the Iraqi Government.

Please, yeah.

QUESTION: But to clear this point --

MR TONER: Okay.

QUESTION: -- the Iraqi Government has asked the Turks to withdraw from Iraq and they want to be involved in the liberation of Mosul. What's your position on this? Do you call Turkey to leave Iraq, to stay there, not to intervene? They don't want to coordinate with the Iraqi Government.

MR TONER: What we want to see is both governments focus on who the common enemy is here, and that is ISIL.

QUESTION: Mark, do you agree --

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: -- that Turkish troops were – started their training program with the permission of Iraqi Government?

MR TONER: I'm not going to get into past history.

Please.

QUESTION: The UN and the Red Cross are – say they're preparing for hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing the battle of Mosul. When I asked John Kirby last week about civilians trying to leave Aleppo, he said they shouldn't have to leave. Do you think civilians in Mosul shouldn't leave?

MR TONER: Well, again, it's not a question of whether we think they should or should not have to leave, but we're recognizing the fact that a real challenge to this operation is going to be dealing with displaced civilians. And that's something we've been working diligently on, and in fact have committed a lot of money and a lot of effort to help the Iraqis and other local government officials to address. And we've also been working – learning from past efforts – Tikrit, Ramadi, and others – but how you can coordinate with the Iraqi Government, with the UN, and with international – the international community, that you can at least mitigate some of the effects of this displacement that's somewhat inevitable in an operation of this scale.

QUESTION: What measures is the U.S. taking to create conditions for civilians not to leave Mosul?

MR TONER: Well, again, there have been a number of preparatory – or there's been a lot of preparatory work done in advance of this offensive. We've contributed more than $1.1 billion in humanitarian assistance, and as you may recall, over the summer we secured additional pledges of over $2.3 billion from our partners for humanitarian assistance stabilization and demining, all in the run-up to this – or this offensive to liberate Mosul. They'll probably need to raise more money, but at least we've got a considerable sum to start with.

The response is going to be Iraqi-led, UN-coordinated effort. We're playing a supportive role, but the Government of Iraq, with support of humanitarian agencies, is taking steps to prepare emergency shelter for up to 250,000 internally displaced persons, and UN agencies have pre-positioned relief supplies and continue to build stockpiles to provide shelter and other humanitarian aid for up to 1 million people.

So I guess my response is this is a major military offensive; it's going to take a lot of time. I think we recognize that citizens are going to be and civilians are going to be displaced. We've seen this before elsewhere in Iraq, and we're trying to learn from those past efforts. And by "we", I mean collectively, not just the United States – and how to mitigate some of those effects.

QUESTION: Mark, just a follow-up on that. Is there a --

QUESTION: On Syria – oh, I have one on Syria. May I?

MR TONER: Finish with Iraq.

QUESTION: Just a follow-up on Iraq.

MR TONER: And then I have to run, I apologize.

QUESTION: What about the routes? All of this preparation being made for people who are displaced, but what about routes for them to get out of the city safely?

MR TONER: Well, I talked a little bit about that in response to Said's question.

But we talked about the fact that we've got routes set up and that there's screening processes to take place working with various ministries in Iraq where displaced people will be screened. There are shelters or areas set up where these people can be housed in temporary shelters and also screened, as I just said, to – in response to Said's question for – potentially for ISIL fighters who may be trying to intermingle or mix in with the civilian population.

QUESTION: Can we ask on Syria?

QUESTION: On Syria?

QUESTION: A couple questions?

QUESTION: On Syria. Just one --

MR TONER: Can I just – two questions. Starting with you and then I'll get to you, Said.

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR TONER: What's your question on Syria?

QUESTION: Thanks, on Syria. So an announcement came from the Russian defense ministry that says, "Russian and Syrian forces will stop all strikes in eastern Aleppo on October 20th." It says, "Militants can leave the city unimpeded through certain corridors." It also calls on the militants to remove mines and other hazards at humanitarian corridors to allow civilians to leave eastern Aleppo. It says, "Shelter and medical help are guaranteed for all civilians leaving eastern Aleppo." What is your reaction to this announcement?

MR TONER: Well, look, the people of Aleppo have been subjected to near-constant bombardment and airstrikes, frankly, over the past years, but most intensively the past month or so. It's killed scores of civilians, it's leveled much of the civilian infrastructure in the city in what, at best, can only be perceived as a way to starve out and to drive out the opposition and civilians who have held on there for so long. I guess we'll see. If there is actually an eight-hour pause in the unremitting suffering of the people of Aleppo, that would be a good thing; but frankly, it's a bit too little too late. Please.

QUESTION: I just wanted to follow up on the same issue. Do you see this as a warning by the Russians? That an assault of – a major assault is coming – forthcoming?

MR TONER: I would hope not. I mean, we had good discussions in Lausanne over the weekend. Russia was there as part of that group that met. We've agreed to move forward in that format and talk about new ideas to bring about a real cessation of hostilities, so the last thing we want to do is see an uptick in the assault of Aleppo.

QUESTION: Could the Russian proposal be part of those talks, as a result of those Lausanne talks?

MR TONER: Perhaps. You'd have to ask them. Thanks, guys.

QUESTION: Mark?

MR TONER: Yeah, please.

QUESTION: I just wanted a quick – very quick one on Egypt. And then the --

MR TONER: Oh, sure, sure, sure. You're right. Okay.

QUESTION: The detained American – she's been held now for --

MR TONER: Yes.

QUESTION: -- 900 days. Aya Hijazi.

MR TONER: You're talking about Hijazi. We're aware obviously that she's been detained for more than two years – I'm talking about Ms. Hijazi – is currently on trial. We continue to call for an expeditious resolution to this case and a fair and transparent legal process in accordance with local law, and in a manner that also respects international human rights. We're providing all possible consular assistance to Ms. Hijazi. We meet with her frequently, I think most recently on October 11th. We've attended her last court hearing and we'll attend upcoming hearings.

QUESTION: Right, but --

MR TONER: Yeah.

QUESTION: So you want her – I mean, it's been two years. I'm not sure I understand, one, why you're still calling for a speedy legal process when it's clearly not very speedy; and two, why are you not calling for her to just to be released? Not right --

MR TONER: Well, again, because we're not. We're calling for her to have a fair, transparent, and expeditious trial.

QUESTION: Right, well, so expeditious is out the window now, right?

MR TONER: Well --

QUESTION: It's been two years, you see.

MR TONER: I understand that, but it doesn't mitigate our desire to see at least from this point forward that she receive, as quickly as possible, a trial.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR TONER: Yeah. Guys, I've got to run. I'm sorry. I have a meeting I got to go to. I apologize.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:42 p.m.)



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